S. Satyapal Reddy Etc. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors.
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S.S. REDDY v. GOVT. OF A.P. 937
Leave granted
The AP. Public Service Commission had issued an advertisement on
April 20, 1992 calling for applications for recruitment to the posts of Asstt.
Motor Vehicles Inspectors in Andhra Pradesh Transport Subordinate
Service. Though applicants had applied for the said posts, since they
possessed only the qualification of diploma in Mechanical Engineering,
they were not called for interview. Th.e appellants, therefore, filed 0.A.
Nos. 2757/92 and batch in the A.P. Administrative Tribunal questioning the.
competence of the State Govt. in prescribing the qualification of degree in
Mechanical Engineering or Degree in Automobile Engineering or diploma
in Automobile Engineering or any equivalent qualification as conditions
for recruitment, contending that it was the Central Government which had
been conferred with the power under Section 213(4) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, for short 'the Act', of prescribing the qualifications for appoint
ment to any office or class of officers under the Act, which had prescribed
the following:
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1. QuaJifications :
(1) Minimum general educational qualification of a pass in X
standard; and
2(i) A Diploma in Mechanical Engineering (3 years course) or
(ii) ·····················
(iii) a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering awarded by the
State Board of Technical Education (3 years course) or
(iv) Any qualification in either of the above disciplines declared
equivalent by the Central Govt. or State Govt."
When the appellants, had, become qualified to apply for and seek recruit
ment to the said posts, the prescription of qualification of graduation in
Mechanical Engineering by the State Government coming in conflict with G
the Act, stands superceded. The Tribunal by its Order dated July 30, 1993
repelled the contention and dismissed the petitions. Thus, these appeals by
special leave.
Shri K. Madhava Reddy and Shri Guraraja Rao, learned Senior
counsel. for the appellants contended that as the Act was made under Entry H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1994] 3 S.C.R.
A 35 of List III of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution read with Art. 246
of the Constitution, the Act receives paramountcy and the Central Govt.
alone is competent to prescribe the qualifications as to eligibility for
recruitment as Asstt. Motor Vehicles Inspectors and the power of the State
Govt. to that extent gets eclipsed and the prescription of qualification of
degree in mechanical engineering becomes void since it run~ in conflict
with the qualifications prescribed by the Central Govt. Therefore, the State
rules become inapplicable. In support thereof, it was further contended
that other State Governments had fallen in line in prescribing the qualifica
tion of Diploma in Mechanical Engg. prescribed by the Central Govt. and
the State Govt. of A.P. had not adopted that course. Since the State rule
is in conflict with the Central rule, the Central rule would prevail over the
State rules, by operation of Art. 254 of the Constitution.
Sri V.R. Reddy, learned A.S.G. argued that sub-s. (l) of s.213 of the
Act preserves the power to the State Govt. to appoint an officer or class
D of officers to implement the Act, sub-s.( 4) gives power to the Central G0\1.
to prescribe
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the minimum qualifications
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for appointment as Officers or
class of officers to s!lch posts under the Act and that would not mean that
the State Govt. having been given the power to appoint the officers, are
denuded of their power to prescribe higher qualifications than the one
prescribed by the Central Gm1. There is no conflict between the power
E exercised by the Central Govt. under the Act vis-a-vis the power of the
State Govt. under Entry 41 of List II of "the public service" and power
preserved to the Governor exercisable under prO\;so to Art. 309 of the
Constitution. Therefore, the State rules arc not ultra vires.
F Having given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions,
we find that the State's contention merits acceptance. It is seen that
marginal note in s.213 for "appointment of Motor Vehicles Officers" indi
cates the subject-matter of the Section. Sub-section (1) says that the State
Govt. may for the purpose of carrying into effect the proi-isions of this Act,
G establish Motor Vehicles Department and
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appointmcnt as officers thereof
such persons as it thinks fit
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• The power of appointment includes the power
to select a fit and competent person who it thinks fit to hold the post and
would discharge efficiently the functions assigned under the Act. It in
cludes the power to prescribe qualifications to select suitable officers. The
Parliament preserved that power to the State Govt. under s.213(1) itself by
H allowing it to appoint their officers whom it finds fit to carry into effect the
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S.S. REDDY v. GOVT. OF AP. 939
provisions of the Act. Suh-s. ( 4) gives power to the Central Govt., having A
regard to the object of the Act, by a Notification in the Official Gazette
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to prescribe minimum qualification
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which the officers or class of officers
thereof shall possess for being appointed as such officer or to the cadre
belonging to the State Govt. Under Entry 41 of List II (State List) of Vllth
Schedule to the Constitution, the puLlic service includes the services of the
officers to be appointed under sub-s.(1) of s.213 of the Act. No doubt, as
contened by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Act receives
paramountcy, since under Entry 35, the subject under the Act covers the
concurrent field. Sub-s.(4) of s.213 also preserve the power to prescribe
qualifications higher than that "minimum qualification" prescribed by the
Central Govt. to appoint the "said officers or any class thereof shall possess
for being appointed as such".
In Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 at 47 considering
the scope of Art. 246 of the Constitution, a bench of seven Judges of this
Court held thus:
"Reading Art. 246 with the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule,
it is quite clear that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws ,
with respect to all the matters enumerated in List I and this
notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3) of Art. 246. The
State Legislatures have exclusive powers to make laws with respect E
to any of the matters enumerated in List II, but this is subject to
clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 246. The object of this subjection is to
make Parliamentary legislation on matters in Lists I and III
paramount. Under cl. (4) of Art. 246 Parliament is competent also
to legislate on a matter enumerated in State List for any part of F
the territory of India not included in a State. Art. 248 gives the
residuary powers of legislation to the Union Parliament.
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It is thus settled law that the parliament has exclusive power to make
law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I or concurrent
power with the State legislature in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the G
Constitution which shall prevail over the State law made by the State
Legislature exercising the power on any of the Entries in List III. If the
said law is inconsistent with or incompatable tu occupy the same field to
that extent the State law stands superseded or becomes void. It is settled
law that when Parliament and the Legislature derive that power under Art. H
A 246(2) and the entry in the concurrent list. whether prior or later to the
law made by the State legislature, Art. 246(2) gives power, to legislate upon
any subject enumerated in the concurrent list, the law made by the Parlia
ment gets paramountcy over the law made by the State Legislature unless
the State !av.' is reserved for consideration of the President and receives
his assent. Whether there is an apparent repugnance or conflict between
Central and State Laws occupying the same field and cannot operate
harmoniously in each case the court has to examine whether the provisions
occupying the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in
the concurrent list and whether there exists repugnancy between the two
laws. Art. 254 laid emphasis "with respect to that matter". Repugnancy
arises when both the laws are fully inconsistent or are absolutely idecon
cilable and when it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the
other. The repugnancy would arise when conflicting results are produced
when both the statutes covering the same field are applied to a given set
of facts. But the court has to make every attempt to reconcile the provisions
D of the apparently conflicting laws and court would endeavour to give
harmonious construction. The purpose to determine inconsistency is to
ascertain the intention of the Parliament which would be gathered from a
consideration of the entire field occupied by the law. The proper test would
be whether effect can be given to the provisions of both the laws or whether
both the laws can stand together. Section 213 itself made the distinction of
the powers exercisable by the State Govt. and the Central Govt. in working
the provisions of the Act. It is the State Govt. that operates the provisions
of the Act through its officers. Therefore, sub- s.(1) of s.213 gives power
to the State Govt. to create Transport Department and to appoint officers,
as it thinks fit. Sub-section (4) thereof also preserves the power. By
necessary in1plication, it also preserves the power to prescribe higher
qualification for appointment of officers of the State Govt. to man the
Motor Vehicles Department. What was done by the Central Govt. was only
the prescription of minimum qualifications, leaving the field open to the
State Govt. concerned to prescribe if it finds necessary, higher qua1ifica-
G lions. The Governor has been given power under proviso to Art. 309 of the
Constitution, subject to any law made by the State Legislature, to make
rules regulating the recruitment which includes prescription of qualifica
tions for appointment to an office or post under the. State. Since the
Transport Department under the Act is constituted by the State Govt. and
H the officers appointed to those posts belong to the State service, while
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S.S. REDDY v. GOVT OF AP. 941
appointing its own officers, the State Govt. as a necessary adjunct is A
entitled to prescribe qualifications for recruitment or conditions of service.
But while so prescribing, lhe State Govt. may accept the qualifications or
prescribe higher qualification but in no case prescribe any qualification less
than the qualifications prescribed by the Central Govt. under sub-s.( 4) of
s.213 of the Act. In the later event, i.e. prescribing lesser qualifications,
both the rules cannot operate without colliding with each other. When the
rules made by the Central Govt. under s.213( 4) and the statutory rules
made under proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution are construed har
moniously, there is no incompatability or inconsistency in the operation of
both the rules to appoint fit persons to the posts or class of officers the
State Govt. vis-a-vis the qualifications prescribed by the Central Govt.
under sub.-s.( 4) of s.213 of the Act.
It is seen that A.P. Transport Subordinate Service Rules have been
made by the Governor exercising the power under proviso to Art. 309 of
the Constitution and rule 6 thereof prescribes the qualifications as
enumerated above. Graduation in mechanical engineering is one of the
higher qualifications than diploma. Since s.213 ( 4) gives such power to the
State Govt. by operation of s.217 of the Act, the statutory rules remain valid
and operate in the field without colliding with the Central Rules. Both the
Rules would operate harmoniously and effect can be given to both the
Rules. Thus the question of inconsistency or repugnancy under Art.254 of E
the Constitution does not arise. Therefore, we do not find that there is any
conflict in the exercise of power by both Central and State Governments
or inconsistency in operation of the provisions of the statutory rules made
by the Government under proviso to Art. 309 and the rules made by the
Central Govt. under s.213(4) of the Acl. The recruitment as per State Rules
is valid and legal.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances,
without costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.