M.P. Vidyut Karamchari Sangh v. M.P. Electricity Board

S.B. SINHA, J. Introduction : Whether an agreement despite expiry would prevail over a regulation made under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') as regard the age of superannuation of an employee of the Respondent­ Board is the primal question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 11.9.2001 passed by the High Court of Judicature G of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in L.P.A. No. 34 of 200 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: The appellant is a registered Union of the employees of the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity. Board (for short 'the Board'). The erstwhile H Electricity Board framed regulations in the year 1952 under Section 79( c) of A the Act known as General Service Conditions of Board Servants. In the year 1957, the respondent-Board came into existence on re-organisation of the State. The State of Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short 'the 1960 Act') with a view to regulate the B relations of employers and employees in certain matters, to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for matters connected therewith. In the year 1961, the State of Madhya Pradesh also enacted Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 (for short 'the 1961 Act') to provide for rules defining with sufficient precision - C of certain matters relating to the conditions of employment of employees in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Schedule appended to the 1961 Act provided for the standard standing orders and item No. XV thereof relates to 'age of retirement'. On or about 19.10.1963, the Board purported to have adopted D fundamental rules, supplementary rules and other service conditions as in force in Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The said rules, however, had no application as regard work-charged employees. On or about 16.9.1976 by a notification issued under Section 79(c} of the Act, the Board adopted Madhya Pradesh Shasakiya Sevak (Adhivarshiki Ayu) Sanshodhan Adhiniyam, E 1972 relating to the retirement age of government employees under FR 56(3) prescribing 58 years as the age of superannuation. It is not in dispute that the parties hereto entered into an agreement on or about 10.6.1996 whereby and whereunder the age of superannuation of the employees was made at par with the employees of the Central Government as other fringe benefits were F to be the same as might be accepted by the Central Government while enforcing the Report of the Fifth Pay Commission. The Central Government while accepting the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission fixed 60 years as the age of superannuation of its employees. In the said agreement, . . it was stipulated : "(S) It has been further agreed that the following fringe benefits shall be regulated as per Vth Pay Commission Report after its adoption by Central Government. *** 9. Age of retirement." .\ - MP VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, l.J J J 3 The said agreement was registered in terms of Section 33 of the 1960 A Act. The Board Thereafter issued a notification dated 22.5. 1998 adopting the notification issued by the Central Government dated 13.5.1998 as a result whereof the age of retirement of the officers and employees of the respondent Board was enhanced to .60 years. The said order came into force with effect from 13.5.1998. By reason of the impugned notification dated 26.12.2000, B the Board reduced the age of superannuation of its employees, except class IV employees, to 58 years. Questioning the said notification, the appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur which was marked as Writ Petition No. 7255 of 2000. The said writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court where against the appellant herein preferred a Letters Patent Appeal C marked as Letters Patent Appeal No. 34 of2001. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 11.9.2001, the Division Bench dismissed the said appeal. HIGH COURT JUDGMENT: The Division Bench of the High Coutt in its judgment held: D (i) As notification was not published under Section 2(2) of the 1961 '/ Act by the State Government in the official gazette, the Act would apply to the parties to the /is. However, as the said notification has been published on 26.12.2000, it became a part of the Board's regulations and as such the conditions of service E of the employees of the Board would be governed thereby. (ii) Standing Order 14-A was brought into animation i'n the year 1973 but the amendment was brought into existence after a period of 8 years i.e. in the year 1981. The intention is writ large that proviso carves out an exception to enable the employer granting F freedom, independence and liberty to enter into an agreement/ settlement to confer more benefit to an employee which is in tune with the Industrial Law. (iii) As the Board is empowered to make regulation in exercise of its power under Section 79( c) of the Act, it is also entitled to G issue administrative instructions in absence of the regulation holding the field. As after 1984 the Board could not have passed any administrative order without amending the regulation and having regard to the fact that the relevant notifications were not published in the official gazettee, they would be non est in law. As by reason of the notification dated 14.7.2000, the Board had H adopted the regulations made in the year 1963, subsequent amendments which had taken place in the regulations and supplementary rules increasing the age of superannuation to 60 years will have no effect. The submissions of the appellant to the effect that the settlement/ agreement should be construed with reference to a letter dated 22.10.1999 issued by the Secretary of the Board to the Federation being unpragmatic cannot be accepkd. SUBMISSIONS: Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the C appellant would submit that the High Court went wrong in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the regulations made under the Electricity (Supply) Act being a general law and the terms and conditions laid down under the Certified Standing Order being a special law, the latter shall prevail over the former. Strong reliance in this D behalf has been placed on The UP. State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Hari Shankar Jain and Ors., [ 1978] 4 SCC 16. The learned counsel would contend that a manifest error has been committed by the Division Bench of the High Court insofar as it despite having held that a notification issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh was E necessary to exclude the application of the Standing Order in terms of Section 2(2) of the 1961 Act, relying on or on the basis of the notification issued by the respondent Board although the same was issued by the Board only and not by the State Government under Section 2(2) of the 1961 Act. Dr. Dhawan would submit that the regulations framed by the Board in F the year 1976 applying the fundamental and supplementary rules could not have excluded the application of the Standing Order as the same had been published in the official Gazette by the Board in the year 2000 only and that too by the Board and not by the State Government. Section 79(c) of the Act, Dr. Dhawan would contend, is merely G implemental in nature and do not have the character of substantive law and in that view of the matter the settlement arrived at by the parties in terms of Sections 31 and 33 of the Industrial Relations Act would prevail thereover. Despite expiry of the said settlement, Dr. Dhawan would urge, the agreement would continue to operate unless the same is terminated by a notice and in that view of the matter no notification altering the terms and conditions of H service could be validly issued in derogation of the terms of the said agreement ~·· MP VlDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MP ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, J] 115 having regard to the provisions contained in Standing Order l 4A of the A Rules. Mr. 'P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would subl)lit that the decision of this Court in Hari Shankar Jain (supra) cannot be said to have laid down good law inasmuch as therein it had not been considered that the Electricity (Supply) B Act, 1948 is a law relatable to Entry 38 of List III of Constitution of India; and the 1960 Act and the 1961 Act having been made in terms of Entries 22, 23 and 24 of List Ill, Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India would not have any application and in that view of the matter the agreement dated I 0.6.1960 cannot override the statutory power conferred upon the Board C under Section 79 ( c) of the Act in terms whereof the Board can make regulations laying down duties of its officers and other employees and fixing their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. For enforcing the 1963 Regulations, Mr. Rao would urge, there was no statutory requirement to notify the same in the gazette as prior to 15.3.1984, D there did not exist any such statutory requirement. It was urged that as the Board by a notification dated 19.10.1963 adopted fundamental rules for its employees except those in work-charged establishments and further adopted M.P. Act No.9 of 1976 by a notification dated 16.9.1976, in terms whereof the age of retirement was prescribed at 58 years for all classes of employees except Class IV employees in terms of FR 56 and 60 years for Class IV E employees. In any event, Mr. Rao would submit, as the agreement/ settlement expired on 31.3.1999, the impugned notification dated 26.12.2000 cannot be faulted as the agreement by itself did not specify any age of retirement and, thus, the employer had a right to reduce the age of retirement which became necessary due to financial conditions of the Board. Mr. Rao would argue that the decisions of this Court interpreting Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be applied to the industrial settlements governed by the 1960 Act inasmuch in terms of Section 99 thereof an agreement shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein and the said act does not contain any provisions like Section 19(2) of the Industrial G Disputes Act, 1947 in terms whereof an agreement is to continue to be binding on the parties until the expiry of two months from the date of service of notice terminating the said agreement. ST A TUTORY PROVISIONS: The relevant entries of List lil of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution H A of India read thus: "22. Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes. 23. Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment. B 24. Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. 38. Electricity." Sections 33 and 99 of the 1960 Act are as under: "33. Agreements (!) If in regard to a change proposed under sub-section (1) or (2) of section 31, an agreement is arrived at, a memorandum of such agreement shall be forwarded to the Registrar. (2) On receipt of the memorandum of agreement signed by the parties under sub-section (1 ), the Registrar shall register the agreement if it is arrived at - (a) within seven days from the service of a notice under sub­ section ( 1) or sub-section (2) of section 31, or with such further period as may he agreed upon by the parties; or (b) *** (c) within two months from the completion of conciliation proceedings: Provided that the Registrar shall not register an agreement which on enquiry he is satisfied is in contravention of the provisions of this Act or was the resul: of mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, coercion or threat. (3) An appeal shall lie to the Industrial Court against an order of the Registrar refusing to register an agreement under sub-section (2). The provisions of section 22 shall apply to such appeal. (4) An agreement registered under this section shall come into operation on the date specified therein or if no date is so specified L on its being recorded by the Registrar." )- M.P. VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, J.] ] J 7 "99. Agreements etc., when to case to have effect:- A (I) A registered agreement or a settlement or award shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein or if no such date is specified therein on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such agreement, settlement or award, as the case may be, is g;ven in the prescribed B manner by any of the parties thereto to the other parties: Provided that no such notice shall bi: given till the expiry ~- of six months after the agreement, settlement or award comes into operation. (2) Nothing in this section shall prevent the terms of a registered c agreement or a settlement or an award in terms of an agreement being changed or modified by mutual consent of the parties affected thereby and the registered agreement, settlement or award shall be deemed to be changed or modified accordingly. (3) *** D (4) The party giving notice under sub-section [!] shall send a ..., copy of it to the Register and the Labour Officer of the local area concerned. (5) If a registered agreement or a settlement or an award is E terminated under sub-section [I] or if the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or an award are changed or modified by mutual consent, notice of such termination, change or modification shall be given by the parties concerned to the Registrar and the Labour Officer. The Registrar shall enter the notice of such termination, change or modification in a register F kept for the purpose." ). Section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 reads as under: "79. Power to make regulations-The Board may by notification in the Official Gazette, make regulations not inconsistent with G this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the following matters:- (c) the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service;" Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act reads thus: H "2(2) Nothing in this Act shall apply to the employees in an undertaking to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the State Government in the official Gazette apply." The relevant part of Standing Order I 4A of the 1963 Rules reads as under: "14-A: Retirement: (I) An employee shall retire from the service C of the employer on the date he attains the age of 58 years. He may, however, be retained in service by the employer after the date of attaining the age of 58 years if his services are necessary in the interest of the undertaking but he shall not be retained in service after the age of 60 years: Issues : Provided that nothing in this clause shall adversely affect the operation of the terms of any contract, agreement, settlement, or award on this subject, if the age of retirement is not less than 58 years." (i) Whether the regulations made under Section 79 ( c) of the Act would prevail over the Standing Order framed under the 1961 Act. (ii) Whether regulation dated 19.10.1963 issued by the Board adopting fundamental and supplementary rules for its employees except those in work-charged establishment and published in gazette on 26.12.2000 the application of the 1961 Act by reason of Section 2(2) thereof stand excluded. (iii) Whether the respondent Board acted illegally and without jurisdiction in issuing the noti.fication dated 26.12.2000 reducing the age of Class Ill employees to 58 years. FINDINGS: It is trite that India being a Union of State both the Parliament and the State Legislature can frame laws having regard to their respective legislative competence enumerated in the three Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule H of the Constitution of India. ·' ... ). MP VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MP ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, Jl 119 Before analyzing the relevant provisions of the State Acts vis-a-vis 'the /. Act', we may have an overview of the constitutional scheme. Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India read with the Seventh Schedule and Legislative Lists contained therein prescribe the extent of legislative competence of Parliament and State Legislatures. Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect of any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule. Similarly, State Legislatures have exclusive power B to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in List IL Parliament and State Legislatures both have legislative power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in List Ill, the Concurrent List. The various entries in the three Lists are fields of legislation. They are C designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and State Legislatures. Since legislative subjects cannot always be divided into water tight compartments; some overlappings between List I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule is inevitable. Notwithstanding the fact that great care with which the various entries D in the three lists have been framed; on some rare occasions it may be found that one or the other field is not covered by these entries. The makers of our Constitution have, in such a case, taken care by conferring power to legislate on such residuary subjects upon the Union Parliament including taxation by reason of A11icle 248 of the Constitution. Doctrine of pith and substance, however, is taken recourse to when examining the constitutionality of an Act with respect to competing legislative competence of the Parliament and the State Legislature qua the subject matter. Incidental entrenchment however is permissible: As in a federal Constitution.division of legislative powers between the F Central and Provincial Legislatures exists, controversies arise as regards encroachment of one legislative power by the other particularly in cases where both the Union as well as the State Legislation have the competence to enact laws. Article 254 provides that if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision made by the Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing G law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List then subject to provisions of clause (2), the law made by the Parliament shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy required. In terms of clause 2 of Article 254 of the Constitution of India where a law made by the legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters H A enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provisions repugnant to the ,>( provisions of an earlier law made by the Parliament or an existing law with respect to the matters, then the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for consideration of the President and has received its assent, prevail in that State. It is not in dispute that the 1961 Act has B received the assent of the President of India and, thus, would prevail over any parliamentary law governing the same field. It is no doubt true that the entire field relating to 'Electricity' is covered under Entry 38 of List III pursuant whereto the Indian Electricity Act and Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 were enacted but thereby the State's legislative C competence to exercise its legislative power under Entries 22, 23 and 24 was not taken away. Section 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act provides for an incidental power upon the Board. The same would, therefore, not prevail over the specific legislative competence granted to the State to regulate the conditions of service between an industrial undertaking and its employees nor thereby the State Government would be denuded of its legislative power I) relating to regulation of the industrial re.lations. Furthermore, both the Parliament and the State within their own respective legislative competence may make legislations covering more than one entries in the three Lists contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Article 254 of the Constitution of India would be E attracted only when legislations covering the same ground both by Centre and by the Province operate in the field; both of them being competent to enact. See Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1959) SC 648; M Karunanidhi v. Union of India, AIR (1979) SC 898 and The State F of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd and Ors., (2004) I SCALE 425. Recourse to the said principles, however, would be resorted to only when there exists direct conflict between two provisions and not otherwise. Once it is held that the law made by the Parliament and the State Legislature occupy the same field, the subsequent legislation made by th.e State which G had received the assent of the President of India indisputably would prevail over the Parliamentary Act when there exists direct conflict between two enactments. Both the laws would ordinarily be allowed to have their play in their own respective fields. However, in the event, there does not exist any conflict, the Parliamentary Act or the State Act shall prevail over the other H depending upon the fact as to whether the assent of the President has been ... M P VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M P ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, l) J 2 J obtained therefor or not. (See. Bharat Hydro Power Corp. Ltd. and Ors. v. A ~· State of Assam and Anr., (2004) 1 SCALE 211. Keeping in view of the fact that the State Government has the exclusive power to enact a law regulating industrial relations and resolution of labour disputes, as has been held by this Court in Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union and Anr. v. Christian Medical College Ve/lore Association B and Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 691, the same shall prevail over the regulations framed by· the Board in exercise of its power under Section 79 (c). This brings us to the. question as regard the effect of the 1961 Act. In tenns of Section 2, the 1961 Act, applies to every undertaking wherein the number of employees on any day during the twelve months preceding or on C the day the said Act came into force or any day thereafter was or is more than twenty and such other class or classes of undertakings as the State Government may, from !L>ne to time, by notification, specify in this.behalf. The undertaking of the Board indisputably was in existence in 1961. Per se, therefore, the provisions of the 1961 Act shall apply to the undertakings of the Board. Sub- D Section (2) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act makes an exception to the applicability of the Act stating that nothing therein shall apply to the employees of an undertaking to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Tempo Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf the State Government E in the official gazette apply. For excluding the operation of the 1961 Act, it is imperative that an appropriate notification in tenns of Section 2(2) of the 1961 Act is issued. The Board adopted Fundamental and Supplementary Rules which per se were not applicable to the employees of their undertaking. They were F adopted by the Boan~. The provisions of Fundamental and Supplementary Rules to the extent it was made applicable, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 79 ( c) would, thus, be deemed to be the regulations governing the tenns and conditions of the employees of the Board. The requisite notification under Section 2(2) of the 1961 Act was, thus, required G to be issued by the State Government. It is not in dispute that the State Government has not issued any notification in tenns of Section 2(2) of the 1961 Act and in that view of the matter the provisions thereof shall apply to the employees of the State. The 1961 Act is a special law whereas the regulations framed by the Board under H 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 3 S.C.R. A Section 79 (c) are general provisions. The maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant' would, thus, be applicable in this case. [See D.R. Yadav and Anr. v. R.K. Singh and Anr., [2003] 7 SCC 110 and Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 589. The question need not detain us long in view of a 3-Judge Bench B decision of this Court in Hari Shankar Jain (supra). This Court therein in no uncertain terms held that the provisions of the Standing Order Act are special laws in regard to the matters enumerated in the Schedule and, thus, the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless the regulations are either notified by the C Government or certified by the certifying officer, holding : "18 .... ln regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act shall continue to apply. In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age of superannuation having been duly notified by the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact that it is a matter which could be the subject matter of Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act..." See also U. P. State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Labour Court (I), U.P., Kanpur and Anr., [1984] l SCC 147. We do n<it find any infirmity in the said decisions of this Court and respectfully agree with the ratio laid down therein. This leads us to the question as to the applicability of the Standing Order l 4A vis-a-vis the agreement/settlement entered into by and between the parties dated I 0.6.1996. In terms of Standing Order I 4A of the 1963 Rules the age of superannuation was fixed at 58 years. The proviso appended to Standing Order l 4A of the 1963 Rules, however, postulates that nothing therein shall adversely affect the operation of the term of any agreement on G the subject ifthe age of retirement is not less than 58 years. We have noticed that Clause (S) (9) of the settlement refers to the age of retirement which was registered in terms of Section 33 of the 1960 Act. The said agreement, keeping in view of the proviso appended to Standing Order l 4A and having been issued in compliance of the requirements of the Act will operate in the H field. In terms of the said agreement the age of retirement was to be the same ·' MP VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, J.] J 23 as that of the employees of the Central Government on acceptance of the A recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission. The Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and Clause (5) of Article 148 made rules known as Fundamental (Amendment) Rules, 1998 in terms whereof Clause (a) was amended in the following terms: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, every Government servant shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years: Provided that a Government servant whose date of birth is the first of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last C day of preceding month on attaining the age of sixty years." Having regard to the said agreement, indisputably the Board also enhanced the age of retirement of its emp.loyees by a notification dated 22.5.1998 which reads thus: "Sub: Enhancement in age of retirement. In exercise of the powers conferred under clause ( c) of section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the M.P. Electricity Board is pleased to adopt the orders as contained in Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions (Department of E Personnel & Training), notification No. 25012/2/97-Estt.(A) dated 13.8. 1998 (copy enclosed) for application to the Board' officers/ employee with effect from 13.5.1998." It is, however, not in dispute that the agreement dated I 0.6.1996 expired on 31.3.1999 as would appear from the following: F "(W) The wage structure and fringe benefits shall be effective for a period of 5 years upto 31.3.99 and no demand whatsoever shall be made or considered in respect of the items already agreed to." Section 99 of the 1960 Act, as referred to hereinbefore, postulates that a registered agreement or a settlement or award shall cease to have effect on G the date specified therein and only in the event no date is specified on the expiry of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such agreement, settlement or award, as the case may be, is given in the prescribed manner by any of the parties thereof to the other parties. By reason of the said provision, therefore, the settlement comes to end H A automatically on the date specified therefor and only in the event no date of expiry thereof is specified, a notice contemplated thereby is required to be issued. The provisions of the 1960 Act shall apply to the undertakings of the electricity, generation and distribution in terms of notification 31.12.1960 issued by the State. B Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, however, has been couched in a different language in tenns whereof a settlement will be binding as is agreed upon by the parties and shall continue to be binding despite expiry thereof until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the C parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. The decisions of this Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. v. A.R. Chacko, [1964] 5 SCR 625, Life Insurance Corporation and Ors. v. D.J Bahadur, [1981] 1 SCC 315 and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. KSRTC Staff and Workers' Federation and Anr., [1999 2 SCC 687, which D have been rendered having regard to the phraseology used in Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the 1961 Act will thus have no application to the fact of the present case. The proviso appended to Standing Order l 4A of the 1963 Rules would, thus, operate provided there exists a valid agreement. Furthermore, the E terms and conditions laid down in the certified order may have the force of law but they by themselves do not constitute statutory provisions. See Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 75. Standing Order I 4A of the 1963 Rules prescribes the age of F superannuation to 58 years. It can be enhanced upto the age of 60 years if the services of the person are necessary in the interest of the undertaking but he shall not be retained in service after the age of 60 years unless in tenns of the proviso, there exists any agreement/settlement or award to the contrary. The enhanced age of superannuation of members of the appellant Association was, therefore, subject to any law that may operate in the field. The respondent G Board, as noticed hereinbefore, issued the notification dated 22.5.1998 whereby and whereunder it had given a seal of approval to the aforementioned agreement, which was to continue to operate in view of the agreement, until the same is replaced by another valid notification. The Board bas issued such a notification on 26.12.2000 in exercise of its statutory power under Section H 79(c) of 'the Act'. - M.P. VIDYUT KARAMCHARI SANGH 1·. M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD [SINHA, J.] J 25 It is one thing to say that when there exists a conflict between a regulation A made under Section 79(c) of the Act and a certified standing order or a rule made under the 1961 Act, the latter shall prevail; but it is another thing to say that in absence of any statutory provision governing the age of retirement, the statutory regulations framed by the respondent Board shall ·have no application. It is not in dispute that the impugned notification dated 26.12.2000 B had been issued by the Board in exercise of its power under Section 79( c) of Electricity Supply Act. Section 15 of the Act empowers the Board to appoint a Secretary and such other officers as may be required to enable the Board to carry out its functions. Section 79( c) empowers the Board to make regulations inter alia as regar<l the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. The C Board, therefore, was empowered to make regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules providing for the duties of officers, their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service. The power of the Board, therefore, to lay down the conditions of service of its employees either in terms of regulation or otherwise would be subject D only to any valid law to the contrary operating in the field. Agreement within the meaning of proviso appended to Standing Order 14A is not a law and, thus, the regulations made by the Board shall prevail thereover. The Board has power to make regulations which having regard to the provisions of General Clauses Act would mean that they can make such E regulations from time to time. Alterations in the age of retirement by the employer is a matter of executive policy and for sufficient and cogent reasons, the same is permissible. See K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., [1985] 1 SCC 523, Osmania University v. Muthurangam and Ors., [1997] 10 SCC 741, N. F Lakshm.ana Rao and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., [1976] 2 SCC 502 j. and Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [2003] 6 SCC 545. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. No. costs. B.K.M. Appeal dismissed.