Raman Lal Bhai Lal v. State of Gujarat
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. This appeal by special leave,
against the judgment dated 4.3.2003 passed by the Gujarat
D High Court in LP.A. No.123 of 2000, relates to the interpretation
of the word 'person' in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
Act, 1960 ('Ceiling Act' for short). ~
The Facts :
E 2. The five appellants along with their respective spouses
purchased 172 acres and 36 guntas of agricultural land in
Madheli village under four sale deeds dated 14.11.1970 (128A,
26G), 29.4.1971 (26A, 37G), 23.6.1971 (1 OA, 14G) and
18.12.1971 (6A, 39G) for a total consideration of Rs.46,300/-.
F Before such purchase, the ten purchasers entered into an + ·
agreement dated 15.9.1969 proposing to purchase about 175
acres of land in their joint names and recording the conditions
subject to which they proposed to purchase such land. The
reason stated in the agreementfor the joint purchase, was to
G avoid each of them having to individually negotiate and enter
into separate agreements with several owners of the lands. They
agreed that one of them would be authorized to hold negotiations
and go through the procedural requirements for the purchase;
and that after purchasing the land in their names, they would
H divide the lands equally as early as possible. They also agreed
t -i,
- RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 477
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
,..
that there will be no collective or joint cultivation of the lands A . proposed to be purchased by them. j
3. After the purchase of the lands, the ten purchasers
entered into another agreement on 30.12.1971 recording that
the total sale price of Rs.46,300/- was paid equally by all of B them. The said agreement also recorded the division of 172A,
{
36G of land purchased by them into ten portions among them.
...!, Under the said agreement, they also agreed to get their names
registered in the Land Revenue Records as per the division.
Subsequently, on their applications, Mutation Entry No.1371
c dated 25.2.1976 (duly verified and approved on 19.4.1976) was
made showing each co-owner as the separate owner of the
lands respectively allotted to him/her, vide Hak Patrak (Village
Form No.6), issued by the Land Revenue authorities.
The Proceedings : D
4. The Mamlatdar issued a notice dated 5.11.1976 under
section 20 of the Ceiling Act to the co-owners seeking
particulars of the lands held by them, to determine whether they
held any surplus land. After considering their statements, he
. passed an order dated 30.4.1983. He held that the total land E
held by them was 182 A. 23 Guntas; that when the lands were
converted into 'C' Class category, th~ extent was 181A, 31 G;
that each couple (husband and wife) were together entitled to
.. one unit (36 acres of 'C' category land); and that therefore the
'
-+ five couples (the five appellants with their spouses) were entitled F
to hold five units, that is, 180 acres. Consequently, he made a
declaration under section 21 of the Ceiling Act, that the surplus
holding was 1 acre, 31 guntas and that such surplus land (in Sy.
No.643/43 in Madheli) shall vest in the Government.
5. The Deputy Collector, Dabhoi, in exercise of suo motu G
power of revision under section 37 of the Ceiling Act, issued a
show cause notice dated 3.5.1984 to the appellants, being of
the view that the determination of surplus land by the Mamlatdar
was contrary to the provisions of the Ceiling Act. After hearing,
he passed an order dated 23.8.1984 holding that a group of H
A persons or association of persons purchasing agricultural land
together, had to be treated as 'a person' .under the Act and
therefore they could jointly hold only one unit (36Acres) in view
of the. provision of section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act. As a ·
consequence,_he determined the surplus land as 145 A, 31 G
B and directed the Mamlatdar to obtain selection of the land to be
surrendered. The said order was challenged by the appellants
before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, by invoking its revisional
jurisdiction. The Tribl!nal, by its judgment dated 29.12.1987,.
upheld the decision of the Deputy Collector, by applying the
c definition of 'person' in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904,
to the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act. ·
6. The appellants challenged the order of the Tribunal
before the Gujarat High Court. A learned Single Judge by order
dated 30.12:1999 allowed the petition and remanded the matter·
D to the Revenue Tribunal to decide whether the definition of
'person' in the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 ·('General
Clauses Act' for short) could be imported into the definition of a
'person' under the Ceiling Act. The appellants challenged the
order of the learned Single Judge in appeal.A Division Bench
E of the Gujarat High Court allowed the appeal in part, by judgment
dated 4.3.2003. It held that there was no need for remand, as
the question whether the definition of 'person' included an
association of persons, was a pure question of law which can
be decided by the High Court itself, It held that definition of
F 'person' in the General Clauses Act has to be read into the
definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act and therefore, the decision
of the Revenue Tribunal treating the ten co-owners as an
association of persons, and consequently, a 'person' for the
purpose of the Ceiling Act, entitling them to hold only one unit
. G
H.
(36 acres), did not suffer from any infirmity. The order of th~ .
Tribunal was thus restored. The said order of the Division Bench
of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
The Contentions :
7. The appellants contend that the definition of 'person' in
rl
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 479
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
~
General Clauses Act cannot be read into the definition of A
'person' in the· Ceiling Act. They submitted that the general
definition in the General Clauses Act would apply only in the
absence of a specific definition in the concerned enactment;
that as the Ceiling Act itself defined the word 'person', there
was an legislative intention to exclude· the general definition of B
the word 'person' in the GC Act; and that consequently the
t definition of 'person' in section 2(21) should be interpreted as
,.&
referring only to a natural person (a human being) or a joint family
as defined in the Ceiling Act; and that therefore, an association
of persons or body of individuals will not be a 'person' for the c purpose of Ceiling Act.
7 .1) Alternatively, it is· submitted that even if the word
·'person' is held to include an association of persons or body of
individuals, a co-ownership cannot be considered as a body of
individuals or association of persons and each co-owner should D
be considered as a person for the purposes of the Ceiling Act.
7 .2) The appellants contende(j tha,t section 6(~) of the
Ceiling Act provided that while calculating the holding of an
individual who is a member of a family, the land held by the E spouse {as also minor sons and minor unmarried daughters)
has to be clubbed with the individual's holding; and therefore, in
this case, the holding of wife of each appellant should be added
to his holding for the purpose of considering whether he held
any surplus land. In other word$, each couple (each ofthe five
appellants with his wife) was a 'person' entitled to hold one unit F
(36 acres); and therefore, the decision of the Mamlatdar that
the appellants were entitled to hold five units (180 acres) and
only the land in excess of five units was surplus land was in
accordance with law.
8. On the other hand, the respondent State contended that G
-+ the definition of 'person' in the GC Act will have ,to be read into . '
the definition of 'person' in section 2(21) of the Ceiling Act and
therefore any 'association· of persons' or 'body of individua\s'
will have to be treated as a person. It is submitted that when the H
A five appellants and their respective spouses joined together to
purchase 172 acres 36 guntas of land, they constituted an
'association of persons' or 'body of individuals' and therefore,
the purchase by the ten purchasers was a purchase by a 'person'
and the ten co-owners as a 'person' were entitled to hold only
B one unit (36 acres of 'C' class land).
8.1) The respondent's next contention is based on section
8 of Ceiling Act which provides that any transfer or partition
effected between 24.1.1971 and the date on which the Gujarat
Agricultural Land Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972 came into
C force shall be deemed to have been made in anticipation in
order to defeat the object of the said Amending Act unless it is
proved to the contrary. It is contended that the partition effected
among the ten co-owners under the unregistered agreement
dated 30.12.1971 should be deemed to have been effected
D with the intention of defeating the object of Gujarat Agricultural
Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972, (Amending Act for short)
having regard to the provisions of section 8 of the Ceiling Act. It
is pointed out that the only way to avoid such a presumption
was to make an application to the Collector under sub-section
E (2) of section 8 in the prescribed form within the prescribed
period seeking a declaration that such partition was not made
in anticipation in order to defeat the object of the Amending Act,
1972. It is contended that as such an application was not made
to the Collector, the partition will have to be deemed as having
F been made to defeat the object of the Act and consequently the
partition shall have to be ignored in computing the surplus land
under the Act.
8.2) Lastly it is submitted by the respondents that the joint
purchase by ten persons was a ruse to circumvent the bar
G contained in section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 ('Tenancy Act' for short) which prohibits sale of +
agricultural land in favour of non-agriculturists. It is alleged that
most of the ten purchasers were non-agriculturists who could
not have purchased agricultural land, and they have attempted
H to circumvent the bar contained in Tenancy Act, by nominally
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 481
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
joining with some agriculturists and buying land as co-owners A
and thereafter effecting a partition and claiming exclusive
ownership. It is contended that if each co-owner is a distinct
'person', then sale in favour of non-agriculturists will not be valid,
even if the purchase was jointly in the names of agriculturists
and non-agriculturist and consequently, the lands to the extent B
purchased by the non-agriculturists will vest in the State
Government.
9. The appellants replied that even if the partition was
ignored under section 8 of the Ceiling Act, it would not affect the
calculation of surplus land, as each co-owner was a 'person' C
and each family (husband and wife) will be entitled to one unit.
In regard to contention based on section 63 of the Tenancy Act,
it was submitted that while determining the surplus land under
the provisions of the Ceiling Act, there was no question of holding
any enquiry under section 63 of Tenancy Act. And at all events, D
even if the question as to whether the purchasers were
agriculturists or not, has to be gone into, the same being a
question of fact that will have to be decided by a separate inquiry
under the Tenancy Act and not in the proceedings under the
Ceiling Act. E
10. On the contentions raised, the following questions arise
for our consideration :
(i) Whether the definition of 'person' in the Gujarat
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, includes a body F
of individuals/association of persons ?
(ii) Whether co-ownership, per se, is an 'association of
persons/body of individuals' and therefore,
constitutes a 'person'?
(iii) G Whether the ten purchasers, who became co-owners
of the land, together constitute a 'body of individuals/
association of persons' and therefore a 'person'
within the meaning of that expression in the Ceiling
Act? H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 2 S.C.R.
A (iv) Whether the partition dated 30.12.1971 among the
co-owners is 'deemed to have been made in
anticipation to defeat the object of Gujarat Agricultural
Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972' under section
8(1) of the Ceiling Act; and if so what is the effect of
B failure to make an application under sub-section (2)
of section 8 of the Ceiling Act.
(v) What would be the position if some of the co-owners . ,.
were nori- agriculturists at the time of purchase of
the lands? Whether the Mamlatdar can examine this·
issue when considering the question of surplus land
under the Ceiling Act?
Statutory Provisions :
11. The Ceiling Act was enacted to fix a ceiling on holding
·· D of agricultural lands and to provide for the acquisition and
disposal of surplus agricultural land. Section 4 relates to
delimitation of local areas and provides that there shall be
different classes of local areas in the state as specified in
Schedule I and the local areas falling in each such class shall
E be as respectively specified in Schedule II. Section 5 deals with
ceiling areas. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to
the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), in relation to each
class of local area as specified in Schedule I, the ceiling area
with reference to each class of land shall be as specified in the
F .said s·chedule against the respective class of local area.
Madheli village, Waghodia Taluk (Baroda District) is specified
as class C area under Schedule II. It is not in dispute that the
lands in question were found to be dry crop land, and therefore
the unit.ceiling area was 36Acres under Schedule I to the Ceiling
G Act.
11: 1) Section 6 deals with ceiling on holding of land.
Sub-sections (1), (2), 3(8), 3(C), and 3(0fwhlch are relevant
are. ;extracted below :
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
+
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 483
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
time being i·n force or in any agreement, usage or decree A
or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day, no
person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2),
(3), (38) and 4 be entitled to hold whether as owner or
tenant or partly as Qwner and partly as tenant land in excess
of the ceiling area. B
(2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a member of
a ·famHy, not being a joint family which consists of the
individual and. his spouse (or more than one spouse) and
their minor .sons and minor unmarried daughters,
irrespective of whether the family also includes· any major C
son, land is also separately held by such individual's
spouse or minor children, then the lands held by the
individual and the said members of the individual's family
excluding the major sons, if any, shall be grouped together
for the purposes of the Act and the provisions of the Act D
shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such
land had been held by one person.
xxxxxxx
(38) Where a family or a joint family consist of more than E
five members comprising a person and other members
belonging to all or any of the following categories, namely:
(i) minor son,
(ii) widow of a pre-deceased son, F
(iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-
deceased son, where his or her mother is dead,
such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the·
ceiling area to the extent of one fifth of the ceiling area for G
each member in excess of five, so however that the total
holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling
area; and in such a case, in relation to the holding of such
family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area:
xxxxx H
(3C) Where a family or a joint family irrespective of the
number of members includes a major son, then such major
son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the
purposes of sub-section (1).
xxxxx
11.2) Section 8 deals with transfers and partitions
effected to defeat the objects of the Ceiling Act. Sub-section
(1) provides that where after 24.1.1971 but before the stipulated
date (the date on which the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
c (Amendment) Act, 1972 - Gujarat Act 2of1974) came into force),
any person has transferred or partitioned any land held by him,
then notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force, such transfer or partition, shall, unless it is proved
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in anticipation
0 in order to defeat the object of the Amending Act of 1972. Sub-
sections (2) and (4) of section 8 read as under:
"(2) Any person effected by the provisions of sub-section
(1) may, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed
form, make an application to the Collector for a declaration
E that the transfer or partition was not made in anticipation
in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may
be, of the Amending Act of 1972.
xxxxx
(4) Where the application is rejected, the transfer or, as
the case may be, the partition shall be ignored in computing
under this Act the area of surplus land, if any, held by such
person."
11.3) Section 2 contains the definitions. Clauses (16)
and (21) which are relevant are extracted below:
"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context
requires otherwise -
xxxxx
+
-i,
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 485
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
y (16) "Joint family" means a undivided Hindu family A
A and in the case of other persons a group or unit the
members of which by custom or usage are joint in
estate or residence;
-=1
xxxxx B
(21) "person" includes a joint family;"
12. Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 also defines the
~ word 'person'. The said definition in section 3(35) is extracted
below:
"3. Definitions : In this Act, and in all Bombay and Gujarat
Acts made after the commencement of this Act, unless
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, ........
(35). "Person" shall include any company or association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; D
13. Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948, as applicable in Gujarat bars transfer to non-
agriculturists. Sub-section (1) of section 63 provides that save
as otherwise provided in the Act, no sale shall be valid in favour
of a person - (i) who is not an agriculturist, or (ii) who being an E
agriculturist cultivates lands not less than ceiling area, or (iii)
who is not an agricultural labour. The first proviso to sub-section
(1) provides that the Collector (or an officer authorized by the
r State Government) may grant permission for such sale, but the
second proviso to sub-section (1) provides that no such F
permission shall be granted where the land is being sold to a
person who is not an agriculturist for agricultural purpose, if the
annual income of such person from other sources exceeds
Rupees five thousand.
Question (i) - who is a 'person' ? G
--+ 14. The extent of land that could be held by the appellants
depends upon the interpretation of the word 'person' in section
6(1) of the Ceiling Act which provides that "no person shall ...
be entitled to hold ... land in excess of the ceiling area". If the H
1-
I
A ten co-owners are considered gs an 'association of persons' --./
or 'body of individuals', and consequently as a 'person', then "
the ten co-owners together as a person, will be entitled to only
one unit of land which is the ceiling area per person. But if
'association of persons' or body of individuals is not a 'person',
B or if a co-ownership is not an association of person/body of
individuals, then each co-owner or the family of each co-owner,
as the case may be will be a separate 'person' having regard to
the definition of person in section 2(21) of Ceiling Act, in which ~-
event, each family will be entitled to hold one unit of land.
c 15. The word 'person' is defined in the Act, but it is an
inclusive definition, that is "a person includes a joint ·family."
' Where the definition is an inclusive definition, the use of the
word 'includes' indicates ~n intention to enlarge the meaning of
the word used in the Statute. Consequently, the word must be
D construed as comprehending not only such things which they
signify according to their natural import, but also those things
which the interpretation clause declares that they sha·11 include.
Thus, where a definition uses the word 'includes', as contrasted ~ .
from 'means', the word defined not only bears its ordinary
E popular and natural meaning, but in addition also bear the
extended statutory meaning (See S.K. Gupta v. K.P Jain -AIR
1979 SC 734 following Dilworth vs. Commissioner of Stamps
- 1899 AC 99 and Jobbins vs. Middlesex County Council -
1949 (1) KB 142). '
F 16. The ordinary, popular and natural meaning of the word
'person' is 'a specific individual human being'. But in law the
:y-
word 'person' has a slightly different connotation, and refers to
any entity that is recognized by law ~s having the rights and
duties of a human being. Salmond defines 'person' as 'any
G- being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties' or
as 'a being, whether human or not, of which rights and duties
are the attributes (Jurisprudence : 12th Edition Page 299]. Thus +-
the word 'person', in law, unless otherwise intended, refers not
only to a natural person (male or female human being), but also
H any legal person (that is an entity that is recognized by law as
I ....._
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 487
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.] ,.,.
having or capable of having rights and duties). The General A
-\ Clauses Act thus defines a 'person' as including a corporation
~ or an association of persons or a body of individuals whether
incorporated or not. The said general legal definition is, however,
either modified or restricted or expanded in different statutes
with reference to the object of the enactment or the context in B
which it is used. For instance, the definition of the word 'person'
~
in Income Tax Act, is very wide and includes an individual, a
"' Hindu Undivided Family, a company, a firm, an association of
persons or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, a
local authority and every other artificial juridical person. At the c
other extreme is the Citizenship Act, section 2(f) of which reads
thus : "Person does not include any company or association or
body of individuals whether incorporated or not." Similarly, the
definition under Section 2(g) of Representation of People Act
1950, is "person" does not include a body of persons. D
17. Both definitions of the word 'person', in General
....... Clauses Act and Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions. The
inclusive definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act applies
to all Gujarat Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or the context. The inclusive definition of 'person' in section 2(21) E
of the Ceiling Act, does not indicate anything repugnant to the
definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act, but merely adds
'joint family' to the existing definition. Therefore the definition of
person in the Ceiling Act, would include the definition of person
"it in section 3(35) of General Clauses Act. The resultant position F
can be stated thus : The definition of person in General Clauses
Act, being an inclusive definition, would include the ordinary,
popular and general meaning and those specifically included in
the definition. The inclusive definition of 'person' in the Ceiling
Act, in the absence of any exclusion, would have the same G
..,. meaning assigned to the word in the General Clauses Act, and
in addition, a 'joint family' as defined. Thus, the word 'person' in
the Ceiling Act will, unless the context otherwise requires, refer
to:
(i) a natural human being, H
8
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 2 S.C.R.
(ii) any legal entity which is capable of possessing rights
and duties, including any company or association of
persons or body of individuals (whether incorporated
or not); and
(iii) a Hindu Undivided Family or any other group or unit
of persons, the members of which by custom or
usage, are joint in estate and residence.
18. We are fortified in this view by the decision of this Court
in Hasmukhalal Dahayabhai vs. State of Gujarat - 1976 (4)
c SCC 100, wherein this Court had occasion to consider the
definition of 'person' in the Ceiling Act, in a different context. It
was contended in that case that in view of the definition of
'person' in General Clauses Act, 1897, a central enactment, that
is, 'person' shall include any company or association or body of
0 individuals, whether incorporated or not, there cannot be a
different definition in the Ceiling Act, and therefore, section 6(2)
of the Ceiling Act treating family as a 'person' was
unconstitutional. It was pointed out that section 6(2) had the effect
of making a person who held land within ceiling limit, to lose
part of his/her holding, on marriage to someone who also held
E land within ceiling limit. (For example, if a bachelor who was
holding 35 acres of land which is within ceiling limit, married
someone who held 20 acres, they will together lose 19 acres by
reason of the fact that they formed a 'family'). This Court negatived
the challenge to the definition of 'person'. In that context this
F Court observed that the term 'person' is not, strictly speaking,
defined in the Act, and the definition merely clarified that the
term includes a joint family and did not exclude an individual
from being a person in the eye of law. This Court observed that
the term 'person' for the purposes of Ceiling Act would include
G individuals as natural persons as well as group or body of
individuals as artificial persons, as also a joint family and a
family. This Court proceeded to explain section 6(2) thus:
·H
"We do not find any fixed concept of "person" anywhere.
No doubt the concept is wide so that it could be contended
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 489
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
~ that it should not be narrowed down or confined. But does A
Section 6(2) do that? Section 6(2) does not either disable
a husband or wife from owning or holding their separate
properties separately. It does not merge or destroy their
separate legal personalities. It requires their separate
holdings to be grouped together as though they were held · B
by one person only for the purpose of determining the
ceiling limit for each member of a family. It may indirectly
-1., have· the effect of disabling a member of a family from
holding land upto the prescribed ceiling limit for a person
holding as an individual. In other words, the result is that c
such a member of a family will have to be content with a
holding less than that of an unmarried individual. It has the
effect of making it clear that what have to be grouped
together are the separate properties of individuals
belonging to families other than what are "joint families", D in law. It takes in and applies to members of families other
than undivided Hindu families. It means that married
~
persons and their minor children will have to be viewed as
though they hold one lot together even though they retain
their separate legal personalities and remain competent
E owners of their separate holdings. It does not affect either
th'eir legal status or competence. It does reduce their
individual holdings."
Question (ii) - Whether co-owners are together a
'person'? F
19. When several persons acquire undivided shares (as
contrasted from defined portions) in a property, either equal or
unequal, they become co-owners of the property; or where an
owner of a property transfers a share in the property to another,
the transferee becomes a co-owner along with the original owner. Gi
To be termed as co-owners, the right of each owner should be
~ co-ordinate with the other 'owners'. If the right of one is higher in
degree than that of the other, there is no co-ownership. For
example, a mortgagor and mortgagee are not co-owners. A
lessor and lessee are not co-owners. Whether the shares are H
A equal or not, each co-owner is entitled to be in possession of
every part of the property, jointly with the other co-owners. In Sri
Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [AIR 1976 SC 2335], this Court
observed:
"Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of
a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the
composite property along with others and it cannot be
said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of
. the property. The position will change only when partition
takes place ... "
·. This Court also relied on the following passage from
Salmond's 'Jurisprudence':
"It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time
in more than one person ... The several ownership of a
D part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole.
So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part
·of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership
has been dissolved into sole ownership by the process
known as partition. Co-ownership involves the undivided
E integrity of what is owned."
20. The terms 'association of persons' and 'body of
individuals' (which are interchangeable) have a legal connotation
and refer to an entity having rights and duties. They are not to
be understood literally. For example, if half a dozen people are
F travelling in a car or a boat, or standing in a bus stop, they may
be a group of persons or a 'body of individuals' in the literal
sense. But they are not an association of persons/body of
individuals in the legal sense. When a calamity occurs or a
disaster strikes, and a band of volunteers or doctors meet at
G the site and associate or co-operate with each other for
providing relief to victims, and not doing anything for their own
benefit, they may literally be an association of persons, but they
are not 'an association of persons/body of individuals' in the
legal sense. A mere combination of persons or coming together
H of persons without anything more, without any intention to have
' '
-
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 491
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
a joint venture or carry on some common activity with a common A
understanding and purpose will not convert two or more persons
into a body of individuals/association of persons. An 'association
of persons/body of individuals' is one in which two or more
persons join in a common purpose and common action to .
achieve some common benefit. Where there is a combination B
of individuals by volition of the parties, engaged together in
some joint enterprise or venture, it is known as 'association of
persons/body of individuals'. The common object will have some
relevance to determine whether a group or set of persons is an
association of persons or body of individuals with reference to c
a particular statute. For example, when the said terms
'association or persons' or 'body of individuals' occur in a section
which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one
the object of which is to produce income, profit or gain. [vide :
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Indira Balkrishna (AIR 1960 D
SC 1172), Mohammed Noorul/a vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1043, M. V Shanmugam vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (AIR 1970 SC 1707)]
and Meera and Company vs. Commissioner of Income Tax -
1997 (4) SCC 677. But the object need not always be to carry
on commercial or business activity. For example, when the word E
'person' occurs in a statute relating to agriculture or ceiling on
land holding, the term 'association of persons/body of
individuals' may refer to a combination of individuals who join
together to acquire and own land as co-owners and carry on
agricultural operations as a joint enterprise. F
21. Normally, where a group of persons have not become
co-owners by their volition with a common purpose, they cannot
be considered as a 'person'. When the children of the owner of
a property succeed to his property by testamentary succession
or inherit by operation of law, they become co-owners, but the G
co-ownership is not by volition.of parties nor do they have any
common purpose. Each can act in regard to his/her share, on
his/her own, without any right or obligation towards the other
owners. The legal heirs though co-owners, do not automatically H .
}
A become an 'association of persons/ body of individuals'. When "<f
different persons buy undivided shares in a plot of land and
engage a common developer to construct an apartment building,
with individual ownership in regard to respective apartment and
joint ownership of common areas, the co-owners of the plot of
B land, do not become an 'association of persons/body of
individuals', in the absence of a deeming provision in a statute
or an agreement. Similarly, when two or more persons merely ~
purchase a property, under a common sale deed, without any >-·
agreement to have a common or joint venture, they will not
c become an 'association of persons/body of individuals'. Mere
purchase under a common deed without anything more, will not
convert a co-ownership into a joint enterprise. Thus when there (
are ten co-owners of a property, they are ten persons and not a
'body of individuals' to be treated as a 'single person'. But if the
D co-owners proceed further and enter into an arrangement or
agreement to have a joint enterprise or venture to produce a
common result for their benefit, then the co-owners may answer
the definition of a 'person'.
Question (iii) - Whether the ten purchasers constitute
E a 'person'?
22·. We will now examine whether a group of individuals ....
purchasing agricultural land jointly as co-owners, not with the
intention of retaining the property in co-ownership and carrying
on agricultural activities jointly, nor with the intention of managing
it as a joint venture nor with the intention of holding it together to ~
generate income, profit or gain, but solely with the intention of
dividing the land so purchased and hold their respective shares
separately and individually, can be considered as a 'person' for
the purposes of the Ceiling Act. The Tribunal and the High court
G have proceeded on the basis that the ten purchasers constituted
an 'association of persons' and therefore a separate juristic ""'('
person. Let us examine whether the said conclusion is correct.
23. Instead of buying the land (172 acres, 36 guntas) jointly
under the four sale deeds it was open to the ten persons to
RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 493
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
have bought the lands individually, that is each of them A
purchasing such extent of land as he or she wanted. If they had
registered the sale deeds individually (subject to each of them
being entitled to buy agricultural land, under the land reforms
laws In force) each couple would have been entitled to hold land
to the extent of one unit. Instead of each individual or couple B
purchasing the land in their respective names, if for convenience
in negotiations, ten individuals buy the land jointly, the position
will be no different. It cannot be said that merely because the
sale deed is in the joint names of ten persons, they purchased
the land as "an association of persons" or as "body of individuals" C
with the common intention of carrying on agricultural activities
jointly or producing income, profit or gain or carry on some
common joint venture. In fact before purchasing the lands, the
ten persons had entered into an agreement placing on record
that the object of purchasing the lands jointly was only to facilitate 0 .
negotiations and avoid duplicating the purchase procedures and
not to cultivate them jointly. There is no evidence of any joint
cultivation, nor any evidence of any intention to have a joint
venture. On the other hand, after purchase, they divided the lands
and informed the land revenue authorities and each co-owner
E was registered as the owner of the respective land allotted to
him/her. This is not a case where a body of individuals purchased
the land with the intention of having a continued community of
interest by way of a joint venture or as a business venture. It is
therefore not possible to treat the ten purchasers as an
'association of persons/body of individuals' nor is it permissible F
to treat them as a single 'person', thereby restricting their
entitlement to hold land to only one unit, even though there are
ten purchasers.
24. The Tribunal and the High Court were right in holding G
that the word 'person' in the Ceiling Act includes an 'association
of persons/body of individuals'. But they were not justified in
treating the co-owners as an 'association of persons', or in
holding that the ten co-owners will be entitled to own only one
unit. Having regard to section 6(2) of the Act, the share of each H
A couple (husband and wife) in the land, plus any other land
individually held by them will have to calculated to find out
whether they held any land in excess of the ceiling limit.Therefore
the share of each appellant in the lands jointly purchased, with
the addition of the lands held by his spouse, and addition of any
B other land held by them, will give the basis for determining the
surplus land. For example, if a husband's share as co-owner is
20 acres and wife's share as co-owner is 20 acres, and their
other individual holding is another 10 acres (all of the same
category in C class), the total holding of the family will be 50
c acres (20+20+10 acres) and the surplus will be 14 acres.
Question (iv) - What is the effect of section 8 of Ceiling
Act?
25. The fact that the partition among the co-owners on
D 30 .12 .1971 was between 24.1.1971 and the date on which the
Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Amendment Act, 1972 came
into effect, is not in dispute. Sub-section (1) of section 8 makes
it clear that where any person has transferred or partitioned any
land held by him between those dates then notwithstanding
E anything contained in any law, such partition shall be deemed
to have been made in anticipation in order to defeat the object
of the said Amendment Act unless it is proved to the contrary.
Sub-section (2) provides how the affected person may prove
the contrary by filing an application to the collector seeking a
declaration to that effect. When such an application is made,
sub-section (3) requires the Collector to hold an inquiry and make
an order either rejecting the application or declaring that the
partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the
object of the Amending Act, 1972. Sub-section (4) lays down
that where an application for declaration is rejected, the transfer
G or partition shall be ignored in computing the area of surplus
land held by such person. The same will be the effect where no
application is made at all. It is thus clear that the statutory
presumption that a partition made between those dates was
intended to defeat the object of the Amendment Act cannot be
H displaced unless an application is made under sub-section (2)
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RAMAN LAL BHAI LAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT 495
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
and a declaration is made by the Collector under sub-section A
(3). In this case, neither any application was made under sub
section (2) nor any declaration was made under sub-section
(3). Therefore it has to be held that the partition effected on
30.12.1971 was deemed to have been made in order to defeat
the object of the Amendment Act, 1972 and consequently, the B,
partition will have to be ignored while computing the surplus
land.
26. But in this case the exclusion of the partition may not
have any significant effect. As we have held that the ten co
owners together are not to be treated as a person, the share of C
the co-owner will have to be calculated and the lands individually .
held by such co-owner will have to be added to determine his
holding. Thereafter, the holdings of the person with that of his
spouse and minor sons and unmarried daughter will have to be
aggregated to determine the surplus. D
Question (v) - What requires to be done?
27. The Mamlatdar will have to decide the matter by
holding an enquiry under section 21 of the Ceiling Act keeping
in view the principles laid down in sections 6 to 8 of the Ceiling E
Act. Further section 63 of the Tenancy Act also has to be kept in
view while examining the claim of co-owners. If the sale was
effected jointly in the name of ten persons to enable some non
agriculturists who were barred from buying agricultural land, to
buy agricultural land by joining some agriculturists as co- F
purchasers, the sale to the extent it is in favour of non
agriculturists will not be valid and the consequences on account
of sale not being valid for violation of section 63 of Tenancy Act
will follow as provided in section 84C of that Act. For example if
ten purchasers purchase hundred acres of land with equal G
shares, and six of them are non-agriculturists, then the sale in
respect of the six non-agriculturists (to an extent of 60 acres)
will not be valid and such land purchased by non-agriculturists •
may have to vest in the State Government as provided in section
84C of the Tenancy Act. In this case no such enquiry has been H
A held to find out about the validity of the sale. Therefore, the matter
will have to be remitted to the Mamlatdar to hold an enquiry
under sections 63 and 84C of Tenancy Act to decide whether
all the purchasers were agriculturists who were entitled to
purchase agricultural land and whether transfer in favour of all
B of them is valid or invalid and to make consequential orders.
28. We therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders
of the High Court as also that of the authorities below. As a
consequence, we direct the Mamlatdar :
c (a) to decide whether any of the ten purchasers is a non
agriculturist and if so the extent of transfer in favour of
such non-agriculturist which will be invalid and pass
consequential orders in respect of such land in accordance
with law;
D (b) to determine whether any of the ten purchasers who
are agriculturists, holds excess land by considering their
share in the lands purchased as co-owners, with other
lands as provided in sections 6 to 8 of the Ceiling Act, and
pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
E D.G. Appeal allowed.
'I""