S.R Ejaz v. Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd.
SHAH, J. Leave granted.
The appellant who was forcibly and illegally dispossessed since May
1986 from the tenanted premises by his landlord is moving from pillar to post
for getting justice. Unfortunately, after considering all the relevant facts which
were brought on record, the High Coun remanded the proceedings under D
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act") for reconsideration by the trial court. It is apparent that the whole
purpose of proceedings under Section 6 of the Act is frustrated by such order.
The procedure under Section 6 of the Act is summary and its object is to
prevent self help and to discourage people to adopt any foul means to E
dispossess a person. Dispossession of a tenant should be in accordance with
law.
It is the submission of the appellant that as Proprietor of India Watch
House, he was doing business in tenanted premises situated at 843, Anna
Salai Madras for more than 35 years. Subsequently, the respondent the F
Tamilnadu Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd., Madras purchased
the said premises and, therefore, the appellant was paying rent regularly to
it.
In 1978, respondent filed Civil Suit for getting the premises vacated G
--' from the appellant. During the pendency of the proceedings, appellant gave
a power of attorney to one Muralidhar Balani to run business of India Watch
House, hence Balani was getting the said shop re-modelled. However, on
20th May, 1986 at about 7.30 p.m., while the work of re-modelling of shop
was going on, one Mr. Anakaputhur Ramalingam and about 20 Co-Optex
Workers with the help of police forcibly trespassed into the tenanted premises. H
A They took forcible possession despite the fact their Civil Suit for eviction
was pending in the court.
On the same day, appellant filed a complaint but the police did not
take any action on it. On 21st May, 1986, the complaint was sent to the
Commissioner of Police, Chennai for immediate action against the trespassers.
B On 31st May, 1986 telegraphic complaints were sent to the Director General
of Police and the Inspector General of Police. The~eafter, on 16th June, 1986,
appellant filed Writ Petition No. 5382 of 1986 for a direction to the police
to take appropriate action on the complaint filed by the appellant. That writ
petition was allowed by the High Court on 3rd May, 1988 and the Court
C directed the CB CID to investigate the complaint of the appellant. On such
direction, CB CID registered the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147,
149, 323, 341 and 441 of IPC. The main accused Anakaputhur Ramalingam
was arrested on 19th July, 1988. Thereafter, on 18.6.1991, the Government
of Tamilnadu accorded sanction to prosecute the case against the accused.
Hence, the CB CID police filed the charge sheet against all the accused for
D the offence punishable under sections 147, 149, 441, 352, 380 and 341 of
IPC in the Court of Addi. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai.
It is alleged by the appellant that accused succeeded in pressurizing and
influencing the Government to withdraw the prosecution against all accused
and thereafter public prosecutor filed an application for withdrawal of the
E prosecution. P.ermission to withdraw the prosecution case was granted by the
ACMM on 15th October, 1993.
In the meantime, within a period of six months from the date of
dispossession, on 25.9.1986, appellant filed OS No. 6998 of 1986 for
restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Aet. Respondent filed written
F statement and pleaded that appellant had informed them that he has vacated
the premises and it was open to the respondent to take the possession either
on 19th or 20th May, 1986. Therefore, possession was taken in presence of
the police constables. The trial court dismissed the suit. Against the said
judgment and order, appellant preferred C.R.P. No. 1818 of 1996 before the
G High Court of Madras. Considering the facts stated above, the High Court
allowed the petition. However, the High Court held that in the interest of _._
justice the matter requires to be remanded to the trial court for fresh
consideration of the evidence and proper disposal. That order is challenged
in this appeal.
H. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that pending suit filed by
S.R. EJAZ '· TAMIL NADU HAND LOOM WEAVERS CO-OP SOCIETY LTD. (SHAH, J.) 35
the respondent for evicting the appellant, the respondent took forcible A
'possession of the tenanted premises, for that purpose appellant had lodged
criminal complaint on the same day and as no action was taken, he had
informed various authorities immediately. Despite the representation made to
the higher authorities as police had not taken any action, appellant preferred
Writ Petition before the High Court and the High Court directed the CB CID B
to investigate the case. Thereafter the charge sheet was submitted; Government
granted sanction; however, for the reasons best known to it, the Government
withdrew the criminal proceedings. This would clearly establish that appellant
was in possession of the premises and pending suit, he was forcibly
dispossessed. Hence, in such circumstances if matter is remanded for
reconsideration after lapse of 15 years, the whole purpose of summary suit C
under Section 6 of the Act for taking possession would be frustrated. The
facts were eloquent and no further evidence was necessary nor anything was
required to be re-appreciated. It is to be stated that admittedly there is no
document to indicate that appellant willingly handed over the possession of
the suit premises. If appellant was prepared to hand over the possession of
the suit premises willingly a consent decree would have been obtained in a D
pending suit which was filed in 1978. In any case, there was no necessity of
taking possession by use of force in presence of police. If the appellant had
willingly handed over possession, he would not have immediately lodged the
criminal complaint and made representation to the higher authorities for taking
action nor he would have filed a writ petition for appropriate directions. E
Hence, this contention does not deserve to be accepted by any process of
reasoning.
In our view, if such actions by the mighty or powerful are condoned
in a democratic country, nobody would be safe nor the citizens can protect
their properties. Law frowns upon such conduct. The Court accords legitimacy F
and legality only to possession taken in due course of law. If such actions are
condoned, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India
or the legal rights would be given go bye either by the authority or by rich
and influential persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and
'might would be right' instead of 'right being might'. This Court in State of G
UP. and Ors. v. Maharoja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors., (1989) 2
SCC 505 dealt with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and observed
that a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra
judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier
termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. Under law, the possession
of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession H
36 'suPREME COURT' REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
A and forcible· dispossession is prohibited. The Court also held that there is no·
question of Government withdrawing o~ appropriating to it an extra judicial
right' of re-entry and the possession of the property can be resumed by the
Government ?nly in a manner known to or recognized by law.
In' this view of the·matter, this ·appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment ·
B and order passed by the High Court is set aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff
appellant for restoration of·j:>ossession of the 'suit property is decreed. The '
respondent is directed to hand over the possession of the premises within one
month to the appellant~ Further, we strongly deprecate the high handed·action ·
taken by the respondent in taking forcibfe possession from a tenant and direct"
the respondent to ·pay Rs: 50,000 as costs to the appellant.
v.s.s. Appeal allowed;
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