State of Punjab v. Navraj Singh
Cited by 2 judgments in this corpus
- State Of Maharashtra Tr.C.B.I vs Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar · (2012) 12 SCC 384
- STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH CBI, ANTI CORRUPTION BRANCH, MUMBAI v. BALAKRISHNA DATTATRYA KUMBHAR · 2012 INSC 473
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
;
learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
directing that the conviction of the respondent shall remained B
stayed during the pendency of Criminal Appeal No. 1498- SB
of 2002.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
4. Respondent who was working as Patwari Halqa and c
was convicted by learned Special Judge, Nawanshahr, Punjab
for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1 )(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short
'P.C. Act') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- with D default stipulation. Against the judgment in question respondent
filed the aforesaid Criminal appeal which was admitted. After
admission of the appeal, respondent filed an application in terms
of Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in
short the 'Code') read with Section 482 of the Code for sus-
E pension of the judgment of learned Special Judge.
5. The High Court by order dated 27.1.2005 stayed the
conviction. According to the appellant, the view expressed by
this Court in K. C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh [2001 (6) SCC
584] was not kept in view. The High Court dismissed that appli- F
cation only on the ground that the review of the order was not
permissible.
6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant-State
that the suspension of the conviction is clearly unsustainable. It
is pointed out that the High Court noted that the Collector, G
Nawanshaher had given a notice for dispensing his services
as Patwari Halqa, Musapur.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
High Court took note of the fact that this was a case where the H
A prayer for suspension of the conviction was to be granted. Un
less the order of conviction was suspended, the respondent
would have lost his job.
8. In State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan and Another
[2003(12)SCC 432], it was noted as follows:
Having perused the impugned order as also the judgment
of this Court in K. C. Sareen's case [2001 (6) SCC 584]
we find the High Court had no room for distinguishing the
law laid down by this Court in K. C. Sareen case supra
c even on facts. This Court in the said case held: (SCC p.
589, para 11)
"11. The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power
to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of
sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its
exercise should be limited to very exceptional ca~e.s.
Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in
challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend
the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a
duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications. of
keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the
above legal position that we have to examine the question
as to what should be the position when a public servant is
convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when
the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge ·at
the conviction and sentence for the offence underJhe PC
Act, the superior court should normally suspend the
sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal,
because refusal thereof would render the very appeal
otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the
filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the
offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of
imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter."
(emphasis supplied)
In the said judgment of KC. Sareen's case (supra) this
STATE OF PUNJAB v. NAVRAJ SINGH 929
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Court has held that it is only in very exceptional cases that A
the court should exercise such power of stay in matters
arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned
order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact
which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The
High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court B
that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification
of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court,
in our opinion, has not taken into conside_ration any of the
above factors while staying the conviction. It should also
be noted that the view expressed by this Court in KC. c
Sareen case (supra) was subsequently approved followed
by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Atar
Singh [2003(12) sec 434}.
9. In Union of India v. Avtar Singh & Anr. (2003(12) SCC
434) it was held as follows: D
"This appeal is directed against the impugned order of
the High Court. The respondent-accused, who has been
convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, preferred an appeal to the
E High Court, which has been entertained. On an application
being filed under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the High Court has suspended the conviction
solely on the ground that the non-suspension of conviction
-t· may entail removal of the delinquent government servant
from service." F
10. In K. C. Sareen's case (supra) it was noted as follows:
"11. The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power
to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of
sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its G
exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases.
Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in
challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend
the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a
duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of H
A keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the
above legal position that we have to examine the question
as to what sbould be the position when a public servant is
convicted of an offence u_nder the PC Act. No doubt when
the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of
B the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC ~ f-..
Act, the superior court should normally suspend the
sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal,
because refusal thereof would render the very appeal . ,--
otiose unless such appt~al could be heard soon after the \.
c filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the
offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of
imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter.
12. Corruption by public servants has now reached a .._
monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started .
'
D grappling even the institutions created for the protection
I-
of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted
and irnp.3ded from gripping the normal and orderly
functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative,
executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public
E servants could even paralyse the functioning of such
institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity.
r Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner
momentum to cripple the social order if such men are t-
allowed to continue to manage and operate public
F institutions. When a public servant is found guilty of ;.-
corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted
by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should
be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated ·by a superior
court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum
G has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the
issues and findings made against such public servants
once again should not even temporarily absolve him from ~~
such findings. If such a public serJant becomes entitled to
hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he
is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of
.... .. STATE. OF PUNJAB v. NAVRAJ SINGH 931
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
suspension of the order of conviction, it is public interest A
which suffers and sometimes, even irreparably. When a
public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to
continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale
of the other persons manning such office, and consequently
that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the B
people in such public institutions besides demoralising
the other honest public servants who would either be the
colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If
honest public servants are compelled to take orders from
proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension c
of the conviction, the fallout would be. one of shaking the
system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should
not aid the public servant who stands convicted for
corruption charges to hold only (sic) public office until he
is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at D the appellate or revisional level. It is a ctifferent matter if a
corrupt public officer could continue to" hold such public
office even without the help of a court order suspending
the conviction.
13. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary E
for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If
so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction
is on a corruption charge against a public servant the
appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend
. ' the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal
even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would
be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant
is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping
the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal
ofthe appeal or revision." G
11. In State of Haryana v. Hasmat [2004(6) SCC 175] it
.-....+
was noted as follows:
"6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of
execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of
j
the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail
and suspension of sentence. One of the essential
ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the
appellate court to record reasons in writing for ·ordering
suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed.
If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be
released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of
recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there
has: tq be careful consideration ·of the relevant aspects
and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant
of bc:iil should not be passed as a matter of routine."
. 12. It is to be noted that learned Single Judge while. direct-
ing suspension of conviction indicated no reasons.
· 13. Above being the position the order of the learned Single
0 Judge, directing the suspension/stay of the conviction as well
as.the order refusing to recall the said order cannot stand and
are set aside.
14. Appeal is allowed.
D.G. Appeal allowed.
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