Chandra Kanta Sinha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.
SYED SHAH MOAMMED QUADRI, J. Leave is granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in L.P.A. No. 599of1998 dated
July 2, 1998 holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable.
The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is :
whether the Letters Patent Appeal No. 599 of 1988 filed against the order of D
a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court passed in M.A. No. 494 of
1996 dated April 13, 1998, is maintainable.
The following resume of the facts will be helpful in appreciating the
question.
The appellant is the owner of a truck which met with an accident, on
February I, 1996, resulting in the death of one Pradeep Kumar. The parents
of the victim filed a Claim Case No. 31 of 1996 under Section 140 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. On October 15, 1996, the learned Trial Judge, Madhubani,
Bihar ordered that interim compensation of Rs. 50,000 be paid to the claimants
by the Insurance Company within one month. Against that order, M.A. No. F
- 494 of 1996 was filed by the Insurance Company, which was allowed by a
learned Single Judge of the High Court on April 13, 1998. It was from that
order that the Letters Patent Appeal arose, which was held to be not
maintainable by the Division Bench of the High Court.
Mr. S.B. Sanyal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
contended that under clause I 0 of the Letters Patent of Patna an appeal
against the order of learned Single Judge would lie to the High Court which
was erroneously dismissed as not maintainable. He relied on a decision of this
Court in National Sewing Thread Co. ltd v. James Chadwich & Bros. ltd.,
[1953) SCR 1028. H
A Mr. Vishnu Mehra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
relying on the judgment of this Court in New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v.
Orissa State Finance Corporation & Ors., [ 1977] 3 SCC 462 argued that the ,
Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and the High Court had rightly
rejected the same.
It will be useful to refer to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Patna, which,
after omitting the words not necessary for the present discussion, would read
thus :
"That an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from the judgment )._
(Not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said high
Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional
jurisdiction .... ) of one Judge of the said High Court ...... that
Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie
to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High
Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section I 08 of
the Government of India Act (Article 225 of the Constitution of India)
In the exercise of appellate jurisdiction respect of a decree or order
made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the
superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed
the judgment declared that the case is a fit one for appeal... .. "
It can thus be seen that for purposes of appeal, under this clause,
judgments of one Judge of the High Court of Patna are classified in two
groups. In the first group fall judgments from which appeal will lie to the said
F High Court. From this group two categories of judgments of one Judge of the
High Court are excluded (i) a judgment passed in exercise of the appellate
1
jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise r°f-the appellate
jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court,
that is, where a judgment is passed by a Judge of the High Court in second
G appeal, no Letters Patent Appeal lies in the said High Court; and (i) from an
order or judgment made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The second
group takes in judgments of one Judge passed in second appeal where the
J~dge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal.
But now Section· IOOA of the Code of Civil Procedore bars an appeal under
the Letters Patent from the judgment of one Judge of a High Court passed
H · in second appeal even with the Leave of the Judge who passed the judgment.
C.K. SINll/\ v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. [()UADRI. .I.] 763
In Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai & Anr. v. State Bank of A
India, [1999] 1 SCC 123, the question before a three-Judge Bench of this Court
was whether the Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment and order of Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court passed in an appeal under Section 218-D
of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, was maintainable. It was
held that the appeal under Section 218-D of the said Act was a second appeal
against the appellate order made by the Additional Chief Judge, Small Causes B
Court. In view of Section 1 OOA CPC, Letters Patent Appeal against. the
judgment of a Single Judge passed in the second appeal was not maintainable.
In National Sewing Thread (supra), the case arose from the order of
the Registrar of Trade Marks. The first appeal against the order of the C
R.egistrar was filed under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 before
the High Court which was decided by a learned Single Judge. No procedure
was prescribed as to the hearing of the appeal under that Act. The question
that arose for consideration was : whether the judgment of the learned Single
Judge was appealable to the Division Bench under clause 15 of the Letters
Patent, Bombay. It was held that the High Court had to exercise its appellate D
jurisdiction under Section 76 of the said Act in the same manner as it exercised
its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction was exercised by
a Single Judge, his judgment was appealable under clause t .S of the Letters
Patent.
Clause I 0 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court has been the
subject-matter of consideration of two-Judge Bench of this Court (of which
I was a member) in a recent case-Employer in Relation to Management of
Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.,
JT [2001] 2 SC 87. After noticing that ~lause 15 of the Letters Patent of
Calcutta, Bombay and Madras is in iis dem terminis clause I 0 of the Letters F
Patent of Allahabad, Patna, Punjab & Haryana and Madhya Pradesh; the
Court laid down as follows:
"The above analysis of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will equally
apply to Clause I 0 of the Letters Patent of Patna. It follows that an G
appeal shall lie to a larger Branch of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one
Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution
of India. The following categories of judgment are excluded from the
appealable judgments under the first I imb of clause I 0 of the Letters
Patent: H
764
(i) A judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect
of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by
a court subject to superintendence of the said High Cou1t; in
other words, no letters patent appeal lies to the High Court from
a judgment of one Judge of the High Court passed in second
appeal;
(ii) an order made by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction; and
(iii) a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of power under
the provisions of Section I 07 of Government of India Act, 1915
(now Article 227 of the Constitution of India) or in exercise ,of
criminal jurisdiction."
Learned counsel for the respondents, however, argued that clause 10
provides that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court only from "a judgment
passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction not being a judgment passed
D in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction" and as the judgment of the
learned Single Judge was passed in the appellate jurisdiction, a Letters. Patent
Appeal was not maintainable. In our view, the contention of the learned
counsel is based on a mis-reading of clause 10. He has overlooked the vital
words, namely, "in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate ,j
E jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High
Court" in the first limb of clause 10. If those words are also read along with
the words relied upon by the learned counsel, it becomes clear that the
appellate jurisdiction mentioned therein refers to a second appeal under
Section I 00 CPC (or under any provision of an special Act) which is in respect
- of decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in the first appeal,
F filed under Section 96 CPC, {or under any provisiqn of an special Act) by a
court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. In other words. From
a judgment passed by one judge in second appeal, under Section I 00 CPC
or any other provision of an special Act no Letters Patent Appeal will lie to
the High Court provided the second appeal was ~gainst a decree or order of
G a District Judge or a subordinate judge or any 'other judge subject to the
superintendence of the High Court passed in a first appeal under Section 96
CPC or any other provision of an special Act.
In New Kenilworth Hotel (P) ltd. case (supra), aggrieved by the order
the Trial Court passed under Order 39, Rules (I) and (2), an appeal under
H Section 104(1) CPC read with Order 43, Rule l(r) was filed before the High
C.K. SINHA v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. [QUADRI. J.] 765
Court which was disposed of by one Judge of the High Court. From the order/ A
, judgment of one Judge, a letters patent appeal (second appeal) was filed
~ before the Division Bench under clause I 0 of the Letters Patent of Orissa
High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the Letters Patent
Appeal was not maintainable. Having regard to the provision of Section
104(2), the appeal before the Division Bench was barred. On appeal to this B
Court it was held:
. ...(
"As held earlier, the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and
the statute having expressly prohibited the filing of second appeal
under sub-section (2) of Section 104, the right of appeal provided
under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would not be available".
Therefore, reliance on the judgment of this Court in New Kenilworth Hotel
(P) ltd. case (supra) will be of no avail to the respondents.
From the above discussion, it follows that the appeal against the order
of the learned Single Judge in M.A. No. 494 of 1996 dated April 13, 1998
would lie before the Division Bench under clause I 0 of the Letters Patent. D
Letters Patent Appeal No. 599 of 1998 is, therefore, maintainable. The order
of the High Court under challenge is set aside. The Letters Patent Appeal is
~- restored to the file of the High Court. The High Court will now decide the said
letters patent appeal on merits in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly
allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. E
A.Q. Appeal allowed.
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