Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v. the State of Maharashtra
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
D 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of Bombay
High Court, Aurangabad Bench, dismissing the appeal of the
appellant who faced trial for alleged commission of offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short 'IPC') and was sentenced to imprisonment for life by
E learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The complainant Sajay Vithal was serving as a Waiter in
Sanjog Hotel for 2-1/2 months prior to the incident. Pradip
F Panjabi is the owner of the said hotel. Business in the hotel is ~ •
conducted from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m. After closure of the hotel,
complainant Sanjay alongwith 5 workers of the hotel used to
reside in a staff room. Hotel was closed on 3.11.1999 at 11.30
p.m. Pradip Panjabi and other staff members went out at about
G 1 a.m. Thereafter on 4.11.1999 around 1.30 a.m. in the night,
altercations took place between Ramesh Nayar and Anna Devraj
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') on the point of
switching off the lights. Both used to reside in the staff room. At
that time, complainant, Kundlik Chavhan and Chhotu intervened.
H Thereafter complainant and Anna Devraj slept in the staff room.
RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYAR v. 153
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASAYAT, J.]
. .., At about 8.30 a.m. complainant heard loud noise relating to a A
quarrel and got up. He saw the accused and the deceased
quarrelling and accused inflicting two blows by a wooden log
on the head of Anna Devraj. Ramesh Nayar threatened. the
complainant that if he disclosed anything to anybody, he will
teach him a lesson. Hence complainant went out of the room. B
He disclosed the incident to the persons in the tiotel working as
"'
gardeners in the morning. At that time, Anna Devraj was not
speaking anything. He was lying unconscious and moaning.
Thereafter owner of the hotel was informed on phone. He came
and the deceased was shifted to Civil Hospital for treatment. c
His right ear was bleeding. Thereafter, the complainant and hotel
owner went to Tophkhana Police Station and reported the matter
to police as per Exh.26. AS.I. Puri registered the offence as
Crime No.227/99 under Sections 307, 506 of IPC and handed
over investigation to PW.7. P.S.I. Jyoti Madhav Karandikar. After D completion of investigation, charge sheet was placed and
~
accused-appellant faced trial as he denied the occurrence and
pleaded false implication. The trial Court placed reliance on
the evidence of Sanjay Diwate (PW-5). It is to be noted that
certain other persons i.e. Dhirendera Suryavanshi (PW-2),
E Ashok Palve (PW-3) and Datta Pingale (PW-6) were claimed
to be eye-witnesses, but they made departure from the
statements given during investigation. The trial Court found
the evidence of PW-5 to be credible and cogent and recorded
his conviction and imposed the sentence of imprisonment
for life. F
4. The conviction and sentence were challenged before
the High Court, which as noted above, dismissed the appeal.
5. In support of the appeal, leaned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the conviction could not have been recorded solely G
on the testimony of one alleged eye-witness PW-5. Alternatively,
it is submitted that Section 302 IPC has no application to the
facts of the case in view of the factual scenario highlighted.
According to him in course of a sudden quarrel the incident
happened. In other words, according to him Exception 4 to H
A Section 300 IPC applies. r- j
6. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand supported the judgment of conviction and sentence.
7. Coming to the question whether on the basis of a solitary
B evidence conviction can be maintained, a bare reference to
Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence
Act") would suffice. The provision clearly states that no particular
number of witnesses is required to establish the case.
Conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness if
c he is wholly reliable. Corroboration may be necessary when he
is only partially reliable. If the evidence is unblemished and
beyond all possible criticism and the court is satisfied that the
witness was speaking the truth then on his evidence alone
conviction can be maintained.
D 8. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without
premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue
advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
E 9. The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts
done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of
prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its
place would have been more appropriate. The exception is
F· founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence
of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is ~
total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is
only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reasons·
and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do.
There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1 ; but the
injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In
fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that
a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the
origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have
originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them
H in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies
RAMESH KRISHNA MADHUSUDAN NAYAR v. 155
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [PASAYAT, J.]
I 1 mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide A
committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation,
nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side.
For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable
would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or
determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which B
both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one
of them starts it, but if the other had not aggmvated it by his own
""'\ conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is
then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to
apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. c
The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a)
without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person
killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' D
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not defined in
~~ . the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires
that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in
this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on E account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a
combat between two and more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to
what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of
fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily F .,,. depend upon the proved facts of each cas.e. For the application
of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden
quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in
cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as
used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. G
10. The aforesaid aspects have been highlighted in
Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa (JT 2004 (6) SC 299),
Prakash Chand v. State of H.P (JT 2004 (6) SC 302), Sachchey
Lal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (JT 2004 (8) SC 534), H
A Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra [2006(4) SCC 653]
and Lachman Singh v. State Of Haryana [2006 (10) SCC 524).
11. Considering the factual background the inevitable
conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under
Section 304 Part I, IPC and not Section 302 IPC. Custodial
8 sentence of 1 O years would meet the ends of justice.
·12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
N.J. Appeal partly allowed.