Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh and Ors. v. the State of Maharashtra
N.P. SINGH, J. Leave granted.
These appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the Designated
Court, Bombay, rejecting the prayer for bail made on behalf of the appellants,
who are accused under different Sections of the Penal Code including Section
302 read with 149 and under sub-section (I) and sub-section (2)(i) of Section
3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) act, 1987 (hereinafter
referred to as 'TADA').
After the incident relating to the Babri Masjid ~t Ayodhya on 6.12.1992,
communal riots flared up in the city of Bombay and its suburbs. On the night
of?.1.1993, around 11.30 P.M., according to the complainant, some unknown
miscreants knocked the door of her house. The husband of the complainant sent
her and the two ch!ldren aged about 11 years and 9 years to a nearby house for
shelter. In that very house other families had also taken shelter. It is said that
around 12.30 in the night, the appellants along with others assembled in front
of the said house and poured kerosene oil and set the house on fire. They also
threatened and prevented persons from coming to the rescue of the victims by
threatening them at the point of deadly weapons. Some inrnates rnanaged to
come out of the house by opening the tiles of the roof, but many children, ladies
and males were burnt to death. It is also the case of the prosecution that door
H of the house had been bolted from outside so that they may not es~ape. After
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MOHD. IQBAL MADAR v. STATE [N.P. SINGH, J.] 187
investigation, charge-sheet was submitied and the appellants were put on trail
for different offences including under Section 3(1) and 3(2)(i) of the TADA.
The Designated Court constituted under the provisions of the TADA, has
rejected the prayer for bail, after discussing the allegations made against
different appellants and materials collected during investigation against them
including ocular testimony, that appellants put the house in question on fire by
locking the doors from outside which resulted in death of several children,
ladies and males. In one house itself six people were charred to death. The
Designated Court has directed release on bail some of the accused persons, but
in respect of the appellants, it has come to the conclusion that prima-facie there
were materials on the record to show that these appellants purported to strike
terror and to create hatred among the two communities by using inflammable
substance, that is petrol and kerosene, resulting in death of many of the victims
and as such a case under the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 3(2) (i) of the
TADA was made out.
The learned counsel, perhaps in view of serious allegations made against
the appellants, did not press the appeal on merit by contending that if the
allegations are considered in a prima-facie manner, no offence under Section
3(1) or Section 3(2)(i) of the TADA was disclosed. He however, took a stand
that as the TADA was a temporary Act which has admittedly lapsed, there is no
question of the appellants being.tried for offences under any of the Sections of
the TADA and the conditions prescribed by sub-section (8) of Section 20 of
TADA in respect of grant of bail now have to be ignored. In_ other words, the
Designated Court might be justified, according to the learned counsel, when it
rejected the prayer for bail of the appellants, on 7th and 8th March 1994, but
in view of the lapse of the TADA, now ·this court can direct release of the
appellants ignoring the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 20, because it
will be deemed that after the lapse of TADA, now no prosecution for any
offence urider Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(i) is pending before the Designated Court.
There is no dispute that the TADA being a temporary enactment, its
duration was specified irt the Act itself, and it has expired on the expiry of the
specified time. In such a situation, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
shall be of no help because Section 6 of the aforesaid Act i s applicable only
when any Central Act is repealed and it shall not be attracted when a temporary
Act expires on the expiry of \he specified time. The relevant part of Section 6
of the General clause Act says :
"Section 6. Effect of repeal·_ Where tltis Act, or any Central Act
or Regulation made after the commencement'ofthis Act, repeals any If
enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not -
(a) ....................................................................................................... .
(b) ....................................................................................................... .
(c) ········································································································
(d) ········································································································
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right. privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture
or punishment as aforesaid,
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had
not been passed."
As such what will be the effect of expiry of a Temporary Act, has to be
examined on the provisions of that Act itself, without any aid from Section 6
of the General clauses act. That is why after expiry of a temporary Act, often
a question arises in connection with the legal proceedings whether they can be
continued? In many temporary Acts a saving provision in the nature of section
6 of the General Clauses Act is enacted. If there is no provision in the temporary
Act similar to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the normal rule is that the
proceedings initiated under that Act shall ipso facto come to an end with the
expiry of the Act. If there is no saving provision, after the expiry of the Act a
person who was bein_g prosecuted under the said Act, cannot be prosecuted.
So far TADA is concerned, the framers of the Act have specially enacted
a provision similar to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in sub-section (4)
of Section' 1 which says :
"Section I(!) ........................................................................................ .
(2) ....................................................................................................... .
(3) ..................................................................................................... .
( 4) It shall remain in force for a period of eight years from the 24th day
of Mhy, 1987, but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section .
shall not effect -
(a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered
under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made
under any such rule, or
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MOHD. IQBAL MADAR v. STATE [N.P. SINGH, J.] 189
(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or A
incurred under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order
rnade under any such rule, or
(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any
offence under this Act or any contravention of any rule 111ade
under this Act or of any order made under any such rule, or B
(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or re1nedy in respect of any
such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be C
inscituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired."
In view of the aforesaid sub-section ( 4) of Section I, it has lo be held that
framers of the Acl had enacted a saving provision like Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, in sub-section (4) of Section I of TADA and desired that even after D
expiry of such temporary Act, the proceedings initiated under the said Act,
should not come to an end without the final conclusion and determination. They
are to be continued in spite of the expiry of the Act. The deeming clause in sub
section (4) of Section I, saying 'as if this Act had not expired' shall keep the
pending investigations and legal proceedings alive. In spite of the Act having
expired, it has to be treated that it has not expired so far such pending
investigations and legal proceedings are concerned. The effect of a legal fiction
by a deeming clause is well known. Legislature can introduce a statutory fiction
and courts have to proceed on the assumption that such state of affairs exists on
tI1e relevant date, because when one is bidden to treat an imaginary state of
affairs as real he has to also imagine as real the consequences which shall flow
from it unless prohibited by some other statutory provision.
In the case of State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC
945 = ( 1962) supp. 2 S.C.R. 380, a Constitution Bench of this Court said about
the effect of the expiry of a temporary Act :
"It is true that the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses
Act in relation to the effect of repeal do not apply to a temporary Act.
As observed by.Patanjali Sastri, J, as he then was, in S. Krishnan v.
State of Madras, 1951SCR621: AIR 195I SC 301, the general rule
in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special
provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against
A a person under it will ipso facto terminate as sOon as the statute -4~,
expires. That is why the Legislature can, and often does, avoid such
an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a
saving provision, the effect of which is in some respects similar to that
of S.6 of the General Clauses Act."
B As a specific provision has been enacted in subsection (4) of Section 1
of TADA in respect of continuance of investigation, legal proceeding, penalty,
punishment which is virtually identical to·Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
there is no scope for a controversy as to whether any investigation, inquiry, trial
in respect of any offence alleged to have been comn1itted under TADA when
the said Act was in force shall come to an end. Sub-section ( 4) of Section I
gives protection and keeps such investigations and trials alive, as is done by
Section 6 of the General clauses Act, when a later Act repeals the earlier Act.
In such a situation, it is not possible to hold that because of the expiry of the
TADA which was a temporary Act, situation has changed so far the offences
which arc alleged to have been conlillittcd when that Act was in force.
D It was then submitted that in the present case the appellants have been
denied the benefit of proviso (a) to Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') of their being released on
ground of default in submission of the charge-sheet within the statutory period
specified. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA makes the provisi'!!' of
E Section 167 of the Code applicable in respect of offences under TADA except
that the periods prescribed for the authorised detention in respect of such
"' offences during which the investigation should be completed are different.
After the expiry of periods which have been specified in Section 20( 4 )(b) and
Section 20(4)(bb), the accused for an offence under TADA acquires the right
to be released on bail, in terms of Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code. It
F need not be pointed out or impressed that in view of series of judgments of this
Court, this right cannot be defeated by any Court, if the accused concerned is
prepared and does furnish bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Court concerned.
Any accused released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of tl1e Code
read with Section 20(4)(b) or Section 20(4)(bb), because of the default on the
G part of the investigating agency to conclude the investigation, within the period
prescribed, in view of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) itself, shall be deemed to 1•
have be.en so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII of the Code. It
cannot be held that an accused charged of any offence, including offences under
TADA, if released on bail because of the default in completion of the
investigation, then no sooner the charge-sheet is filed, ti1e order granting bail
H to such accused is to be cancelled. The bail of such accused who has been
MOHD. IQBAL MADAR v. STATE [N.P. SINGH, J.] 191
released, because of the default on the part of the investigating officer to A
complete the investigation, can be cancelled, but not on1y on the' ground that
after the release, charge-sheet has been submitted against such accused for an
offence under TADA. For cancelling the bail, the well settled p1inciples in
respect of cancellation of bail have to be 1nade out. In this connection,
reference may be made to the case of Asla111 Babalal Desai v. State of
Maharashtra, [ 1992] 4 SCC 272. The majority judgment has held that in view B
of dee1ning provision under proviso (a) to section 167(2), the order granting
·bail shall be deemed to be one under Section 437(1) or sub-section (2) or
Section 439(1) and that order can be cancelled, when a case for cancellation is
made out under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) of the Code. But for that, the sole
ground should not be that after the release of such accused, the charge-sheet has
been submitted. The same view was expressed by this Court in the case of
Raghubir Singh v. State ~f Bihar, AIR (1987) SC 149 = 1986 (3) SCR 802.
So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the appellant Nos. 1 to
6 were taken into custody on 16.1.1993. The charge-sheet was submitted on
30.8.1993; obviously beyond the statutory period under Section 20(4)(b).
There is nothing on record to show that provisions of Section 20( 4(bb) were
applied in respect of appellants. They had become entitled to be released on bail
under proviso (a) lo Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4)(b) of
the TADA But it is an admitted position that no application for bail on the said
ground was made on behalf of the appellants. Unless applications had been
made on behalf of the appellants, there was no question of their being released
on ground of default in co1npletion of the investigation within the statutory
period.' It is now settled that this right cannot be exercised after the charge-sheet
has been submitted and cognizance has been taken, because in that event the
remand of the accused concerned including one who is alleged to have committed
an offence under TADA, is not under Section 167(2) but under other provisions
of the Code. This has been specifically considered by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B./. Bombay (II), [ 1994]
5 sec 410. It was said :
"The "indefeasible right" of the accused to be released on bail in
accordance with Section 20( 4 J(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section
167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of
the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as
held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is
enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing
of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the
challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] 1 S.C.R.
on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case
may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so
released on bail inay be arrested and comn1itted to custody according
to the provis10ns of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the
accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notv.
1
ithstanding
the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the
time of filiug of the ehallan only by the provisions relating to the grant
of bail applicable at that stage".
As such now it is not open to the appellants to claim bail under proviso (a) to
Section 167(2) of the Code. Admittedly charge-sheet has been submitted against
the appellants, and they are in custody on the basis of orders of remand passed
under other provisions of the Code and at this stage proviso (a) to Section
167(2) shall not be applicable.
During hearing of the appeal, it was pointed out by the counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellants that some courts in order to defeat the right of the
accused to be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) after expiry
of the statutory period for completion of the investigation, keep the applicatious
for bail pending for some days so that in the meantime, charge-sheets are
submitted. Any such act on the part of any court cannot be approved. If an
accused charged with any kind of offence, becomes entitled to be released on
bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) that statutory right should not be
defeated by keeping the applications pending till the charge-sheets are submitted,
so that the right which had accrued is extinguished and defeated. So far the
present case is concerned, we are informed by the counsel for the appellants that
a petition for grant of bail on merit had been filed which was rejected on
22.3.1993. But admittedly no petition for grant of bail after the expiry of the.
statutory period for the submission of the charge-sheet had been filed. There is
no statement that any application for grant of bail had been filed on behalf of
the appellants under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) after the expiry of the
statutory period which application was kept pending till 30th August 1993.
Now the appellants have forfeited their right to be released on bail under
proviso (a) to section 167(2) as they are in custody on basis of orders for
remand passed under other provisions of the Code. In such a situation, we are
left with no option, but to dismiss these appeals. However, we directed that the
trial of the appellants be expedited.
R.P. Appeals dismissed.
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