Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh .

,, ... ' ' ' , - The Jud_gm~nt of th~ Cqurt was delivere.d by . B - , · ·t Challenge in this· a~peal is'to the judgment of a Divis,Jon B~nch ·o-r the 'Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalp·ur Bench, holdi.ng· the appellant guilty of offence punish.able under Section 326 read with Section 34 -of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the· 'IPC'). The a·ppellant was ·sentenced to undergo c rigorous imprisonment for 1 O years. By the impugned judgment three.appeals were disposed ofbeing Criminal Appeal No.185 q_(1995;·184.of 1995 and 261 of1993. The appeal filed by accused Nanhe Lal was dismissed while the appeal filed by the app,ellant was partly· allowed altering his conviction for 0 offence.punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC to one under Section 326. read with Section 34 IPC. Similar was the position in respect of co-accused Jagdish . . I '· - .· ~ ~ I. • ~ • · '. 3: Prosecution version in a nutsh~ll is as follows: ·.. .. .. ~ . . .. ~ , E ... A .few m,cmths before the incident dated 28.12.1987, Dropadibai, daughter of Gayaprasad was molested -by accused Prabhu about which he was facing prosecution in the court. Accused Prabhu Dayalwas in this context trying to pressurize d!3ceased Shankar, broth~r of Dropdibai, to amicably settle the F matter, but finding that.he did not budge: the accu$ed persons who were related started bearing a grudge against Shankar. On 28.12.1987 at about 9.00 in the morning, Shankar had gone out in the village. At 11 O' clock Gayaprasad (PW-5) had gone to call his ploughman followed by Rishiraj (PW-9). No sooner G thatthey reached Soryana Mahalia, they heard the call of Sha.nker that he be saved. Both Gayaprasad and Rishi Raj rushed-to the place and they noticed that the three accused were beating· Shanker. Accused Nanhelal was armed with· Katarna. (a sharp instrument for cutting) while the.either-two were armed H _with_ lathis. It is aJleged that all of them· administered several ;.( ., .,;.· ..( PRABHU V.'STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1099 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] blows with their respective weapons and caused severe injuries and thereafter ran away towards the jungle. The report of the incident Ext.P-12 was lodged by Gayaprasad (PW-5). Fourteen external.injuries were found on the body of the deceased. As per the opinion of the Autopsy Surgeon, the death of the deceased was caused due to extensive hemorrhage on account of shock due to injury No.8 mainly arid injury Nos. 13 and 14 causing hemorrhage. They were incised wounds. Since accused persons abjured guilt, trial was held. Each of the accused persons was convicted as noted above. Appeals were filed before the High Court. So far as the appellant is concerned, it was submitted that he could not be convicted in terms of Section 302 read With Section 34 IPC as only accused Nanhe, according to the prosecution, caused incised wounds. The appellant was holding only a stick. The High Court relied on the evidence of two eye-witnesses PWs 5 and 9 and held that the appellant cannot be held guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. It was held that the prosecution has not proved that each of the participating culprits had the same intention and each one shared the intention of the other. The High Court noticed that the accused Prabhu and Jagdish had caused lacerated wounds and, therefore, the knowledge which can be inferred from the said acts is that they intended to cause grievous hurt. Accordingly, the conviction as noted above was altered. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant cannot be convicted in terms of Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. It was submitted that none of the injurieswere grievous hurts and the sentence in any way is very harsh. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported the judgment. 6. Section 325 deals with punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. 1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 16 S.C.R. A 7. Section 326 deals with offence of voluntarily causing hurt ). by dangerous weapons or means. 8. Section 326 provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by. Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any .instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, 8 or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likeiy . to.cause death, or .by· mearis of fire or arw gorrosive substance, r · or· by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which is deleterious to the human body to inh.~1~ 1 f9 C swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall. be punished with imprisonment for life or with ·imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also with a liability to pay a fine. 9. Sections 325 and 326, like the two Secti'ons D immediately preceding, provide the ord.!nary punishment and . punishment 1.mder certain aggravating circumstances of th~ offences mentioned thereunder. The two latter Sections apply to the case of causing "grievous hurt" and the immediately preceding two Sections to the case of 'hurt\ 10. "Grievous hurt" has been defined in Section 320 IPC, which read as follows: "320 Grievous Hurt - The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"- First - Emasculation; Secondly - Permanent eye.· privation of the sight of either G Thirdly - Permanent privation of the .hearing of either ear. Fourthly - Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly - Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any members or joint. -t PRABHU v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1101 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] Sixthly - Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly - Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth . . Eighthly -Any hurt which endangers life orwhich causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." ~ 11. Some hurts which are not like those hurts which are mentioned in t~e first seven clauses, are obviously distinguished from a slight hurt, may nevertheless be more serigµs .. Thu~ a wound may cause intense pain, prolonged c g\sease or lasting injury to the victim, although it does not fall within any of the first seven clauses. Before a conviction for the sentence of grievous hurt can be passed, one of the injuries defined in Section 320 must be strictly proved, and the eighth clause is no exception to the general rule of law that a penal o statute must be construed strictly. 12. The expression "any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death" has to be gauged taking note of the heading of the Section. What would constitute a 'dangerous weapon' would depend upon the facts of each E case and no generalization can be made. 13. The heading of the Section provides some insight Into , the factors to be considered. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are : (1) voluntarily c~using a hurt; (2) hurt caused F. must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means. As was noted by this. Court in State of U.P. v. lndrajeet Alias Sukhatha (2000(7) sec 249) there is no such thing as ·a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that matter a . G hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined factually. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that in some provisions e.g. Sections 324 and 326 expression "dangerous weapon" is used. In some other more serious offences the H l 1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 16 S.C.R. A expression used is ''deadly weapon" (e.g. Sections 397 and _,JI. 398). The facts involved in a particular case, _depending upon various factors like size, sharpness, would throw light on-" the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not. That would determine whether in the case B Section 325 or Section 326 would be applicable. 14. The above position was highlighted in Mathai v. State ~· of Kera/a (2005 (2) JT 365). 15. Considering the principles set out above, certainly the C appellant was guilty of offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. However, in the peculiar facts of the ; case, the sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. 0 16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. D.G. Appeal partly allowed.