D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India and Ors.
Leave granted.
Heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question that arises
H for decision in this case is whether for promotion to the post of Assistant
1040
D.S. JOSEPH v. U.0.l. 1041
Engineer in the 50% promotion quota reserved for the person possessing A
degree in Electrical Engineering from a recognised University or an
equivalent with three years' regular service in the grade of Junior Engineers
in the electricity department. Government of Pondicherry, three years'
experience as Junior Engineer in the grade is to be counted from the date
of acquisition of the degree in Electrical Engineering or the length of B
service in the grade of Junior Engineers is to be reckoned if the incumbent
at the time of promotion to the 50% quota also possesses degree in
Electrical Engineering.
The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench by the im
pugned order has held that the respondents who are holding the post of C
Junior Engineers and have three years' regular service in that grade and
also possess degree in Electrical Engineering will be entitled to get such
promotion to 50% reserved quota and their experience of three years is
not to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the degree in Electrical
Engineering. Such decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal is being D
impugned in this case.
Mr. Venkataramani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
contended that the plain language of the Rule need not be followed in all
cases and in applying the rule for promotion to 50% quota from amongst
Junior Engineers with degree in Electrical Engineering, past practice is E
required to be considered as held by this Court in N. Suresh Nathan a11d
Anr. v. Union of India &: Ors., (1992] Suppt 1 SCC page 484. If the past
practice is taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the said
Rule, it will be quite evident that experience of three years had always
been reckoned from the date of the acquisition of the degree in Electrical F
Engineering. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained
and the promotion of private respondents in the 50% quota earmarked for
the persons holding degree in Electrical Engineering could not have given
to the said Private respondents.
It appears to us that the State Government is labouring under a G
wrong impression as to the applicability of the past practice as indicated
in Suresh Nathan's case. This Court in the said decision, has only indicated
that past practice should not be upset provided such practice conforms to
the rule for promotion and consistently for some time past the rule has
made applicable in a particular manner. In our view, the decision in H
A Nathan's case only indicates that past practice must be referable to the
applicability of the Rule by interpreting it in a particular manner consis
tently for some time. Any past practice dehors the rule cannot be taken
into consideration as past practice consistently followed for long by in
terpreting the Rule. It may be indicated here that a similar question also
B came up for consideration before this Court in M.B. Joshi and Ors. v. Satish
Kumar Pandey and Ors., [1993] Suppl. 2 SCC 419. The decision in Suresh
Natha11 's case distinguished in the facts of that case and it was indicated
that when the language of the Rule is quite specific that if a particular
length of service in the feeder post together with educational qualification
enable a candidate to be considered for promotion, it will not be proper
C to count the experience only from the date of acquisition of superior
educational qualification because such interpretation will violate the very
propose to give incentive to the employee to acquire higher education.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the rule for promotion to
50% quota came into effect in 1982 and in 1987 and thereafter only some
D ad hoc promotions were given. Therefore, there is no occasion to proceed
on the footing that the Rule for promotion since effective from 1982 has
been followed differently by giving an interpretation of the Rule as was
noted in the decision in Suresh Nathan's case. Therefore, in our view, the
decision in Suresh Nathan's case, which is an exception to the accepted
E principle of interpretation of the Rule on the plain language, only under
special circumstances, has no manner of application in the facts of the case.
We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the ultimate decision of the
Tribunal. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order
as to costs.
F G.N. Appeal. dismissed.