Sachida Nand Lal @ Sachida Nand Shah v. State of Bihar, (now Jharkhand)

.A_ We do not find any merit in this Letters Patent Appeal which is accordingly dismissed." F 6. The above order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is challenged by the appellant in the present appeal. Initially when the matter was placed for admission hearing, the following order was passed by this Court on August 28, 2000; G "Issue notice limited to the question, whether the High { Court is right while enhancing the rate of compensation of category 'Ka' land to Rs. 66,000.00 per acre but maintaining the category 'Kha' land at Rs. 24,250.00. The H 834 SUPREME. COURT 'REPORTS [2008] 15'S.C.R. A case of the petitioner is that the rate of the land of 'Kha' , .. J..,_ ..... l should have been at least half of the rate of the 'Ka' property as held by the referring Court." (emphasis supplied) ··s 7. On November 13, 2000, the petition was called out for hearing. Service of notice was complete, but none appeared for the respondent and hence leave was granted. It was >c thereafter placed for final hearing before the Court, but it was I, brought to the notice of the Court that in the light of bifurcation ·c oftwostates of (i) Bihar and (ii) Jharkhand, the subject matter in the appeal related to the State of Jharkhand. Fresh notices were, therefore, issued and opportunity was given to the State of Jharkhand to make submissions. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the ;r Division Bench committed c;in error of law in dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal without entering into the merits of the matter. He also submitted that the Division Bench ought to have E allowed the appeal by enhancing the amount of compensation. 10. In our opinion, however, the matter deserves to be allowed on the first ground and it would not be appropriate for this Court fo express any opinion on the second question on merits of the matter. ~ 11. As already observed earlier, after the Reference Court decided the Reference, Appeal from Original Decree was preferred by the claimant before the High Court. It was heard by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Section 54 of G the Act provides for filing Appeals in proceedings before the Col'.lrt. It reads as under; Appeals in proceedings before Court.-Subject to J the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and H notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment SACHIOA NANO LAL@ SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 835 OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO) [C.K. THAKKER, J.] .>-- ~ for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any A proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of B Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof. ,t 12. In view of express provision as to filing of appeal under / the Act as also the provision relating to filing of Letters Patent as applicable to the High Court of Patna, an order passed by c a single Judge of the High Court can be challenged by filing an intra-Court appeal before a Division Bench of the same Court. The claimant was, therefore, justified in exercising the right of filing Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, appeal was preferred before a Division Bench. ~ 13. Since the appeal before the learned Single Judge was Appeal from Original Decree, i.e. First Appeal, the Division Bench ought to have considered the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the learned Single Judge by exercising same powers as exercised by the learned single Judge in the E appeal from original decree. The Letters Patent before the Division Bench was not in the nature of appeal from an appellate decree, i.e. Second Appeal, but it was continuation of appeal from original decree, i.e. First Appeal. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the Division Bench committed F an error of law in dismissing the appeal in limine by a brief order quoted hereinabove without considering the merits. 14. The law on the point is well-settled as regards the power of the Division Bench while dealing with and deciding Letters Patent Appeal from an order passed by a single Judge G. in exercise of power as a Court of Appeal. 15. In Asha Devi v. Oukhi Sao, AIR 1974 SC 2048, a similar question came up for consideration before this Court. There, a First Appeal came up for hearing before a Single 836 · SUPREMi=: COURT REPORTS. r2008J 15 s.c.R: .. A Judge of the High Court and was disposed of. Against the said ;"°'- 1 order, a Letters Patent Appeals was filed. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that since it was an appeal from a decree passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in First Appeal, the appeal before the Division B Bench was in substance and in reality in the nature of Second Appeal and questions of law only could be agitated in such Letters Patent Appeal. .... 16. N·egativing the contention and holding that the scope .. ' of appeal before the Division Bench was similar to one before a Single Judge. this Court stated; "There is no dispute that an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of that Court in appeal from a judgment and decree of a court D subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The only question is whether the power of a Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court or under the analogous provisions in the Letters Patent of other High Courts is E limited only to a question of law under Section 100 of the CPC or has it the same power which the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The limitations on the power of the Court imposed by Sections 100 and 101 of the CPC cannot be F made applicable to an Appellate Court hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge of that High Court in a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the court subordinate to the High Court, for the simple reason that a Single Judge to the High Court is not a Court subordinate, to the High Court". 17. The above observations in Asha Devi make it explicitly clear that an intra-Court appeal is required to be considered and decided by the Division Bench of the High Court on the same footing as an appeal considered and decided by a single H Judge of the Court. r )..1 -~ --..) 'T "' __.I..., SACHIOA NANO LAL@ SACHIOA NANO SHAH v. STATE 837 OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHANO) [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 18. A similar question again arose before this Court recently in Gaudiya Mission v. Shobha Bose & Anr., JT 2008 (1) SC 384. There also, a single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad decided the First Appeal against which Letters Patent Appeal was filed before a Di.vision Bench. There also, the Division Bench without entering into questions of fact and law, dismissed the appeal as if it was in the nature of Second Appeal. Setting aside the order passed by the Single Judge, following the law laid down by this Court in Asha Devi and remitting the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law, this Court held that the order passed by the Division Bench was liable to be set aside and the matter was required to be decided on all questions, i.e. on questions of fact as also on questions of law. 19. The same principle applies in the present case also. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal cannot be said to be in accordance with law and the said order deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench is set aside. The appeal stands allowed and the matter is remanded to Division Bench which will now hear the parties on merits and decide the case in accordance with law by a reasoned judgment. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. 20. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. All the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for the purpose of deciding the present appeal. As and when the matter will be placed for hearing before the Division Bench, the same will be decided strictly on its own merits without being influenced by the above observations. 21. The ~ppeai is accordingly. allowed. D.G. Appeal allowed.