L.I.C of India v. Sushil

.. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J .. Leave granted. . Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, Nagp;.r.The respondent had secured employment in the Life Insurance Corporation of India {hereinafter referred to as the 'LIC') the appellant in this appeal on the basis that he.belongs to Scheduled_ Tribe. Undisputedly, his caste was recorded as Halba. Committee · for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims, Amaravati vide its order dated F 30.4.2004 held that respondent's claim of belo~ging to Scheduled Tribe was wrong. unfounded and was a fraudulent claim. The order was questioned by respondent before the High cOurt by filing a writ petition, Before the High Court, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the writ petitioner · was willing to file an undertaking to the effect that he ·will not claim any G ~ , benefit ·on the basisofhis case as Halb~ eith~i i~· his. service or anywhere else ~ at any time for himself as well as for his legal heirs. With reference to a judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mi/ind and Ors. (2001] I SCC_:I. the High Court held that in view of the undertaking the writ petitioner's services were not to be terminated notwithstanding invalidation order passed by the Scrutiny Committee. H .-· - A Learned counsel for the LIC submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. In Mi/ind's case (supra) this Court never laid down any principle of law having universal application. The observations in para 38 of the judgment were limited to the peculiar facts of the case. The High Court erroneously proceeded on the basis that the decision laid down B a rule of universal application. In response, learned counsel for· the respondent submitted that the respondent had already rendered about 14 years of uninterrupted and blemishless service and merely because he could not establish his Scheduled Tribe claim, the benefit already granted should not have been withdrawn. It C was pointed out that undertaking in the lines noted by the High Court had already been filed. This Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kera/a and Ors., (2004] 2 SCC I 05) and lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST and Ors., (2005] 8 sec 283 have considered the effect of non-genuine certificates in the case D of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes' claims. The protection under the Milind's case (supra) cannot be extended to the respondent no. I-employee as the protection was given under the peculiar factual background of that case. The employee concerned was a doctor and had rendered long years of service. This Court noted that on a doctor public E money has been spent and, therefore, it will not be desirable to deprive the society of a doctor's service. Respondent no. I-employee in the present case is an UC employee and the factor which weighed with this Court cannot be applied to him. The above position was elaborated in Bank of India and Anr. v. Avinash F D. Mandivikar and Ors .. (2005] 7 SCC 690. It is noted that in spite of six opportunities the respondent No. I did not appear before the Scrutiny Committee. That being the position the Scrutiny Committee had no other option than to take a decision in the matter. We also G find that the Scrutiny Committee referred to documents which were before it and came to the conclusion about the claim of respondent No. I being not genuine. In Milind's case (supra). filing of the undertaking was not to be treated as the ratio of the judgment. Before us it was urged on behalf of respondent H No. I that in State of Maharashtra at the relevant time there were resolutions/ . , ... - L.I.C. OF INDIA v. SlJSHIL [PASAY AT. J.I 561 -., Government Orders which made respondent believe that there was no A fraudulent intention in claiming to be Halba. Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for respondent submitted that none of these aspects (including various G.Rs.) have been considered. The High Court in the present case proceeded on the basis as if mere filing of an undertaking in the line suggested by the writ petitioner was sufficient to bring the case under the umbrella of decision in B Milind's case (supra). That is clearly not so. As the High Court has not considered the matter in its proper perspective, except relying on Mi/ind's case (supra) we think it appropriate to remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration on merits of case on the grounds, if any, without influenced by any observation in this order. C The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid exterit without any order as to costs. R.P . Appeal allowed.