Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Ors

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I. 1. Reservation for G admission in educational institutions or for public employment has been a matter of challenge in various litigations in this Court as well as in the High Courts. Diverse opinions have been expressed in regard to the need for reservation. Though several grounds have been raised to oppose any form of reservation, H few in independent India have voiced disa~;;-eement with the - ( ) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 65 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN,'C.J.I.] proposition that the disadvantaged sections of the population A deserve and need "special help". But there has been consid~rab.le disagreement as to which category of disadvantaged sections deserve such help, about the form this help ought to take and about the efficacy and propriety of what the government has done in this regard. B 2. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who presided over the Congress Expert Committee emphasized before the Constituent Assembly that the removal of socio-economic inequalities was the highest priority. He believed that only.this could make India a casteless and classless society, without which the Constitution C will become useless and purposeless 1 . The Founding Fathers of the Constitution were thus aware of the ripples of inequality present in society, decried the notion of caste and ensured that the Constitutional framework contained adequate safeguards that would ensure the upliftment of the socially and educationally D backward classes of citizens, thus creating a society of equals. The interpretation of the term "socially and educationally backward", and its constituent classes, was left for future generations to decide. 3. Regarding equality, Dr. Ambedkar stated in the E Constituent Assembly2 : " ... We must begin by acknowledging the fact that there is complete absence of two things in Indian Society. One of these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India a F society based on the principle of graded inequality which means elevation for some and degradation for others. On the economic plane, we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as against many who live in abject poverty." 4. Judge Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice, writing in 1945, described the importance of the principle of 1 11 ConstituentAssembly Debates 317 (Wednesday, Janu'ary 22, 1947) 2 XI Constituent Assembly Debates 979 (Friday, November 25, 1949) H l I A equality in the following words:- "The claim to equality before the law is in substantial sense tlie most fundamental of the rights of man. It occupies the first place in most written constitutions. It is the starting point of all other liberties."3 5. Equality has also been enshrined in various international instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its Preamble speaks of "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family", and of "the equal rights of c men and women."4 6. Reservation is one of the many tools that are used to preserve and promote the essence of equality, so that disadvantaged groups can be brought to the forefront of civil life. It is also the duty of the State to promote positive measures D to remove barriers of inequality and enable diverse communities to enjoy the freedoms and share the benefits guaranteed by the Constitution. In the context of education, any measure that ~ promotes the sharing of knowledge, information and ideas, and encourages and improves learning, among India's vastly diverse E classes deserves encouragement. To cope with the modern world and its complexities and turbulent problems, education is a must and it cannot remain cloistered for the benefit of a privileged few. Reservations provide that extra advantage to those persons who, without such support, can forever only dream F of university, education, without ever being able to realize it. This advantage is necessary. In the words of President Lyndon Johnson, "You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the G starting line and then say, 'You are free to compete with 3 Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of the Man (New York, ~ Columbia University Press, 194,5) .. 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. . H GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. DocA/810 (1948) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 67 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] all the others ... "5 A . 7. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, at the concluding address of the Const.ituentAssembly, stated in the following words:- ·: ... To all we give the assurance that it will be our endeavour to end poverty and squalor and its companions, hunger B and disease; to abolish distinction and exploitation and to ensure decent conditions of living. We are embarking on a great task. We hope that in this we shall have the unstinted service and co-operation of all our people and the sympathy and support of all the communities ... "6 c 8. It must also be borne in mind that many other democracies face similar problems and grapple with issues of discrimination, in their own societal context. Though their social structure may be markedly different from ours, the problem of inequality in the larger context and the tools used to combat it D may be common. As stated by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the 51 st Cardozo Memorial Lecture, in 1999 : "In my view, comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are losers if we neglect what others can E tell us about endeavours to eradicate bias against women, · -- minorities and other disadvantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and rank discrimination are infectious in our world. In this, reality, as well as the determination to counter it, we all share." F 9. We are conscious of the fact that any reservation or preference shall not lead~ to reverse discrimination._The __ Constitution (Ninety-Third) Amendment Act, 2005 and the enactment of Act 5 of 2007 giving reservation to Other Backward G Classes (OBCs), Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled 5 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University Commencement Address, 'To Fulfill These R.ights", June 4, 1965 6 V Constituent Assembly Debates 2 (Thursday, the 14th August 1947) H A Tribes (STs) created mixed reactions in the society. Though the reservation in favour of SC and ST is not opposed by the petitioners, the reservation of 27% in favour of Other Backward Classes/Socially and educationally backward classes is strongly opposed by various petitioners in these cases. Eminent Counsel B appeared both for the petitioners and respondents. The learned Solicitor General and Additional Solicitor General appeared and expressed their views. We have tried to address, with utmost care and attention, the various arguments advanced by the learned counsel and we are greatly beholden to all of them for c the manner in which they have analysed and presented the case before us which is of great importance, affecting large sections of the community. 10. By The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, clause (5) was inserted in Article 15 of the Constitution D which reads as under:- "Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to the educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30." 11. In Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.7 . it was held that right to establish educational institutions can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a G profession within the meaning of Article 19(1}(g). This was overruled in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.8 , wherein it was held that all citizens have 7 1993 (1) sec 645 H s 2002 (8) sec 481 ,.. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 69 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] -+ the fundamental right to establish and administer educational A institutions under Article 19(1 )(g) and the term "occupation" in Article 19(1 )(g) comprehends the establishment and running of educational institutions and State regulation of admissions in such institutions would not be regarded as an unreasonable restriction on that fundamental right to carry on business.under B Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Education is primarily the responsibility of the State Governments. The Union Government ., ./ also has certain responsibility specified in the Constitution on matters relating to institutions of national importance and certain other specified institutions of higher education and promotion c of educational opportunities for the weaker sections of society. The Parliament introduced Article 15(5) by The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 to enable the State to make such provision for the advancement of SC, ST and Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) of citizens in relation D to a specific subject, namely, admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions whether aided or unaided by the State notwithstanding the provisions of Article 19(1 )(g). In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 it has been E stated that :- "At present, the number of seats available in aided or State maintained institutions, partiqilarly in respect of professional education, is limited in comparison to those in private unaided institutions. F To promote the educational advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, i.e., the OBCs or the Scheduled Castes ad Scheduled Tribes in matters of admission of students belonging to these categories in unaided educational institutions other than G the minority educational institutions referred to Clause (1) ~ of Article 30 of the Constitution, it is proposed to amplify Article 15. The new Clause (5) shall enable the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures to make appropriate laws for the purposes mentioned above." H · A 12. After the above Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, the Parliament passed The Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 (No. 5 of 2007) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act 5 of 2007"). 13. Section 3 of Act 5 of 2007 provides for reservation of B 15% seats for Scheduled Castes, 7%% seats for Scheduled · Tribes and 27% for Other Backward Classes in Central Educational Institutions. The said section is extracted below : - "3. The reservation of seats in admission and its extent in a Central Educational Institution shall be provided in the following manner, namely:- (i) out of the annual permitted strength in each branch of study or faculty, fifteen per cent seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes; (ii) out of the annual permitted strength in each branch of study or faculty, seven and one-half per cent seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Tribes; (iii) out of the annual permitted strength in each branch E of study or faculty, twenty-seven per cent seats shall be reserved for the Other Backward Classes." 14. "Central Educational Institution" has been defined under Section 2(d} of the Act as follows: F 2(d) "Central Educational Institution" means- (i) a university established or incorporated by or under a Central Act; (ii) an institution of national importance set up by an Act of Parliament; (iii) an institution, declared as a deemed University under section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, and maintained by or receiving aid from the Central Government; - ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 71 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] (iv) an institution maintained by or receiving aid from the A Central Government, whether directly or indirectly, and affiliated to an institution referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii}, or a constituent unit of an institution, referre.d to in clause (iii); (v) an educational institution set up by the Central B Government under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. 15. The percentage of reservation to various groups such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward c Classes are with reference to the annual permitted strength of the Central Educational Institutions and the "annual permitted strength" is defined under Section2(b) of the Act as follows:- 2(b)"annual permitted strength" means the number of seats, in a course or programme for teaching or instruction D in each branch of study or faculty authorized by an appropriate authority for admission of students to a Central Educational Institution 16. Section 4 of the Act specifically says that the provisions of Section 3 shall apply to certain institutions. Section 4 reads E as under:- 4. The provisions of Section 3 of this Act shall no~ apply to - (a) a Central Educational Institution established in the F tribal areas referred to in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; (b) the institutions of excellence, research institutions, institutions of national and strategic importance G specified in the Schedule to this Act; Provided that the Central Government may, as and when considered necessary, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule; 72. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. (c) a Minority Educational Institution as defined in this Act; (d) a course or programme at high levels of specialization, including at the post-doctoral level, within any branch or study or faculty, which the Central Government may, in consultation with the appropriate authority, specify." 17. "Minority Educational Institution" is defined in Section 2(f) of the Act as follows:- C "Minority Educational Institution" means an institution established and administered by the minorities under clause (1) of article 30 of the Constitution and so declared by an Act of Parliament or by the Central Government or declared as a Minority Educational Institution under the D National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004" 18. Section 2(g) defines "Other Backward Classes" as under:- . E "Other Backward Classes" means the class or classes of citizens who are socially and educationally backward, and are so determined by the Central Government" 19. Clause 2(h) defines. "Scheduled Castes" and clause 2(i) defines "Scheduled Tribes" as under: "Scheduled Castes" means the Scheduled Castes notified under article 341 of the Constitution; "Scheduled Tribes" means the Scheduled Tribes notified under article 342 of the Constitution. 20. Section 5 of the Act mandates the increase of seats in the Central Educational Institutions by providing reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes arid Other Backward Classes. Section 5 reads as follows:- "5.(1) Notwithstanding anythi1g contained in clause (iii) of , \ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 73 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] section 3 and in any other law for the time being in force, A every Central Educational Institution shall, with the prior approval of the appropriate authority, increase the number of seats in a branch of study or faculty over and above its annual permitted strength so that the number of seats, excluding those reserved for the persons belonging to the B Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes, is not less than the number of such ,. ~ seats available for the academic session immediately preceding the date of the coming into force of this Act. (2) Where, on a representation by any Central Educational · C Institution, the Central Government, in consultation with the appropriate authority, is satisfied that for reasons of financial, physical or academic limitations or in order to maintain the standards of education, the annual permitted strength in any branch of study or faculty of such institution D cannot be increased for the academic session following the commencement of this Act, it may permit by notification in the Official Gazette, such institution to increase the annual permitted strength over a maximum period of three years beginning with the academic session following the E commencement of this Act; and then, the extent of reservation for the Other Backward Classes as provided in clause (iii) of section 3 shall be limited for that academic session in such manner that the number of seats available to the Other Backward Classes for each academic session F are commensurate with the increase in the permitted strength for each year." 21. By virtue of definition of the "Central Educational Institutions" under clause (d)(iv) of Section 2 of the Act, all institutions maintained by or receiving aid from the Central G Government whether directly or indirectly, and affiliated to any university or deemed university or institution of national importance, in addition to universities which are established or incorporated under a Central Act, institutions of national importance set up by Acts of Parliament, deemed universities H A maintained or receiving aid from Central Government and institutions set up by the Central Government with the Societies Registration Act, 1960, are brought under the purview of reservation under Section 3 of the Act. The object of the Act is to introduce iil. reservation in only such institutions which are B defined as "Central Educational Institutions" and not any other private unaided institutions. 22. The Statement of Objects and Reason~ for the Act gives the object of the Act thus :- "Greater access to higher education including professional education, to a larg~ number of students belonging to the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Sched\Jled Tribes, has been a matter of major concern. The reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes of citizens (OBCs) in admission to educational institutions is derived from the provisions of clause (4) of article 15. At present, the number of seats available in aided or State maintained institutions, particularly in respect of professional education, is limited in comparison to those in private unaided institutions. 2. It is laid down in article 46, as a directive principle of State policy, that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and protect them from social injustice. Access to education is important in order to ensure advancement of persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the socially and educationally backward classes also referred to as the OBCs. 3. Clause (1) of article 30 provides the right to all minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. It is essential that the rights available to minorities are protected in regard to institutions established and administered by them. Accordingly, institutions declared . ' ~ ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 75 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] by the State to be minority institutions under clause (1) of A article 30 are omitted from the operation of the proposal. 4. To promote the educational advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens i.e. the OBCs or of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes B in matters of admission of students belonging to these categories in unaided educational institutions, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause . I ~ (1) of article 30 of the Constitution, it is proposed to amplify article 15 .. The new clause (5) shall enable the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures to make appropriate c laws for the purposes mentioned above. 5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects." 23. The Constitution (Ninety-ThirdAmendment)Act, 2005, by which Article 15(5) was inserted in the Constitution, is D challenged in these petitions, on various grounds. In some of the writ petitions which have been filed after the passing of Act 5 of 2007, the challenge is directed against the various provisions of the Act 5 of 2007. Initially, these writ petitions were heard by a Bench of two Judges. Considering the constitutional E importance of these questions, all these writ petitions were referred to a Constitution Bench. 24. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the various petitioners. The learned Senior Counsel, Shri Harish Salve, Shri F.S. Nariman, Shri K.K. Venugopal, Shri P.P. Rao F /. and Dr. Rajeev Dhavan and learned Counsel Shri Sushi! Kumar Jain addressed the main arguments on behalf of the petitioners. Shri Ashok Kumar Thakur appeared in person. Supporting the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 and the provisions of the said Act, learned Senior Counsel Shri K. G Parasaran, appearing for the Union of India, learned Solicitor General Shri G.E. Vahanvati and learned Additional Solicitor • General Shri Gopal Subramanium submitted arguments. We have also heard learned Senior Counsel Shri Ram Jethmalani, Shri T.R.Andhyarujina, Ms. Indra Jaisingh, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi H \ l 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A and Shri Ravivarma Kumar. We also had the advantage of the written submissions made by these Counsel. ~ 25. The arguments advanced against the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 and Act 5 of 2007 can be summarized as follows. 26. It was contended by Shri Harish Salve, learned Senior Counsel, who confined his arguments to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, especially sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the Act which deals with the reservation to the extent of 27% > ' ·c of the total number of seats for the "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens". According to him, the admission to educational institutions should be based purely on merit and to allow the State to prefer a student with lesser merit over those who would have otherwise got admission, is ex facie D discriminatory. It is submitted that all obviously discriminatory laws are violative of the rule of equality and it is for the State to maintain the principles of equality and to establish the need for such laws as well as their validity. It was further argued that Article 15(5) does not protect the validity of the Act and that the provision E in the Act for preferential admission solely on the basis of caste would violate Article 29(2) of the Constitution, as has been laid down in The State of Madras Vs. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan9 . It was also argued that Article 15(5) could be construed as an exception to Article 15( 1) and affirmative action, if excessive, is bound to result in reverse discrimination which F is not permissible. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this is not a genuine social engineering measure but vote bank ~ politics and would create permanent fissures in society. It was argued that the provisions of the Act are facially violative of Article 14 and it could only be justified on the basis of compelling State G necessity. A greater degree of compulsion is necessary to establish a compelling State necessity than what is ordinarily required to be shown in the case of economic legislation. The learned Senior Counsel dealt in detail with the argument that ;. H 9 1951 SCR 525 f J - ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 77 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] the backward classes cannot be defined solely on the basis of A A- caste and reference was made to various decisions of this Court. ~ Th~ learned Senior Counsel particularly referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and contended that this kind of legislation, that is, the impugned Act, attempting affirmative action is to be treated as "suspect B legislation" and it has to undergo the tests of "strict scrutiny" and "compelling state necessity". Finally, the learned Counsel ~ argued that non-exclusion of creamy layer is per se illegal and contrary to what has been laid down by t.his Court in Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India & Ors. 10 . c 27. The validity of Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 was seriously challenged by arguing that the amendment is destructive of basic structure of the Constitution. The learned Counsel was of the view that both the Act as well as the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 have D to be declared ultra vires the Constitution. 28. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 53/2007 contended that the affirmative action scheme under Article 15(4), 15(5) and E 16(4) has to comply with the mandate of Article 14, 15(1) and 16(1) of the Constitution. It was argued that these are only enabling provisions and not part of the fundamental rights. "Notwithstanding", as used in Article 15(3), 15(4) and 15(5) cannot be construed as "notwithstanding the declaration of equality principle". In view of the decision of this Court in F Champakam Dorairajan (supra) admission quotas are impermissible on any ground based solely on religion, race, caste or any one of them. It was argued that there is a lack of criteria for identification of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs). G The concept of creamy layer is applicable to Article 15 and "* Article 16 and non-exclusion of creamy layer in the Act is illegal. Further it was argued that quota should not be a punishment for 10 1992 Supp. (3) sec 215 H ~ unreserved categories and there should not be any reverse discrimination. The learned Senior Counsel further challenged the constitutional validity of Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 and contended that it is against the basic structure of the Constitution. The procedure laid down under 3 Article 368 has not been followed. It was contended that the proviso to Article 368 of the Constitution requires ratification of the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 by one half of the States. The amendment seeks to nationalize the private educational institutions which is unreasonable and ~ . impermissible and reference was made in this regard to T.M.A. _, Pai Foundation (supra). It was argued that Act 5 of 2007 is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. He elaborated his arguments on the basis of the tests laid down in the M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.11 and l.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRS. Vs. State O of T.N.12 cases and lastly, submitted that both Act 5 of 2007 and The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 are liable to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution. 29. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan elaborately argued that perusal of •E the history of the reservations from 1880 to 2007 for OBCs and SEBCs showed that there was no emphasis on communities · by the British regime and community based criteria was held to be illegal in Champakam Dorairajan (supra). From 1950 to 1970, there was no proper inquiry for ascertaining the OBCs or F SEBCs. The learned Counsel emphasized that in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), caste was excluded as a criteria and the identification of SEBCs or OBCs based on caste could not operate for both Articles 15(4) and 16(4). According to the learned Senior Counsel, the criteria for identifying SEBCs G should be based on the atrocities inflicted on that class, discriminatory patterns followed against that class, disadvantage suffered by that class and disempowerment in 11 (2006) a sec 212 H 12 (2007) 2 sec 1 \ J l } ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 79 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] respect of the power of the State and political non- A ... representation. The class should also be relatively homogeneous in nature. 30. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there is a lack of criteria for fixing SEBCs or OBCs and this case is being B taken to excite vote-banks. It was argued that the 27% of reservation under the Act of 2007 was based on criteria which did not exist. It was contended that the creamy layer principle is applicable to OBCs and also to SCs and STs. It was argued that historic discrimination is not a valid criteria for determining the beneficiaries of affirmative action and the correct approach c is to look at the continuing wrong and not past discrimination and that the quotas should not be a punishment for the non- reserved category resulting in reverse discrimination. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the Ninety-Third Amendment is against the basic structure of the Constitution. It D was argued that the Doctrine of Equality is adversely affected , by giving a wide and untrammeled enabling power to the Union Legislature that may affect the rights of the non-OBCs, SCs and STs. It was argued that the balance between what was referred to as the "Golden Triangle" in Minerva Mill!! Ltd. & Ors. Vs. E Union of India & Ors.13 has been totally nullified by the Ninety- Third Amendment. It was argued that the legislative declarations of facts are not beyond judicial scrutiny and the court can tear the veil to decide the real nature of the statute and decide the constitutional validity. It was argued that the Act 5 of 2007 is F I- subject to judicial review on the ground that its unreasonable and clear criteria have not been laid down to identify OBCs and there was no compelling necessity other than political patronage. 31. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing in W.P. (Civil) No. 598 of 2006 contended that Articles G 15(4) and 15(5) are mutually exclusive with the former concerning ~ admissions to aided institutions and the latter concerning admissions to unaided institutions. Article 15(5) expressly used 13 AIR 1980 SC 1789 = (1980) 3 sec 625 H A the phrase "whether aided or unaided", making it clear that it is not merely restricting itself to unaided institutions. Therefore, it is argued that from the very inception of the Constitution, Article 15(4) was a provision and was the source of legislative power for the purpose of making reservation for the Scheduled Castes, B Scheduled Tribes as well as the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of citizens in aided minority educational institutions. On the other hand, Article 15(5), which provides reservation of seats for SCs and STs as well as SEBCs in aided educational institutions expressly excludes such reservation C being made at all in minority educational institutions covered by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. According to him, it would take away the valuable rights of OBCs, SCs and STs given by the State under Article 15(4) of the Constitution and this would result in annulling the endeavour of the founding fathers of the 0 Constitution and would result in exclusion of SCs and STs from the mainstream of the society and stall their development for centuries to come. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the argument of the Union of India that Article 15(4) and 15(5) are both enabling provisions and both will stand together and both can be complied with is incorrect. It was E argued that Article 15(4) operates with a qualification that nothing in Article 15 or in Article 29(2) of the Constitution shall prevent the State from making special provision for SCs and STs as well as SEBCs while Article 15(5) operates with a qualification that "nothing in Article 15 or Article 19(1 )(g)" shall prevent the F State from making such special provisions for SCs and STs as well as SEBCs. The qualifying words in Article 15(4) do not have any real meaning or effect for the reason that both Article 15(1) as well as Article 29(2) prohibit discrimination on grounds only of religion and/or for caste. Therefore, it is argued that there is G a direct conflict betw~enArticle 15(4) and 15(5). As both Articles contain an exclusionary clause excluding the operation of the rest of Article 15. It was contended that The Constitution (Ninety­ Third Amendment) Act, 2005 is violative of the basic structure as it breaches the central character of the Constitution by placing H the minority educational institutions based on religion on a ( ~ ASHOKA KUMAR lHAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 81 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] ). special footing and exempting it from bearing the common burden of reservation for SCs, STs and SEBCs. It was argued . that such exclusion of minority institution is not severable from Article 15(5). As regards the validity of the Act 5 of 2007, it failed to exclude the "creamy layer" from the caste which would render the identification of the "caste" as "backward class" which is B unconstitutional and void. Their inclusion would result in unequals being treated as equals and result in giving the benefit of reservation to. the advanced sections in that caste. The consequences would be that the inclusion of the caste for the benefit of reservations would be purely on the basis of caste c only thus violating Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) of the Constitution. The doctrine of severability does not apply and therefore, the Act 5 of 2007 is unconstitutional and void to the extent that it does not provide exclusion of 'creamy layer' from the SEBCs. Therefore, it was prayed that both The Constitution D (Ninety-Third Amendment) Amendment Act, 2005 as well as the Act 5 of 2007 be struck down as unconstitutional. 32. Shri F.S. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe petitioners in W.P. (Civil) No. 35 of2007, contended that the caste cannot be the sole criteria for determining the socially E and educationally backward classes under Article 15(4) and 15(5) of the Constitution and the test for Article 15(5) has to be "occupation cum income" where caste may or may not be one of the many considerations having a nebulous weightage, and alternatively without conceding if caste at all is taken as one of F the many considerations then it can only be those castes which satisfy the test of similarity with Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. It was argued that the decision of this Court in R. Chitralekha & Anr. Vs. State of Mysore·& Ors.14 still occupies the field for the purpose of Article 15 and the decision G in R. Chitralekha's case (supra) was affirmed by the Bench in . Indra Sawhney's case (supra). It was argued that OBCs are 1· •· .. already educationally forward a~d no reservation in higher 14 (1964) 6 SCR 368 H A education is justified. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the literacy rate by age groups as quoted in the Sachar Committee Report. It was contended that in data given in the judgment in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), OBCs were not taken as educationally backward?. According to the learned Senior B Counsel for the petitioners, there can only be presumption of forwardness of OBCs and they are not backward. The burden is on the Government to provide that the intended beneficiaries are really backward citizens. The OBCs have not suffered social inequalities or oppression that had been inflicted on Scheduled c Castes and Scheduled Tribes by the society and, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the caste-occupation nexus barely survives today and is a misleading guide. The caste based occupation association has been rapidly disappearing from the Indian society. For Articles 15(4) and 15(5), economic 0 consideration has to be the dominant criterion. The non­ exclusion of "creamy layer" is illegal and it was intended to safeguard the really deprived and backward people among the so-called OBCs. It was contended that the Government has not published the list of OBCs for Article 15(5) and the Union of India has not been able to produce the list or the criteria for E determining the SEBCs. No time frame has been fixed for such reservation. Therefore, the Act 5 of 2007 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is thus unconstitutional. 33. Appearing for the Writ Petitioner in W.P. (Civil) No. F 231/2007 filed by the Citizens for Equality, the learned Senior Counsel Shri P.P. Rao contended that the mandate of Article 45 to provide free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years has not been complied with by the Government and therefore, there is clear violation of Article 20 of the Constitution. Although the Sarva Shiksh.a G Abhiyan (SSA) Project was introduced with certain objectives, these objectives were not fulfilled. The Constitution seeks to achieve a casteless and classless society. The.refore, identification of socially and educationally backward classes should be based on such criteria which facilitate the eradication \ I t ) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF !NOIA & ORS. 83 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] of the caste system. The educational backwardness of the A backward classes and the SEBCs should be removed and once this educational backwardness is removed, clause 4 and 5 of Article 15 will become redundant and unnecessary. It was argued that without ensuring that every child belonging to a backward class is provided free and compulsory education upto B 10+2 level any reservation provided in higher education is discriminatory inter se between members of the backward classes themselves and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Education upto secondary school level should be the measure for determining educational backwardness. The c social and educational backwardness referred to in Article 15(4) requires separate identification of SEBCs. Agricultural labourers, rickshaw pullers/drivers, street hawkers etc. may well qualify for being designated as "backward classes" According to petitioner's learned Senior Counsel, a rational basis would 0 be to identify backward classes through occupations traditionally considered to be inferior, yielding low income. It was argued that in any event, the "creamy layer" among the socially and educationally backward classes is liable to be excluded. 34. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Counsel appearing in E W.P. (Civil) No. 598 of 2006, elaborately argued the issues involved in this case. The main contention of the petitioner's Counsel is that the "affirmative action" policy of the Government of India is discriminatory and against general public interest. The policy is intended to "uplift" the so called socially and F educationally backward sections of the society by the process of positive discrimination. It was argued that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment is destructive of the basic structure of the Constitution as it destroys the delicate balance of the various fundamental rights that the citizens of the country enjoy. G The provision of Article 15(5) was inserted as a proviso to Article 19(6) which has been held to be unreasonable and against the constitutional scheme. Article 15(5) makes an exception for the minority institutions covered under Article 30 and therefore treats them differently from other private institutions. The Central H 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS .(2008] 4 S.C.R. A Education Institution (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2007which has been enacted in purported exercise of the said powers, is in excess of the said powers. Since the target beneficiaries of Article 15(5) have not been identified with a necessary degree of specificity, the Act 5 of 2007 is illegal. There ought to be a B quantitative correlation between the benefits conferred and the extent of the "problem" sought to be remedied, the correlation being "reasonable" and not "proportionate". The Act 5 of 2007 does not provide the manner or the principles on which the . identification of OBC is to be made. Therefore, it lacks the c necessary nexus with the ultimate objects sought to be achieved. The reservation of seats for the "beneficiaries" for many years to come without any provision for review gives rigidity and permanency to such measures. This would result in excessive reservation and thereby cause reverse discrimination. The 0 100% quota in the additional seats that will be created in the educational institutions is facially discriminatory. Identification of SEBCs on the basis of caste creates vested interest in backwardness. Therefore, the measures and means chosen by the Government are therefore unethical to the constitutional goals. Failure to exclude "creamy layer" allows conferment of E benefits on undeserving persons. The action of the State Governments lacks in the basic details of the extent of the measure. The exact social malaise sought to be remedied is not clear. F 35. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment violates the basic structure of the Constitution. This Court clarified the rights of the private educational institutions in terms of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) as explained in P.A. Inamdar & Ors. Vs. State of G Maharashtra & Ors. 15 It was held in that case that fixation of quotas and reservation of seats in private educational institutions amounts to '.'Nationalization of Education". The H 15 (2005) 6 sec 537 \ I . ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 85 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment is thus an unreasonable A action of the legislatu~e. It was argued that the impugned amendment alters supremacy of the Constitution and there was only limited constituent power to amend Article 368. Article 15(5) would enable the State to make the law to provide reservation to private educational institution which has been held to be an B unreasonable encroachment on the fundamental rights and this amendment would alter the balance-between Part Ill and IV of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on various decisions by the petitionefs learned Counsel. The impugned amendment specifically excludes the application of Article 19( 1 )(g), whereas c the institutions governed by Article 26 and the minority institutions . governed by Article 30(1) have been left out. This, according to the petitioner's Counsel, is discriminatory and illegal and that · there was no justification to this differential treatment. The petitioner's learned Counsel also. challenged the quantum of 0 reservations provided under the Act 5 of 2007 . Any determination of the extent of reservation without considering the future impact of the reservation would be unjust, arbitrary . and unreasonable. Caste based reservation would not be in · the larger interest of the national unity and integrity. The benefits could be given only to those communities which are not E adequately represented and not to those which are socially and educationally advanced. Reservation in the form of quota is illegal and if some classes are to be given some benefit and to be equalized with the general category they could be awarded some additional marks like ·it is being given to the women F ~ - candidates seeking admission in colleges. Many of the castes included in SEBCs are not really backward classes and some · of them were even rulers of erstwhile States for a number of years. The benefits and privileges which are given to SCs/STs should not be extended to OBCs. The members of the OBC G communities are capable of competing with the general category candidates and the increase in seats would entail a corresponding increase m· infrastructure, and it is submitted that an increase in infrastructure would, therefore, to be financed through tax collections and, therefore, every member of the public H A (including the general category) is entitled to be considered for -1 admission in the said increase. The learned Counsel also strongly objected to "caste" being taken as a means of classification and identification of SEBCs and OBCs. It is contended that it is in complete derogation of provisions of B Article 15(1) and, according to the petitioner's learned Counsel, many of the castes which have been included in SEBCs are really not SEBCs and thus past historical discrimination is entirely irrelevant for conferment of benefits in the present times. • • It was also contended that there are no traditional occupations c now. It is submitted that the identification of castes as a "class" to justify the same as being occupations on a presumption that the persons belonging to a particular caste continue to follow a particular occupation especially in the present constitutional scheme which gives freedom to choose any business, 0 occupation or profession is entirely fallacious. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also contended that the non-exclusion of creamy layer is illegal and relied on Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and Indra Sawhney (II) Vs. Union of India & Others16 . E 36. Shri Ashoka Kumar Thakur, who appeared in person, supported all the contentions raised by various learned Counsel and urged that the Ninety-Third Constitution Amendment as well as the Act 5 of 20b7 are unconstitutional and they are liable to be struck down. F 37. On behalf of the respondents, several Senior Counsel appeared and contended that the contentions of the petitioners challenging the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment and the Act 5 of 2007 are without any merit and are liable to be dismissed. The contentions raised by the petitioners' Counsel G were refuted by the respondents' Counsel by raising the plea that affirmative action is needed for promoting educational and economic interest of weaker section of society. Shri K. Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union of H 16 (2000) 1sec168, at p. 190 - ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 87 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] j.. India, submitted that the Constitution is to be interpreted as an A integral, logical whole, and while construing one part, regard must be had to the provisions of the other parts, rendering no portion as unnecessary or redundant. It was argued that when constitutional provisions are interpreted, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation is such as to further the object of B their incorporation and they cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders another provision redundant. ~ i 38. It was argued that the constitutional provision must not be construed in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take into account the c changing conditions and purposes so that the constitutional provision does not get fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges of this age. Reference was made to various decisions rendered by this Court regarding the interpretations of constitutional provisions. It was D pointed out that when social welfare measures are sought to be ! implemented and the Constitution has to be interpreted in such context, it has to be kept in mind that the Preamble is the text which sets out the goal that i~ to be attained; and that Part Ill is the texture into which is woven a pattern of rights. E 39: Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are both complementary and supplementary to each other. Preamble is a part of the Constitution and the edifice of our Constitution is built upon the concepts crystallized in the Preamble. Reference .. was made to the observations made by Chief Justice Sikri in F His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala 17 , wherein it was argued that the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision expressed in the Preamble.The Preamble secures and assures to all citizens justice, social, economic and political and G it assures the equality of status and of opportunity. Education ~ and the economic well-being of an individual give a status in society. When a large number of OBCs, SCs and STs g·et better •7 (1973) Supp. SCR 1=(1973)4 sec 225 H ' I A educated and get into Parliament, legislative assemblies, public employment, professions and into other walks of public life, the attitude that they are inferior will disappear. This will promote fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. The single most powerful tool for the B upliftment and progress of such diverse communities is education. 40. The Fundamental Rights in Part Ill are not to be read in isolation. All rights conferred in Part Ill of the Constitution are ~ ... subject to at least other provisions of the said Part Ill. The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution are equally as important as Fundamental Rights. Part IV ismade not enforceable by Court for the reason inter alia as to financial implications and priorities. Principles of Part IV have to be gradually transformed into fundamental rights depending upon D the economic capacity of the State. Article 45 is being transformed into a fundamental right by 861h Amendment of the Constitution by inserting Article 21A.Clause2 of Article 38 says that, "the State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities E in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations". Under Article 46, "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people F and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all i forms of exploitation". It is submitted that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment was brought into force to bring about economic and social regeneration of the teeming millions who G are steeped in poverty, ignorance and social backwardness. Shri K. Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the concept of basic structure is not a vague concept and it was illustrated in the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case .. (supra). It was pointed out that the supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of Government and sovereignty ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 89 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] of the country, secular and federal character of the Constitution, A demarcation of power between the legislature, the· executive and the judiciary, the dignity of the individual (secured by the various freedoms and basic rights in Part Ill and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part IV), the unity and the integrity of the nation are spme of the principles of basic structure B of the Constitution. It was contended that when the constitutional validity of a statute is considered, the cardinal rule to be followed is to look at the Preamble to the Constitution as the guiding light and the Directive Principles of State Policy as a book of interpretation. On a harmonious reading of the Preamble, Part c Ill and Part IV, it is manifest that there is a Constitutional promise to the weaker sections I SEBCs and this solemn duty has to be fulfilled. 41. It was pointed out that the observations in Champakam Dorairajan (supra) that the Directive Principles D are subordinate to the Fundamental Rights is no longer good law after the decision of the Kesavanda Bharati (supra) case and other decisions of this Court. It was pointed out that the de facto inequalities which exist in the society are to be taken into account and affirmative action by way of giving preference to E the socially and economically disadvantaged persons or inflicting handicaps on those more advantageously plac~d is to be made in order to bring about real equality. It is submitted that special provision for advancement of any socially and educationally backward citizens may be made by determining the socially F and educationally backward classes on the basis of caste. Article 15(4) neutralized the decision in Champakam Dorairajan's case (surpa). It was enacted by the Provisional Parliament which consisted of the very same Members who constituted the Constituent Assembly. Our Constitution is not G caste blind and the Constitution prohibits discrimination based 'only on caste' and not 'caste and something else'. 42. In Unni Krishnan's case (supra) it was held that Article 19(1)(g) is not attracted for establishing and running educational institutio·ns. But this decision was overruled in T.M.A. Pai H A Foundation (supra) and it was held that establishing and running an educational institution is an "occupation" within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g). In P.A. lnamdar's case (supra), it was held that the private educational institutions, including minority institutions, are free to admit students of their own B choice and the State by regulatory measures cannot control the admission. It was held that the State cannot impose reservation policy to unaided institutions. The above ruling disabled the State to resort to its enabling power under Article 15(4) of the Constitution. It was argued by Shri Parasaran that the above C rulings necessitated the enactment of The Constitution (Ninety­ Third Amendment) Act, 2005 by inserting Article 15(5) through which enabling power was conferred on the Parliament and the State Legislatures, so that they would have the legislative competence to pass a law providing for reservation in 0 educational institutions which will not be hit by Article 19(1 )(g). But rights of minorities under Article 30 are not touched by Article 15(5). 43. In Kesavananda Bharati (supra) it was held that the fundamental rights may not be abrogated but they can be E abridged. The validity of the 24th Amendment of the Constitution abridging the fundamental rights was upheld by the Court. The right under Article 19(1 )(f) has been completely abrogated by the 44th Amendment of the Constitution which is permissible for the constituent power to abridge the Fundamental Rights F especially for reaching the goal of the Preamble of the Constitution. It is an instance of transforming the principles of Part IV into Part Ill whereby it becomes enforceable. All rights conferred in Part Ill of the Constitution are subject to other provisions in the same Part. Article 15(4) introduced by the 1st G Amendment to the Constitution is a similar instance of abridging of Fundamental Rights of the general category of citizens to ensure the Fundamental Rights of OBCs, SCs and STs. Article 15(5) is a similar provision and is well within the Constituent power of amendment. Article 15(5) is an enabling provision and vests power in the Parliament and the State legislatures. , , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 91 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] 44. There is vital distinction between the vesting of a power A ~ and the exercise of power and the manner of its exercise. It would only enable the Parliament and the State legislatures to make special provisions by law for enforcement of any socially and educationally backward class of citizens or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes relating to their admission to B educational institutions including private educational institutions. ' 45. As regards exemption of minority educational ., institutions in Article 15(5), it was contended that this was done to conform with the Constitutional mandate of additional ...., protection for minorities under Article 30. It was argued that c i Article 15(5) does not override Article 15(4). They have to be read together as supplementary to each other and Article 15(5) being an additional provision, there is no conflict between Article 15(4) and Article 15(5). Article 15(4), 15(5), 29(2), 30(1), and 30(2) all together constitute a Code in relation to admission to D educational institutions. They have to be harmoniously construed j in the light of the Preamble and Part IV of the Constitution. It was also contended that the Article 15(5) does not interfere with the executive power of the State and there is no violation of the proviso to Article 368. E 46. The Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment does not specifically or impliedly make any change in Article 162. Article 15(5) does not seek to make any change in Article 162 either directly or indirectly. The field of legislation as to "education" was in Entry 11 of List 11. By virtue of the 42"d Amendment of the F :.;.;> Constitution, "education", which was in Entry 11 in List 11, was deleted and inserted as Entry 25 in List 111. The executive power of the State is not touched by the present Constitutional Amendment. 47. Article 15(5) does not abrogate th.e fundamental right G enshrined under Article 19(1 )(g). If at all there is an abridgement 4 of Fundamental Right, it is in a limited area of admission to educational institutions and such abridgement does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. In any way, Constitutional H ~ I A Amendments giving effect to Directive Principles of the State Policy would not offend the basic structure of the Constitution. ,. '48. The Right to Equality enshrined in our Constitution is not merely a formal right or a vacuous decl\'lration. Affirmative 8 action though apparently discriminatory is calculated to produce equality on a broader basis. By eliminating de facto inequalities and placing the weaker sections of the community on a footing of equality with the stronger and more powerful sections so that each member of the community whatever is his birth, occupation .. or social position may be, enjoys equal opportunity of using to c the full, his natural endowments of physique, of character and of intelligence. 49. Shri Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel, further contended that the Act 5 of 2007 is a constitutionally valid piece D of legislation. Under Section 2(g) of Act 5 of 2007, there is no excessive delegation. The plea of the petitioners that the Parliament itself should have determined OBCs and that Act 5 of 2007 suffers from excessive delegation or. lack of guidelines is not tenable. The backward classes of citizens have to be identified on the materials and evidence and therefore the E Parliament necessarily has to leave it to the Executive. The determination of OBCs is a long-drawn process which would cause enormous delay. Therefore, it was appropriate to leave the identification to the Executive. Such determination of each class as backward class would be open to judicial review. And F the scope of judicial review would be wider if the same is made ., by the Executive rather than by the Parliament. 50. It is also contended that merely because no time limit ,. . is fixed, Act 5 of2007 cannot be rendered invalid. The Parliament G has got the power to review periodically and either make modifications in the Act or repeal the Act. It is for the first time certain special provisions are being made in favour of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, SCs and STs ~ for reservation of seats in Central Educational Institutions after H 56 years of coming into force of the Constitution. At its very ' I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] 93 commencement, a time limit may not be anticipated and fixed. A Over a period of time depending upon the result of the measures taken and improvements in the status and educational advancement of the SCs, STs and SEBCs, the matter could always be reviewed. The Act cannot be struck down at the very commencement on the ground no time limit for its operation B has been fixed. 51. It was also submitted that the quantum of reservation provided under the Act is valid. The ratio of population is a relevant consideration in fixing the quantum of reservation. Reservation in favour of OBCs is 27% and by adding the C percentage of reservation for SCs and STs, the total quantum of reservation does not exceed 50%. It is indisputable that the population of OBCs exceeds 27% and SCs and STs constitute more than 22 12%. The quantum of reservation within 50% has been determined by the Parliament based on facts considered D by legislature and they are conclusive and the Courts do not exercise the power of judicial review by examining those facts. 52. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the contention of the Petitioners that special provisions can only be made up to 10+2 stage is untenable. If this plea is accepted, it E would result in higher education being the privilege of the higher classes only and it would be a distortion of the concept of social advancement of the downtrodden and the negation of the goal envisaged by the Preamble. It was also contended that the principle of reverse discrimination is not applicable. The F Doctrine of Strict Scrutiny and Narrow Tailoring are not applicable in India as they r.re American doctrines which operate under different facts and circumstances. This court on earlier occasion had rejected these pleas, when dealing with admission to Post­ graduate Medical Courses, when 75% of seats were being G reserved on the basis of institutional preference. 53. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the exclusion of creamy layer has no application to SCs and STs in regard to employment and education. Articles 341, 342, 366(24) H -94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. A and 366(25) of the Constitution would militate against such course of action. 54. It was held in E.V. Chinnaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.18 , that the SCs and STs form a single class. B The observations in Nagaraj's case (supra) cannot be construed as requiring exclusion of creamy layer in SCs and STs. Creamy layer principle was applied for the identification of backWard classes of citizens. And it was specifically held in Indra Sawhney's case, (supra) that the above discussion was confined to Other Backward Classes and has no relevance in c the case of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. The observations of the Supreme Court in Nagaraj's case (supra) should not be read as conflicting with the decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). The observations in Nagaraj's case (supra) as regards SCs and STs are obiter. In regard to SCs D and STs, there can be no concept of creamy layer. 55. Once the President of India has determined the list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it is only by a law made by the Parliament that there can be exclusion from the list E of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. As far as OBCs are concerned, the principle of exclusion of creamy lawyer is applicable only for Article 16( 4). It has no application to Article 15(4) or 15(5) as education stands on a different footing. 56. Equality of opportunity of education is a must for every F citizen and the doctrine of "creamy layer" is inapplicable and inappropriate in the context of giving opportunity for education. In the matter of education there cannot be any exclusion on the ground of creamy layer. Such exclusion would only be counter productive and would retard the development and progress of G the groups and communities and their eventual integration with the rest of the society. 57. It was further argued that Article 15(4) and 15(5) are + provisions of power coupled with duty. It is the constitutional duty H ·18 (2005) 1 sec 394 ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF !NOIA & ORS. 95 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] to apply these principles in the governance of the country and in A making law for the reason that it is a constitutional promise of social justice which has to be redeemed. 58. It was strongly contended by the· learned Senior Counsel Shri Parasaran that the validity of the constitutional amendment and the validity of plenary legislation have to be B decided purely on the basis of constitutional law. And the submission, as it was contended that the Amendment has a vote catching mechanism is inappropriate. The contention that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment is against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also not tenable. Right C to Equality of Opportunity operates at every level and it is being provided for a particular level either by a legislative or an executive action. The merit has to be interpreted in the context of egalitarian equality and not formal equality. 59. It was also submitted that the speeches in the Parliament, constitutional debates, text books of authors and views expressed in articles do not normally constitute evidence before the Court to determine the Constitutional validity of the legislations. 60. Shri G.E. Vahanvati, learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the Union of India, submitted that the argument of Shri Harish Salve, learned Senior Counsel that the American doctrine of "strict scrutiny" should be applied to the affirmative action envisaged under Article 15(5) is not correct. It F was argued that the impugned iegislation is not ex facie discriminatory and, therefore, it cannot be classified as a "suspect legislation". It was argued that right that from 'the case of The General Manager Sou.them Railway Vs. Rangachari,19 Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and G this reasoning was followed in M.R. Balaji & Others Vs. State of Mysore20 by a five Judge Bench. Ther~after, the same view 19 1962 (2) SCR 586 at p. 607 20 (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 439 at 455 =AIR 1963 SC 649 H A prevailed in T. Devadasan Vs. The Union of India & Anr. 21 But Subba Rao. J. (as he then was) said that "the expression 'nothing in this article' is a legislative device to express its intention in a most emphatic way that the power conferred there under is not limited in any way by the main provision but falls B outside it". The view that Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are exceptions to Article 15(1) and 16(1) respectively was again reiterated in Triloki Nath Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. (11)22 and in The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. U.S.V. Bairam, Etc 23 . The learned Solicitor General further pointed C out that in State of Kerala & Anr. Vs N.M. Thomas & Ors. 24 the majority opinion held that Articles 14, 15 and 16 are parts of the scheme of equality and that Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are not exceptions to Articles 15(1) and 16(1) respectively. The said change in N.M. Thomas's case (supra) was noticed by Justice 0 Chinnappa Reddy in K.C. Vasanth Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka 25 and the same view was upheld in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). The learned Solicitor General further contended that once it is accepted that Articles 15( 4) and 16( 4) are not exceptions to Articles 15( 1) and 16( 1) respectively, then there is no question of treating the social welfare measure as E being 'facially discriminatory' or "ex facie"violative of the rule of equality. It was argued that it is not simply a matter of legal equality. De jure equality must ultimately find its raison d'etre in de facto equality. The State must, therefore, resort to . compensatory State action for the purpose of uplifting people ~ who are factually unequal in their wealth, education or social environment. Relying on the observations of Subba Rao, J. in T. Devadasan's case (supra), it was argued that centuries of calculated oppression and habitual submission has reduced a G 21 1964 (4) SCR 680 22 1969 (1) SCR 103 23 1972 (1 l sec 660 24 1975 (2) sec 310 H 25 (1985) Supp sec 714 -I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 97 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] considerable section of our community to a life of serfdom and A it would be well nigh impossible to raise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity was strictly enforced in their case and they would not have any change if they were made to enter the open field of competition without adventitious aids till such time when they could stand on their own legs. Laying reliance B on the observations made in N.M. Thomas's case (supra) and also in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), the learned Solicitor General argued that under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) the State is obliged to remove inequalities and backwardness from society. It was further submitted that the American doctrine of "strict c scrutiny" had been expressly rejected by this Court in Saurabh Chaudri & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 26 As regards identification of backward classes, the learned Solicitor General contended that while dealing with the aspect of identification of backwardness forsocially and educationally backward classes, D it cannot be denied that there is backwardness in this country; that large sections of the country are socially and educationally backward; that this problem is not new but is age old; that such backwardness arose because of certain peculiarities of the caste system which proceeded on the assumption that the choice of occupation of members of a caste was pre-determined E in many castes; and that member~ of particular castes were prohibited from engaging themselves in· occupations other than those certain occupations which were considered to be degrading and impure and considered fit only for those castes. It was pointed out that Chief Justice Wanchoo in C.A. Rajendran F Vs. Union of India & Ors. 27 held that the main criteria for inclusion in the list is social and educational backwardness of the castes based on the occupation pursued by those castes. Reference was made to various decisions rendered by this Court on this issue, especially Minor A. Peeriakaruppan & Anr. Vs. G State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 28 ; U.S.V. Bairam (supra); K.C. 26 (2003) 11 sec 146 27 (1968) 1 SCR 721 28 1911 (1) sec 38 H A Vasanth Kumar (supra), referred to earlier. The learned Solicitor General also pointed out that in B. Venkataramana Vs. The State of Madras & Anr. 29 , the list of backward classes as mentioned in Schedule 3 to the Madras Provincial and Subordinate Services Rule, 1942 was approved and which was s also noticed in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). Reference was also made to the debates in Parliament where Dr. Ambedkar stated that "the backward classes are nothing but collection of certain castes". It was further contended that it is incorrect to say that the majority in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) did not c accept or approve the Mandal Commission Report. That Report was referred to in several places in that judgment and the criterion adopted by the Mandal Commission to classify the backward clas$es was more or less accepted. The learned Solicitor General also pointed out that it is not correct to say that the 0 State Lists are defective and that they ought not to have been accepted by the Central Government. It is pointed out that the Central List has been operating for 14 years for the purposes of reservations of posts and not a single person has challenged any Inclusion in the Central List as being void or illegal; that the State Lists have also been operating both for the purposes of E Arti~les 16(4) and 15(4) and there has been no challenge at all in any High Court or in the Supreme Court with regard to the State List and that there has not been a single complaint made before the State Government or the National Commission with· regard to over-inclusion of any caste or community. The learned F Solicitor General pointed out that the allegations in relation to the working of the National Commission for the Backward . Classes are not true. The National Commission has framed elaborate guidelines for consideration of request for inclusion and complaints of non-inclusion in the Central List for other G backward classes. The guidelines have been framed after studying the criteria/indicators framed by the Mandal Commission and the Commissions set up in the past by different State Governments. Th~ National Commission held 236 public H 29 AIR 1951 SC 229 = 19511 MLJ 625 + ~ } ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 99 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] hearings at various places since its inception. The National A Commission had also prepared an elaborate questionnaire for considering classes for inclusion in the State Lists. Detailed data was required to be submitted with regard to social, educational and economic criteria of the communities that were considered. It is pointed out that during the period of its B functioning the National Commission recommended 297 requests for inclusion and at the same time rejected 288 requests for inclusion of main castes. It was further pointed out that the National Commission has not mechanically allowed all applications for inclusion in the Central List. The National c Commission while examining the applications had taken note of the ethnographic history of the concerned castes/sub-groups/ communities and it has also taken note of the recommendations of the various State Commissions. It was also submitted that the contention that the inclusion of the caste in OBCs was D motivated by political considerations is erroneous and the National Commission had emphatically rejected politically dominant castes such as the Marathas from being included in the Central List and several other castes were thus excluded from OBCs list. The learned Solicitor General also contended E that the plea that reservation under Article 15(5) with reference to Article 29(2) would render 15(5) constitutionally violative is incorrect. Article 2~(2) is a protection given by the Constitution against denial of admission to educational institutions on the ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It does F not apply if provision is made for backward classes when the basis for classification is not solely on these grounds. It was argued further that the American doctrines and tests relating to "strict scrutiny", "compelling State necessity" and "narrow tailoring" are tests which are not applicable to India at all. There c:- is a presumption of constitutionality of the legislatiops passed by Parliament. The Indian Constitution specifically provides .. provisions like Articles 15(4) and 16(4) which permit special , provisions for backward classes. It was also contended that it is incorrect to suggest that there have been no efforts on the ~ 100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A part of successive Governments to concentrate on elementary education towards universal elementary education. "Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan" (SSA) had been launched by the Government in 2001-2002. The learned Solicitor General also pointed out that it is incorrect to say that there has been no proper B consideration of the Bill in Parliament, particularly in relation to Financial Memorandum. It is pointed that debates in Parliament are not usually relevant for construction of the provisions of an Act. The learned Solicitor General also submitted that it cannot seriously be disputed that large sections of the population are •C socially and educationally backward and it is nobody's case that the total population of OBCs in this country is less than 27%. Even on the basis of the facts relied on by the petitioners, namely, National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), the total population of OBCs in India is around 36%. The NSSO had IJ conducted this survey for the preparation of its 61 51 Round of survey which was published in October 2006. This survey indicated that the total number of OBCs in India is around 41 %. 27% reservation in relation to admission had been upheld in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and the Parliament has taken - special care to see that this reservation does not affect seats in the general category. The learned Solicitor General also pointed out that the policy of reservation flows from the mandate of equality till the time the Constitutional objective of real equality is achieved. Moreover, the policy of reservation has been - introduced for the first time after 56 years of coming into force of the Constitution. The learned Solicitor General also pointed out thq:it meticulous care has been taken for the inclusion of certain castes in the OBCs list and reference was made to cases in Rajasthan, Karnataka and Kerala. , 61. Shri Gopal Subramanium, the learned Additional Solicitor General, supported the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 and also the provisions of Act 5 of2007. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the American doctrines are not applicable to India. In this regard, t ! ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 101 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] the observations of this Court in A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India A ·t & Ors. 30 , that "we cannot transplant, in the Indian context and conditions, principles which took birth in other soils, without a careful examination of their relevance to the interpretation of our Constitution" were cited. It is pointed by the learned Additional Solicitor General that prepositions enunciated in the B decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California Vs. Bakke 31 , Grutter Vs. .( Bollinger3 2 and Gratz Vs. Bollinger 33 , and Parents Involved in Community Schools Vs. Seattle School District 34 , that the Court will apply the standard of strict scrutiny while reviewing c legislation involving suspect classification; that and such legislation would be effected if two conditions are met, namely, (i) there is a compelling governmental interest in making the classification, and (ii) the legislation has been narrowly tailored to meet that classification; that the classification based on race D is a suspect classification and that accordingly while race can be a factor in admission policies of educational institutions, it cannot be the sole factor and it cannot lead to the imposition of quotas, which are per se unconstitutional - each of these propositions has been rejected in Indian law and the Indian E Constitution neither admits "suspect classification" nor "strict scrutiny". The constitutionality of quotas has been repeatedly affirmed and reliance by the Petitioners on the United States "affirmative action" judgments is wholly misconceived. The learned Additional Solicitor General has made special reference to various American decisions on the doctrine of "affirmative F f- action". The learned Additional Solicitor General has also referred to the decisions of this Court in N.M. Thomas' case (supra) and K.C. Vasanth kumar's case (supra) and other 30 1982 (1) sec 271 31 438 us 265 (1978) 32 539 us 306 (2003) 33 539 us 244 (2003) 34 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007) H A decisions to contend that Articles 16(4) and 15(4) are not exceptions to Articles 16(1) and 15(1) respectively and these .;. provisions have to be read together with the principles of governance set out in Part IV of the Constitution and it is beyond doubt that underlying constitutional obligations are towards B socially and educationally backward classes and there is a positive obligation on the State to take steps to eradicate their backwardness. The learned Additional Solicitor General also refuted the contentions advanced by Shri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel, and contended that all efforts have been made c by the Government to improve primary and upper primary education in India. The learned Additional Solicitor General also contended that the argument advanced by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan is not correct. He relied upon Arjun Sen Gupta's Report 35 wherein it is stated :- D " ..... Education can b~ a liberating capability but access ~ . to it is made difficuit, if not impossible, by such inherited characteristics as lower social status, rural origin, informal ~ work status and gender or a combination of these." 62. Shri Ram Jethmalani , learned Senior Counsel E appearing for the lntervener-Rashtriya Janta Dal Party in W.P. No. 313 of 2007 and W.P. No. 335 of 2007 , contended that the attempt of the petitioners in these writ petitions is to off-set the decision of the Nine Judges Bench in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). It is pointed out that the equality of citizens is the basic .F feature of the Indian Constitution but by "equality" is meant not .. "formal or technical equality" but "real and substantial equality". The word "only" used in Articles 15(1) and 16(2) is decisive. Even if reservations are made for castes, the classification will become invalid if it is only on the basis of caste and if some G other additional requirement is imposed, that case would be considered to be outside the prohibition of Article 15(1 ). Reference is made to B. Venkataramana's case (supra) . It 35 Arjun Sen Gupta Report on "Conditi; ns of Work and Promotion of H Livelihood in the Unorganised Sector (July 2007) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 103 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] was contended that a statute cannot be declared ultra vires A merely because backwardness is a complex concept and no precise definition is possible. The Court is bound to assume that a state of facts existed at the time of the enactment of the · statute which would validate that statute and when the Constitution of the United States came into effect it did not B contain the constitutional right of equality . Even the Vth · Amendment of 1971 to the Constitution of the United States of .f America did not introduce this concept. The XIVth Amendment of 1868 provided that the "State shall not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws". Even after this injunction, the United c States Supreme Court delivered the judgment in Plessy Vs. Ferguson 36 , which laid down the doctrine of "Equal but Separate" . This doctrine was in force till it was reversed in 1954. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the policy of reservation is not destructive of merit and that the Symbiosis 0 University is not covered by the statute. 63. Shri T.R. Andhyarujina , the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents in W.P. 265/2006 , contended thatArticles 15(4) and 16(4) operate in different fields and Article 15(4) enables the State Government to make special provisions E for backward classes, SCs and STs which can be done both by law or by executive order. The special provision in Article 15(4) is not restricted to advancement of SEBCs, SCs and STs in educational institutions only and enables the State to make several kinds of positive action programmes in addition to F reservations. As a condition for giving aid, the State can make reservations for SEBCs, SCs and STs in educational institutions which are State owned or State aided. The State, however , cannot make such reservations in private unaided educational institutions , as held by this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation G (supra) and P.A. lnamdar (supra). This disability was because of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) which provided that private unaided educational institutions had a fundamental right to 36 (1896)41 L.Ed. 256 H A "occupation" of carrying on education under Article 19(1 )(g). Therefore, the Parliament introduced Article 15(5) by the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act to enable the State to make special provisions for the advancement of SCs, STs and SEBCs in relation to a specific subject, namely, admission 8 in educational institutions including private educational institutions whether aided or unaided by the State notwithstanding the provisions of Article 19(1 )(g). However, Article 15(5) excluded private educational institutions. which are minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article c 30. The saving for minority educational institutions in Article 15(5) is really ex abundandi cautela as minority educational institutions were constitutionally protected and at all times considered different from other private educational institutions. Article 15(5) does not take away the "basic structure" of the 0 Constitution. The "basic structure" of the Constitution should not be trivialized to mean other features of the Constitution. Reference was made to the observations made by Khanna, J. in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra). It was also submitted that Article 15(5) does not amend Entry 25 List Ill to the extent that the State can no more make laws for reservation of seats in E minority educational institutions and, therefore, it is incorrect to say that the amendment in Article 15(5) required ratification under Article 368(2). The State's power to legislate under Article 245 is always subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. Article 15(4) does 'not take away F the power of the State to make reservations in its own institutions by an executive action under Article 162. Right to carry on business is not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution . 64. On behalf of the respondent/State of Bihar in Writ G Petition (Civil) No. 269/2007, learned Senior Counsel Shri Rakesh Dwivedi submitted that the use of non-obstante clauses in Article 15(3), (4) and (5) vis-a-vis Article 15(1) shows that the prohibition against use of only caste as a ground for discrimination qua any citizen is there in so far as making of a special provision for adva'1cement of prescribed categories is ( J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 105 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.) concerned. There is no repugnance between 15(4) and 15(5). A .... It was contended that in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra), it was held that "Part Ill of the Constitution could be amended subject to the basic structure doctrine". The view which was held in l.C. Golak'Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anrs,37 making Article 368 more restrictive, had been overruled in B Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra). The Fundamental Rights are not absolute and are designed to suffer reasonable . JI restrictions and classifications. Any sort of abridgement by Constitutional Amendment is clearly permissible so long as the invasion does not amount to total elimination or emasculation. c Within the domain of equality there is distinction between formal equality and real equality or equality in fact and both are comprehended in Article 14 and both are part of the basic structure. 65. The learned Senior Counsel also contended that the D judicial review ideas of "suspect classification'', "strict scrutiny", i "compelling State interest" and "narrow tailoring" are measures propounded by the U.S. Supreme Court are not applicable and the Supreme Court of India has consistently taken a view that the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court do norafford safe E guidance on account of differing structure of the provisions under the two constitutions and the social conditions in these two countries being different. 66. Reference was made to the various decisions of this ~ court and it was argued that the comparison of the 14th F Amendment of the US Supreme Court read with Civil Rights Act, 1964 on the one hand and the fascicules of equality provisions in the Constitution of India, i.e. Articles 14 to 18 on the other hand shows that the equality provisions of our Constitution are not only differently structured but it contains G provisions for making special provisions for the advancement of SEBCs & SCs/STs. It is pointed out that our Constitution additionally enshrines Directive Principles of State Policy in 37 (1967) 2 SCR 762 H A Part-IV of the Constitution requiring the State to strive to promote justice social, economic and political and to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to remove inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities (Article 38). 67. Shri Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel 8 appearing for Pattali Makkal Katchi, contended that the creamy layer principle shall not be invoked for the purpose of Article 15(5). According to the Counsel, reservation in educational institutions is not a poverty alleviation programme nor it is a programme to eradicate unemployment. Reservation under C Article 15(5) is not even a programme to educate all the backward classes. According to the Counsel the one and only goal of the reservation policy under Clause 4 & 5 of Article 15 of the Constitution is to bring about equality among various castes and unless all the castes are brought to one level playing field, D the caste system cannot be eradicated. It is intended for removal of inequality between castes so that the castes will come together. These provisions are designed to bring together the leaders of each caste and community together and the same can be achieved only if the best teachers, the best E administrators, the best doctors, the best engineers and the best lawyers are brought together. And so long as the gap in education persists between castes, the castes will not come together. It is only when each backward caste is permitted to advance educationally to meet the educational level of upper F castes, can there be a real egalitarian society. According to the Counsel, it is precisely for this reason that Clause (2) of Article 38 seeks to eliminate inequality in status, facilities and opportunities, not only among individuals, but also among groups of people. Therefore, it is to provide for such equality in status, G facilities and opportunities, that reservation is contemplated to those castes which are socially and educationally below other castes. If the best from the lower caste are deprived of these facilities and opportunities in the name of "creamy layer", it will be counter productive and frustrate the very object of reservation, namely to achieve equality in status, facilities and opportunities. ~ I ... - ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 107 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] 68. The Counsel also contended that the question of A prescribing prior time limit for reservation under the impugned Act is immature and should not be considered at this stage. 69. The link between "caste" and its occupation is an unbreakable bondage to which the caste system has condemned the backward classes. Whether a backward caste 8 man carries on his traditional occupation or not, he continues to be socially identified with the said occupation. This link between ' the caste and the occupation has not been severed for thousands of years and it cannot be broken by arguments and theories. The ground reality is that every caste in every village is identified C by its traditional occupation. And all the service communities continue to discharge their traditional occupation. It is pointed out that throughout the country in 6.5 lakh villages, it is the barber communities and barber communities alone, which carry on the traditional occupation of hair cuttings and no other community D has taken up the said occupation. And they continue to labour 1 without any social security or whatsoever. 70. The Counsel pointed out that the last six decennial censuses have eschewed recording of caste particulars, the three National Commissions and scores of State Commissions E have found these Census data useless in identification of Backward Classes. 71. The learned Counsel submitted that there is no justification for not collecting details of caste identity at the F decennial census operation. According to the Counsel a .massive exercise is rendered useless for the all important work of identification of Backward Classes. 72. It is further submitted that the entire identification of backward classes has not been done on the basis of 1931 G Census data. In each State the identification of Backward Classes has been done on the basis of criteria evolved by the State Commissions on social, educational and economic parameters. Each State has adopted its own methodology. The identification of backward classes is essentially done at the H 108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A State level on a very objective criteria and a scientific methodology. According to the Counsel, origin of the term "classes of citizens" may be traced to the later part of the 19th century. Quite often classes have been interchangeably used with castes, tribes and communities. Some of the earlier ... B Committee reports referred to Depressed Classes. Under the 1919 Act, Governors of the provinces give instruction to take measures forthe social and industrial welfare of the people and tending to fit all classes of population. And the Provincial ~ Governments prepared a list of Backward Classes with three c parts namely, Depressed Classes, Aboriginal Tribes and Backward Communities. Dr. Ambedkar demanded separate electorate for the Depressed Classes at the Round Table Conference. 73. The Counsel also pointed out that the building of a D casteless society is not the goal of the Constitution. And that it is futile to contend that caste should not be considered for any purpose whatsoever. In every conceivable activity of private life caste system plays an important role. There are hundreds of communal hostels and educational institutions owned and E managed by certain communities. Some castes and communities have communal clubs, associations, cooperatives, banks etc. Their membership and admission are confined to a particular caste or community. Even carrying of the caste names is the guaranteed right of every citizen. There is nothing in the F Constitution to prohibit a person from discriminating on the ground only of caste or community in matters relating to marriage, electing candidates to political position etc. Most of the professional colleges like medical, dental and engineering colleges are established and administered by a body of persons G exclusively belonging -to a class or a community. Though Dr. Ambedkar intended to abolish caste system by abolishing all the privileges and disabilities of the forward classes, the plea was opposed by Shri K.M. Munshi and the Draft Article 3(4) stated: H "Un-touchability is abolished and its practice thereof is - ~ J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 109 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] punishable by the law of the Union" . A ..! 74. The Constitution never prohibits the practice of caste ::j and casteism. Every activity in Hindu society, from cradle to grave is carried on solely on the basis of one's caste. Even after death, a Hindu is not allowed to be cremated in the crematorium which is maintained for the exclusive use of the other caste or B community. Dalits are not permitted to be buried in graves or cremated in crematoriums where upper caste people bury or cremate their dead. Christians have their own graveyards. · Muslims are not allowed to be buried in the Hindu crematoriums and vice-versa. Thus, caste rules the roost in the life of a Hindu c " and even after his death. In such circumstances, it is entirely fallacious to advance this argument on the ground that the .. Constitution has prohibited the use of caste. It was argued what • the Constitution aims at is achievement of equality between the castes and not elimination of castes. D ./ 75. The learned Senior Counsel points out that it would be utopian to expect that by ignoring caste, the castes will perish. And the Counsel contended the Constitution has not abolished the caste system much less has it prohibited its use. The Counsel E pointed out that the Constitutional Amendment under the impugned Act in favour of backward classes is an unprecedented leap taking the higher education in the country forward, without depriving a single seat to the forward castes. And the advanced castes, with a population of less than 20% would still be able to get 50% of the seats in the name of merit F disproportionate to their known proportion of their.population. It is contended that without the advancement of SCs, $Ts and OBCs constituting over 80% population and mainly living in rural areas, it will not be possible to take the nation forward. And the students who are admitted under the reserved quota have G performed much better than the students admitted on the basis of merit. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the Moily Report - Case studies from four States. 76. The main challenge in these writ petitions is the H 110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A constitutional validity of the Act 5 of 2007. This legislation was passed by Parliament consequent upon The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, by which sub-article (5) was inserted in Article 15 of the Constitution. The constitutionality of this amendment has also been challenged in the various writ B petitions filed by the petitioners. As the Act itself is based on the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, the validity of the Act depends on the fact whether the Constitution (Ninety­ Third Amendment) Act, 2005 itself is valid or not. Article 15 of the Constitution, afterthe Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) c Act, 2005, reads as follows :- "15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.- (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to,- (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. · (3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. (4) Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (5) Nothing in this Article or sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State from making any provision l I , , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS .. 111 [K.G BALAK~ISHNAN, C.J.1.] by law for the advancement of any socially a.nd A educationally backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provision relate to their admission to the educational institutions, including private educational institutions whether aided or unaided by the State other B minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30." 77. T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) held that a private unaided educational institution has the fundamental right under Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution as the running of an c educational institution was treated as an "occupation" and further that the State's regulation in such institutions would not be regarded as a reasonable restriction on that fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(6). This decision necessitated the Ninety-Third Amendment to the Constitution D since as a result of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) the State would not be in a position to control or regulate the admission in private educational institutions. At the outset, it may have to be stated that no educational institution has come up to challenge the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005. E The challenge about the constitutionality of the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 has been advanced by the petitioners, who based their contentions on the equality principles enunciated in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. F 78. The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 is challenged on many grounds. The first ground of attack is that if the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 is allowed to stand it would be against the "basic structure" of the Constitution itself and this Amendment seriously abridges the G equality principles guaranteed under Article 15 and other ·I provisions of the Constitution. Another contention raised by the petitioners' Counsel is that the Golden Triangle of Articles 14, 19 and 21 is not to be altered and the balance and structure of these constitutional provisions has been ousted by the H \ A Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005. Yet another contention urged by Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel, is that Article 15(4) and 15(5) are mutually exclusive and under Article 15(5) the minority educational institutions are excluded. According to him, this is a clear contravention of the B secular and equality principles. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that minority institutions are not severable from the purview of Article 15(5) and therefore, the whole Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 is to be declared illegal. Another argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel is c that there is inconsistency between Article 15(4) and Article 15(5) and by virtue of the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, the States are devoid of their wide power under Article 15(5) to make reservation in minority educational institutions which are getting aid from the States and thus it is violative of 0 the very essence of equality. He further argued that the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 could control the legislative and executive power of the State and, therefore, it is not constitutionally valid. The learned Counsel had further challenged the validity of Act 5 of 2007, with which we will deal separately. E t 1. Whether Ninety-Third Amendment of the Constitution Is against the "basic structure" of the Constitution? 79. The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, F by which clause (5) was added to Article 15 of the Constitution, is an enabling provision which states that nothing in Article 15 or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward G classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to the educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State. Of course, minority educational institutions referred to in clause H (1) of Article ~Oare excluded. Thus, the newlv added clause (5) , , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 113 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] of Article 15 is sought to be applied to educational institutions A r whether aided or unaided. In other words, this newly added constitutional provision would enable the State to make any special provision by law for admissi.on in private educational institutions whether aided or unaided. In al! the petitions which have been filed before us the main challenge is against Act 5 of B 2007. Act 5 of 2007 has been enacted to provide reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and SEBCs of citizens in Central Educational Institutions. The "Central Educational Institution" has been defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. They are institutions established or incorporated by or c under the Central Act or set up by an Act of Parliament or deemed Universities maintained by or receiving aid from the Central Government or institutions maintained by or receiving aid from the Central Government or educational institutions set up by the Central Government under the Societies Registration D Act, 1860. Act 5 of 2007 is not intended to provide reservation in "private unaided" educational institutions. None of the private unaided educational institutions have filed petitions before us challenging the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have challenged the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment on E various grounds, they were vis-a-vis the challenge to Act 5 of 2007. The counter to the challenge by the learned Solicitor General as well as by Shri K. Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel was also in that context. We do not want to enter a finding as to whether the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment is violative F of the "basic structure" of the Constitution so far as it relates to "private unaided" educational institutions. In the absence of challenge by private unaided educational institutions,,it would not be proper to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of that part of the Constitutional Amendment. As the main challenge G in these various petitions was only regarding the provisions of Act 5 of 2007, which related to state maintained institutions, the challenge to the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment so far as it relates to private unaided educational institutions, does not strictly arise in these proceedings. In the absence of H ' I 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. A challenge by private unaided institutions, it may not be proper for this Court to decide whether the Ninety-Third Constitutional ~ Amendment is violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution so far as it relates to private unaided educational institutions merely because we are considering its validity in B the context of Act 5 of 2007. We feel that such questions could be decided as the main questions that are involved in these petitions are specific regarding Act 5 of 2007, we leave open the question as to whether the Ninety-Third Amendment to the Constitution by C which sub-clause (5) was inserted is violative of the basic structure doctrine or not so far as it relates to "private unaided" educational institutions to be decided in other appropriate cases. We deal only with the question of whether the Ninety­ Third Constitutional Amendment is constitutionally valid so far D as it relates to the state maintained institutions and aided educational institutions. 80. Several contentions have been advanced by the petitioners' Counsel challenging the constitutional validity of the E Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005. The main argument was on the ground that this amendment is against the "basic structure" of the Constitution. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioners' Counsel, it is necessary to understand the "basic structure" theory that has been propounded in the celebrated case of Kesavananda Bharati F (supra). This case was a decision of 13 Judge Bench of this Court. Though the Judges were not unanimous about what the "basic structure" of the Constitution be, however, Shelat J. (at page 280) in his judgment had indicated the following basic features of the Constitution :- . "The basic structure of the Constitution is not a vague concept and the apprehensions exp,ressed on behalf of the respondents that neither the citizen nor the Parliament would be able to understand it are unfounded. If the historical background, the Preamble, the entire scheme ~ , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 115 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] of the Constitution, the relevant provisions thereof including A L Article 368 are kept in kind there can be no difficulty in discerning that the following can be regarded as the basic elements of the constitutional structure. (These cannot be catalogued but can only be illustrated) :- 1. The supremacy of the Constitution. B 2. Republican and Democratic form of Government and sovereignty of the country. 3. Secular and federal character of the Constitution. 4. Demarcation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 5. The dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms and basic rights in Part Ill and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part IV. D 6. The unity and the integrity of the nation." 81. Sikri, CJ (at page 165-166) held that:- "The true position is that every provision of the Constitution E can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the constitution remains the same. The basic structure may be said to consist of the following features :- (1) Supremacy of the Constitution. F (2) Republication and Democratic form of Government. (3) Secular character of the Constitution. (4) Separation of powers between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary. G= (5) Federal character of the Constitution." ~ 82. The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution also was dealt with in detail and majority of the Judges held that the fundamental rights can be amended, altered or abridged. HI A The majority decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) overruled the decision in l.C. Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab, (supra). Kesavananda Bharati indicates the extent to which amendment of the Constitution could be carried out and lays down that the legality of an amendment is no more open to attack 18 than the Constitution itself. It was held that the validity of an ordinary law can be questioned and when it is questioned it must be justified by reference to a higher law. In the case of the Constitution the validity is inherent and lies within itself. The Constitution generates its own validity. The validity of the "' Constitution lies in the social fact of its acceptance by the .., community. There is a clear demarcation between an ordinary law made in exercise of the legislative power and the constituent law made in exercise of constitutional power. Therefore, the power to amend the Constitution is different from the power to ) amend ordinary law. The distinction between the legislative power and the constitutional power is vital in a rigid or controlled Constitution because it is that distinction which brings in the doctrin¢ that a law ultra vires the Constitution is void. When the Parliament is engaged in the amending process it is not _ legislating, it is exercising a particular power bestowed upon it sui generis by the amending clause in the Constitution. Sikri, CJ, held that the expression "amendment of this Constitution" does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights or to completely change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to destroy its identity. Within these limits Parliament can amend eivery article. Shelat & Grover JJ. (at p 291) concluded that: -i ''Though the power to amend cannot be narrowly construed and extends to all the Articles it is not unlimited so as to include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the Constitution or its basic features." 83. Hegde & Mukherjee, JJ. finally concluded (at p 355) that: "The power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 ' I 1 ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 117 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] as It stood before its amendment empowered the A Parliament by following the form and manner laid down in that Article, to amend each and every Article and each · and every Part of the Constitution ..... Though the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is a very wide power, it does not yet include the power to destroy or B emasculate the basic elements or the fundamental features of the Constitution." -f 84. Ray J. (as he then was) (at p 461) held that:- " ... The Constitution is the supreme law. Third, an c amendment of the Constitution is. an exercise of the constituent power. The majority view in Golak Nath case is with respect wrong. Fourth, there are no express limitations to the power of amendment. Fifth, there are no implied and inherent limitations on the power of D amendment. Neither the Preamble nor Article 13(2) is at all a limitation on the power of amendment. Sixth, the power -/ to amend is wide and unlimited. The power to amend means the power to add, alter or repeal any provision of the Constitution. There can be or is no distinction between essential and in-essential features of the Constitution to E raise any impediment to amendment of alleged essential features." 85. Palekar, J. (at p. 632) concluded that :- ''The power and the procedure for the amendment of the F Constitution were contained in the unamended Article 368. An Amendment of the Constitution in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that Article is not a 'law' within the meaning of Article 13. An amendment of the Constitution abridging or taking away a fundamental right conferred by . Part Ill of the Constitution is not void as contravening the provisions of Article 13(2). There were no implied or • inherent limitations on the amending power under the unamended Article 368 in its operation over the fundamental rights . There can be non·e after its H ' I A amendment." 86. Khanna, J. (at p. 758, 759) concluded that:- "The power to amendment under Article 368 does not include power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it B include the power to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. Subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, the power of amendment is plenary and includes within itself the power ' to amend the various articles of the Constitution, including .. c those relating to fundamental rights as well as those which may be said to relate to essential features. No part of a fundamental right can claim immunity from amendatory process by being described as the essence or core of that right. The power of amendment would also include D within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles." 87. Mathew, J. (at p. 857) held that:- "The only limitation is that the Constitution cannot be E repealed or abrogated in the exercise of the power of amendment without substituting a mechanism by which the State is constituted and organized. That limitation flows from the language of the article itself." 88. Beg, J. (at p. 886) held that:- F "The majority view in Golak Nath's case (supra), holding thatArticle 13 operated as a limitation upon the powers of Constitutional amendment found in Article 368, was erroneous." G He upheld the 24th Amendment and the 25th Amendment Act including addition of Article 31C. 89. Dwivedi, J finally concluded that: • "The word "amendmenr in Article 368 is broad enough to H authorize the varying or abridging each and every provision ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 119 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN; C.J.I.] of the Constitution, including Part Ill. There are no inherent A and implied limitations of the amendment power in Article ·3sa" 90. Finally, Chandrachud, J. (at p. 1000} held.that: "The power of amendment of the Constitution conferred B by the then Article 368 was wide and unfettered. It reached every part and provision of the Constitution." -i 91. A survey of the conclusions reached by the learned Judges in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) clearly shows that the power of amendment was very wide and even the C fundamental rights could be amended or altered. It is also important to note that the decision in RE : The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, Reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of lndia 38 , to the effect that preamble to the Constitution was not part of the Constitution wa~ disapproved D in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) and it was held that it is a part of the Constitution and the Preamble to the Constitution is of extreme importance and the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble visions envisaged in the Preamble. A close analysis of the decisions in E Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) shows that all the provisions of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights,· could be amended or altered and the only limitation placed is that the basic structure of the Constitution shall not be altered. The judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra} clearly F indicates what is the basic structure of the Constitution. It is not any single idea or principle like equality or any other constitutional principles that are subject to variation, but the principles of equality cannot be completely taken away so as to leave the citizens in this country in a state of lawlessness. But the facets G of the principle of equality could always be altered especially to carry out the Directive Principles of the State Policy envisaged in Part IV of the Constitution. The Constitution (Ninely-Third 38 (1960) 3 SCR 250 H t I 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A Amendment) Act, 2005 is to be examined in the light of the above position. 92. The basic structure of the Constitution is to be taken as a larger principle on which the Constitution itself is framed 8 and some of the illustrations given as to what constitutes the -basic structure of the Constitution would show that they are not confined to the alteration or modification of any of the Fundamental Rights alone or any of the provisions of the Constitution. Of course, if any of the basic rights enshrined in y .. the Constitution are completely taken out, it may be argued that c it amounts to alteration of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. For example, the federal character of the Constitution is considered to be the basic structure of the Constitution. There are large number of provisions in the Constitution dealing with the federal character of the Constitution. If any one of the D provisions is altered or modified, that does not amount to the alteration of the basic structure of the Constitution. Various fundamental rights are given in the Constitution dealing with various aspects of human life. The Constitution itself sets out principles for an expanding future and is obligated to endure for E future ages to come and consequently it has to be adapted to the various changes that may take place in human affairs. 93. For determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is part of the basic structure or not, it has to be examined in each individual case keeping in mind the scheme F of the Constitution, its objects and purpose and the integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the country's governance. It may be noticed that it is not open to challenge the ordinary legislations on the basis of the basic structure principle. State legislation can be challenged on the question G whether it is violative of the provisions of the Constitution. But as regards constitutional amendments, if any challenge is made on the basis of basic structure, it has to be examined based on the basic features of the Constitution. It may be noticed that the ; majority in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra) did not hold H that all facets of Article 14 or any of the fundamental rights would \ ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 121 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J:I.] \ form part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The majority A upheld the validity of the first part of Article 30(1 )(c) which would show that the constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges the right to challenge the validity of an arbitrary law or .. violating a fundamental right under that Article would not destroy or damage the basic structure. Equality is a multi-coloured B concept incapable of a single definition as is also the fundamental right under Article 19(1 )(g). The principle of equality ,, "' is a delicate, vulnerable and supremely precious concept for our society. It is true that it has embraced a critical and essential component of constitutional identity. The larger principles of equality as stated in Article 14, 15 and 16 may be understood c as an element of the "basic structure" of the Constitution and may not be subject to amendment, although, these provisions, intended to configure these rights in a particular way; may be changed within the constraints of the broader principle. The D variability of changing conditions may necessitate the I modifications in the structure and design of these rights, but the transient characters of formal a·rrangements must reflect the larger purpose and principles that are the continuous and unalterable thread of constitutional identity. It is not the E introduction of significant and far-reaching change that is objectionable, rather it is the content of this change in so far as it implicates the question of constitutional identity. 94. The observations made by Mathew, J in Smt. Indra Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain39 are significant in this regard: F "To be a basic structure it must be a terrestrial concept having its habitat within the four corners of the Constitution." What constitutes basic structure is not like "a. twinkling star up above the Constitution." It does not consist of any abstract ideals to be found outside the provisions of the G Constitution. The Preamble no doubt enumerates great .. concepts embodying the ideological aspirations of the people but these concepts are particularised and their 39 (1976) 2 SCR 347: (AIR 1975 SC 2299) H 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 4 S.C.R. essential features delineated in the various provisions of the Constitution. It is these specific provisions in the body of the Constitution which determine the type of democracy which the founders of that instrument established; the quality and nature of justice, political, social and economic which they aimed to realize, the content of liberty of thought and expression which they entrenched in that document and the scope of equality of status and of opportunity which they enshrined in it. These specific provisions enacted in the Constitution alone ccin determine the basic structure of the Constitution. These specific provisions, either separately or in combination, determine the content of the great concepts set out in the Preamble. It is impossible to spin out any concrete concept of basic structure out of the gossamer concepts set out in the Preamble. The specific provisions of the Constitution are the stuff from which the basic structure has to be woven". 95. If any Constitutional amendment is made which moderately abridges or alters the equality principle or the principles under Article 19(1 )(g), it cannot be said that it violates E the basic structure of the Constitution. If such a principle is accepted, our Constitution would not be able to adapt itself to the changing conditions of a dynamic human society. Therefore, the plea raised by the Petitioners' that the present Constitutional Ninety-Third Amendment Act, 2005 alters the basic structure of F the constitution is of no force. Moreover, the interpretation of the Constitution shall not be in a narrow pedantic way. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in Nagaraj's case (supra) at page 240 are relevant: · "Constitution Is not an ephermal legal document G embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is Intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the H interpretation should be adopted. A Constitutional provision l I \ J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 123 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense A but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account-of changing conditions and purposes so that constitutional provision does not get fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges." B 96. It has been held in many decisions that when a constitutional provision is interpreted, the cardinal rule is to look ... ~ to the Preamble to the Constitution as the guiding star and the Directive Principles of State Policy as the 'Book of Interpretation'. The Preamble embodies the hopes and aspirations of the c people and Directive Principles set out the proximate grounds in the governance of this country. 97. Therefore, we hold that the Ninety-Third Amendment to the Constitution does not violate the "basic structure" of the D. Constitution so far as it relates to aided educational institutions. Question whether reservation could be made for SCs, STs or SEBCs in private unaided educational institutions on the basis of the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment; or whether reservation could be given in such institutions; or whether any E such legislation would be violative of Article 19(1 )(g) or Article. 14 of the Constitution; or whether the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment which enables the State Legislatures or Parliament to make such legislation - are all questions to be decided in a properly constituted /is between the affected parties and others who support such legislation. F 2. Whether Articles 15(4) arid 15(5) are mutually contradictory, hence Artlcle 15(5) Is to be held ultra vires? 98. The next contention raised by the petitioner's Counsel G is that Article 15(4) and 15(5) are mutually exclusive and \ contradictory. The Counsel for the petitioner, particularly the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 598 of 2006, submitted that Article 15(4) was a provision and a source of legislative power for the purpose of making reservation for Scheduled Castes H 1 I A (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) as well as for Socially and ,_ Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) of citizens in aided minority educational institutions. And Article 15(4) was inserted after the decision of this Court in Champakam Dorairajan (supra) and Article 15(5) provides for reservation of seats for B SCs, STs and SEBCs in aided or unaided educational institutions but expressly excludes all such reservation being made in minority educational institutions covered by Article 30( 1) of the Constitution. This, according to the Petitioner's learned Counsel, will lead to a situation where the State would not be in c a position to give reservation to SCs, STs and SEBCs even in aided minority institutions which have got protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. It is argued that in view of the express provision contained in Article 15(5), the State would no more be able to give the reservation and this according to the 0 petitioner's Counsel would result in annulling the endeavour of the founding fathers and the various provisions for neutralizing the exclusion of SCs & STs from the mainstream of society and development for centuries. 99. It is argued by petitioners' learned Counsel that Article E 15(4) and 15(5) both commence with an exclusionary clause excluding the operation of the rest of the Article 15, and hence would result in a conflict to the extent of inconsistency. According to the petitioners', Article 15(5) is a special provision relating to educational institutions and being a later amendment, it would F prevail over Article 15(4), thus in substance and effect resulting in an amendment of Article 15(4) of the Constitution. According to the petitioner's Counsel, "nothing in this Article" in Article 15(5) would include Article 15(4) also and in view of this inconsistent provision, Article 15(5) has to be held to be G inconsistent with 15(4) and thus non-operative. 100. Both Article 15(4) and 15(5) are enabling provisions. , " Article 15(4) was introduced when the "Communal G.O." in the 1 State of Madras was struck down by this Court in Champakam Doralrajan's case (supra). In Unni Krishnan (supra), this Court H held that Article 19(1 )(g) is not attracted for establishing and \ ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 125 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] running educational institutions. However, in T.M.A. Pai A l Foundation case, (supra), it was held that the right to establish and running educational institutions is an occupation within the meaning of Article 19(1 )(g). The scope of the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation's case was later explained in P.A. lnamdar's case, (supra). It was held that as regards unaided institutions, B the State has no control and such institutions are free to admit students of their own choice. The said decision necessitated the enactment of the Constitution Ninety-Third Amendment Act, 2005. Thus, both Article 15(4) and 15(5) operate in different areas. The "nothing in this Article" [mentioned at the beginning c of Article 15(5)] would only mean that the nothing in this Article which prohibit the State on grounds which are mentioned in Article 15(1) alone be given importance. Article 15(5) does not exclude 15(4) of the Constitution. It is a well settled principle of ' constitutional interpretation that while interpreting the provisions ~I of Constitution, effect shall be given to all the provisions of the D "I Constitution and no provision shall be interpreted in a manner as to make any· other provision in the Constitution inoperative or otiose. If the intention of the Parliament was to exclude Article 15(4), they could have very well deleted Article 15(4) of the E Constitution. Minority institutions are also entitled to the exercise of fundamental rights under Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution, whether they be aided or unaided. But in the case of Article 15(5), the minority educational institutions, whether aided or ' unaided, are excluded from the purview of Article 15(5) of the Constitution. Both, being enabling provisions, would operate in F J their own field and the validity of any legislation made on the "I basis of Article 15(4) or 15(5) have to be examined on the basis j of provisions contained in such legislation or the special provision that may be made under Article 15(4) or 15(5). It may also be noticed that no educational institutions or any aggrieved party G have come before us challenging the constitutional amendment on these grounds. The challenge is made by petitioners • objecting to the reservations made under Act 5 of 2007. Therefore, the plea that Article 15(4) and 15(5) are mutually <• contradictory and, therefore, Article 15(5) is not constitutionally H A valid cannot be accepted. As has been held in N.M. Thomas case (supra) and Indra Sawhney's case (supra), Article 15(4) and 16(4) are not exceptions to Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) but independent enabling provision. Article 15(5) also to be taken as an enabling provision to carry out certain constitutional B mandate and thus it is constitutionally valid and the contentions o. raised on these grounds are rejected. 3. Whether exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) is violative of Article 14 of Constitution? 101. Another contention raised by the petitioner's Counsel is that the exclusion of minority institutions under Article 15(5) itself is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the exclusion by itself is not severable from the rest of the provision. This plea also is not tenable because the minority institutions have been given a separate treatment in view of Article 30 of Constitution. Such classification has been held to be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The exemption of minority educational institutions has been allowed to conform Article 15(5) with the mandate of Article 30 of the E Constitution. Moreover, both Article 15(4) and Article 15(5) are operative and the plea of non-severability is not applicable. 102. Learned Senior Counsel Dr. Rajeev Dhavan and · 1earned 'Counsel Shri Sushil Kumar Jain appearing for the F petitioners contended that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment would violate the equality principles enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and thereby the "Golden Triangle" of these three Articles could be seriously violated. The learned counsel also contended that exclusion of minorities from the operation G of Article 15(5) is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We "do not find much force in this contention. It has been held that Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) are not exceptions to Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) respectively. It may also be noted that if at all there is any violation of Article 14 ~r any other equality principle, the affected educational institution should have { ~ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 127 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] approached this Court to vindicate their rights. No such petition A has been filed before this Court. Therefore, we hold that the exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the minority educational institutions, by themselves, are a separate class and their rights are protected by other constitutional provisions. B 4. Whether the Constitutional Amendment followed the procedure prescribed under Article 368 of the Constitution? 103. Another contention raised by the petitioner's Counsel c is that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment is invalid as it violates the proviso to Article 368 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner's Counsel, the procedure prescribed under the proviso to Article 368 was not followed in the case of the Ninety- Third Amendment. According to the petitioner's Counsel, Article D 15(5) of the Constitution interferes with the executive power of the States as it impliedly takes away the power of the State Government under Article 162 of the Constitution. 104. This contention of the petitioner's Counsel has no force. The powers of the Parliament and the State legislatures E to legislate are provided for under Article 245-255 of the Constitution. Under the proviso to Article 162, any matter with respect to which the legislature of the State and the Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to and limited by the executive power expressly F conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union authorities thereof. The Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment does not expressly or impliedly take away any such power conferred by Article 162. It may also be noticed that by virtue of the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, G "education" which was previously in Entry No. 11 in List II was deleted and inserted in List Ill as Entry No. 25 as the field of ' legislation in List Ill. Article 245 will operate and by reasons of proviso to Article 162, the executive power of the State be subject to, limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by the H ,,,. ..... I A Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union authorities thereof. Subject to restrictions imposed under the Constitution, it has been in existence. Such power of the State is not limited or curtailed by the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment as it does not interfere with the power of the State B under Article 162. The Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment does not fall within the scope of proviso to Article 368. Therefore, the plea raised by the petitioner's Counsel that the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment did not follow the prescribed procedure of Article 368 is not correct and the plea is only to be c rejected. 5. Whether the Act 5 of 2007 is constitutionally invalid in view of definition of "Backward Class" and whether the identification of such "Backward Class" based on "caste" is constitutionally valid? 105. The next important plea raised by the petitioner's Counsel is regarding the validity of the Act 5 of 2007. The several contentions have been raised regarding the validity of the Act 5 of 2007. The first contention which was raised by the petitioner's Counsel that this Act is ex-facie unconstitutional and is a suspect E legislation and violative of the Article 14, 15 and 19(1 )(g} of the Constitution. The main attack against the Act was that the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens were not properly identified and the delegation of power to identify the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens to F the Central Government itself is illegal and the delegation of such powers by itself without laying down any guidelines is arbitrarily illegal. Elaborate arguments were made by the petitioner's Counsel and the first and foremost contention was that "caste" is the sole basis on which the socially and G educationally backward classes of citizens were determined. And this, according to the petitioner's Counsel, is illegal. Reference was made to a series of decisions of this Court on this issue. 106. There is a long jurisprudential history as to whether ' I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 129 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] caste can play any role in determining the socially and A educationally backward classes of citizens. In Indra Sawhney's case (supra), which is a Nine Judge Bench decision, it was held that the "caste" could be a beginning point and a determinative factor in identifying the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. But nevertheless, a brief survey B of various decisions on this question would give a history of the jurisprudential development on this subject. 107. Reference to the earlier decisions is necessary because serious doubt has been raised as to whether "caste" could be the basis for recognizing backwardness. Some of the c earlier decisions have stated that caste should not be a basis for recognizing backwardness and gradually there was a shift in the views and finally, in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), it was held that caste could be the starting point for determining the socially and educationally backward classes of citizen .. D 108. In Champakam Dorairajan (supra), this Court struck down the classification made in the Communal G.O. of the then State of Madras. The G.O. was founded on the basis of religion and castes and was struck down on the ground that it is opposed E to the Constitution and is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens. The court held that Article 46 cannot override the provisions of Article 29 (2) because of the Directive Principles of State Policy which were then taken subsidiary to fundamental rights. This decision led to the first constitutional amendment by which Article 15(4) was added to the F Constitution. 1109. The next important case is M.R. Balaji & Ors. Vs. State of Mysore (supra). In this case, the State of Mysore issued an order that all the communities except the Brahm in community G would fall within the definition of socially and educationally ~. backward class and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes ; and 75% of the seats in educational institutions were reserved for them. It was observed that though caste in relation to Hindus __,. may be a relevant factor to consider while determining social H A backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be made the sole or dominant test. It was held that the classes of citizens who are deplorably poor automatically become socially backward. Moreover, the occupation of citizens and the place of their habitation also result in social backwardness. The B problem of determining who are socially backward classes is undoubtedly very complex, but the classification of socially backward citizens on the basis of their caste alone is not permissible under Article 15 (4). Learned Senior Counsel Shri Harish Salve drew our attention to the various passages in the C judgment. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the majority of the Judges, said :- "The Problem of determining who are socially backward classes is undoubtedly very complex. Sociological, social and economic considerations come into play in solving D the problem and evolving proper criteria for determining which classes are socially backward is obviously a very difficult task; it will need an elaborate investigation and collection of data and examining the said data in a rational and scientific way. That is the function of the State which E purports to act under Article 15 (4)." 110. The court drew a clear distinction between 'caste' and 'class' and tried to make an attempt to find a new basis for ascertaining social and educational backwardness in place of caste and in this decision a majority of Judges held that in a F broad way, a special provision of reservation should be less than 50%; how much less than. 50% would depend upon the relevant and prevailing circumstances in each case. 111. In R. Chitralekha's case (supra), the Government of G Mysore, by an order defining backward classes directed that 30% of the seats in professional and technical colleges and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18% to the SCs and STs. It was laid down that classification of socially and educationally backward classes should be made on the basis of economic condition and occupation. Suba Rao, J. (as he ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 131 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] then was), speaking for the majority, held that a classification of A backward classes based on economic conditions and occupations is not bad in law and does· not offend Article 15 (4). The caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social backwardness and though it is a relevant factor to dete.rmine social backwardness of a class, it B cannot be the sole or dominant test in that behalf. If, in a given situation, caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Article 15 (4), it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfies other tests. The Court observed that various provisions of the Constitution which recognized the factual c existence of backwardness in the country and which make a sincere attempt to promote the welfare of the weaker sections thereof should be construed to effectuate that policy and not to give weightage to progressive sections of the society under the false colour of caste to which they happen to belong. The Court 0 held that under no circumstance a 'class' can be equated to a 'caste' though the caste of an individual or group of individuals may be a relevant factor in putting him in a particular class. 112. Minor P. Rajendran Vs. State of Madras & Ors.40 is another Constitution Bench decision wherein the order of the E State Government providing reservation of seats for various categories of candidates namely Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and SEBCs was challenged on various grounds. The main challenge was that the reservation was based entirely on consideration of caste and therefore it violates Article 15. Justice F Wanchoo, held that:- "Now if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not taken into account the social and educational backwardness of the castes in question, it would be violative of Article 15 ( 1). But it must not be G forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the . 40 (1968) 2 SCR 786 H 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 4 S.C.R. A ground that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15 (4). Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of this Court in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore to the effect that it was not irrelevant to consider the caste B of a class of citizens in determining their social and educational backwardness. It was further observed that though the caste of a class of citizens may be relevant its . importance should not be exaggerated; and if classification of backward classes of citizens was based c solely on the caste of the citizen, it might be open to objection. (emphasis supplied) 113. It may be noticed that the list prepared by the State 0 showed certain castes, and members of those castes according to the State were really classes of socially and educationally backward citizens. It was observed in that case that the petitioners therein did not make any attempt to show that any caste mentioned in the list of educationally and socially backward classes of citizens was not educationally and socially E backward and the list based on caste was upheld by the Constitution Bench and held to be not violative of Article 15(1 ). 114. In Triloki Nath Tiku Vs. State of J & K (1)41 , 50% of the gazetted posts were to be filled up by promotion in favour of F the Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir. The Court held that inadequate representation in State services would not be decisive for determining the backwardness of a section. The Court accordingly gave directions for collecting further material relevant to the subject. And in a subsequent decision, Triloki G Nath(ll) (supra), the court observed that the expression "backward class" is not used as synonymous with "backward caste". 115. In Minor A. Peerikaruppan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu t IH 41 (1967)2 SCR 265 -ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 133 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] & Ors. (supra), this Court made reference to the earlier A .\ decisions especially in M.R. Balaji case (supra) and R. Chitralekha case (supra). Hegde, J., at paragraph 29, observed :- 'There is no gainsaying the fact that there are numerous B castes in this country which are socially and educationally backward. To ignore their existence is to ignore the facts of life. Hence we are unable to uphold the contention that r 1 the impugned reservation is not in accordance with Article 15 (4). But all the same the Government should not proceed on the basis that once a class is considered as a c backward class it should continue to be backward class for all times. Such an approach would defeat the Very purpose of the reservation because once a class reaches a stage of progress which some modern writers call as take off stage then competition is necessary for their future D progress. The Government should always keep under review the question of reservation of seats and only the classes which are really socially and educationally backward should be allowed to have the benefit of reservation." E 116. The learned Counsel. for the petitioners also made reference to State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Pradip f Tandon & Ors.42 wherein Chief Justice Ray observed at paragraph 14 :- "Socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in Article 15 (4) could not be equated with castes. In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore and State of A.P. v. Sagar this Court held that classification of backwardness on the basis of castes would violate both Articles 15 (1) and 15 G (4)." 117. Another important decision is that of State of Kerala • & Anr. Vs N.M. Thomas & Ors. (supra), wherein the 42 (1975) 1 sec 267 H ' I A constitutional validity of Rule 13-AA of the Kerala State & Subordinate Services Rules was under challenge. The Rule 1- gave ex~mption of 2 years to members belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in services, from passing the departmental test. The High Court of Kerala struck down the B Rule and in an appeal by the State the question of reservation was elaborately considered. Mathew, ~· in his concurring judgment, held that in ord~r to give equality of opportunity for employment to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it is necessary to take note of their social, - c educational and economic backwardness. Not only is the Directive Principle embodied in Article 46 binding on the law­ makers as ordinarily understood, but it should equally inform ahd illumina.te the approach of the court when it makes a decision, as the court is also a "State" within the meaning of D Article 12 and makes law even though interstitially. Existence of equality depends not merely on the absence of disabilities but on the presence of disabilities. To achieve it, differential treatment of persons who are unequal is permissible. This is what is styled as compensatory discrimination or affirmative action. 118. In K.C. Vasanth Kumar Vs. State of Karnataka (supra) the question of identifying socially and educationally backward class came up for consideration. Desai, J., elaborately considered this question in paragraph 20 and F observed :- "By its existence over thousands of years, more or less it was assumed that caste should be the criterion for determining social and educational backwardness. In other words, it was said, look at the caste, its traditional functions, G its position in relation to upper castes by the standard of purity and pollution, pure and not so pure occupation, once these questions are satisfactorily answered without anything more, those who belong to that caste must be ; labeled socially and educationally backward. This over- H simplified approach ignored a very realistic situation '~ ' / ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 135 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] existing in each caste that in every such caste whose A l members claim to be socially and educationally backward, had an economically well-placed segments." 119. Chinnappa Reddy, J., also dealt with the question elaborately and observed :- "However we look at the question of 'backwardness', . whether from the angle of class, status or power, we find -! the economic factor at the bottom of it all and we find .,.. poverty, the culprit-cause and the dominant characteristic. Poverty, the economic factor brands all backwardness c ·just as the erect posture brands the homosapiens and . distinguishes him from all other animals, in the eyes of the beholder from Mars. But, whether his racial stock is Caucasian, Mongoloid, Negroid, etc., further investigation will have to be made. So too the further question of social D and educational backwardness requires further scrutiny. In India, the matter is further aggravated, complicated and pitilessly tyrannized by the ubiquitous caste system, a unique and devastating system of gradation ai:id degradation which has divided the entire Indian and E particularly Hindu society horizontally into such distinct layers as to be destructive of mobility, a system which has penetrated and corrupted the mind and soul of every Indian citizen. It is a· notorious fact that there is an upper crust of rural society consisting of the superior castes, generally F the priestly, the landlord and the merchant castes, there is . a bottom strata consisting of the 'out-castes' of Indian Rural Society, namely the Scheduled Castes, ·and, in between the highest _and the lowest, there are large segments of population who because of the low gradation G of the caste to which they ·belong in the rural society hierarchy, because of the humble occupation which they ' pursue, because of their poverty and ignorance are also condemned to backwardness, social and educational, backwardness which prevents them from competing on H A equal terms to catch up with the upper crust. " 120. Reference was also made to other decisions, namely, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Vs. P: Sagar43 and T. Devadasan Vs. The Union of India & Anr.44 . The earlier decisions took the view that caste shall not be a basis for B determining the socially and educationally backward class of citizens. But from the later decisions, we find a slight shift in the approach of the court. If the classification of SEBCs is done exclusively on the basis of caste, it would flyin the face of Article 15(1) of the Constitution as it expressly prohibits any C discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. After a careful examination of the various previous decisions of this Court, in Indra Sawhney (supra), while examining the validity of the 'Backward Class List' prepared by the Manda! Commisson, Jeevan Reddy. J., D speaking for the majority, held as under:- "705. During the years 1968 to 1971, this Court had to consider the validity of identification of backward classes made by Madras and Andhra Pradesh Governments. P. Rajendran v. State of Madras 3 13 related to specification of socially and educationally backward classes with reference to castes. The question was whether such an identification infringes Article 15. Wanchoo, CJ, speaking for the Constitution Bench dealt with the contention in the following words: (SCR p. 790-91) "The contention is that the list of socially and educationally backward classes for whom reservation is made under Rule 5 is nothing but a list of certain castes. Therefore, reservation in favour of certain castes based only on caste considerations violates Article 15(1 ), which prohibits discrimination on the ground of caste only. Now if the reservation in question had been based only on caste and 43 (1968) 3 SCR 595 H 44 (1964) 4 SCR 680 ( I ' J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 137 [K.G,. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] had not taken into account the social and educational A backwardness of the caste in question, it would be violative ~ of Article 15(1). But it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally backward reservation can be made in fa'7our of such a caste on the ground that is a B socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4) .... It is true that in the present ...... ..., -' cases the list of socially and educationally backward }-.......... ' classes has been specified by caste. But that does not necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration c and that persons belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially and educationally backward citizens .. . . As it was found that members of these castes as a whole were educationally and socially backward, the list which had been coming on from as far back as 1906 was D finally adopted for purposes of Article 15(4) .... In view however of the explanation given by the State of Madras, which has not been controverted by any rejoinder, ~ it must be accepted that though the list shows certain castes, the members at those castes are really classes of E educationally and socially backward citizens. No attempt was made on behalf of the petitioners/appellant to show that any caste mentioned in this list was not educationally and socially backward. In this state of the pleadings, we must come to the conclusion that though the list is prepared F caste-wise, the castes included therein are as a whole educationally and socially backward and therefore the list is not violative of Article 15. The challenge to Rule 5 must therefore fail." 121. In that decision it was further held that "Backward G Class" in Article 16(4) cannot be read as "Backward Caste". And under Article 340 of the Constitution, the President may by J order appoint a Commission consisting of such persons as he thinks fit to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens within the territory of India and the H A difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove the difficulties and to improve their condition. The object of this provision is to empower the President to appoint a Commission to ascertain the difficulties B and problems of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. And in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), the majority held that the ideal and wise method would be to mark out various occupations which on the lower level in many cases amongst Hindus would be their caste itself and find out their social c acceptability and educational standard, weigh them in the balance of economic conditions and, the result would be backward class of citizens needing a genuine protective umbrella. And after having adopted occupation as the starting point, the next point should be to ascertain their social acceptability. A person carrying on scavenging becomes an D untouchable whereas others who were as law in the social strata as untouchables became depressed. The Court has cautioned that the backwardness should be traditional. Mere educational or social backwardness would not have been sufficient as it would enlarge the field thus frustrating the very purpose of the E constitutional goal. It was pointed ~ut that after applying these tests, the economic criteria or the means-test should be applied since poverty is the prime cause of all backwardness as it generates social and educational backwardness. F 122. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that caste cannot be used even as one of the criteria for identifying the SEBCs as many persons have ·Shifted their traditional occupations and have become doctors, engineers and lawyers. But these are only a few cases and even such persons continue G to suffer social segregation based on caste. In Pradip Tandon's case (supra) it was held at para 17 that: "The expression 'classes of citizens' indicates a homogenous section of the people who are grouped together because of certain likenesses and common traits H and who are identifiable by some common attributes. The l J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNlON OF INDIA & ORS. 139 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] homogeneity of the class of citizens is social and A educational backwardness. Neither caste nor religion nor place of birth will be the uniform element of common attributes to make them a class of citizens." 123. The above statement is not fully correct. Caste plays B an important role in determining the backwardness ot the individual. In society, social status and standing depend upon the nature of the occupation followed. In paragraph 779 of Indra .-> 1 Sawhney's case, it is stated: "Lowlier the occupation, lowlier the social standing of the c class in the graded hierarchy. In rural India, occupation- caste nexus is true even today. A few members may have gone to cities or even abroad but when they return - they do, barring a few exceptions - they go into the same fold again. It does not matter if he has earned money. He may D not follow that particular occupation. Still, the label remains. His identity is not changed for the purpose of marriage, death and all other social functions, it is his social class - the caste - that is relevant." 124. "Caste" is often used interchangeably with "class" and E can be called as the basic unit in social stratification. The most characteristic thing about a caste group is its autonomy in caste related matters. One of the universal codes enforced by all castes is the requirement of endogamy.,Qfher rules have to do with the regulC1tions pertaining to religious purity or cleanliness. F . Sometimes it restricts occupational choices as well. It ·is not necessary"that these rules be enforced in particular classes as well, and as such a "class" may be distinguished from the broader realm of "caste" on these grounds. Castes were often rated, on a purity scale, and not on a social scale. G 125. The observations made byVenkataramaiah J. in K.C. Vasanth Kumar case are relevant in this regard : "We are aware of the meanings of the words caste, race, or tribe or religious minorities in India. A caste is an· H 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. association of families which practise the custom of endogamy i.e. which permits marriages amongst the members belonging to such families only. Caste rules prohibit its members from marrying outside their caste. There are sub-groups amongst the castes which sometimes inter-marry and sometimes do not. A caste is based on various factors, sometimes it may be a class, a race or a racial unit. A caste has nothing to do with wealth. The caste of a person is governed by his birth in a family. Certain ideas of ceremonial purity are peculiar to each caste. Sometimes caste practices even led to segregation of same castes in the villages. Even the choice of occupation of members of castes was predetermined in many cases, and the members of a particular caste were prohibited from engaging themselves in other types of callings, professions or occupations. Certain occupations were considered to be degrading or impure. A certain amount of rigidity developed in several matters and many . who belonged to castes which were lower in social order were made to suffer many restrictions, privations and humiliations. Untouchability was practised against members belonging to certain castes. Inter-dining was prohibited in some cases. None of these rules governing a caste had anything to do with either the individual merit of a person or his capacity. The wealth owned by him would not save him from many social discriminations practised by members belonging to higher castes. Children who grew in this caste ridden atmosphere naturally suffered from many social disadvantages apart from the denial of opportunity to live in the same kind of environment in which persons of higher castes lived. Many social reformers have tried in the last two centuries to remove the stigma of caste from which people born in lower castes were suffering. Many laws were also passed prohibiting some of the inhuman caste practices." (p. 110) 126. Rivers, the leading anthropologist, criticizes the use • , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 141 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] of the terms "caste" and "class" as synonyms45 . However, many A others, such as Lowie46 and Kimball Young47 , use these terms as though they were identical. , 127. Very common is the use of the word caste to indicate hereditary status. Cecil Clare. North48 , the noted sociologist, B accepts the point of view that degrees of rigidity mark the difference between class and caste systems. His definition reads: "A group in which status, occupation, and culture have become hereditary is known as a caste. As a matter of c fact, however, the distinction between a society based upon caste and one in which open classes prevail is simply one of degree." 128. North concludes by saying that the term "caste" applies to classes that have become fixed, and that all such D classes tend to become castes. 129. Maclver49 , another leading authority in the field of social class theory, also identifies caste with hereditary status. He attempts to tie his interpretation with the situation in India, a E procedure not often followed by the other sociologists. He writes thus, "Caste as unchangeable status: - The feudal order approximated to a caste system. When status is wholly predetermined, so that men are born to their lot in life F without hope of changing it, then class takes the extreme " form of caste. This is the situation in Hindu society. 'Every 45 W.H.R. Rivers, Social Organization (New York, 1924) p. 143 46 Robert H. Lowie, The Origin of the State (New York, 1927) p. 21; Lowie, G An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (New York, 1940) p. 268 47 Kimball Young, An Introductory Sociology (New York, 1924) I 48 Cecil Clare North, Social Differentiation (Chapel Hill, 1926) p. 254 -~ 49 R.N. Maciver, Society: A textbook of Sociology (New York 1937) p.171.9 H ~ , A Hindu necessarily belongs to the caste of his parents, and in that caste he inevitably remains. No accumulation of wealth and no exercise of talents can alter his caste status; and marriage outside his caste is prohibited or severely discouraged.' Caste is a complete barrier to the mobility B of class." 130. Therefore, a class always enjoys certain privileges or at least certain advantages over others in society. When it is more or less rigorously closed, or enjoys hereditary privileges, it is called a "caste''. 131. However, there are other sociologists who are of the opinion that the Caste system has a hereditary function also. Charles Horton Cooley50 opines that: "if the transmission of function from father to son has D become established, a caste spirit, a sentiment in favour of such transmission and opposed to the passage from one class to another, may arise and be shared even by the unprivileged classes. The individual then thinks of himself and his family as identified with his caste ... " E 132. Therefore, according to the early sociological theories, the term "caste" has been used to mean "class", hereditary or rigid status, and hereditary occupation. 133. The Mysore Census of 190151 is quoted, in this F connection, as follows: "In any one of the iinguistic divisions of India there are as many as two hundred castes which can be grouped in classes whose gradation is largely acknowledged by all. But the order of social precedence amongst the individual G castes of any class cannot be made definite, because not only is there no ungrudging acceptance of such rank but 5° Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization (New York, 1909) p. 215 ' 51 G.S. Ghurye, Caste and Race in India (Bombay, 1979) p. 6, Quoting H from Mysore Census, 1901, p. 400 • , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 143 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] -4 f also the ideas of the people on this point are very nebulous A and uncertain. The following observations vividly bring out this state of things." Excepting the Brahm in at· one end and the admittedly l degraded castes like the Holeyas at the other, the B members of a large proportion of the immediate castes think or profess to think that their caste is better than their ~ neighbours, and should be ranked accordingly." ~ 134. On the other hand, it is possible that within a caste ~ group there is a marked inequality of status, opportunity, or social c standing - which then defines the "class" within that particular "caste" system. For example, all the Brahmins are not engaged in highly respectable employment, nor are all very wealthy. It may even be that some Brahmins may be servants of members of a '! lower caste, or it may also be so that the personal servant ofa D rich Brahmin may be a poor Brahmin. ;. 135. Hence, there is every reason to believe that within a single caste group there are some classes or groups of people to whom good fortune or perseverance has brought more dignity, social influence and social esteem than it has to others. E 136. In India, caste, in a socio-organizational manner would . mean that it is not characterized merely by the physical or ,, occupational characteristics of the individuals who make it up; J rather, it is characterized by its codes and its close-knit socia' controls. In the case of classes, however, there may not exist, ·F , } such close-knit unit social controls, and there may exist great disparity in occupational characteristics. 137. A social class is therefore a homogeneous unit, from the point of view of status and mutual recognition; whereas a G caste is a homogeneous unit from the point of view of common ancestrY, religious rites and strict organizational control. Thus ·/ the manner in which the caste is closed both in the organizational 1 and biological sense causes it to differ from social class. i Moreover, its emphasis upon ritual and regulations pertaining H A to cleanliness and purity differs radically from the secular nature and informality of social class rules. In a social class, the exclusiveness would be based primarily on status. Social classes divide homogeneous populations into layers of prestige and esteem, and the members of each layer are able to circulate B freely with it. r38. In a caste, however, the social distance between members is due to the fact that they belong to entirely different organizations. It may be said, therefore, that a caste is a horizontal division and a class, a vertical division. 139. The Solicitor General, Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, pointed out that for the purpose of reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, the Central List has been in operation for the past 14 years and not a single person has challenged any inclusion 0 in the Central List as void or illegal. 140. It was pointed out that the National Commission for the Backward Classes and the State Commission for Backward Classes have prepared a list based on elaborate guidelines and these guiqelines have been framed after studying the E criteria/indicators framed by the Mandal Commission and the Commissions set up in the past by different State Governments. Various Commissions held public hearings at various places and the National Commission held 236 public hearings before it finalized the list. It is also pointed out that during the period of F its functioning, the National Commission had recommended 297 requests for inclusion and at the same time rejected 288 requests for inclusion of the main castes. It is further pointed out that the Commission took into consideration detailed data with regard to social, educational and economic criteria. The G Commission has also looked into whether there has been any improvement or deterioration in the condition of the caste or community being considered for inclusion during the past twenty ( , years. \ 141. It is pointed out that an elaborate questionnaire was H prepared by the Commission and the answers in this ·- ~ , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 145 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] questionnaire were considered in detail for inclusion/rejection A in the list. It is clear that the lists of socially and educationally · backward classes of citizens are being prepared not solely on the basis of the caste and if caste and other considerations are taken into account for determining backwardness, it cannot be said that it would be violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution. B 142. We hold that the determination of SEBCs is done (I not solely based on caste and hence, the identification of SEBCs is not violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution. 6. Whether Creamy Layer is to be excluded from c SEBCs? 143. The SEBCs have been identified by applying various criteria. Though for the purpose of convenience, the list is based _, or caste, it cannot be said that 'Backward Class' has been identified solely on the basis of caste. All the castes which D suffered the social and educational backwardness have been /1- included in the list. Therefore, it is not violative of Article 15(1'). i The only possible objection that could be agitated is that in many of the castes included in this list, there may be an affluent section (Creamy Layer) which cannot be included in the list of E SEBCs. 144. When socially and educationally backward classes are determined by giving importance to caste, it shall not be forgotten that a segment of that caste is economically advanced F and they do not require the protection of reservation. It was J argued on behalf of the petitioners that the principle of 'Creamy Layer' should be strictly applied to SEBCs while giving affirmative action and the principles of exclusion of 'Creamy Layer' applied in Indra Sawhney's case should be equally applied to any of the legislations that may be passed as per G Article 15(5) of the Constitution. The Counsel forthe petitioners -{ ·yf submitted that SEBCs have been defined under section 2 (g) of the Act and fhe Central Government has been delegated with the power to determine Other Backward Classes. The Counsel for the petitioners have pointed out that the definition given in H A section 2(g) of the Act should be judicially interpreted. That the backward class so stated therein should mean to exclude the 'Creamy Layer'. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) stated that exclusion of 'Creamy Layer' shall not apply for reservation in educational institutions. B He pointed out that in case the 'creamy layer' is excluded, the other members of the backward class community would not be in a position to avail the benefit of reservation and the fee structure in many of these centrally administered institutions is exorbitantly high and the ordinary citizen would not be in a c position to afford the payment of fees and thus the very purpose of the reservation would be frustrated. 145. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the creamy layer elimination will only perpetuate caste inequalities. It would enable the advanced castes to eliminate D any challenge or competition to their leadership in the professions and services and that they will gain by eliminating all possible beneficiaries of reservation in the name of creamy layer especially in the institutions of higher learning. It was argued that the analogy of Creamy Layer applied in reservations to jobs E cannot be applied in reservations to educational institutions of higher learning. The position of a student getting admission to an institution of higher learning is totally different and can never be compared to that of backward class person to get a job by virtue of reservation. The study in any educational institution of F higher learning is very expensive and the non-creamy layer backward class parent cannot afford his son or his daughter incurring such a huge expenditure. Eliminating them from the Creamy Layer will frustrate the very object of providing reservation. Therefore, it is wholly impracticable and highly G counter productive to import the policy of Creamy Layer for reservation in these institutions. And according to the learned Counsel there is a difference between services and education and that under the purview of Act 5 of 2007, around 3 lakh seats would be filled up every year. Whereas the jobs are limited and they will not become vacant every year. H . , I ~ ., ' "' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 147 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.) 146. The learned Counsel pointed out that grouping of all A castes together may enable a less backward caste among the backward classes to corner more seats than it deserves. It is also possible that more b!'ickward classes cannot afford to compete with the less backward classes. The only way to solve the said problem is by categorization of Backward Classes and B sub classifying them so as to ensure that under each category only similarly circumstanced castes are grouped together. The { categorization of backward class has successfully worked in ' State of Tamil Nadu where most backward class is provided 20% reservation and the most backward castes and denotified c tribes are grouped together and the backward classes are provided 30% reservation. In the State.of Karnataka, backward classes are divided into 5 categories and separate reservations have been provided. And in the State of Andhra Pradesh, Backward Classes have been divided into 4 divisions and D separate percentage of reservation .has been provided. 147. As noticed earlier, determination of backward class cannot be exclusively based on caste. Poverty, social backwardness, economic backwardness, all are criteria for determination of backwardness. It has been noticed in Indra E Sawhney's case that among the backward class, a section of the backward class is a member of the affluent section of society. They do not deserve any sort of reservatiqn for further progress in life. They are socially and educationally advanced enough to compete for the general seats along with other candidates. F ./ 148. In Indra Sawhney's case (supra) Jeevan Reddy, J., has observed : "In our opinion, it is not a question of permissibility or desirability of such test but one of proper and more G appropriate identification of a class - a backward class. The very concept of a class denotes a number of persons ' having certain common traits which distinguish them from ~ ·.,t the others. In a backward class under clause (4) of Article 16, if the connecting link is the social backwardness, it H 4 ~ .- A should broadly be the same in a given class. If some of the members are far too advanced socially (which in the context, necessarily means economically and, may also mean educationally) the connecting thread between them and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits in B the class. After excluding them alone, would the class be a compact class. In fact, such exclusion benefits the truly backward." (p. 724) 149. It is to be understood that "creamy layer" principle is I .\ introduced merely to exclude a section of a particular caste on c the ground that they are economically advanced or educationally forward. They are excluded because unless this segment of caste is excluded from that caste group, there cannot be proper identification of the backward class. If the "Creamy Layer" principle is not applied, it could easily be said that all the castes D that have be.en included among the socially and educationally backward classes have been included exclusively on the b.asis of caste. Identification of SEBC for the purpose of either Article "" 15(4), 15(5) or 16(4) solely on the basis of caste is expressly I prohibited by various decisions of this Court and it is also against ... E Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) of the Constitution. To fulfil the conditions and to find out truly what is socially and educationally backward class, the exclusion of "creamy layer" is essential. 150. It may be noted that the "creamy layer" principle is ' applied not as a general principle of reservation. It is applied F for the purpose of identifying the socially and educationally backward class. One of the main criteria for determining the SEBC is poverty. If that be so, the principle of exclusion of "creamy layer" is necessary. Moreover, the majority in Indra Sawhney's case upheld the exclusion of "creamy layer" for the G purpose of reservation in Article 16(4). Therefore, we are bound by the larger Bench decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney's case, and it cannot be said that the "creamy layer" principle cannot be applied for identifying SEBCs. Moreover, Articles \ 15(4) and 15(5) are designed to provide opportunities in H education thereby raising educational, social and economical ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 149 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] levels of those who are lagging behind and once this progress A is achieved by this section, any legislation passed thereunder should be deemed to have served its purpose. By excluding those who have already attained economic well being or educational advancement, the special benefits provided under these clauses cannot be further extended to them and, if done B so, it would be unreasonable, discriminatory or arbitrary, resulting in reverse discrimination. 151 . Sawant, J. also made observation in Indra Sawhney's case to ensure removal of 'creamy layer'. He observed:- C " .... at least some individuals and families in the backward classes -- gaining. sufficient means to develop their capacities to compete with others in every fi~ld .... Legally, therefore, they are not entitled to be any longer called as D part of the backward classes whatever their original birth mark - to continue to confer upon such advanced sections from the backward classes the special benefits, would amount to treating equals unequally violating the equality provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, to rank them with the rest of the backward .classes would equally violate the E right to equality of the rest in those classes, since it would amount to treating the unequals equally .... It will lead to perverting the objectives of the special constitutional provisions since the forwards among the backward classes will thereby be enabled to tap up all the special benefits F to the exclusion and to the cost of the rest in those classes, thus keeping the rest in perpetual backwardness." 152. All these reasonings are equally applicable to the reservation or any special action contemplated under Article G 15(5). Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention raised by the respondent's learned Counsel that if 'creamy layer' is excluded, there may be practically no representation for a particular backward class in educational institutions because the remaining members, namely, the non-creamy layer, may not H A have risen to the level or standard necessary to qualify to get admission even within the reserved quota. If the creamy layer is not excluded, the identification of SEBC will not be complete and any SEBC without the exclusion of 'creamy layer' may not be in accordance with Article 15(1) of the Constitution. B 7. What should be the para-meters for determining the "creamy layer" group ? 153. After the decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public c Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) issued an Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 providing for 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes. The Memorandum reads as follows :- "OFFICE MEMORANDUM Subject: Reservation for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services Under the Government of India -regarding The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's OM No. 36012/31/90-Estt. (SCT), dated the 13th August, 1990 E and 25th September, 1991 regarding reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of India and to say that following the Supreme Court judgment in the Indra Sawhneyvs. Union of India (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 930of1990) the Government of F India appointed an Expert Committee to recommend the criteria for exclusion of the socially advanced persons/sections from the benefits of reservations for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of India. 2. Consequent to the consideration of the Expert G Committee's recommendations this Department's Office Memorandum No. 36012/31/90-Estt. (SCT), dated 13.8.1990 referred to in para (1) above is hereby modified to provide as follows: H (a) 27% (twenty-seven per cent) of the vacancies in Civil . ' -f.- I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 151 1 I. [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.) Posts and Services under the Government of India, to be A filled through direct recruitment, shall be reserved for the Other Backward Classes. Detailed instructions relating to the procedure to be followed for enforcing reservation will be issued separately. (b) *** (c) (i) The aforesaid reservation shall not apply to persons/ sections mentioned in Column 3 of the Schedule to this office memorandum. (ii) The rule of exclusion will not apply to persons working C as artisans or engaged in hereditary occupations, callings. A list of such occupations, callings will be issued separately by the Ministry of Welfare. (d)-(e) * * * D * * * 3. SCHEDULE Description of category To whom rule of exclusion will apply E 2 3 CONSTITUTIONAL Son(s) and daughter(s) of POSTS (a) President of India; (b) Vice-President of India; F (c) Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts; (d) Chairman & Members of UPSC and of the State Public G Service Commission; Chief Election Commissioner; Comptroller and Auditor General of India; t ~ ... A (e) persons holding _. constitutional positions of like nature. II. SERVICE CATEGORY Son(s) and daughter(s) of B A. Group A/Class I Officers (a) parents, both of whom are of the All India Central Class I Officers; and State Services (b) parents, either of whom is a Class I officer; I~ (' (Direct Recruits) (c) parents, both of whom are c Class I Officers, but one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation; (d) parents, either of whom is D a Class I officer and such parent dies or suffers permanent incapacitation and before such death or such -", incapacitation has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years; F (e) parents, both of whom are Class I officers die or suffer " permanent incapacitation and before such death or such incapacitation of the both, G either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for y a period of not less than 5 years. ' , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 153 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.) Provided that the rule of . A ·+ exclusion shall not apply in the following cases : (a) Son(s) and daughter(s) of parents either of whom or both 8 of whom are class I officers and such parent(s) dies/die or "'"' suffer permanent "} \ incapacitation; ' (b) A lady belonging to OBC c t category has got married to a / Class I officer, and may herself like to apply for a job. -'I B. Group B/Class II officers Son(s) and daughter(s) of of the Central and State (a) Parents both of whom D Services are Class II officers; ,,... (Direct Recruitment) (b) parents of whom only the husband is a Class II officer and he get into Class I at the age of 40 or earlier; E (c) parents, both of whom are Class 11 officers and one of them dies or suffers ~ permanent incapacitation and F .j ,,. either one of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank etc. for a period of not less than 5 years G before such death or permanent incapacitation; -,; (d) parents of whom the husband is a Class I officer (direct recruit or pre-forty H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S. C.R. promoted) and the wife is a Class II officer and the wife dies; or suffers permanent incapacitation; and (e) parents, of whom the wife is a Class I officer (direct recruit or pre-forty promoted) and the husband is a Class II officer and the husband dies or suffers permanent incapacitation: Provided that the rule of exclusion shall not apply in the following cases: Son(s) and daughter(s) of (a) parents both of whom are Class II officers and one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation; (b) parents, both of whom are Class II officers and both of them die or suffer permanent incapacitation, even though either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank etc. for a period of not less than 5 years before their death or permanent incapacitation. C. Employees in Public Sector Undertakings etc. The criteria enumerated in A and . , I ,A ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 155 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] Ill. ARMED FORCES INCLUDING PARAMILITARY FORCES (Persons holding civil posts are not Included) B above in this category will apply mutatis mutandis to officers holding equivaleot or comparable posts in PSUs, Banks, Insurance Organisations, Universities, etc. and also to equivalent or comparable posts and positions under private employment, pending the evaluation of the posts on equivalent or comparable basis in these institutions, the criteria specified in Category VI below will apply to the officers in these institutions. Son(s) and daughter(s) of parents either or both of whom is or are in the rank of Colonel and above in the Army and to equivalent posts in the Navy and the Air Force and the Paramilitary Forces: Provided that: (i) If the wife of an Armed F Forces officer is herself in the Armed Forces (i.e. the category under consideration) the rule of exclusion will apply only when she herself has G reached the rank of Colonel; (ii) The service ranks below Colonel of husband and wife shall not be clubbed together; I I A (iii) If the wife of an officer in the Armed Forces is in civil employment, this will not be taken into account for applying the rule of exclusion unless she B falls in the service category under Item No. II in which case the criteria and conditions enumerated therein will apply .t f •• to her independently. IV. PROFESSIONAL CLASS AND THOSE ENGAGED IN TRADE AND INDUSTRY D (i) Persons engaged in profession as a doctor, lawyer, chartered ..... accountant, Income Tax consultant, financial or E management consultant, dental surgeon, engineer, architect, computer specialist, film artists F and other film professional, author, playwright, sports persons, sports professional, media G professional or any other vocations of like status. (ii) Persons engaged in Criteria specified against '-f trade, business and Category VI will apply- ' , ,> ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 157 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.) industry. V. PROPERTY OWNERS A. Agricultural holdings Criteria specified against Category VI will apply­ Explanation: (i) Where the husband is in same profession and the wife 8 is in a Class II or lower grade employment, the income/ wealth test will apply only on the basis of the husband's income; (ii) If the wife .is in any profession and the husband is in employment in a Class II or lower rank post, then the income/wealth criterion will D apply only on the basis of the wife's income and the husband's income will not be clubbed with it. Son(s) and daughter(s) of persons belonging to a family (father, mother and minor children) which owns only F irrigated land which is equal to or inore than 85% of the statutory area; or -·· (a) both irrigated and unirrigated land, as follows : (i) The rule of exclusion will apply where the precondition exists that the irrigated area (having been brought to a 158 single type under a common denominator) 40% or more of the statutory ceiling limit for irrigated land (this being calculated by excluding the unirrigated portion). If this precondition of not less than 40% exists, then only the area of unirrigated land will be taken into account. This will be done by converting the unirrigated land on the basis of the conversion formula existing, into the irrigated type. The irrigated area so computed from unirrigated land shall be added to the actual area of irrigated land and if after such clubbing together the total area in terms of irrigated land is 80% or more of the statutory ceiling limit for irrigated land, then the rule of exclusion will apply and disentitlement will occur; (ii) The rule of exclusion will not apply if the land holding of a family is exclusively unirrigated. Criteria of income/wealth specified in Category VI below will apply Deemed as agricultural holding and hence criteria at .t. ' I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 159 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] A above under this category A -+ will apply. Criteria specified in Category VI below will apply. Explanation: Building may be 8 used for residential, ir:idustrial or commercial purpose and " .. the like two or more such purposes. B. Plantations (i) Coffee, tea, rubber etc. (ii) Mango, citrus, apple D plantations, etc. ,>.. C. Vacant land and/or buildings, in urban areas or urban agglomerations VI. INCOME/ Son(s) and daughter(s) of E WEALTH TEST (a) persons having gross annual income of Rs. 1 lakh or above or possessing wealth above the exemption limit as F prescribed in the Wealth Tax ! ,;:, Act for a period of thre.e consecutive years; (b) persons in Categories I, II, Ill and V-A who are not G disentitled to the benefit of reservation but have income from other sources of wealth y which will bring them within the income/wealth criteria H A mentioned in (a) above. Explanation. (i) Income from salaries or agricultural land shall not be clubbed; (ii) The income criteria in terms of rupee will be modified taking into account the change c in its value every three years; If the situation,- however, so demands, the interregnum may be less. Explanation: Wherever the expression 'permanent incapacitation' occurs in this Schedule, it shall mean D incapacitation which results in putting an officer out of service." 154. We make it clear that same principle of determining E the creamy layer for providing 27% reservation for backward classes for appointment need not be strictly followed in case of reservation envisaged under Article 1°5(5) of the Constitution. As pointed by Shri Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, if a strict income restriction is made for identifying the "creamy F layer'', those who are left in the particular caste may not be able to have a sufficient number of candidates for getting admisslon in the central institutions as per Act 5 of 2007. Government can make a relaxation to some extent so that sufficient number of candidates may be available for the purpose of filling up the G 27% reservation. It is for the Union Government and the State Governments to issue appropriate guidelines to identify the "creamy layer" so that SEBC are properly determined in accordance with the guidelines given by this Court. If, even by applying this principle, still the candidates are not available, the State can issue appropriate guidelines to effectuate the . , ~ , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 161 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] implementation of the reservation purposefully. A 155. As noticed earlier, "backward class" defined in Section 2(g) does not exclude "creamy layer''. Therefore, we make it clear that backward class as defined in Section 2(g) of Act 5 of 2007 must be deemed to have been such backward class by applying the· principle of exclusion of "creamy layer". B 8. Whether the "creamy layer" principle is applicable ~). to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes ? 156. Learned Senior Counsel Dr. Rajeev Dhavan submitted that "cr~amy layer" principle is to be applied to SCs c and STs. He drew inspiration from the observations made by Justice Krishna Iyer in N.M. Thomas's case (supra) and also from the observations made in Nagaraj's case and reference was made to paragraphs 80, 110 and 120 to 123 of Nagaraj's case (supra). D 157. N.M. Thomas's case (supra) does not state that "creamy layer" principle should apply to SCs and STs. In K.C. Vasanth Kumar's case (supra) the "creamy layer" was used in the case of backward caste or class. In K.C. Vasanth E Kumar52 (supra), Desai J. quoted from N.M. Thomas (supra) as follows :- "In the light of experience, here and elsewhere, the danger of 'reservation', it seems to me, is threefold. Its ben~fits, ) by and large, are snatched away by the top creamy layer F .;'- of the 'backward' caste or class, thus keeping the weakest among the weak always weak and leave the fortunate . layers to consume the whole cake." (N.M. Thomas (supra) p. 363, para 124) 158. In Nagaraj's case (supra) in paragraph 80, it is stated G that while "applying the 'creamy layer' test, this Court held that if roster-point promotees are given consequential seniority, it 52 (supra) p. 733 H A will violate the equality principle which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and in which even Article 16( 4-A) cannot be of any help to the reserved category candidates." This was with reference to the observations made in Indra Sawhney's case· (supra) and earlier in M.G. Badappanavar B & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. 53 ; Ajit Singh & Ors. (II) vs. State of Punjab & Ors.54 and Union of India & Ors. Vs . . Virpal Singh Chauhan & Ors.55 . Virpal Singh Chauhan's . , } case (supra) dealt with reservation of railway employees wherein , ~ it is held that once the number of posts reserved for being filled C by reserved category candidates in a cadre, category or grade (unit for application of rule of reservation) are filled by the operation of roster, the object of the rule of reservation should be deemed to have been achieved. Ajit Singh ll's case (supra) dealt with consequential seniority on promotion and held that 0 roster points fixed at Level 1 are not intended to determine any seniority at Level 1 between general candidates and the reserved candidates and the roster point merely becomes operative whenever a vacancy reserved at Level 2 becomes available. Thereby holding that if promotion is obtained by way of reservation, the consequential seniority will not be counted. E M.G. Badappanavar's case (supra) followed the cases of Ajit Singh II (supra) and Virpal Singh (supra). 159. In none of these decisions it is stated that the "creamy layer" principle would apply to SCs and STs. In Indra F Sawhney's case (supra), it is specifically stated that the "creamy layer" principle will not apply to STs and SCs. In ,._ Nagaraj's case (supra) , in paragraphs 110 and 120 and finally in paragraphs 121, 122 and 123, it is only stated that when considering questions of affirmative action, the larger principle G of equality such as 50% ceiling (quantitative limitation) and "creamy layer'' (quantitative exclusion) may be kept in mind. In 53 (2001) 2 sec 666 54 (1999)1sec209 H 55 (1995) 6 sec 684 ( J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 163 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.1.] Nagaraj's case (supra) it has not been discussed or· decided A that the creamy layer principle would be applicable to SCs/STs. Therefore, it cannot be said that the observations made in Nagaraj's case are contrary to the decision in Indra Sawhney's case (supra). 160. Moreover, the "creamy layer" principle is not yet B applied as a principle of equality or as a general principle to -I apply for all affirmative actions. The observations made by .. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in K.C. Vasanth Kumar case are relevant in this regard. The learned Judge observed as under : "One cannot quarrel with the statement that social science ·research and not judicial impressionism should form the basis of examination, by courts, of the sensitive question of reservation for backward classes. Earlier we mentioned how the assumption that efficiency will be impaired if D reservation exceeds 50%, if reservation is extended to promotional posts or if the carry forward rule is adopted, is not based on any scientific data. One must, however, enter a caveat to the criticism that the benefits of reservation are often snatched away by the top creamy E layer of backward class or caste. That a few of the seats and posts reserved for backward classes are snatched away by the more fortunate among them is not to say that reservation is not necessary. This is bound to happen in a competitive society such as ours. Are not the unreserved seats and posts snatched away, in the same way, by the F j top creamy layer of society itself? Seats reserved for the backward classes are taken away by the top layers amongst them on the same principle of merit on which the unreserved seats are taken away by the top layers of society." (p. 763) G 161. So far, this Court has not applied the "creamy layer" y . principle to the general principle of equality for the purpose of reservation. The "creamy layer" so far has been applied only to ' identify the backward class, as it required certain parameters , ~ J A to determine the backward classes. "Creamy layer" principle is one of the parameters to identify backward classes. Therefore; principally, the "creamy layer" principle cannot be applied to STs and SCs, as SCs and STs are separate classes by themselves. Ray, CJ., in an earlier decisions, stated that "Scheduled Castes B and Scheduled Tribes are not a caste within the ordinary meaning of caste". And they are so identified by virtue of the • Notification issued by the President of India under Arti.cles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. The President may, after .. ~ consultation with the Governor, by public notification, specify the c caste·s, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which for the purpose of the Constitution shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes of Scheduled Tribes. Once the N'otification is issued, they are deemed to be the members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, whichever is D applicable. In E.V. Chinnaiah (supra), concurring with the majority judgment, S.B. Sinha, J. said :- · "The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes occupy a special place in our Constitution. The President of India is the sole repository of the power to specify the castes, E races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 made in terms of Article 341(1) is exhaustive. The object of Articles 341 and 342 F is to provide for grant of protection to the backward class of citizens who are specified in the Scheduled Castes .... Order and Scheduled Tribes Order having regard to the economic and education backwardness wherefrom they suffer. Any legislation which would bring them out of the G 1:1urview thereof or tinker with the order issued by the President of India would be unconstitutional. (Paras 52, 111 and 84) (emphasis supplied) y H 162. A plea was raised by the respondent-State that • I _,._ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF !NOIA & ORS. 165 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] categorization of Scheduled Castes could be justified by A applying the "creamy layer" test as used in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) which was specifically rejected in paragraph 96 of the E.V. Chinnaiah's case (supra) . It is observed :- But we must state that whenever such a situation arises in respect of S~heduled Caste, it will be Parliament alone to 8 take the necessary legislative steps in terms of clause (2) of Article 341 of the Constitution. The States concededly do not have the legislative competence therefor." (p. 430) 163. Moreover, right from the beginning , the Scheduled c Castes and Scheduled Tribes were treated as a separate category and nobody ever disputed identification of such classes. So long as "creamy layer" is not applied as one of the · principles of equality, it cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. So far, it is applied only to identify the 0 soeially and educationally backward classes. We make it clear that for the purpose of reservation, the principles of "creamy layer" are not applicable for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Trib~. . 9. Whether the principles laid down by the United E . States Supreme Court for affirmative action such as "suspect legislation", "strict scrutiny" and "compelling State necessity" are applicable to principles of reservation or other affirmative action contemplated under Article 15(5) of the Constitution F of India? 164. Based on the Ninety-Third Constitutional Amendment Act , Act 5 of 2007 has been enacted. According to the petitioner's Counsel, this is a "suspect legislation" and therefore, it is to be subjected to "strict scrutiny" as laid by the United States G Supreme Court and only by passing this test of ·"strict scrutiny", ·such legislation could be put into practice. 165. At the. outset, it must be stated that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court were not applied in the lncjian H A context as it was felt that the structure of the provisions under the two Constitutions and the social conditions as well as other >- factors are widely different in both the countries. Reference may be made to Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.56 and A.S. Krishna Vs. State of B Madras57 wherein this Court specifically held that the due process clause in the Constitution of the United States of America is not applicable to India. While considering the scope and applicability of Article 19( 1 )(g) in Kameshwar Prasad and .. t Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another 58 , it was observed "- • c "As regards these decisions of the American Courts, it should be borne in mind that though the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reading "Congress shall make no law .. .-.abridging the freedom of speech .... " appears to confer no power on the Congress to impose D any restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the freedom guaranteed .is subject to the police power - the scope of which however .... ~ has not been defined with precision or uniformly. " (p. 378) 166. In Kesavananda Bharati 59 case also , while considering the extent and scope of the power of amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution of India, the Constitution of the United States of America was extensively referred to and Ray, J., held :- F "The American decisions which have been copiously cited before us, ~ere rendered in the context of the history of the struggle against colonialism of the American people, "' sovereignty of several States which came together to form a Confederation, the strains and pressures which induced G them to frame a Constitution for a Federal Government 56 [1955] 2 SCR 589 57 (1957} SCR 399 .. .,.. 58 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 369 H 59 [1973] 4 sec 22s ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 167 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] ~ and the underlying concepts of law and judicial approach A · over a period of nearly 200 years, cannot be used to persuade this Court to apply their approach in determining the cases arising under our Constitution". (p. 615) 167. It may also be noticed that there are structural B differences in the Constitution of India and the Constitution of the United States of America. Reference may be made to the i';. 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Some of the relevant .> portions thereof are as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and c subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property D without due process of law nor deny to any person within >- its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1·68. Whereas in India, Articles 14 and 18 are differently structured and contain express provisions for special provision ;~ for the advancement of SEBCs, STs and SCs. Moreover, in our E Constitution there is a specific provision under the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution requiring the State to strive for justice - social, economic and political - and to minimize the inequalities of income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities F ' (Article 38). Earlier, there was a view that Articles 16(4) and ). 15(5) are exceptions to Article 16(1) and 15(1) respectively. This view was held in The General Manager Southern Railways Vs. Rangachari60 and M.R. Balaji Vs. State of Mysore61 . 169. In T. Devadasan62 (supra), Subba Rao J., gave a G dissenting opinion wherein he held that Article 16(4) was not an v' 60 (supra) at p. 607 ;~ 61 (supra) at 455 62 (supra) at 700 H A exception to Article 16(1 ). He observed:- " ... The expression 'nothing in this article' is a legislative device to express its intention in a most emphatic way that the power conferred thereunder is not limited in any way by the main provision but falls outside it. It has not really carved out an exception, but has preserved a power untrammeled by the other provisions of the Article." 170. In two other subsequent decisions, i.e. in Triloki Nath (1)63 (supra) and T. Devadasan case (supra), it was held that, c article 15(4) and 16(4) are exceptions to Article 15(1) and 16(1) respectively. But a 7-Judge Bench in State of Kerala Vs. N.M. Thomas (supra) held that Article 15(4) and 16(4) are not exceptions to Article 15(1) and 16(1) respectively. Fazal Ali J., said: D "This form of classification which is referred to as reservation, is in my opinion, clearly covered by Article 16(4) of the Constitution which is completely exhaustive on this point. That is to say clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to Article 14 in the sense that whatever E classification can be made, can be done only through clause (4) of Article 16. Claus~ (4) of Article 16, however, is an explanation containing an exhaustive and exclusive provision regarding reservation which is one of the forms of classification." F 171. This brought out a drastic change in the view of this Court. In K.C. Vasanth Kumar Vs. State of Karnataka64 (supra), Venkatramaiah J. observed: "Article 14 of the Constitution consists of two parts. It asks G the State not to deny to any person equality before law. It also asks the State not to deny the equal protection of the laws. Equality before law connotes absence of any 63 (supra) at 104 64 (supra) at 800 .... ' ''( ,..._ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 169 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] discriminatic;m in law. The concept of equal protection A required the State to mete out differential treatment to persons in different situations in order to establish an equilibrium amongst all. This is the basis of the rule that equals should be treated equally and unequals must be treated unequally if the doctrine of equality which is one of B the corner-stone of our Constitution is to be duly implemented. In order to do justice amongst unequals, the State has to resort to compensatory or protective discrimination . Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) of the Constitution were enacted as measures of compensatory c ·or protective discrimination to grant relief to persons . belonging to socially oppressed castes and minorities.". 172. The amendment to Article 15 by inserting Article 15(5) and the new Act (Act 5 of 2007) are to be viewed in· the background of these constitutional provisions . It may also be D recalled that the Preamble to the Constitution and the· Directive Principles of State Policy give a positive mandate to the State and the State is obliged to remove inequalities and backwardness from society . While considering the constitutionality of a social justice legislation, it is worthwhile to E note the objectives which have been incorporated by the Constitution makers in the Preamble of the Constitution and how they are sought to be secured by enacting fundamental rights in Part 111 and Directives Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights represent the F civil and political rights and the Directive Principles embody social and economic rights. Together they are intended to carry out the objectives set out in the Prea~ble of the Constitution. Granville Austin, in his· book65 , states : 1 . "Both types of rights have developed as a common G demand, products of the national and social revolutions , of their almost inseparable intertwi ning, and of the 65 Granville Austin: The Indian Constitution: Corner-stone o·fa Nation, . ~~ . H ( - "' A character of Indian politics itself." 173. From the constitutional history of India, it can be seen I- that from the point of view of importance and significance, no distinction can be made between the two sets of rights, namely, B Fundamental Rights which are made justicia.ble and the Directives Principles which are made non-justiciable. The Directive Principles of State Policy are made non-justiciable for the reason that the' implementation of many of these rights would depend on the financial capability of the State. Non- "' justiciable clause was provided for the reason that an infant State c shall not be made accountable immediately for not fulfilling these obligations. Merely because the Directive Principles are non- justiciable by the judicial process does not mean that they are of subordinate importance. In Champakam Dorairajan's case (supra), it was observed that "the Directive Principles have to D conform to and run subsidiary to the Chapter of Fundamental Rights." But this view did not hold for a long time and was later changed in a series of subsequent decisions. (See : In Re. . .. Kerala Education Bill, 195766 ; Minerava Mills (supra)) E 17 4. In Minerva Mills67 (supra) Bhagwati, J observed : "The Fundamental Rights are no doubt important and valuable in a democracy, but there can be no real democracy without social and economic justice to the common man and to create socio-economic conditions in F which there can be social and economic justice to every one, is the theme of the Directive Principles. It is the Directive Principles which nourish the roots of our democracy, provide strength and vigour to it and attempt to make it a real participatory democracy which does not G remain merely a political democracy with Fundamental Rights available to all irrespective of their power, position or wealth. The dynamic provisions of the Directive y 66 1959 SCR 995 67 AIR 1980 SC 1789, at p. 1847 ·- .- ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 171 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] Principles fertilise the static provisions of the Fundamental A Rights. The object of the Fundamental Rights is to protect individual liberty, but can individual liberty be considered in isolation from the socio-economic structure in which it is to operate. There is a real connection between individual liberty and the shape and form of the social and economic B structure of the society. Can there be any individual liberty at all for the large masses of people who are suffering 1" from want and privation and who are cheated out of their individual rights by the exploitative economic system? Would their individual liberty not come in conflict with the c liberty of the socially and economically more powerful class and in the process, get mutilated or destroyed? It is exiomatic that the real controversies in the present day society are not between power and freedom but between one form of liberty and another. Under the present socio- D economic system, it is the liberty of the few which is in conflict with the liberty of the many. The Directive Principles therefore, impose an obligation on the State to take positive action for creating socio-economic conditions in which there will be an egalitarian social order with social E and economic justice to all, so that individual liberty will become a cherished value and the dignity of the individual a living reality, not only for a few privileged persons but for the entire people of the country. It will thus be seen that the Directive Principles enjoy a very high place in the constitutional scheme and it is only in the framework of the F . .A ·socio-economic structure envisaged in the Directive Principles that the Fundamental Rights are intended to operate, for it is only then they can become meaningful and significant for the millions of our poor and deprived people who do not have been the bare necessities of life G and who are living below the poverty level." v 175. Article 46 enjoins upon the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and to protect them from social A injustice and all forms of exploitation whereas urider the Constitution of the United States of America, we get an entirely different picture. Though equality was one of the solemn affirmations of the American Declaration of Independence, slavery continued unabatedly and it was, to some extent, legally B recognized. In Dred Scott Vs. Saunders68 wherein Chief Justice Taney held that [African-Americans] were not entitled to get citizenship. He was of the view that 'once a slave always a slave', and one slave never would become the citizen of America. This view held by the Chief Justice Taney continued C for a long time and after the Civil War, the 14th amendment was enacted in 1868 and this amendment gave (equal protection of laws to all persons). In Plassy Vs. Ferguson69 which involved a challenge to a Louisiana statute that provided for equal but separate accommodations for black and white passengers in D trains, the United States Supreme Court was of the view that racial segregation was a reasonable exercise of State police power for the promotion of the public good and upheld the law. Several affirmative actions were challenged and the landmark decision of Brown Vs. Board of Education70 was delivered in 1954. In many cases, the strict scrutiny doctrine was being E applied to all laws of racial classifications. The learned Counsel for the petitioner made reference to Gratz Vs. Bollinger (supra) and some of the earlier decisions of the UniteJStates Supreme Court. During the past two decades, the Court has become sceptical of race-based affirmative action practiced or ordered F by the State. The Supreme Court of the US is of the view that affirmative action plans must rest upon a sufficient showing or predicate. of past discrimination which must go beyond the effects of societal discrimination. 176. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United G States of America and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 68 60 us 393( 1856) 69 163 us 537(1896) H 70 347 us 483 •.,.- • ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 173 [K.G BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] ~ prohibit universities to discriminate on the basis of classifications A such as race, colour, national origin and the like in all their .., operations. In a number of decisions of the United States 1 Supreme Court spanning decades of jurisprudence, a heavy " burden has been placed on institutionswhose affirmative action 'I "' programmes are challenged before the United States Supreme B Court on grounds that have been recognized as suspect or l_j unconstitutional. According to the United States Supreme Court, all such programmes are inherently suspect since they rely on suspect forms of classification (such as race). Therefore, because such forms of classification are inherently suspect, the courts have subjected all affirmative action programmes relying c -j on them to a very high standard of scrutiny, wherein those ....._ practicing these affirmative action programmes have to adhere to a very high standard of proof, which we know as the "strict "' scrutiny" test. I D ) >-. 177. The case of Regents of the University of California Vs. Bakke71 provided a starting point and from this case onwards, affirmative action programmes can be justified only on two distinct grounds, and only these grounds have been recognized as compelling enough so as to satisfy the "strict E _, scrutiny'' test, as developed by the United States Supreme Court. The two grounds are as follows: ~. 1. Remedial Justification: All efforts aimed at remedying past injustices against certain identified groups of people, who ' were unlawfully discriminated against in the past, serve as F ,,,, adequate justifications and all affirmative action programmes that are implemented with this aim serve the compelling institutional interest in removing all vestiges of discrimination that occurred in the past. In the case of City of Richmond Vs. J A Croson Co.72 , the United States Supreme Court held that if a university is able ' y 71 438 us 265 (1978) 72 488 U.S. 469 (1989) H ' , ' 174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A to show "some showing of prior discrimination" in its existing affirmative action program furthering racial exclusion then the university may take "affirmative steps to dismantle such a system". However, it is to be noted that the US Supreme Court also attached a warning with the above observation. While B scrutinizing such programmes, it was held that the Court would make "searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures ... [and to] identify that discrimination ... with some specificity before they may use race-conscious " t relief'. (Croson's Case73 ) c 2. Diversity-All affirmative action programmes aimed at bringing about racial diversity among the scholarship of the institution(s) may be said to in furtherance of compelling institutional interest. The starting point for this ground is Justice Powell's detailed opinion regarding the issue of diversity in the D case of Regents of the University of California Vs. Bakke74 (supra). In this case, according to Justice Powell, "[t]he attainment of a diverse student body is clearly a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education". He quoted from two of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding E academic freedom [Sweezy Vs. New Hampshire75 and Keyishian Vs. Board of Regents76 } and observed: "[l]t is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation ......... The atmosphere of ..... F speculation, experiment and creation - so essential to ~ the quality of higher education - is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body .... [l]t is not too much to say that the nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students 73 (supra), p. 492-93 14 (supra) at 311-313 y 75 (1957) 354 US 234 at 263 H 1s ( 1967) 385 US 589 at 603 I ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 175 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] __.. as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." A 178. The other part of the "strict scrutiny" test is the "narrow tailoring" test. The University, whose affirmative action programme is in question before the United States Supreme Court, is required to prove that its affirmative action programme 8 has been designed in the narrowest possible manner, in order to benefit only those specific people who are to be benefited, ! ,. thus serving the "compelling purposes" of the affirmative action programme. The program cannot be made in a broad manner to encompass a large group of people, and it has to serve the minimum possible requirement, in order to achieve its goal. c Otherwise, it may be possible that the rights of other people may be infringed upon, which would make the affirmative action programme unconstitutional. 179. Thus, the first limb of the strict scrutiny test that D elucidates the "compelling institutional interest" is focused on the objectives that affirmative action programmes are designed to achieve. The second limb, that of "narrow tailoring", focuses on the details of specific affirmative action programmes and on the specific people it aims to benefit. E 180. The United States Supreme Court has held that race may be one of the many factors that can be taken into account while structuring an affirmative action programme. At this stage, an analogy may be drawn with the Indian situation wherein the Supreme Court of India, in various cases, has held that caste F " may be one of the factors that can be taken into account, while providing for reservations for the socially and educationally backward classes. However, caste cannot be the "only" factor, just as race alone cannot be the only factor in the United States, while structuring reservation or affirmative action programmes. G 181. Furthermore, the courts, both in India as well as in the United States of America, have looked with extreme caution and care at any legislation that aims to discriminate on the basis of race in the US and caste in lr:idia. As the US Supreme Court elucidated in the case of Grutter Vs. Bollinger (supra), H A "Because the Fourteenth Amendment "protect[s] persons, not f groups," all governmental action based on race ought to be subjected to a very detailed and careful judicial inquiry and scrutiny so as to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed. (See : Adarand B Constructors Inc. Vs. Peiia)77 . 182. It therefore follows that the Government may treat people differently because of their race but only for those ~' , reasons that serve what is known as "compelling Government interest". c 183. Furthermore, for any affirmative action programme to survive the strict standard of judicial scrutiny, the Courts want "compelling evidence", that proves without any doubt that the affirmative action program is narrowly tailored and serves only D the most compelling of interests. Thus, the bar for the State or institution that practices affirmative action programmes based on suspect classifications has been effectively raised. " Therefore, in cases where a compelling interest is found, race- based methods may be used only after all other methods have E been considered and found deficient, and that too only to that limited extent which is required to remedy a discrimination that has been identified, and only when it has been shown that the identified beneficiaries have suffered previously in the past, and lastly, only if all undue burdens that may impinge upon the rights of other non- beneficiaries are avoided. F .~ 184. The aforesaid principles applied by the Supreme Court of the United States of America cannot be applied directly to India as the gamut of affirmative action in India is fully supported by constitutional provisions and we have not applied G the principles of "suspect legislation" and we have been following the doctrine that every legislation passed by the Parliament is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless otherwise proved. ~- We have repeatedly held that the Am~,,ican decisions are not 77 (1995) 515 US 200 at 227 ( ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 177 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] strictly applicable to us and the very same principles of strict A --'. scrutiny and suspect legislation were sought to be applied and this Court rejected the same in Saurabh Chaudhari Vs. Union of lndia78 . Speaking for the bench, V.N. Khare, CJI, said: "The strict scrutiny test or the intermediate scrutiny test B applicable in the United States of America as argued by Shri Salve cannot be applied in this case. Such a test is not applied in Indian Courts. In any event, such a test may -J;. be applied in a case where a legislation ex facie is found to be unreasonable. Such a test may also be applied in a case where by reason of a statute the life and liberty of a c citizen is put in jeopardy. This Court since its inception apart from a few cases where the legislation was found to be ex facie wholly unreasonable proceeded on the doctrine that constitutionality of a statute is to be presumed and the burden to prove contra is on him who asserts the same." D 185. Learned Counsel Shri Sushil Kumar Jain contended _; .. that the classification of OBCs was not properly done and it is not clear as to whose benefit the legislation itself is made therefore, it is a suspect legislation. This contention cannot be E accepted. We are of the view that the challenge to Act 5 of 2007 on the ground that it does not stand the "strict scrutiny" test and there was no "compellable State necessity" to enact this legislation cannot be accepted. 10. Whether delegation of power to the Union F Government to determine as to who shall be the ·""· backward class is constitutionally valid? 186. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that though "Backward Class" is defined under Section 2(g) of Act 5 of 2007, it is not stated in the Act how the "Backward G Class" would be identified and the delegation of such power to the Union of India to determine as to who shall be the "backward y class" without their being proper guidelines is illegal as it 76 2003 (11) sec 146 H A amounts to excessive delegation. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Parliament itself should have laid down the guidelines and decided that who shall be included in the backward class as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act 5 of 2007. "Backward class" is not a new word. Going by the B Constitution, there are sufficient constitutional provisions to have an idea as to what "backward class" is. Article 340 of the Constitution specifically empowers the President of India to appoint a Commission to investigate the conditions of the socially and educationally backward classes within the territory c of India. Socially and educationally backward classes of citizens are mentioned in Article 15(4) of the Constitution, which formed the First Amendment to the Constitution. Backward class citizens are also mentioned in Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It is only for the purpose of Act 5 of 2007 that the Union of India has been 0 entrusted with the task of determining the backward class. There is already a National Commission and also various State Commissions dealing with the affairs of the backward class of citizens in this country. For the purpose of enforcement of the legislation passed under Article 16(4), the backward class of citizens have already been identified and has been in practice E since the past 14 years. It is in this background that the Union of India has been given the task of determining the backward classes. The determination of backward classes itself is a laborious task and the Parliament cannot do it by itself. It is incorrect to say that there are no sufficient guidelines to F determine the backward classes. Various parameters have been used and it may also be noticed that if any undeserving caste or group of persons are included in the backward class, it is open to any person to challenge the same through judicial review. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the Union of India G has been given wide powers to determine the backward classes. The challenge to Act 5 of 2007 on that ground fails. 11. Whether the Act is invalid as there is no time limit prescribed for its operation and no periodical review is contemplated? ' ) y ' J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 179 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] 187. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended A that the reservation of 27% provided for the backward classes in the educational institutions contemplated under the Act does not prescribe any time limit and this is opposed to the principle of equality. According to learned Counsel for the petitioners, """ this affirmative action that is to bring about equality is calculated B to produce equality on a broader basis by eliminating de facto inequalities and placing the weaker sections of the community " on a footing of equality with the stronger and more power section • .•. so that each member of the community, whatever is his birth, occupation or social position may enjoy equal opportunity of c using to the full, his natural endowments of physique, of character and of intelligence. This compensatory state action can be continued only for a period till that inequality is wiped off. Therefore, the petitioners have contended that unless the period is prescribed, this affirmative action will continue for an indefinite D period and would ultimately result in reverse discrimination. It is true that there is some force in the contention advanced by the >. learned Counsel for the petitioners but that may happen in future if the reservation policy as contemplated under the Act is successfully implemented. But at the outset, it may not be E possible to fix a time limit or a period of time. Depending upon the result of the measures and improvements that have taken place in the status and educational advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, the matter could be examined by the Parliament at a future time but that cannot be a ground for striking down a legislation. After some period, if F ,;, it so happens that any section of the community gets an undue advantage of the affirmative action, then such community can very well be excluded from such affirmative action programme. The Parliament can certainly review the situation and even though a specific class of citizens is in the legislation, it is the G constitutional duty of the Parliament to review such affirmative action as and when the social conditions are required. There is ,.,, also the safeguard of judicial review and the court can exercise its powers of judicial review and say that the affirmative action has carried out its mission and is thus no longer required. In the H ' ) A case of reservation of 27% for backward classes, there could be a periodic review after a period of 10 years and the !- Parliament could examine whether the reservation has worked for the good of the country. Therefore, the legislation cannot be held to be invalid on that ground but a review can be made after B a period of 10 years. 12. What shall be the educational standard to be prescribed to find out whether any class is educationally backward? •• ..- c 188. Learned Senior Counsel Shri P.P. Rao contended that under Article 15(5) of the Constitution, the reservation or any other affirmative action could be made for the advancement of only socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and the educational D standard to be assessed shall be matriculation or 10+2 and not more than that. It was argued that many castes included in the backward class list have got a fairly good number of members who have passed 10+2 and thus such castes are to be treated as educationally forward and the present legislation, namely, E Act 5 of 2007, is intended to give reservation to students in higher institutions of learning and the same is not permissible under Article 15(5) of the Constitution. He contended that the Parliament should not have made this legislation for reservation in the higher institutions of learning as it is not part of the duty of the State under Article 46 of the Constitution. According to the F learned Counsel, education contemplated under Article 46 is only giving education upto the standard of 10+2. The learned >. Counsel argued that this was the desire of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution. The learned Counsel contended further that the State is not taking adequate steps to improve primary G education. 189. In reply to Shri P.P. Rao's arguments, learned Solicitor General Shri G. E. Vahanvati drew our attention to various steps taken by the Union Government to improve the primary school ... H education and also the upper primary school education. It is ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 181 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] incorrect to suggest that there have been no efforts on the part A of successive Governments to concentrate on level of education towards universal elementary education. "Sarva Shiksha Abhiyanf" (SSA} had been launched by the Government in 2001-: 2002. The major components .of SSA include opening of new schools, distribution of teaching: equipments, school grant for B teachers and maintenance for schools, community participation & training, carrying out Civil works in school buildings, additional class rooms, distribution of free text books for ST students and girls. It was pointed out that in the year 2006-2007, nearly Rs. 15,000 crores had been spent for such education . The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS} scheme was c started in 1975. Latest figures show that progress has been made in the field of education. It is pointed out that the primary school coverage has increased from 86.96% (2002) to 96% and that of Upper Primary School has increased from 78.11 % D to 85.3% with the opening of 1.34 Lakh Primary Schools and 1.01 lakh Upper Primary Schools. The gross enrolment has also > increased at the primary as well as upper primary stage. Drop out rate-has fallen by 11.3%. It is also pointed out that girls enrolment has increased from 43.7% (2001) to 46.7% (2004) E at primary and from 40.9% to 44% at upper primary stage. The Union of India has granted funds to various states for the purpose of meeting the education requirements. The entire details were furnished to the Court and we do not think it necessary to go into these details. Though at the time of attaining Independence, the basic idea was to improve primary and secondary level F j education, but now, after a period of more than 50 years, it is ,J., idle to contend that the backward classes shall be determined on the basis of their attaining education only to the level of 10+2 stage. In India there are a large number of arts, science and professional colleges and in the field of education, it is G anachronistic to contend that primary education or secondary education shall be the index for fixing backward class of citizens. '/ We find no force in the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and it is only to be rejected. A 13. Whether the quantum of reservation provided for in the Act is valid and whether 27% of seats for SEBC was required to be reserved? . 190. The main contention of the petitioner's Counsel especially that of Shri Sushil Kumar Jain is that the entire Act is 8 liable to be set aside as there was no necessity to provide any reservation to socially and educationally backward classes and according to him most of the castes included in the list which is prepared in accordance with the Mandal Commission are educationally very much advanced and the population of such C group is not scientifically collected and the population ratio of backward classes is projected only on the basis of the 1931 census and the entire legislation is an attempt to please a section of the society as part of a vote catching mechanism. 0 191. A legislation passed by the Parliament can be challenged only on constitutionally recognized grounds. Ordinarily, grounds of attack of a legislation is whether the legislature has legislative competence or whether the legislation is ultra vires of the provisions of the Constitution. If any of the provisions of the legislation violates fundamental rights orany E other provisions of the Constitution, it could certainly be a valid ground to set aside the legislation by invoking the power of judicial review. A legislation could also be challenged as unreasonable if it violates the principles of equality adumbrated in our Constitution or it unreasonably restricts the fundamental F rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. A legislation cannot be challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a ground. The validity of a constitutional amendment and the validity of plenary legislation have to be decided purely as questions of G constitutional law. This Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India and Others 79 said : " ... if a question brought before the Court is purely a H 79 (1977) 3 sec 592 at p. 660 \ ' J ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 183 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] politically question not involving determination of any legal A or constitutional right or obligation, the court would not entertain it, since the Court is concerned only with adjudication of legal rights and liabilities." 192. Therefore, the plea of the Petitioner that the legislation itself was intended to please a section of the community as part 8 of the vote catching mechanism is not a legally acceptable plea and it is only to be rejected. 193. The quantum of reservation provided under the Act 5 of 2007 is based on the detailed facts available with the c Parliament. Various commissions have been in operation determining as to who shall form the SEBCs. Though a caste­ wise census is not available, several other data and statistics are available. In the case of Indra Sawhney (supra), the Mandal Commission was accepted in principle though the details and 0 findings of the commissions were not fully accepted by this Court. 27% of reservation in the matter of employment was accepted by this Court. Petitioners have not produced any documents to show that the backward class citizens are less than 27%, vis-a-vis, the total population of this country or that there was no requirement of 27% reservation for them. The E Parliament is invested with the power of legislation and must be deemed to have taken into consideration all relevant circumstances when passing a legislation of this nature. It is futile to contend whether Parliament was not aware of the statistical details of the population of this country and, therefore, F we do not think that 27% reservation provided in the Act is illegal or on that account, the Act itself is liable to be struck down. Questions: 1. Whether the Ninety-Third Amendment of the G Constitution is against the "basic structure" of the Constitution? The Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 does not violate the "basic structure" of the Constitution so far as it H . , A relates to the state maintained institutions and aided educational institutions. Question whether the Constitution (Ninety-Third t- Amendment) Act, 2005 would be constitutionally valid or not so far as "private unaided" educational institutions are concerned, is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. (Paragraph B 79) 2. Whether Articles 15(4) and 15(5) are mutually contradictory, hence Article 15(5) is to be held ultra vires? •" c Article 15(5) is constitutionally valid and Articles 15(4) and 15(5) are not mutually contradictory. (Paragraph 100) 3. Whether exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) is violative of Article 14 of Constitution? Exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the minority educational institutions, by themselves, are a separate class and their rights are protected by other constitutional E provisions. (Paragraph 102) 4. Whether the Constitutional Amendment· followed the procedure prescribed under Article 368 of the Constitution? The Ninety-Third Amendment of the Constitution does not F affect the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution and hence, procedure prescribed under Proviso to Article 368(2) is not required to be followed. (Paragraph 103)· G 5. Whether the Act 5 of 2007 is constitutionally invalid in view of definition of "Backward Class" and whether the identification of such "Backward Class" based on "caste" is constitutionally valid? H Identification of "backward class" is not done solely based . ,;., ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 185 [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.J.I.] on caste. Other parameters are followed in identifying the A backward class. Therefore, Act 5 of 2007 is not invalid for this reason. (Paragraph 142) 6. Whether ·~creamy Layer" is to be excluded from SEBCs? "Creamy Layer" is to be excluded from SEBCs. The identification of SEBCs will not be complete and without the exclusion of "creamy layer" such identification may not be valid under Article 15(1) of the Constitution. (Paragraph 152) 7. What should be the para-meters for determining C the "creamy layer" group? The parameters contained in the Office Memorandum issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and 0 Training) on 08.09.1993 may be applied. And the definition of "Other Backward Classes" under Section 2(g) of the Act 5 of · 2007 should be deemed to mean class or classes of citizens who are socially and educationally backward, and so determined by the Central Government; and if the determination is with reference to caste, then the backward class shall be after E excluding the creamy layer. (Paragraphs 153 and 155) 8. Whether the "creamy layer" principle is applicable to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes? F "Creamy Layer" principle is not applicable to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (Paragraph 163) 9. Whether the principles laid down by the United States Supreme Court for affirmative action such G as "suspect legislation", "strict scrutiny" and "compelling State necessity" are applicable to principles of reservation or other affirmative action contemplated under Article 15(5) of the Constitution? H • , 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A The principles laid down by the United States Supreme ~ Court such as "suspect legislation", "strict scrutiny" and "compelling State necessity" are not applicable for challenging the validity of Act 5 of 2007 or reservations or other affirmative action contemplated under Article 15(5) of the Constitution. B (Paragraphs 184) 10. Whether delegation of power to the Union Government to determine as to who shall be the backward class is constitutionally valid? c The delegation of power to the Union Government to determine as to who shall be the "other backward classes" is not excessive delegation. Such delegation is constitutionally valid. (Paragraph 186) 11. Whether the Act is invalid as there is no time D limit prescribed for its operation and no periodical review is contemplated? ;. The Act 5 of 2007 is not invalid for the reason that there is no time limit prescribed for its operation, but a review can be made after a period of 10 years. (Paragraph 187) 12. What shall be the educational standard to be prescribed to find out whether any class is educationally backward? The contention that educational standard of matriculation F or (10+2) should be the benchmark to find out whether any class . J.. is educationally backward is rejected. (Paragraph 189) 13. Whether the quantum of reservation provided for in the Act is valid and whether 27% of seats G for SEBC was required to be reserved? 27% of seats for other backward classes is not illegal and the Parliament must be deemed to have taken into consideration .v all relevant circumstances when fixing the 27% reservation. (Paragraph 193) ' , " ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 187 ' [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] These Writ Petitions are disposed off in light of the above A findings, and the "Other Backward Classes" defined in Section 2(g) of Act 5 of 2007 is to be read as "Socially and Educationally Backward Classes" other than Scheduled Castes and .....;, Scheduled Tribes, determined as 'Other Backward Classes' by the Central Government and if such determination is with B reference to caste, it shall exclude "Creamy Layer" from among such caste. In Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 112/2007 in Writ -.; Petition (C) No. 265/2006, no orders are required. It is \. - dismissed. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. The issues involved in the c present writ petitions have far reaching consequences and in essence pose several questions of seminal importance. In essence, they raise questions which have no easy answers. The complexity can be gauged from the fact that on one hand the petitioners have questioned the logic of providing D ). reservations/quotas for a class of people whom they described as "unidentifiable" or "undetermined" while the respondents justify their action by labelling them as measures taken for upliftment of vast majority of people who have suffered social humiliation and sneer for the social backwardness. Complex E questions like whether the expressions 'class' and 'castes' are synonyms, whether reservations provide the only solution for social empowerment measures, alleged lack of concern for the economically weaker group of citizens are some of the basic . issues which need to be addressed. It has been emphatically F ,A. highlighted by the petitioners that when the ultimate objective is classless and casteless in Indian democracy, there is no question of unendingly providing the reservation and that too without any definite data regarding backwardness. In essence, they contend that these measures perpetuate backwardness and do not remove them. On the epicenter of challenge is the Central G Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act 2006 )I (in short the 'Act') and the 93rd Amendment to the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution~). Interestingly, both the petitioners and the respondents rely strongly on certain H . ) I.• I A observations made by this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 (Suppl. 3) SCC 217 (commonly known as 'Indra Sawhney No.1 ') 2. When the writ petitions were placed before a Bench of ... two Judges, considering the importance of the matter they were referred to be heard by a larger bench and certain questions which arise for consideration were formulated. That is how these cases are before this Bench. J -3. Arguments have been advanced by both the sides as to c whether Constitution contemplates casteless society. While the respondents submit that the Constitution really does not think of a casteless society, it prohibits untouchability in the background of Article 17. It has to be noted that both in Articles 15 and 16 the stress is on non-discrimination on the ground of castes. The D Preamble of the Constitution also throws light on this aspect. Ultimately if the social status of a man goes in the higher direction because of his education, the difference in status gets obliterated. Education is a great leveller. In that sense, the ultimate object is that every Indian citizen should have the social E status which is not inferior to another and that would be obliteration of the difference in status. The ultimate objective is to see that no person gets discriminated because of his caste. If that be so, it would not be right to say that the ultimate objective is not the casteless society. F 4. Various Articles of the Constitution of India and the . Preamble provide an insight to the. monumental document i.e. .l.. the Constitution of India. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law in addition to equal protection of law. Article 15(1) mandates that there shall not be any discrimination against any G citizen on the grounds of religion, caste, sex, race, or place of birth. Article 16(1) makes the fundamental right of equality specific relating to job opportunities. Article 16(2) significantly ~ speaks of government employment by providing that no citizen shall be ineligible only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, H sex, descent, place of birth or any of them or discriminated ' , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 189 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] against in respect of any employment or office under the State. A -4 Article 16(4) is an important provision which empowers the State ~ permitting the provision for the reservation of appointments and ~ posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services of the State. The stress is on backwardness of the citizens and B inadequate representation in the services under the State. 5. If one takes a walk on the pathway relating to the views \. expressed by this Court in the matter of reservation or quotas for the other backward classes one comes across many milestones. Some of them were noted extensively in Indra c Sawhney No. 1. They are: The State of Madras v. Sm. Champakam Dorairajan & Anr. (AIR 1951 SC 226), Minor A Peeriakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph (1971 (1) SCC 38), The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. U.S. V Bairam, etc. (1972 (1) SCC 660), Shri Janki Prasad Parimoo and Ors. v. State of D Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. (1973(1) SCC 420), State of ·~ Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Pradip Tandon and Ors. (1975 (1) )... SCC 267), State of Kera/a and Anr. v. N.M. Thomas and Ors. (1976(2) SCC 310), Kumari KS. Jayashree and Anr. v. The State of Kera/a and Anr. (1976 (3) SCC 730), K.C. Vasanth E Kumar and Anr. v. State of Kamataka (1985 (Supp) SCC 714) and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors. (2000 (1) SCC 168) (known as Indra Sawhney No.2). 6. Two recent decisions have also been highlighted by the parties. They are M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and F . Ors. (2006 (8) SCC 212) and Nair Service Society v. State of Jo- Kera/a (2007 (4) sec 1 ). It is to be noted that some of the arguments which have been raised relate to broad principles of law and the jurisprudential approach. They are the applicability of the foreign decisions, more particularly, the decisions of the G American Courts. They relate to the principles of strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. 'f 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners have stressed on these decisions to show as to what should be the approach in H \ A matters relating to social empowerment. Learned counsel for the respondents have however submitted that the approach is to be different because the problems before the American Courts essentially related to individual rights while the Indian Courts are more concerned with group rights i.e. rights of class B of citizens. We shall deal with this in some length later. 8. The other issue which was hotly contested related to the exclusion of the creamy layer. 9. One of the major challenges raised by the petitioners is c based on the allegation that there is no acceptable data for fixing the percentage of other backward classes. This has been highlighted to show that there is no rational basis for fixing the percentage of reservation at 27% for the other backward classes. It is pointed out that the figures appear to have been 0 culled out from some survey done more than seven decades back i.e. 1931 to be precise. Thereafter, there seems to be no definite data to know the actual percentage. It is pointed out that in Indra Sawhney No. 1 (supra) this Court had laid considerable stress on having a Commission to identify and determine the criteria for determining the socially and E educationally backward classes. Very little appears to have been done. It is surprising, it was contended, that there has been not even a single case of exclusion but on the other hand more than 250 new castes/sub-castes have been added. This shows that there is really no serious attempt to identify the other backward F classes. On the other hand, there has been over-jealous anxiety to include more number of people so that they can get the benefits of reservations/quotas and this has been termed as "vote bank politics". It is highlighted that even when a serious matter relatfng to adoption of the Act was under consideration G there was hardly any discussion and every political party was exhibiting its anxiety to get the Statute passed. Crocodile tears were shed to show lip sympathy for the backwardness of the people. In reality, the object was to give a wrong impression to the people that they were concerned about the backwardness H of the people and they were the 'Messiahs' of the poor and the •• . ..... ~ , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 191 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] down trodden. In reality, in their hearts the ultimate object was A -+ to grab more votes. The lack of seriousness of the debate exhibits that the debate was nothing but a red-herring to divert attention from the sinister, politically motivated design masked by the "tearful" faces of the people masquerading as champions of the poor and down trodden. It is pointed out that contrary to. B what was being projected by the parties when the discussions were going on, in an impassioned speech by late Rajeev \ Gandhi who was the leader of opposition at an earlier point of time, the fallacies in adopting the Manda! Report were highlighted. It is surprising, it is submitted, that those very people c who were the champions of anti-reservation and anti-quota as members. of opposition, have done summersault and were saying just the opposite. It is pointed out that when one member Shri P.C. Alexandar exhibited real courage and highlighted the fallacies in the stand taken, his view appears to have been lightly D brushed aside and the Statute hustled through. It is also submitted that the objectivity and sanctity of the report submitted in the Parliament commonly known as "Oversight Committee Report" has been lightly brushed aside. This only indicates that there was no serious debate about the consequences. The E foresight of late Rajiv Gandhi in saying that the country will be divided on caste basis and that would lead to disaster has been prophetically proved to be correct and it is a reality. It is submitted that the enactment has created a sharp divide amongst the citizens of the country and it has not even an iota of good results flowing from it. On the contrary, the country will be divided sharply F . leading to social unrest and caste-wars. It is pointed out that in ) .. the recent past such caste wars have resulted in large scale . loss of life and destruction of public properties. 10. The relevance of the parliamentary debate or the G speech of the Minister has been highlighted by this Court in many cases. It is a settled position in law that there can be only limited use of the parliamentary debate. The Courts should not I '~ normally critically analyse the proceedings of Parliament. This flows from a very fundamental aspect i.e. mutual respect of the H ~ , , A Parliament and the Judiciary for each other. Each of these great institutions in a democracy operates in different fields. It is not .... expected that one wing of democracy would criticize the manner of functioning of another wing. That would be against the basic desirability 'of mutual respect. Any opinion or comment or B criticism about the manner of functioning of one by the other would be not only undesirable but imperatively avoidable. The citizens of this country expect a great deal from the Parliament and the Judiciary. It is but natural that the people of this country ./ would be disappointed and dis-heartened and their hopes will c be shattered if instead of showing respect for each other, there is mudslinging, unwanted criticism or impermissible criticism about the manner of functioning or the rationale of a decision or a view taken. In this context, it would be relevant to take note of what this Court said in Builders Association of India v. Union D of India and Ors. (1995 Supp (1) sec 41), and K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1985 (1) SCC 523). In State of Mysore v. R. V Bidap (1974 (3) SCC 337), it was observed as follows: "5. Anglo-American jurisprudence, unlike other systems, E has generally frowned upon the use of parliamentary debates and press discussions as throwing light upon the meaning of statutory provisions. Willes, J. in Miller v. Tayler, [1769] 4 Burri, 2303, 2332., stated that the sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from F what it says when passed into law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise. ;.. That history is not known to the other House or to the Sovereign. In Assam Railways and Trading Company Ltd. v. l.R.C., [1935] A.C. 445 at p. 458, Lord Writ in the G Privy Council said : "It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible and the 1' ~ report of commissioners is even more removed from H value as evidence of intention, because it does not ~ , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 193 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) follow that their recommendations were accepted." A The rule of grammatical construction has been accepted in India before and after Independence. In the State of Travancore-Cochin and Ors. v. Bombay Company Ltd., Alleppey, (AIR 1952 S.C. 366), Chief Justice Patanjali B Sastri delivering the judgment of the Court, said :- "It remains only to point out that the use made by the , learned Judges below of the speeches made by the • members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution is c unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally accepted in England, and the same rule has been observed in the construction of Indian statutes-see Administrator-General of Bengal v. D Prem Lal Mullick, 22 Ind. Appl. 107 (P.C.) at p. 118. "· The reason behind the rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 thus: A speech made in' the course of the debate on a bill E could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that ' the minds of all those legislators were in accord". F .~ Or, as it is more tersely put in an American case- "Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other-United States v. Trans-Missouri G Freight Association, (1897) 169 U.S. 290 at p. 318 (sic). , T This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose H • , A of a statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning. It would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn. p. 122 (pp. 368-9)". 11. In the American jurisdiction, a more natural note has sometimes been struck. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was of the view that- "If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment )' ( of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should c be excluded, and yet, the Rule of Exclusion, which is generally followed in England, insists that, in interpreting statutes, the proceedings in the Legislatures, including speeches delivered when the statute was discussed and adopted, cannot be cited D in courts." 12. Crawford on Statutory Construction at page 388 notes that- 'The judicial opinion on this point is certainly not quite E uniform and there are American decisions to the effect that the general history of a statute and the various steps leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications of the original bill and reports of Legislative Committees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the legislature where F it is in doubt; but they hold definitely that the legislative J.. history is inadmissible when there is no obscurity in the meaning of the statute." The Rule of Exclusion has been criticised by jurists as G artificial. The trend of academic opinion and the practice in the European system suggest that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. Recently, an eminent _., Indian jurist has reviewed the legal position and expressed his H agreement with Julius Stone and Justice Frankfurter. Of course, , , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 195 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] _. nobody suggests that such extrinsic materials should be A decisive but they must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation must mutually illumine and interact. There is authority for the proposition that resort may be had to these sources with great caution and only when incongruities and ambiguities are to be resolved. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras B (1950 SCR 88). There is a strong case for whittling down the Rule of Exclusion followed in the British courts and for less ~ --( apologetic reference to legislative proceedings and like materials to read the meaning of the words of a statute. Where it is plain, the language prevails, but where there is obscurity or c lack of harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances, it may be legitimate to take external assistance such as the object of the provisions, the mischief sought tq be remedied, the social context, the words of the authors and other allied matters. The law of statutory construction is a strategic D branch of jurisprudence which must, it may be felt, respond to the great social changes but a conclusive pronouncement on the particular point arising here need not detain us because nothing decisive as between the alternative interpretations flows from a reliance on the Constituent Assembly proceedings or E the broad purposes of the statutory scheme. 13. One thing however needs to be noted here that mere short length of debate cannot and does not become a ground for invalidity of the decision and the reverse is also not true. • 14. Elaborate arguments have been advanced about the F .). . applicability of the foreign decisions, more particularly, the American Courts. It is to be noted that the American cases which have been highlighted by the petitioners relate essentially to strict classification, strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. This issue is of considerable importance when so much debate is taking G place about respect being shown by courts of a country to a '<;. decision of another country. The factual scenario and the basic issues involved in the cases sometimes throw light on the controversy. It has been rightly contended by Mr. Vahanvati and Mr. Gopal Subramanium that there is a conceptual difference H• ~ ) A between the cases decided by the American Supreme Court and the cases at hand. In Saurabh Chaudri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2003 (11) SCC 146) it was held that the logic of strict classification and strict scrutiny does not have much relevance in the cases of the nature at hand. If one looks at the B different Statutes in India, Article 14 of the Constitution is . conceptually different from 14th Amendment to the American Constitution as was noted in State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952 SCR 284) and State of Bombay and Anr. v. .r , FN. Balsara (1952 SCR 682). In Anwar Ali's case (supra) at c pages 363 and 364 it was noted as follows: "I find it impossible to read these portions of the Constitution without regard to the background out of which they arose. I cannot blot out their history and omit from consideration the brooding spirit of the times. They are D not just dull, lifeless words static and hide- bound as in some mummified manuscript, but, living flames intended to give life to a great nation and order its being, tongues of dynamic fire, potent to mould the future as well as guide the present. The Constitution must, in my judgment, be left E elastic enough to meet from time to time the altering conditions of a changing world with its shifting emphasis and differing needs. I feel therefore that in each case judges must look straight into the heart of things and regard the facts of each case concretely much as a jury would do; F and yet, not quite as a jury, for we are considering here a matter of law and not just one of fact; Do these "laws" "' which have been called in question offend a still greater law before which even they must bow? 99. Doing that, what is the history of these provisions? G They arose out of the fight for freedom in this land and are but the endeavour to compress into a few pregnant phrases some of the main attributes of a sovereign .r democratic republic as seen through Indian eyes. There was present to the collective mind of the Constituent H Assembly, reflecting the mood of the peoples of India, the ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 197 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] memory of grim trials by hastily constituted tribunals with A novel forms of procedure set forth in Ordinances promulgated in haste because of what was then felt to be the urgent necessities of the moment. Without casting the slightest reflection of the judges and the Courts so constituted, the fact remains that when these tribunals were B declared invalid and the same persons were retfred in the ordinary Courts, many were acquitted, many who had been sentenced to death were absolved. That was not the fault of the judges but of the imperfect tools with which they were compelled to work. The whole proceedings were repugnant to the peoples of this land, and to my mind, article 14 is but a reflex of this mood . . 100. What I am concerned to see is not whether there is absolute equality in any academical sense of the term but whether the collective conscience of a sovereign D f. democratic republic can regard the impugned law, contrasted with the ordinary law of the land, as the sort of substantially equal treatment which men of resolute minds and unbiased views can regard as right and proper in a democracy of the kind we have proclaimed ourselves to E be. Such views must take into consideration the practical necessities of government, the right to alter the laws and many other facts, but in the forefront must remain the freedom of the individual from unjust and unequal • treatment, unequal in the broad sense in which a F ,J... democracy would view it. In my opinion, 'law' as used in Article 14 does not mean the "legal precepts which are actually · recognised and applied in tribunals of a given time and place" but "the more general body of doctrine and tradition from which those precepts are chiefly drawn, G and by which we criticise, them." .... 15. It needs no emphasis that the formal equality concept ,. came to be recognized in U.S.A. after about 10 years of its inception. In the first phase of the U.S.A. Constitutional Law there was only affirmative action but in the Indian Constitution right H A from the beginning affirmative action has been provided, for example, provisions made for Scheduled Castes and Schedules ~ Tribes. A distinction has been noted in para 640 of Indra Sawhney No.1. Articles 38(1) and 38(2) read with Article 46 of the Constitution make the position clear that the State is charged B with the duty to secure interests of the weaker sections of the people and minimize the inequalities in income. The Constitution from its inception contained Article 17 which abolishes untouchability. r-• 16. In this context the following paras need to be noted. 17. In Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 625) in para 63 it was held as follows : "63. The learned Attorney General argues that the State is under an obligation to take steps for promoting the welfare D of the people by bringing about a social order in which social, economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life. He says that the deprivation ~ of some of the fundamental rights for the purpose of achieving this goal cannot possibly amount to a destruction E of the basic structure of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this contention. The principles enunciated in · Part IV are not the proclaimed monopoly of democracies alone. They are common to all polities, democratic or authoritarian. Every State is goal-oriented and claims to F strive for securing the welfare of its people. The distinction between the different forms of Government consists in .... that a real democracy will endeavour to achieve its objectives through the discipline of fundamental freedoms like those conferred by Articles14 and 19. Those are the G most elementary freedoms without which a free democracy is impossible and which must therefore be preserved at all costs. Besides, as observed by Brandies, J., the need to protect liberty is the greatest when Government's ~ purposes are beneficent. If the discipline of Article 14 is withdrawn and if immunity from the operation of that article ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 199 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] is conferred, not only on laws passed by the Parliament A but on laws passed by the State Legislatures also, the political pressures exercised by numerically large groups can tear the country asunder by leaving it to the legislature to pick and choose favoured areas and favourite classes for preferential treatment." B 18. In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a and Anr. (1973 (4) SCC 225) it was held as under: "531. According to Mr. Palkhivala, the test of the true width c of a power is not how probable it is that it may be exercised but what can possibly be done under it; that the abuse or misuse of power is entirely irrelevant; that the question of the extent of the power cannot be mixed up with the question of its exercise and that when the real question is D as to the width of the power, expectation that it will never be used is as wholly irrelevant as an imminent danger of its use. The court does not decide what is the best and what is the worst. It merely decides what can possibly be done under a power if the words conferring it are so E construed as to have an unbounded and limitless width, as claimed on behalf of the respondents. 532. It is difficult to accede to the submission on behalf of the respondents that while considering the consequences ·' with reference to the width of an amending power F ""' contained in a Constitution any question of its abuse is involved. It is not for the courts to enter into the wisdom or policy of a particular provision in a Constitution or a statute. That is for the Constitution makers or for the parliament or the legislature. But that the real consequences can be G taken into account while judging the width of the power is well settled. The Court cannot ignore the consequences '1';- to which a particular construction can lead while ascertaining the limits of the provisions granting the power. According to the learned Attorney General, the declaration H 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 4 S.C.R. A in the preamble to our Constitution about the resolve of the people of India to constitute it into a Sovereign, Democratic Republic is only a declaration of an intention which was made in 194 7 and it is open to the amending body now under Article 368 to change the Sovereign B Democratics Republic into some other kind of polity. This by itself shows the consequence of accepting the construction sought to be put on the material words in that article for finding out the ambit and width of the power .. ' conferred by it." c 19. In Sajan Singh v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. (AIR 1965 SC 845) it was held as follows: "6. It is obvious that the fundamental rights enshrined in Part Ill are not included in the proviso, and so, if Parliament D intends to amend any of the provisions contained in Articles 12 to 35 which are included in Part Ill, it is not necessary to take recourse to the proviso and to satisfy the additional requirements prescribed by it. Thus far, there is no difficulty. But in considering the scope of Art. 368, it is necessary to E remember that Art. 226, which is included in Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution, is one of the constitutional provisions which fall under clause (b) of the proviso; and so, it is clear that if Parliament intends to amend the provisions of Art. 226, the bill proposing to make such an amendment must satisfy the requirements of the proviso. F The question which calls for our decision is : what would ;.. be the requirement about making an amendment in a constitutional provision contained in Part Ill, if as a result of the said amendment, the powers conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 are likely to be affected? The G petitioners contend that since it appears that the powers prescribed by Art. 226 are likely to be affected by the intended amendment of the provisions contained in Part :r Ill, the bill introduced for the purpose of making such an amendment. must attract the proviso, and as the impugned H Act has admittedly not gone through the procedure ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 201 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] prescribed by the proviso, it is invalid; and that raises the A question about the construction of the provisions contained in Art. 368 and the relation between the substantive part of Art. 368 with its proviso. 8. On the other hand, if the substantive part of Art. 368 is B very liberally and generously construed and it is held that ·even substantial modification of the fundamental rights which may make a very serious and substantial inroad on the powers of the High Courts under Art. 226 can be made without invoking the proviso, it may deprive clause (b) of the proviso of its substance. In other words, in construing c both the parts of Art. 368, the rule of harmonious construction requires that if the direct effect of the amendment of fundamental rights is to make a substantial inroad on the High Courts' powers under Art. 226, it would become necessary to consider whether the prov.iso would D cover such a case or not. If the effect of the amendment ).. , made in the fundamental rights on the powers of the High Courts prescribed by Art. 226, is indirect, incidental, or is otherwise of an insignificant order, it may be that the proviso will not apply. The proviso would apply where the E amendment in question seeks to make any change, inter alia, in Art. 226, and the question in such a case would be : does the amendment seek to make a change in the provisions of Art. 226? The answer to this question would depend upon the effect of the amendment made in the F ). fundamental rights. 9. In dealing with constitutional questions of this character, courts generally adopt a test which is described as the pith and substance test. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers ([1924] AC. 328), the Privy Council G was called upon to consider the validity of the Reciprocal Insurance Act, 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. 5, Ont., c. 62) ands. ~,, 50Bc which had been added to the Criminal Code of Canada by ss. 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 29 Dom. Mr. Justice Duff, who spoke for the Privy Council, observed that in an enquiry H A like the one with which the Privy Council was concerned in that case, "it has been formally laid down in judgments of this Board, that in such an inquiry the Courts must ascertain the 'true nature and character' of the enactment : Citizens' Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons ([1881] 7 B AC 96); its 'pith and substance' : Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia Ltd. v. Bryden ([1899] A.C. 580); and it is the result of this investigation, not the form alone, which the stp• ite may have assumed under the hand of the [ drc> .,intsman, that will determine within which of the < c categories of subject matters mentioned in ss. 91 and 92 the legislation falls; and for this purpose the legislation must be 'scrutinised in its entirety' : "Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King" ([1921] 2A.C. 91, 117). ltis not necessary to multiply authorities in support of the proposition that in D considering the constitutional validity of the impugned Act, it would be relevant to inquire what the pith and substance of the impugned Act is. This legal position can be taken to be established by the decisions of this Court which have consistently adopted the view expressed by Justice Duff, to which we have just referred. 14. Thus, it would be seen that the genesis of the amendments made by Parliament in 1951 by adding Articles 31A and 31 B to the Constitution, clearly is to assist the State Legislatures in this country to give effect to the F economic policy in which the party in power passionately believes to bring about much needed agrarian reform. It .... is with the same object that the second amendment was made by Parliament in 1955, and as we have just indicated, the object underlying the amendment made by G the impugned Act is also the same. Parliament desires that agrarian reform in a broad and comprehensive sense must be introduced in the interests of a very large section of Indian citizens who live in villages and whose financial ~" prospects are integrally connected with the pursuit of progressive agrarian policy. Thus, if the pith and substance ' , .., i • ). ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 203 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] test is applied to the amendment made by the impugned A Act, it would be clear that Parliament is seeking to amend fundamental rights solely with the object of removing any possible obstacle in the fulfilment of the socio-economic policy in which the party in power believes. If that be so, the effect of the amendment on the area over which the · B High Courts' powers prescribed by Art. 226 operate, is incidental and in the present case can be described as of an insignificant order. The impugned Act does not purport to change the provisions of Art. 226 and it cannot be said even to have that effect directly or in any appreciable c measure. That is why we think that the argument that the impugned Act falls under the proviso, cannot be sustained. It is an Act the object of which is to amend the relevant Articles in Part Ill which conferfundamental rights on citizens and as such it falls under the substantive part of Art. 368 0 and does not attract the provisions of clause (b) of the proviso. If the effect of the amendment made in the fundamental rights on Art. 226 is direct and not inciclental and is of a very significant order, different considerations may perhaps arise. But in the present case, there is no occasion to entertain or weigh the said considerations. E Therefore the main contention raised by the petitioners and the interveners against the validity of the impugned Act must be rejected." 20. In Kihoto Ho/Johan v. Zachil/hu and Ors. (1992 Supp. F (2) sec 651) it wa~.pbserved as follows: "61. The propositions that fell for consideration in Sankari Prasad Singh's and Sajjan Singh'scases are indeed different. There the jurisdiction and power of the Courts under Articles 136 and 226 were not sought to be taken G away nor was there any change brought about in those provisions either "in terms or in effect", since the very rights which could be adjudicated under and enforced by the Courtswere themselves taken away by the Constitution. The result was that there was no area for the jurisdiction H • , A of the Courts to operate upon. Matters are entirely different in the context of paragraph 7. Indeed the aforesaid cases, }-.. by necessary implication support the point urged for the petitioners. The changes in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI envisaged by the proviso need not B be direct.The change could be either "in terms of or in effecf'. It is not necessary to change the language of Articles 136 and 226 of the Constitution to attract the proviso. If in effect these Articles are rendered ineffective and made inapplicable where these articles could otherwise have ,_ c been invoked or would.but for Paragraph 7, have operated there is ·in effect' a change in those provisions attracting the proviso. Indeed this position was recognised in Salian Singh'scase (supra) where it was observed: "If the effect of the amendment made in the D fundamental rights on Article 226 is direct and not incidental and is of a very significant order, different considerations may perhaps arise." ... 62. In the present cases, though the amendment does not bring in any change directly in the language of Article 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, however, in effect paragraph 7 curtails the operation of those Articles respecting matters falling under the Tenth Schedule. There is a change in the effect in Article 136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of clause (b) of the proviso to Article 368(2). F Paragraph 7, therefore, attracts the proviso and ratification was necessary. Accordingly, on Point B, we hold: :.. 'That having regard to the background and evolution of the principles underlying the Constitution (52"d G Amendment) Act, 1985, in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the constitution in terms and in effect bring about a change in the operation and effect to' .r Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India . ' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 205 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] and, therefore, the amendment would require to be A ratified in accordance with the proviso to sub-Article (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution of India." 21. In Shri Sarwan Singh and Anr. v. Shri Kasturi Lal (1977 (1) sec 750) it was observed as follows: "20. Speaking generally, the object and purpose of a legislation assume greater relevance if the language of ~ the law is obscure and ambiguous. But, it must be stated that we have referred to the object of the provisions newly introduced into the Delhi Rent Act in 1975 not for seeking c light from it for resolving in ambiguity, for there is none, but for a different purpose altogether. When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of D interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be )., decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. A piquant situation, like the one before us, arose in Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & E Industrial Co. Ltd. competing statutes being the Banking Companies Act, 1949 as amended by Act 52 of 1953, and the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. Section 45A of the Banking Companies Act, which was introduced by the amending Act of 1953, and Section 3 of the Displaced Persons Act 1951 contained such a non F . obstante clause, providing that certain provisions would ,J. have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force". This Court resolved the conflict by considering the object and purpose of the two laws and giving precedence to the G "' Banking Companies Act by observing : "It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the "¥ other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear H t ' 206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 4 S.C.R. A intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein." (p. 615) As indicated by us, the special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of Section 14Aand Chapter lllAofthe Delhi RentActwould be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance B Act requiring permission of the competent authority were to prevail over them. Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the contrary contained ~ in the Slum Clearance Act. . c 21. For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a, fair meaning to the language of the law. That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one. D Section 14A and Chapter lllA having been enacted with effect from December 1, 1975 are later enactments in reference to Section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act which, in Its present form, was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28, 1965 and in reference to Section E 39 of the same Act, which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed. The legislature gave overriding effect to Section 14A and Chapter lllA with the knowledge that Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy. Therefore F the later enactment must prevail over the former. The same test was mentioned with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Narain's case at page 615. :... 23. The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it because our reason for according priority to the G provisions of the Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands impliedly repealed protanto. Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non H obstante clauses in the earlier law, we have come to the ,. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 207 ' [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] conclusion that the provisions of Section 14A and Chapter A lllA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act. 22. In J.K. Cotton Spinning and weaving co. Ltd. v. State B ofU.P. andAnr. (1961 (3) SCR 185) it was observed as under: "There will be complete harmony however if we hold instead that clause 5(a) will apply in all other cases of proposed dismissal or discharge except where an inquiry is pending within the meaning of clause 23. We reach the same result· c by applying another well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision D in another Act, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the same .>.. legislative instrument. This suggestion does not find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an E arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the F . rest the earlier direction should have effect. In Pretty v. ,.i Solly [(1859-53 ER 1032) (quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p. 205, 5th Edition) Romilly, M. R. mentioned the rule thus:- ''The rule is, that whenever there is a particular G eAactment and a general enactment in the same 'j. statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general H 208 enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply". The rule has been applied as between different provisions of the same statute in numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned : De Winton v. Brecon [(1858) 28 L.J. Ch. 598], Churchill v. Crease [(1828) 5 Bing. 177), United States v. Chase [(1889) 135 U.S. 255] and Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. [(1905) 199 U.S. 401)." 23. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI (1957 SCR 930) C it was held as under: "The question whether a statute which is void in part is to be treated as void in toto, or whether it is capable of enforcement as to that part which is valid is one which can arise only with reference to laws enacted by bodies which do not possess unlimited powers of legislation, as, for example, the legislatures in a Federal Union. The limitation on their powers may be of two kinds: It may be with reference to the subject-matter on which they could legislate, as, for example, the topics enumerated in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule in the Indian Constitution, ss. 91 and 92 of the Canadian Constitution, ands. 51 of the Australian Constitution; or it may be with reference to the character of the legislation which they could enact in respect of subjects assigned to them, as for example, in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part Ill of the Constitution and similar constitutionally protected rights in the American and other Constitutions. When a legislature whose authority is subject to limitations aforesaid enacts a law which is wholly in excess of its powers, it is entirely void and must be completely ignored. But where the legislation falls in part within the area allotted to it and in part outside it, it is undoubtedly void as to the latter; but does it on that account become necessarily void in its entirety? The answer to this question must depend on whether what is v·alid could be separated from what is ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 209 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] invalid, and that is a que&tion which has to be decided by A the court on a consideration of the provisions of the Act. This is a principle well established in American Jurisprudence, Vide Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, Chap. VII, Crawford on Statutory Construction, Chap. 16 and Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn, B Vol. 2, Chap. 24. It has also been applied by the Privy Council in deciding on the validity of laws enacted by the legislatures of Australia and Canada, Vide Attorney- General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited [[1914] A.C. 237] and c Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada [L.R. [1947] A.C. 503]. It was approved by the Federal Court in In re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act [[1941] F.C.R. 12] and adopted by this Court in The State of Bombay and anotherv. F. N. Balsara [[1951] S.C.R. D 682] and The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., and others [[1953] S.C.R. 1069]. These decisions are relied on by Mr. Seervai as being decisive in his favour. Mr. Palkhiwala disputes this position, and maintains that on the decision of the Privy Council in Punjab Province v. E Daulat Singh and others [[1946] F.C.R. 1] and of the decisions of this Court in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [[1950] S.C.R. 594] and Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh [[1950] S.C.R. 759], the question must be answered in this favour. We must now examine the . precise scope of these decisions . F l The resulting position may thus be stated : When a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether the invalidity of the statute G arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions. That being the position in law, it is now necessary to consider whether the impugned provisions are severable H 210 SUPREME GOURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A In their application to competitions of a gambling character, t'- ~ assuming of course that the definition of 'prize competition' In s. 2(d) Is wide enough to Include also competitions Involving skill to a substantial degree. It will be useful for the determination of this question to refer to certain rules B of construction laid down by the American Courts, where the question of severablllty has been the subject of consideration In numerous authorities. They may be r summarised as follows : 1. In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the Invalid parts thereof, It Is the Intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied Is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part If it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. Vlde Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, p. 156; D Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, pp, 176-177. 2. If the valid and Invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the Invalidity of a portion must result In the Invalidity E of the Act In Its entirety. On the other hand, If they are so distinct and separate that after striking out what Is Invalid, what remains Is In Itself a complete code Independent of the rest, then It wlll be upheld notwithstanding that the rest has become unenforceable. Vlde Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1 at pp. 360-361: Crawford on Statutory· Construction, pp. 217·216. ""' 3. Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and seporate from those which are invalid, If they all form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operntive G as a whole, then also the Invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole. Vide Crawford on Statutory Construction, pp. 218·219. 4. Likewi~e. when the valid and invalid r Jhs of a statute ~ are independent and do not form part gf a oeheme but H what is left after omitting the invalid pgrtion ia so thin and ) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INOIA & ORS. 211 !DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J truncated as to be In substance different from what It was A when It emerged out of the legislature, then also It will be rejected In lte entirety. 5. The separability of the valid and Invalid provisions.of a statute does not depend on whether the law is enacted In B the same section or different sections; (Vide Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, pp. 361 ·362); it is not the form, but the substance of the matter that Is material, and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein. C 6. If after the Invalid portion Is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be enforced. without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of It must be struck down as void, as otherwise It will amount to judicial legislation. Vlde Sutherland on Statutary D Construction, Vol. 2, p, 194, 7. In determining the legislative Intent on the question of 11eparablllty, It will be legitimate to take Into acgount the history gf the legislation, Its object, the titlt:! and the i; preamble to It. Vlde Sutherland on 6ti:1tutory Construction, Vol. 2, pp, 177,flfil," 24, In AllM$ Studf3nf$ Unionv, A/IMS (2002 (1) SOC 428) In para ~P It was observed Elli> fi:illows: · F "36, ihe pringiple pf institutii;inal l:lontinulty whllt:! seeking i:1dmission tg higher levelis gf stwdy as prnpi;iynfled by th@ learned @guni:iel for th@ 1:1ppellant§ the.Ygh 1;1r1;1ueg at l!!mf:Jth dges not have mYch rogm eivail1;1t;ile fgr innQvi:JtiV§ i1.Jflicial ieal t\:.l Play, ft::!r the gn;iund !i!lrflady §t!ilnd§ !i!lm@st PG@Yi:>ie!'l (3 by Iii §@t g( pregedents, m1:ire §§when we 1=1re d@E!liflg with profe§siim~I or teghni!3-!i!I @oYr§e§ of §tudy, It wgyig §uffi@e tg hi:Jve a brief resume th!:!regf ngtigin~ the detetil§ wh!:!rever nece§§ary", It wa§ again highlight!lld in p!i!rE! 44 Iii§ fgllow§: H A "44. When protective discrimination for promotion of equalisation is pleaded, the burden is one the party who seeks to justify the ex facie deviation from equality. The basic rule is equality of opportunity for every person in the country, which is a constitutional guarantee. A candidate B who gets more marks than another is entitled to preference for admission. Merit must be the test when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This proposition has greater importance when we reach the higher levels and education like post-graduate courses. c Reservation, as an exception, may be justified subject to discharging the burden of proving justification in favour of the class which must be educationally handicapped-the reservation geared up to getting over the handicap. The rationale of reservation in the case of medical students D must be removal of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage. Even there the quantum of reservation should not be excessive or societally injurious. The higher the level of the speciality the lesser the role of reservation." E 25. A bare reading of the provision goes to show that the burden is on the person who justifies deviation from equality. 26. Even then, this doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. in Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537(1896). This case involved a challenge to a Louisiana statute that F provided for equal but separate accommodations for black and .... white passengers in trains. The Court rejected the challenge. Justice Brown famously observed: If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution G of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. (163 U.S. at 552) 27. He held that racial segregation was a reasonable .r exercise of State police power for the promotion of the public good and upheld the law. ""' ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 213 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] -t 28. Thus, even in this second phase, affirmative action was A never truly initiated - the country was still struggling to establish even a formally equal society. 29. At the same time, another very important development in its constitutional law was taking place, which would later have B a serious impact on affirmative action programmes. This was the birth of the doctrine of strict scrutiny. ... -1 30. 'Strict scrutiny' is one of the three standards for judicial review of legislative and administrative action developed in the United States, the other being "rational basis" and "intermediate c scrutiny". 31. The origin of this standard can be traced to the decision in United States v Carotene Products (304 U.S. 144 (1938). The question before the Court was whether the Filled Milk Act, 1923 which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of D skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk ,>- fat, so as to resemble milk or cream, transcended the power of Congress to regulate inter state commerce or infringed the Fifth Amendment. Justice Harlan Stone, writing the opinion for the Court, upheld the law, holding that the existence of facts E supporting the legislative judgment was to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions was not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it was of such a ) character as tci preclude the assumption that it rested upon some F rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. However, he added what has been described as "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law". ·"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears G on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the -r Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." ,.... A 32. What the Court was saying was that economic ~- leglslatlon would be judged by a standard of "rational basis" - so long as the law was a rational way of furthering a legitimate governmental purpose, It was valid. However, where the leglslatlon "on Its face" appeared to be violating any of the B fundamental rights, a more exacting standard would be applied. 33. The precise term "strict scrutiny" was used by the Court for the first time In Sklnnerv. Oklahoma (316 U.S. 535 (1942). t The Oklahoma Habitual Crlmlnal Sterlllsation Act provided for ... vasectomy to be performed on any person convicted two or more times for crimes amounting to "felonies Involving moral turpitude'', Justice Douglas, giving the opinion of the Court, described the statute as vlolatlng the right to have offspring - "a right which Is basic to the perpetuation of a race". The question before the Court was whether this statute violated the 141" D Amendment. Holding that It did, Justice Douglas observed: "Strict scrutiny of the classlflcatlon which a State makes In .... a sterilization law Is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise Invidious discriminations are made against groups or E types of Individuals In violation of the constitutional guarantee of just and equal laws." 34. In India there has to be collective commitment for upliftment of those who needed It. In that sense, the question again comes back to the basic issue as to whether the action F taken by the Government can be upheld after making judicial scrutiny. Much a111Si&tance Ii not available to the petitioners from " the American declaions. 36. It i& to be noted that the doctrine of separation as i8 prevalent in the American Society ia not of much comsequenc:e G in the Indian scenario. It need& tc:> be clarified that the expres§ion '§triet scrutiny' ha11 also been used by the lndi~rn Courts in Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1960 (2) SCR 376) but it appears to have be.en used in different context. Wh111t really i:tppe111rs to be the intention for the. use of the 19 expre.Hion is ''careful and deeper scrutiny" and not in the ae.nae .!> ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INOIA & ORS. 215 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J -1 of strict scrutiny of the provisions as Is prevalent In the American A i )- . , - . _) . jurisprudence. It Is used In different sense. The application appears to be In technical sense In the American Courts, for example, Regents of University of Cal/fornla v. Allan Bakke (438 U.S. 266). 36. Some of the judgments of American Courts throwing B light on the controversy need to be noted: 37. In Allan Bakka's case (supra) It was held as follows: "Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims C of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that Imposes disadvantages upon persons llke respondent, who bear no responslblllty for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions'', D "The fatal flaw In petitioner's preferential program Is Its disregard of Individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kri:iemer, 334 US, at 22, 92 Led 1161, 66 S Ct 636, 3ALRd 441. Such rights are not absolute, But when a State'a.dlstribution of benefits E or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color. of a person's skin or ancestry, that Individual Is @ntltled to a demi;instrntlon thi;it the challenged classlflcatlon Is nec~:u11rnry to promote a sutn~ti;intial state interest. Petitioner has fll!iled tP earry this burden." r 36, In Gmtter v; So/linger (539 U.S. 306) It wll!a held as f1;;1ll!~ws: [21. 22-a) "We !\'lckn()wledi:Je that "there are serious problem§ i;if jYstiee egnneeted with the idea of pr!!!lferenee ltr11elf," Bakke, 4~~ \..1$, lilt ~ea. 57 L md 2d 760, fl!P s et Q 27~~ (opinion of Powell, J), Narrow tail@ring, therefgre, requires th!i!t a rac1M~onsci@Ys @dmissions program n9t uni:luly h11rm members gf @ny rac:iit11l 9rnup, Even remedi@I rt11ce"b11sed 91;;1vernmental @l'ition generli!llY !!remains 1rnbject to c~mtirrning oversight to @ssure that it will wgrk H i 216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. , A the least harm possible to other innocent persons ,_ competing for the benefit." Id., at 308, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733. To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not "unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic B groups." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 Us 547, 630, 111 L Ed 2d 445, 110 S Ct 2997 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). [22b, 23] We are satisfied that the Law School's r • admissions program does not. Because the Law School c considers "all pertinent elements of diversity," it can (and does) select non-minority applicants who have greater potential to enhance student body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants. See Bakke, supra, at 317, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733 (opinion of Powell, D J). As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, so long as a race-conscious admissions program uses race as a "plus" factor in the context of individualized consideration, a rejected applicant "will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the E right color or had the wrong surname ...... His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment." 438 US, at 318, 57 L Ed 2d 750, 98 S Ct 2733. F [13f, 22C] We agree that, in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all ... applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants. G [24, 25a, 26] We are mindful, however, that "[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race" Palmo~e v Sidoti, (539 US 342] 466 US 429, 432, 80 L Ed 2d, 421, 104 s Ct 1879 (1984). Accordingly, race- • conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. a - ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 217 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) This requirement reflects that racial classifications, A _, however, compelling their goals are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle. We see no reason B to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use of race must have · 1 a logical end point. The Law School, too, concedes that .,,- -i' ' all "race-conscious programs must have reasonable durational limits." Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. 32. [25b] In the context of higher education, the durational c requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race- conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity. Universities in California, D Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences ,)-, in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches. Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral E alternatives as they develop. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 US 549, 581, 131 L Ed 2d 626, 115 S Ct 1624 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T] he States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear"). The '- requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs F ~ have a termination point "assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself." Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US, at 510, 102 L Ed 2d 854, 109 S Ct G 706 (plurality opinion); see also Nathanson & Bartnik. The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority '1-' Applicants to Professional Schools, [539 US 343] 58 Chicago Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May-June 1977) ("It would be a sad day indeed, were America to become a quota- H t A ridden society, with each identifiable minority assigned proportional representation in every desirable walk of life. ,_ But that is not the rationale for programs of preferential treatment; the acid test of their justification will be their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic B preferences at all." 39. The provisions of the American Constitution in United States relating to formal equality concept do not appear to have operated from the beginning of the American Constitution. r ' c 40. Although even under the 1919 and 1935 Government of India Acts the rights of certain class of people like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the deprived classes have been recognized, in America, the rights have been conferred on individuals and so much on the groups. The freedoms D contemplated by the Indian Constitution originally related to seven categories which presently stand at six after the property rights were deleted. The stand of Mr. Vahanvati and Mr. Gopal Subramanium is that the logic of strict scrutiny, compelling the "' Government and narrow tailoring do not have relevance so far E as the present case is concerned. 41. In Thomas's case (supra) it was clearly noticed by this Court that American conditions do not apply adequately for the Indian scenario. Unlike U.S.A., the targeted beneficiaries are alien to our Constitution. In India cognizance has been taken F constitutionally. The victims of untouchability, identifying social and economic backwardness have been accepted as "- permissible measures. However, the question how long they can be continued is another aspect which shall be dealt with separately. Rationality in that sense is a measure for the special G provisions. But the question that still needs to be addressed is whether these groups are really identifiable. While formulating the policy all factors need not be specifically expressed but there must be some criteria to identify social and educational { backwardness. H 42. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982 (1) SCC 271) it a a ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 219 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] was noted as follows: A _, "8. We are not, as we cannot be, unmindful of the danger to people's liberties which comes in any community from what is called the tyranny of the majority. Uncontrolled power in the executive is a great enemy of freedom and therefore, B eternal vigilance is necessary in the realm of liberty. But we cannot transplant, in the Indian context and conditions, principles which took birth in other soils, without a careful - j examination of their relevance to the interpretation of our - .. - Constitution. No two Constitutions are alike, for it is not mere words that make a Constitution. It is the history of a c people which lends colour and meaning to its Constitution. We must therefore turn inevitably to the historical origin of the ordinance making power conferred by 9ur Constitution and consider the scope of that power in the light of the restraints by which that power is hedged. Neither in D England nor in the United States of America does the . >- executive enjoy anything like the power to issue ordinances . In India, that power has a historical origin and the executive, at all times, has resorted to it freely as and when it considered it necessary to do so. One of the larger States E in India has manifested its addiction to that power by making an overgenerous use of it- so generous indeed, that ordinances which lapsed by efflux of time were renewed successively by a chain of kindred creatures, one after another. And, the ordinances embrace everything F ) under the sun, from Prince to pauper and crimes to contracts. The Union Government too, so we are informed passed about 200 Ordinances between 1960 and 1980, out of which 19 were passed in 1980". 43. One of the grey areas focused by learned counsel for G the petitioners and the respondents is the ever perplexing question "how long". The respondents say that so long as the ·~ problems of backwardness exist they can be continued. The petitioners have highlighted that notwithstanding the concerns shown in Indra Sawhney No. 1 and in a large number of cases H 220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. · A that the reservations are not meant to be a permanent feature there is a case for concern. Admittedly, there is no deletion from the list of other backward classes. It goes on increasing. Learned counsel for the respondents have stated that in large number of cases where applications were made for inclusion they have B been turned down. But that is no answer to the question as to why and how there has been no exclusion. Is it that backwardness has increased instead of decreasing. If the answer is 'yes', as contended by the respondents, then one is bound to raise eyebrows as to the effectiveness of providing c reservations or quotas. 44. The ultimate object is to bring those who are disadvantaged to a level where they no longer continue to be dis-advantaged. It needs no emphasis that individual rights are superior to the social rights. All fundamental rights are to be D read together. The inequalities are to be removed. Yet the fact that there has been no exclusion raises a doubt about the real concern to remove inequality. 45. The ultimate objective is to bring people to a particular level so that there can be equality of opportunity. In that context, E one has to keep in view the justice and redress principles. There should not be mere equality in law but equality in fact. 46. The necessary ingredients of equality essentially involve equalization of unequals. Linked with this question the F problem posed by the petitioners is whether reservation is the only way to equalize unequals? There are several methods and modes. If reservation really does not work as contended by the petitioners, then the alternative methods can be adopted. It is the stand of the respondents that not only reservations but other G incentives like free lodging and boarding facilities have been provided in some States. 47. Learned counsel for the respondents have stated that ' - the measures under challenge are nothing but a much needed r leap towards attainment of the objectives. If it is true, the leap H has to end somewhere. It cannot hang in the air as there is ---~ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 221 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] _, nothing immortal in this world; much less, a progressive measure A purportedly intended to benefit the other backward classes. If after nearly six decades the objectives have not been achieved, necessarily the need for its continuance warrants deliberations. ,, It is to be noted that some of the provisions were intended to be '· replaced after a decade but have continued. It indirectly shows B that backwardness appears to have purportedly increased and not diminished. It would therefore be rational and logical to restrict operation of the impugned Statute for a period of 10 years from its inception. -1 48. At this juncture, report of the Oversight Committee c throws considerable light on the controversy. Some parts of the Report need to be noted. I llf/ This report seeks to expand the provision of Higher :) Education while at the same time ensuring social inclusion • D I and academic excellence. A society which excludes a . / ... significant section of its population from access to higher ~1 • education cannot be said to be providing equality of opportunity. Equally, if academic excellence gets compromised in the process of expansion, it would lose E its competitive edge in the emerging knowledge society - an edge which can propel India into a position of global leadership. Page X and XI of the report ~ A simpler way of implementing reservations was to F steamroll our way through, in the name of social equity, regardless of its impact on quality and excellence. We have deliberately chosen the more difficult way which delivers equity in a manner that enhances excellence i.e. by making concomitant investments in faculty & G infrastructure and by bringing much needed governance \ related reforms involving institutional, financial and administrative autonomy and process re-engineering in our Higher Educational Governance system. It is easy to equalize by "mindlessly leveling everyone down to lowest H A common-denominator". Our effort has been to create an ' - upward moving equalization process-where the disabilities are overcome by the erstwhile excluded sections and the system brings out the best in them. Besides the many out of the box innovative ideas concerning faculty and infrastructure related issues, I believe three of our recommendations, which cut horizontally across the five groups, are critical to the establishment of the goal of an "inclusive society, in pursuit of excellence". These four programmes are considered c by the Oversight Committee to be integral to the above vision and should be considered to be inseverable part of our core recommendations. (page-x) We have to acknowledge that the challenges facing ... D us in the entire education sector are enormous and in the Tertiary Education Sector these can be met, only if both public and private funding to educational institutions increased several fold. The need for private participation in this mammoth task cannot be over-emphasized but E market forces themselves cannot deliver justice. The relative importance of public vs. private funding is brought out very strongly by Joseph Stiglitz when he opined "I had studied the failures of both markets and governments, and was not so na'ive to think that the government could remedy every failure. Neither was I so foolish as to believe ~ that markets by themselves solved every societal problem. Inequality, unemployment, pollution: these are all important issues in which Government has to take an importance role." G "Expansion, Inclusion and Excellence" has been our credo. They have remained the abiding theme guiding all our deliberations. I will be failing in my duty if the Oversight Committee does not acknowledge the source of inspiration { for our deliberations. It is the Prime Minister's speech giving the overpowering vision of the "need to create the ,_ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 223 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] . I second wave of nation building" which has inspired us in A our thoughts and deliberations. I would also like to express my gratitude to Hon'ble HRD Minister, Sri Arjun Singhji for his affection and guidance right through. (Page-xi) Treatment of the creamy Layer (Chapter IV- Report B of Oversight Committee Vot.-1) .. 4.2 (b) The true benefit of reservations will be realized only when the high school enrolment of OBCs, especially in rural areas, increases significantly. Attention will need to be paid to this issue in the coming years. c Chapter VI- Estimate of Resources required for the expansion 6.1 In overall terms, the total estimated expenditure on the expansion has now been assessed by the five Sub-Groups D in their final reports at Rs.18, 197.83 crore, as compared to the amount of Rs.16,563.34 crore, that was included by the Oversight Committee in its interim report. The summary statement of additional student strength, faculty required and estimates of recurring and non-recurring expenditure E that have been projected by the Groups are as at Table 6.1 and the year-wise break up is at table 6.2. 6.3 The Committee in its discussions with the individual Groups, had stressed. the need to estimate the additional infrastructure and manpower that would be required after F taking into account the slack, if any, in the existing facilities as also the scope for using IT as a resource multiplier. While the Groups seems to have accepted this m principle their expenditure projections, and the norms on which they are based seems to have just extrapolated past trends G The Committee has had some input regarding global trends and the best practices being followed in the world's leading institutions. Based on this, and in consultation with experts, the Committee has developed a plan for a "Gyan Vahini" project, as has been explained in an earlier Chapter H in this report. The total expenditure on this component of the expansion and upgradation project would be Rs.1752 crore in 5 years. Apart from significantly enhancing the quality of instruction and learning, and brining it close to the best levels in the world, this investment will certainly contribute to efficiency and to reducing the conventional costs of the higher education system. Summary Statement of Expenditure Requirements (As given in the Final Reports of the Groups) Sector No. Existing Annual Addi. Non Recur· Total of Student Addi. Facility Recur· ring Exp. lnstn Intake Student Re· ring Exp. In Intake quired Ex. (SY rs) 5 Yrs. Agriculture 5 825 454 187 102.75 92.71 195.46 Central 17 92011 49689 6609 2702.11 2455.92 5158.03 Universities Management 7 1791 966 139 511.32 177.48 688.80 Medical 11 993 565 N.A. 1783.98 1027.69 2811.67 Engineering 38 29671 16440 4919 5503.83 3840.04 9343.87 Grand Total 125291 68114 11854 10603.99 7593.84 18197.83 Chapter VII- The Way Forward 7 .1 As indicated earlier in this report, this opportunity for expansion, inclusion and excellence should only be the beginning of a larger process, which is to build a G knowledge society in India and allow the country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations. Our recent economic growth and the values of knowledge and education carried forward by a billion diverse people, point to India's potential future as a knowledge society. Other H countries that visualize a similar future have planned r ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 225 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] massive investments in order to enhance both the quality A -· and quantity of higher education and research. China, for example, has made substantial increase in its allocation of resources of higher education. In the first phase, China has provided a grant of US $ 125 million to each of the 1 O leading universities and US $ 225 million to Beijing and B Tsinghua Universities. In the second phase, China proposes to provide additional grants to 30 universities, with the objective of having 100 high quality universities in China in the 21 51 century and with 15% of the citizens in the age group 18-22 receiving tertiary education. c 7.2 India has suffered in the past because of severe under investment in higher education. This has been caused partly by the thinking that looks at primary and higher education in an either or manner. It is very clear however that large public investment is needed in both sectors. As D Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said, while launching • the Knowledge Commission, "At the bottom of the knowledge pyramid, the challenge is one of improving access to primary education. At the top of the pyramid there is need to make our institutions of higher education E and research world class. The time has come for India to embark on a second wave of nation building. Denied this investment, the youth will become a social and economic liability. 49. It was emphasized by learned counsel for the F . petitioners that the massive financial burden question finds no ). place in the parliamentary debate. In response, Mr. Vahanvati has submitted that before the Parliamentary Standing Committee, the report of the Oversight Committee was available. When the Oversight Committee's report was discussed in detail, G needless to say the financial aspect was also considered. 50. It has been highlighted by Mr. P.P. Rao that unmindful of the duty to focus on primary and elementary education, large sums of money are intended to be used for implementation of H A Statute. Various figures and datas have been highlighted to show that there is really no concern for the primary and elementary education. Repelling these contentions Mr. Vahanvati has highlighted that there is no laxity so far as primary and elementary education is concerned. He has referred to voluminous details B relating to Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. It is contended that uniform policy of elementary education and the progress made upto 31.3.2007 shows the concern of the Government to translate into reality the constitutional objective of providing adequate education to all citizens. It is true that there has been c considerable effort in this regard. But one question still remains to be answered. There has to be balancing of priorities. Mr. Vahanvati has said that this balancing is prerogative of the Government. It is true that Government has a large area of discretion in choosing its priorities. But one factor cannot be 0 lost sight of: The fundamental stress has to be on elementary education. If that is done, as a consequence there would be reduction in the need for spending more money on higher education. Stress on primary and elementary education would be a leap forward towards higher education. There has been considerable number of drop outs in the higher classes. This is E a reality in spite of all steps which the Government claims to have adopted to ensure that every child of a particular age group has education as warranted by the Constitution as a fundamental right. F 51. Unni Krishnan, J.P and Ors. v. State of A.P and Ors. ( 1993 ( 1) sec 645) emphasized on the importance of education in the following words: "166. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha this Court held that the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does take in G "educational facilities". (The relevant portion has been quoted herein before). Having regard to the fundamental significance of education to the life of, an individual and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted in the earlier decisions of this Court referred to herein H before, we hold, agreeing with the statement in Bandhua .., ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 227 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] Mukti Morcha, that right to education is implicit in and A -~ flows from the right to life guaranteed by Article 21. Th~t the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has been recognised not only in this country since thousands of years, but all over the world. In Mohini Jain, the B impatience of education has been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in para 7 herein before. In particular, we agree with the ! observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the c Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasised than in the above words. The importance of education was emphasised in the "Neethishatakam' by Bhartruhari (First D Century B.C. in the following words: Translation: Education is the special manifestation of man; Education is the treasure which can be preserved E without the fear of loss; Education secures material pleasure, happiness and fame; Education is the teacher of the teacher; Education is God incarnate; Education secures honour at the hands of the State, not money. A man without education is equal to animal. F ). 168. In Brown v. Board of Education (347 US 483 (1954) Earl Warren, C.J., speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the right to education in the following words: "Today, education is perhaps the most important G function of State and local governments ... It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to H cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." 52. Observations of this Court in A/IMS Students' Union case (supra) highlight the importance of higher education and the modalities to be adopted for ensuring excellence are in the following words: "58. The Preamble to the Constitution of India secures, as one of its objects, fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation to 'we he people of India'. Reservation unless protected by the constitution itself, as given to us by the founding fathers and as adopted by the people of India, is sub-version of fraternity, unity and integrity and dignity of the individual. While dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 46 is taken note of often by overlooking Articles 41 and 4 7. Article 41 obliges the State inter alia to make effective provision for securing the right to work and right to education. Any reservation in favour of one, to the extent of reservation, is an inroad on the right of others to work and to learn. Article 47 recognises the improvement of public health as one of the primary duties of the State. Public health can be improved by having the best of doctors, specialists and super specialists. Under-graduate level is a primary or basic level of education in medical sciences wherein reservation can be understood as the fulfilment of societal obligation of the State towards the weaker segments of the society. Beyond this, a reservation is a reversion or diversion from the performance of primary duty of the State. Permissible reservation at the lowest or primary rung is a step in the direction of assimilating the lesser fortunates in mainstream of society by bringing them to the level of others which they cannot achieve unless protectively pushed. Once that is done the protection needs ,.. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 229 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] to be withdrawn in the own interest of protectees so that A _, they develop strength and feel confident of stepping on higher rungs on their own legs shedding the crutches. Pushing the protection of reservation beyond the primary level betrays bigwigs' desire to keep the crippled crippled for ever. Rabindra Nath Tagore's vision of a free India 8 cannot be complete unless "knowledge is free" and "tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection". Almost a ... j quarter century after the people of India have given the Constitution unto themselves, a chapter on fundamental duties came to be incorporated in the Constitution. c Fundamental duties, as defined in Article 51A, are not made enforceable by a writ of court just as the fundamental rights are, but it cannot be lost sight of that 'duties' in Part IVA - Article 51A are prefixed by the same word 'fundamental' which was prefixed by the founding fathers D of the Constitution to 'rights' in Part Ill. Every citizen of India is fundamentally obliged to develop the scientific temper and humanism. He is fundamentally duty bound to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher E levels of endeavour and achievements. State is, all the citizens placed together and hence though Article 51A does not expressly cast any fundamental duty on the State, the fact remains that the duty of every citizen of India is the collective duty of the Sate. Any reservation, apart from being sustainable on the constitutional anvil, must also be F < reasonable to be permissible. In assessing the ,J. reasonability one of the factors to be taken into consideration would be - whether the character and quantum of reservation would stall or accelerate achieving the ultimate goal of excellence enabling the nation G constantly rising to higher levels. In the era of globalisation, where the nation as a whole has to compete with other nations of the world so as to survive, excellence cannot be given an unreasonable go by and certainly not compromised in its entirety. Fundamental duties, though H A not enforceable by a writ of the court, yet provide a valuable guide and aid to interpretation of constitutional and legal issues. In case of doubt or choice, people's wish as manifested through Article 51A, can serve as a guide not only for resolving the issue but also for constructing or B moulding the relief to be given by the courts. Constitutional enactment of fundamental duties, if it has to have any meaning, must be used by courts as a tool to tab, even a taboo, on State action drifting away from constitutional 1 values". ~- c 53. Respondents have vehemently contended that the concept of creamy layer may have relevance for the purpose of Article 16(4), but is really inconsequential so far as Articles 15(4) and 15(5) are concerned. It is submitted that Article 16(4) is relatable to inadequate representation in Government services D and in that context the well to do in the socially and educationally backward classes have to be excluded in view of the decisions of this Court. But that logic cannot apply to the present dispute which relates to admissions to educational institutions. Before considering the question as to the desirability of excluding E 'creamy layer' the concept of creamy layer needs to be focused upon. Observations of this Court in various cases on this concept need to be noted. 54. In N.M. Thomas's case (supra) at page 363, it was inter alia observed as follows : "124. A word of sociological caution. In the light of experience, here and elsewhere, the danger of ,. "reservation", it seems to me, is threefold. Its benefits, by and large, are snatched away by the top creamy layer of G the "backward" caste or class, thus keeping the weakest among the weak always weak and leaving the fortunate layers to consume the whole cake. Secondly, this claim is overplayed extravagantly in democracy by large and vocal groups whose burden of backwardness has been H substantially lightened by the march of time and measures ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 231 of better education and more opportunities of employment, A but wish to wear the "weaker section" label as a means to score over their near-equals formally categorised as the upper brackets. Lastly, a lasting solution to the problem comes only from improvement of social environment, added educational facilities and cross-fertilisation of B castes by inter-caste and inter-class marriages sponsored as a massive State programme, and this solution is calculatedly hidden from 'liew by the higher "backward" groups with a vested interest in the plums of backwardism. But social science research, not judicial impressionism, c will alone tell the whole truth and a constant process of objective re-evaluation of progress registered by the "underdog" categories is essential lest a once deserving "reservation" should be degraded .into "reverse discrimination". Innovations in administrative strategy to 0 help the really untouched, most backward classes also emerge from such socio-legal studies and audit exercises, if dispassionately made. In fact, research conducted by the A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna, has revealed a dual society among harijans, a tiny elite gobbling up the benefits and the darker layers sleeping distances E away from the special concessions. For them, Articles 46 and 335 remain a "noble romance", the bonanza going to the "higher" harijans. I mention this in the present case because lower division clerks are likely to be drawn from the lowest levels of harijan humanity and promotion F prospects being accelerated by withdrawing, for a time, "test" qualifications for this category may perhaps delve deeper. An equalitarian breakthrough in a hierarchical structure has to use many weapons and Rule 13/AA perhaps is one. G Xx xx xx 139. It is platitudinous constitutional law that Articles 14 to 16 are a common code of guaranteed equality, the first laying down the broad doctrine, the other two applying it H A to sensitive areas historically important and politically polemical in a climate of communalism and jobbery. 55. In Vasant Kumar's case (supra) at page 732 the view was re-iterated in the following words : "24. In order to appreciate the view point advanced by Mr Desai which appeals to me both for its indepth study of the problem, and a fresh outlook on this vexed problem, at the outset let me take a look at the futuristic view of the Indian Society as envisaged in the Constitution. No one is left in any doubt that the future Indian Society was to be casteless and classless. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru the first Prime Minister of India said that Mahatma Gandhi has shaken the foundations of caste and the masses have been powerfully affected. But an even greater power than Gandhi is at work, the conditions of modern life - and it seems at last this hoary and tenacious ralic of past times must die. Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the Nation said, "The caste system as we know is an anachronism. It must go if both Hinduism and India are to live and grow from day to day". In its onward march towards realising the constitutional goal, every attempt has to be made to destroy caste stratification. Article 38(2) enjoins the State to strive to minimise the inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. Article 46 enjoins duty to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Continued retention of the division of the society into various castes simultaneously introduces inequality of status. And this inequality in status is largely responsible for retaining inequality in facilities and opportunities, ultimately resulting in bringing into existence an economically depressed ,,- ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 233 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] _, class for transcending caste structure and caste barrier. A The society therefore was to be classless caste less society. In order to set up such a society, steps have to be taken to weaken and progressively eliminate caste structure. Unfortunately, the movement is in the reverse gear. Caste stratification has become more rigid to some extent, and B where concessions and preferred treatment schemes are " introduced for economically disadvantaged classes, ~ identifiable by caste label, the caste structure unfortunately ~ received a fresh lease of life. In fact there is a mad rush for being recognized as belonging to a caste which by its nomenclature would be included in the list of socially and c educationally backward classes. To illustrate: Bakshi Commission in Gujarat recognized as many as 82 castes · as being. socially and educationally backward. On the publication of its report, Government of Gujarat received D representations by members of those castes who had not made any representation to the Bakshi Commission for treating them as socially and educationally backward. This phenomenon was noticed by Mandal Commission when it observed: "Whereas the Commission has tried to make the State-wise lists of OBCs as comprehensive as possible, E it is quite likely that several synonymy of the castes listed as backward have been left out. Certain castes are known by a number of synonymy which vary from one region to the other and their complete coverage is almost impossible". Mandal Commission found a way out by F , recommending that if a particular caste has been listed as backward then all its synonyms whether mentioned in the State lists or not should also be treated as backward. Gujarat Government was forced to appoint a second commission known as Rane Commission. Rane G Commission took note of the fact that there was an organised effort for being considered socially and educationally backward castes. Rane Commission recalled the observations in Balaji case that "Social backwardness is on the ultimate analysis the result of H A poverty to a very large extent". The Commission noticed h that some of the castes just for the sake of being considered as socially and educationally backward, have degraded themselves to such an extent that, they had no hesitation in attributing different types of vices to and B associating other factors indicative of backwardness, with their castes. The Commission noted that the malaise requires to be remedied. The Commission therefore, t devised a method for determining socially and • educationally backward classes without reference to caste, c beneficial to all sections of people irrespective of the caste to whi_ch they belong. The Commission came to an irrefutable conclusion that amongst certain castes and communities or class of people, only lower income groups amongst them are socially and educationally backward. D We may recall here a trite observation in case of N. M. Thomas which reads as under (SCC pg.363 para 124): A- "A word of sociological caution. In the light of · experience, here and elsewhere, the danger of 'reservation', it seems to me, is threefold. Its benefits, E by and large, are snatched away by the top creamy layer of the 'backward' caste or class, thus keeping the weakest among the weak always weak and leaving the fortunate layers to consume the whole cake. Secondly, this claim is overplayed extravagantly F in democracy by large and vocal groups whose burden of backwardness has been substantially lightened by the march of time and measures of better education and more opportunities of employment, but wish to wear the 'weaker section' label as a means G to score over their near-equals formally categorised as the upper brackets." 25. A few other aspects for rejecting caste as the basis for identifying social and educational backwardness may be briefly noted. If State H patronage for preferred treatment accepts caste as ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 235 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] the only insignia for determining social and A educational backwardness, the danger looms large that this approach alone would legitimise and perpetuate caste system. It does not go well with our proclaimed secular character as enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution. The assumption that B all members of same caste a re equally socially and educationally backward is not well-founded. Such an approach provides an over-simplification of a complex problem of identifying the social and educational backwardness. The Chairman of the c Backward Classes Commission, set up in 1953, after having finalised the report, concluded that "it would have been better if we could determine the criteria of backwardness on principles other than caste". Lastly it is recognised without dissent that the caste based 0 reservation has been usurped by the economically well-placed section in the same caste. To illustrate, it may be pointed that some years ago, I came across a petition for special leave against the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in which the reservation of 2Y:z per cent for admission to medical E and engineering colleges in favour of Majhabi Sikhs was challenged by none other than the upper crust of the members of the Scheduled castes amongst Sikhs in Punjab; proving that the labeled weak exploits the really weaker. Add to this, the findings of the Research F Planning Scheme of sociologists assisting the Mandal Commission when it observed: "while determining the criteria of socially and educationally backward classes, social backwardness should be considered to be the critical element and educational G backwardness to be the linked element though not necessarily derived from the former". The team ultimately concluded that "social backwardness refers to ascribed status, and it considered social backwardness as the critical element and H A educational backwardness to be the linked though 1- not derived element". The attempt is to identify socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. The caste, as is understood in Hindu Society, is unknown to Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Jews etc. Caste B criterion would not furnish a reliable yardstick to identify socially and educationally backward group in the aforementioned communities though economic backwardness would. r ~. 28. Reservation in one or other form has been there c for decades. If a survey is made with reference to families in various castes considered to be socially and educationally backward, about the benefits of . preferred treatment, it would unmistakably show that the benefits of reservations are snatched away by D the top creamy layer of the backward castes. This has to be avoided at any cost. _.\. 56. Significantly in Indra Sawhney No. 1 it was emphatically noted as follows: E "520. Society does not remain static. The industrialisation and the urbanisation which necessarily followed in its wake, the advance on political, social and economic fronts made particularly after the commencement of the Constitution, the social reform movements of the last several decades, F the spread of education and the advantages of the special provisions including reservations secured so far, have all ... undoubtedly seen at least some individuals and families in the backward classes, however small in number, gaining sufficient means to develop their capacities to compete G with others in every field. That is an undeniable fact. Legally, therefore, they are not entitled to be any longer called as part of the backward classes whatever their original birthmark. It can further hardly be argued that once a .( backward class, always a backward class. That would H defeat the very purpose of the special provisions made in • . ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 237 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] the Constitution for the advancement of the backward A classes, and for enabling them to come to the level of and to compete with the forward classes, as equal citizens. On the other hand, to continue to confer upon such advanced sections from the backward classes the special benefits, would amount to treating equals unequally B violating the equality provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, to rank them with the rest of the backward classes would equally violate the right to equality of the rest in those classes, since it would amount to treating the unequals equally. What is more, it will lead to perverting c the objectives of the special constitutional provisions since the forwards among the backward classes will thereby be enabled to lap up all the special benefits to the exclusion and at the cost of the rest in those classes, thus keeping the rest in perpetual backwardness. The object of the D special constitutional provisions is not to uplift a few individuals and families in the backward classes but to ensure the advancement of the backward classes as a whole. Hence, taking out the forwards from among the backward classes is not only permissible but obligatory under the Constitution. However, it is necessary to add E that just as the backwardness of the backward groups cannot be measured in terms of the forwardness of the forward groups, so also the forwardness of the forwards among the backward classes cannot be measured in terms of the backwardness of the backward sections of the said F classes. It has to be judged on the basis of the social capacities gained by them to compete with the forward classes. So long as the individuals belonging to the backward classes do oot develop sufficient capacities of their own to compete with others, they can hardly be G classified as forward. xx xx xx 629. More backward and backward is an illusion. No constitutional exercise is called for it. What is required is H 238 practical approach to the problem. The collectivity or the 'group may be backward class but the individuals from that class may have achieved the social status or economic affluence. Disentitle them from claiming reservation. Therefore, while reserving posts for backward classes, the departments should make a condition precedent that every candidate must disclose the annual income of the parents beyond which one could not be considered to be backward. What should be that limit can be determined by the appropriate State. Income apart, provision should be made that wards of those backward classes of persons who have achieved a particular status in society either political or social or economic or if their parents are in higher services then such individuals should be precluded to avoid monopolisation of the services reserved for backward classes by a few. Creamy layer, thus, shall stand eliminated. And once a group or collectivity itself is found to have achieved the constitutional objective then it should be excluded from the list of backward class. Therefore, (1) No reservation can be made on economic criteria. (2) It may be under Article 16(4) if such class satisfies the test of inadequate representation. · (3) Exclusion of creamy layer is a social purpose. Any legislative or executive action to remove such persons individually or collectively cannot be constitutionally invalid. Xx xx xx 790. 'Means-test' in this discussion signifies imposition of an income limit, for the purpose of excluding persons (from the backward class) whose income is above the said limit. This submission is very "Often referred to as the "creamy layer" argument. Petitioners submit that some members of the designated backward classes are highly advanced socially as well as economically and educationally. It is submitted that they constitute the forward l ) '• r ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 239 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] _,,, section of that particular backward class - as forward as A any other forward class member - and that they are lapping up all the benefits of reservations meant for that class, without allowing the benefits to reach the truly backward members of that class. These persons are by no means backward and with them a class cannot be B treated as backward. It is pointed out that since Jayasree I almost every decision has accepted the validity of this . submission . 791. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the States of Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and other counsel for c respondents strongly oppose any such distinction. It is submitted that once a class is identified as a backward class after applying the relevant criteria including the economic one, it is not permissible to apply the economic criteria once again and sub-divide a backward class into D ... two sub-categories. Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted further that at one stage (in July 1979) the State o f Tamil Nadu did indeed prescribe such an income limit but had to delete it in view of the practical difficulties encountered and also in view of the representations E received. In this behalf, the learned counsel invited our attention to Chapter 7-H (pages 60 to 62) of the Ambashankar Commission (Tamil Nadu Second Backward Classes Commission) Report. According to ' the respondents the argument of 'creamy layer' is but a F .... mere ruse, a trick, to deprive the backward classes of the benefit of reservations. It is submitted that no member of backward class has come forward with this plea and that it ill becomes the members of forward classes to raise this point. Strong reliance is placed upon the observations G • of Chinnappa Reddy, J in Vasanth kumar to the following effect (SCC p.763, para 72) ~ " .... One must, however, enter a caveat to the criticism that the benefits of reservation are often snatched away by the top creamy layer of backward class or caste. That H .ti~ A a few of the seats and posts reserved for backward classes ).._ are snatched away by the more fortunate among them is · not to say that reservation is not necessary. This is bound to happen in a competitive society such as ours. Are not the unreserved seats and posts snatched away, in the B same way, by the top creamy layer of society itself? Seats reserved for the backward classes are taken away by the top layers amongst them on the same principle of >. merit on which the unreserved seats are taken away by the top layers of society. How can it.be bad if reserved c seats and posts are snatched away by the creamy layer of backward classes, if such snatching away of unreserved posts by the top creamy layer of society itself is not bad?" 792. In our opinion, it is not a question of permissibility or D desirability of such test out one ·of proper and more appropriate identification of a class - a backward class. The very concept of a class denotes a number of persons having certain common traits which distinguish them from the others. In a backward class under clause (4) of Article E 16, if the connecting link is the social backwardness, it should broadly be the same in a given class. If some of the members are far too advanced socially (which in the context, necessarily means economically and, may also mean educationally) the connecting thread between them F and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits in the class. After excluding them alone, would the class be ;. a compact class. In fact, such exclusion benefits the truly backward. Difficulty, however, really lies in drawing the line - how and where to draw the line? For, while drawing G the line, it should be ensured that it does n·ot result in taking away with one hand what is given by the other. The • basis of exclusion should not merely be economic, unless, of course, the economic advancement is so high that it ~ necessarily means social advancement. Let us illustrate H the point. A member of backward class, say a member of ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 241 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) carpenter caste, goes to Middle East and works there as A a carpenter. If you take his annual income in rupees, it would be fairly high from the Indian standard. Is he to be excluded from the Backward Class? Are his children in India to be deprived of the benefit of Article 16(4)? Situation may, however, be different, if he rises so high economically B as to become - say a factory owner himself. In such a situation, his social status also rises. He himself would be in a position to provide employment to others. In such a case, his income is merely a measure of his social status. Even otherwise there are several practical difficulties too C in imposing an income ceiling. For example, annual income of Rs.36,000 may not count for much in a city like Bombay, Delhi or Calcutta whereas it may be a handsome income in rural India anywhere. The line to be drawn must be a realistic one. Another question would be, should such 0 a line be uniform for the entire country or a given State or should it differ from rural to urban areas and so on. Further, income from agriculture may be difficult to assess and, therefore, in the case of agriculturists, the line may have to be drawn with reference to the extent of holding. While · the income of a person can be taken as a measure of his E social advancement, the limit to be prescribed should not be such as to result in taking away with one hand what is given with the other. The income limit must be such as to mean and signify social advancem,ent. At the same time, it must be recognised that there are certain positions, the F occupants of which can be treated as socially advanced without any further enquiry. For example, if a member of a designated backward class becomes a member of IAS or IPS or any other All India Service, his status is society (social status) rises; he is no longer socially G disadvantaged. His children get full opportunity to realize their potential. They are in no way handicapped in the race of life. 793. Keeping in mind all these considerations, we direct H 242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A the Government of India to specify the basis of exclusion - whether on the basis of income, extent of holding or otherwise - of 'creamy layer'. This shall be done as early as possible, but not exceeding four months. On such specification persons falling within the net of exclusionary B rule shall cease to be the members of the Other Backward Classes (covered by the expression 'backward class of citizens') for the purpose of Article 16(4). The impugned Office Memorandums dated August 13, 1990 and l September 25, 1991 shall be implemented subject only to c such specification and exclusion of socially advanced persons from the backward classes contemplated by the said O.M. In other words, after the expiry of four months from today, the implementation of the said O.M. shall be subject to the exclusion of the 'creamy layer' in accordance D with the criteria to be specified by the Government of India and not otherwise". 57. In.Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 506) at page 508) it was noted as follows : E "3. Thereafter the matter again came up before the Court on 20-3-1995. Finding that the State of Kerala has not taken any steps, this Court issued notice to show cause why action should not be taken for non-compliance of this Court's order. Again the matter came up on 10-7-1995. Even on that date no report of compliance was submitted F to the Court; instead an affidavit sworn to by the Chief Secretary to the State was handed over explaining the ,.. circumstances why the implementation of the judgment was delayed. )()( )()( )()( 5. In the circumstanc,es, out of sheer exhaustion and having ,....- regard to the fact that the constitutionality of the Kera la Act 16of1995 is pending disposal before this Court, we have -F decided to get the information ourselves regarding "creamy H layer" issue through a High Level Committee. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 243 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,. J.] 6. Accordingly, we request the learned Chief Justice of the A Kerala High Court to appoint a retired Judge of the High Court to be the Chairman of the High Level Committee who will induct not more than 4 members from various walks of life to identify the "creamy layer'' among "the designated other backward classes" in Kerala State in B the light of the ruling of this Court in Manda/ case and forward the report to this Court within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order." 58. In Indra Sawhney No. 2 it was observed as follows: "7. Our Constitution is wedded to the concept of equality and equality is a basic feature. Under Article 15(2), there is a prohibition that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth or any of them. It is equally t~ue that ours D is a caste-ridden society. Still, it is a constitutional mandate not to discriminate on the basis of caste alone. Provisions + can be made for the upliftment of socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or for women and children. Article 1-6(4) empowers E the States for making any provision for reservation in appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Reservation is permissible ( i ) in favour of any backward class of citizens; and ( ii ) if it is not adequately represented in F " services under the State. 8. Caste only cannot be the basis for reservation. Reservation can be for a backward class citizen of a particular caste. Therefore, from that caste, the creamy G layer and the non-backward class of citizens are to be · excluded. If the caste is to be taken into consideration then for finding out the socially and economically backward class, the creamy layer of the caste is to be eliminated for granting benefit of reservation, because that creamy layer H 244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R cannot be termed as socially and economically backward. These questions are exhaustively dealt with by a nine­ Judge Bench of this Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and it has been specially held that "only caste" cannot be the basis for reservation. 9. Inclusion of castes in the list of backward classes cannot be mechanical and cannot be done without adequate relevant data. Nor can it be done for extraneous reasons ... Likewise, periodic examination of a backward class could lead to its exclusion if it ceases to be socially backward or if it is adequately represented in the services. Once backward, always backward is not acceptable. In any case, the "creamy layer" has no place in the reservation system. 10. If forward classes are mechanically included in the list of backward classes or if the creamy layer among backward classes is not excluded, then the benefits of reservation will not reach the really backward among the backward classes. Most of the benefits will then be knocked away by the forward castes and the creamy layer. That will leave the truly backward, backward forever. xx xx xx 13. In Indra Sawhney on the question of exclusion of the "creamy layer'' from the backward classes, there was agreement among eight out of the nine learned Judges of this Court. There were five separate judgments in this behalf which required the "creamy layer'' to be identified and excluded. xx xx xx 22. As appears from the judgments of six out of the eight Judges, viz. Jeevan Reddy (for himself and three others), Sawant and Sahai, JJ. - (i.e. six learned Judges out of nine), - they specifically refer to those in higher services like IAS, IPS and All India Services or near about as + ' , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 245 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] persons who have reached a higher level of social A advancement and economic status and therefore as a matter of law, such persons are declared not entitled to be treated as backward. They are to be treated as creamy layer "without further inquiry". Likewise, persons living in sufficient affluence who are able to provide employment B to others are to be treated as having reached a higher social status on account of their affluence, and therefore outside the backward class. Those holding higher levels of agricultural landholdings or getting income from property, beyond a limit, have to be excluded from the backward c classes. This, in our opinion, is a judicial " declaration" made by this Court. Xx )()( )()( 27. As the "creamy layer" in the backward class is to be 0 treated "on a par'' with the forward classes and is not entitled to benefits of reservation, it is obvious that if the "creamy layer'' is not excluded, there will be discrimination and violation of Articles 14 and 16(1) inasmuch as equals (forwards and creamy layer of backward classes) cannot be treated unequally . Again, non-exclusion of creamy E layer will also be violative of Articles 14, 16(1) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India since unequals (the creamy layer) cannot be treated as equals , that is to say, equal to the rest of the backward class. These twin aspects of discrimination are specifically elucidated in the judgment F '... of Sawant, J. where the learned Judge stated as follows: (SCC p. 553, para 520) 'To continue to confer upon such advanced sections special benefits, would amount to treating equals G unequally. Secondly, to rank them with the rest of the backward classes would amount to treating the unequals equally." Thus, any executive or legislative action refusing to exclude the creamy layer from the benefits of reservation will be H 246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) and also of Article 16(4). We shall examine the validity of Sections 3, 4 and 6 in the light of the above principle. Xx xx xx 64. The Preamble to the Constitution of India emphasises the principle of equality as basic to our Constitution. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a it was ruled that even constitutional amendments which offended the basic structure of the Constitution would be ultra vires the basic structure. Sikri, C.J. laid stress on the basic features enumerated in the Preamble to the Constitution and said that there were other basic features too which could be gathered from the constitutional scheme (para 506-A of SCC). Equality was one of the basic features referred to in the Preamble to our Constitution. Shelat and Grover, JJ. also referred to the basic rights referred to in the Preamble. They specifically referred to equality (paras 520 and 535-A of SCC). Hegde and Shelat, JJ. also referred to the Preamble (paras 648, 652). Ray, J. (as he then was) also did so (para 886). Jaganmohan Reddy, J. too referred to the Preamble and the equality doctrine (para 1159). Khanna, J. accepted this position (para 1471). Mathew, J. referred to equality as a basic feature (para 1621). Dwivedi, J. (paras ~882, 1883) and Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) (see para 2086) accepted this position. 65. What we mean to say is that Parliament and the legislature in this country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16(1) is a facet. Whether the creamy layer is not excluded or whether forward castes get included in the list of backward classes , the position will be the same, namely, that there will be a breach not only of Article 14 but of the basic structure of the Constitution. The non-exclusion of the creamy layer ~ , ' , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 247 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] or the inclusion of forward castes in the list of backward A classes will, therefore, be totally illegal. Such an illegality offending the root of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to be perpetuated even by constitutional amendment. The Kerala Legislature is, therefore, least competent to perpetuate such an illegal discrimination. B What even Parliament cannot do, the Kerala Legislature cannot achieve." i 59. Though in M. Nagaraj's case (supra) some ,. " observations of general nature have been made so far as the applicability of the principles to Scheduled Castes and c Scheduled Tribes are concerned, really that case did not concern with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similar is the position here. The focus on the identity test in M. Nagaraj's case (supra) is unexceptionable. At paras 80 and 110, it was noted as follows: D "80. Before concluding, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in M.G Badappanavar. In that case the facts were as follows. Appellants were general candidates. They contended that when they and the reserved candidates E were appointed at Level-1 and junior reserved candidates got promoted earlier on the basis of roster-points to Level- 2 and again by way of roster-points to Level-3, and when the senior general candidate got promoted to Level-3, then the general candidate would become senior to the ·reserved candidate at Level-3. At Level-3, the reserved F • ). candidate should have been considered along with the senior general candidate for promotion to Level-4. In support of their contention, appellants relied upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh (//).The above contentions raised by the appellants were rejected G by the tribunal. Therefore, the general candidates came to this Court in appeal. This Court found on facts that the "• Service Rule concerned did not contemplate computation of seniority in respect of roster promotions. Placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ajit Singh(/) and in Virpa/ H 248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. Singh, this Court held that roster promotions were meant only for the limited purpose of due representation of backward classes at various levels of service and, therefore, such roster promotions did not confer consequential seniority to the roster-point promotee. In Ajit Singh (//) , the circular which gave seniority to the roster-point promotees was held to be violative of Articles 14and16. ltwas further held in M.G Badappanavarthat equality is the basic feature of the Constitution and any treatment of equals as unequals or any treatment of unequals as equals violated the basic structure of the Constitution. For this proposition, this Court placed reliance on the judgment in Indra Sawhneywhile holding that if creamy layer among backward classes were given some benefits as backward classes, it will amount to equals being treated unequals. Applying the creamy layer test, this Court held that if roster-point promotees are given consequential seniority, it will violate the equality principle which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and in which event, even Article 16(4A) cannot be of any help to the reserved category candidates. This is the only judgment of this Court delivered by three-Judge bench saying that if roster-point promotees are given the benefit of consequential seniority, it will result in violation of equality principle which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the tribunal was set aside. xx xx xx 110. As stated above, the boundaries of the width of the power, namely, the ceiling-limit of 50% (the numerical G benchmark), the principle of creamy layer, the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and the overall administrative efficiency are not obliterated by the impugned amendments. At the appropriate time, we have to consider the law as enacted H · by various States providing for reservation if challenged. r ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 249 At that time we have to see whether limitations on the A exercise of power are violated. The State is free to exercise its discretion of providing for reservation subject to limitation, namely, that there must exist compelling reasons of backwardness, inadequacy of representation in a class of post(s) keeping in mind the overall administrative B efficiency. It is made clear that even if the State has reasons to make reservation, as stated above, if the impugned law ~ violates any of the above substantive limits on the width of . ,,. the power the same would be liable to be set aside." · 60. There is an interesting article by an author dealing with c Affirmative Action which reads as follows: "In his much referred to speech on 26November1949, Dr. Ambedkar said that India was wanting in its recognition of the principle of fraternity. What does fraternity mean? D Fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians - of India being one people. The virtues of liberty by themselves do not create fraternity. This is why several liberal theorists are unsure about whether or not state interventions should be allowed for when the issue of overcoming disprivileges are concerned. The central E concern then is how to inculcate a sense of 'common brotherhood' among people with divergent histories and who occupy vastly different positions in the economic and social structure of a society. " Before we go further on discussing the specifics of A. caste and reservations in India it is worth recording that liberty and equality can sometimes be contradictorily positioned. This is why it is important for democracy to redress these community-based grievances within a G framework that does not violate liberal principles. While i the individual needs to be protected, there are individuals ''~ in certain groups and communities that need safeguards and support as well. After all it must be remembered that communities do not create citizens, but that there are H A citizens within communities. Also, while it is rather risky to say that communities have rights, there is no doubt at all ,,_ that within liberal democracies, individuals have rights. Indeed, these rights were secured historically so that individuals did not have to be burdened by community B and ascriptive pressures on them. The rationale behind affirmative action is that it releases suppressed talents and expands the pool of social r.,. assets in society for the general good. If today we are .. looking for a justification for affirmative action in this fashion, several decades ago it was precisely this enlarging of the social pool of talents that recommended equal treatment for women. As L.T. Hobhouse argued then that when women are repressed then there is a loss of all the elements in the common stock which the free play of the woman's mind D would contribute. By increasing the sum of realized talents in society individuals can actually gain greater inter- subjectivity in their everyday lives. As the set of -+- resemblances between them is now so much larger, they can practice, pace Rawls, the moral precept of E participating in one another's fate. In this process, fraternal values of citizenship gain materiality and fulfilment. It should be recognized that fraternity can only come about through a basic set of resemblances between citizens. This conception of resemblances is about citizens being equally F able to avail of institutional facilities that ensure their acquisition of those skills that are considered to be socially valuable. In other words, social opportunities exist for individual self-expansion, and it is only individuals now who can exclude themselves. If grinding poverty comes in G the way of acquiring such socially valuable skills, then those blocks should be met by developmental interventions such as the anti-poverty programmes. But on no account should the removal of poverty be made synonymous with ..... - reservations. Reservations are only meant to create a H measure of confidence and dignity among those who didn't . , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 251 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] dare dream of an alternative life. But that alone cannot A create structural conditions that address the root causes of poverty. If quality education and the imparting of socially valuable skills are provided across the board through B reservations, then that would take care of the complaint that affirmative action is largely about the equality of results. 1 Rawls' principle of justice as fairness only says that offices 1' should be open to all. But what if people do not qualify for these offices because their potentialities have remained unrealized on account of inadequate qualifications arising c from a history of discrimination compounded by poverty, or, indeed, because of sub-standard education? Does it mean that, through positive discrimination and reservations, they should be given these jobs anyway regardless of the welfare of institutions? In this connection, D Andre Beteille's warning that affirmative action should be sensitive to institutional well-being as well needs to be recalled. Beteille sifted between the various imperatives that different organizations are subsumed under and accordingly advised a careful calibration of reservations E such that these provisions of performance do not undermine efficiency of performance. The resemblances that are being advocated in the context of affirmative action should not be interpreted in terms of homogeneous ~. 'sameness'. Sameness is what medieval religious F " fundamentalists aim for. On the other hand, the set of resemblances in a constitutional democracy enhances equality and not sameness by providing identical opportunities to all for self-expression and development. Citizenship is not about the sameness of lifestyles or of G income. Marshall's notion of citizenship as a status that tends towards equality should be interpreted in this light. -~ According to Marshall, the equality that citizenship guarantees should be the foundation on which other kinds of differences can develop. H 4 ' 252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A It will no doubt be the case that differences will exist even after a minimum set of resemblances is established. But these will no longer be outcomes of the accidents of birth. When diversity exists outside of choice then that is not a state of affairs that a democratic society can rejoice B in. Affirmative action is instrumental in enlarging the scope of difference and diversity, but it succeeds in doing so by first ensuring that citizens resemble one another at a very critical level namely in their ability to acquire socially • l valuable skills. c Affirmative action gets somewhat complicated in India on account of caste politics. Undeniably, India is the most stratified society in the world. Over and above caste differentiations there are D huge income disparities, religious and community differences that are deeply engrave'd into everyday social relations. No doubt, the nature of caste and community interactions has changed over time, but con!liderations along ascriptive lines still remain important markers, both E at the public and private domains. Not only are we now confronted by identity assertions of earthy peasant castes, that were earlier ranked as lowly shudras (or menials), but also, of those who, till recently, were called 'untouchables'. Now we also know that none F of these castes had ever ideologically accepted their degraded status. Yet they lived out their humble lives quietly "' for generations for fear of offending the privileged strata. We now know more of their origin tales that boast of the elevated positions they once held before an G unsuspected chicanery, a lost war, or a mercurial god, demoted them to lowly rungs in popular perceptions. Today these tales are an important source of symbolic energy 1/ for caste mobilizations and identity assertions. Now that the Mandal recommendations are in place, reservations H are not just for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but for -,. , 1 .. ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION QF INDIA & ORS. 253 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] the so-called other Backward Castes as well. While there A are a large number of castes listed as Backward, the demand for reservations for this category has been spearheaded by the class of owner-cultivators, or peasant proprietors. Before we assess Manda! reforms it would be useful to know how these peasant castes emerged. B After the zamindari abolition came into effect, adult franchise and land-to-the-tiller programme together forced the earlier landed castes slowly to cede ground in the villages. Soon, however, traditional peasant castes such as the Ahirs, Kurmis, Koeris, Lodhs, Rajputs and Jats C began to dominate the political scape of northern India. In the southern State of Tamil Nadu, the Vanniyars and Thevars have become assertive, and in Karnataka control was wrested in the mid-1950s from the traditional rural elite within the Congress Party by the Vokkaligas and D Linagayats. xx xx )()( In pursuance of Article 340 of the Constitution, the Kalelkar Commission was set up in 1955 but it could not E come to any satisfactory conclusion about who should be legitimately considered as OBCs. The· Manda I Commission came into existence in 1980 and it promptly came up with a long list of 3,743 backward castes on the basis of social, economic and educational backwardness. F The Manda! Commission's recommendations were implemented in 1990 by the then Prime Minister VP Singh. This meant that a further 29 per cent of seats in educational institutions and government jobs would now be reserved for OBCs. The implementation of reservations for OBCs set off a furore of protests, including a few suicides, all over the country by those who are considered to be members of forward castes. Many felt th at reservations for OBCs were not warranted for two reasons. First, this would make India H ~ J A a caste society by law; and, second, because many of those who are considered as OBCs are really quite powerful and dominant in rural India. The obvious reference was to Jats and Yadavs. A majority of social anthropologists wrote against reservations for OBCs primarily on these B grounds. Andre Beteille's criticism of the Mandal Commission recommendations was widely commented upon. He distinguishes between reservations for OBCs following Mandal recommendations and the reservations r "' that were already granted in the Constitution for Scheduled c Castes and Tribes. While provisions for Scheduled Castes and Tribes were with the intention of reaching towards greater equality, reservations for OBCs were really to bring about a balance of power on the calculus of caste. The kind of deprivations that ex-untouchables (Scheduled D Castes) and Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes) encountered for centuries can in no way be compared to the traditional condition of the OBCs. Besides, many OBCs are quite powerful in rural India, both economically and politically. In fact, the Mandal Commission recommendations were actually giving in to a powerful rural lobby that did not really care for equality of opportunities as much as it did for equality of results. xx xx xx There are two considerations that escape many F uncritical applications of affirmative action. First, affirmative ;.. action must resist any tendency whereby its beneficiaries become vested interests. And secondly, it must eventually seek its own dissolution. While the second may be far away, it is by paying attention to the first issue that it is G possible for affirmative action to eventually annihilate itself. Paradoxical as it may appear, but when this happens it is then that positive discrimination has finally triumphed. ., ~ Affirmative action fails to reach this final destination H when it is inconsistently applied, or when its beneficiaries 'Ill , ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 255 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] --- form vested interest bloc within a democratic electoral A system on the basis of ascriptive identity alone. The latter poses a stronger practical and intellectual challenge to the policy of affirmative action. As long as historical disprivileges and economic backwardness go together and the relationship between them is statistically very B strong, colour or caste membership can act as ready reckoners for targeting beneficiaries of affirmative action. ~ This, however, does not mean that membership in these "' communities should advantage individuals in perpetuity once they are able to develop the minimum set of resemblances. Therefore, as and when those who belong c to targeted categories for affirmative action acquire socially useful talents and attributes, they should contribute them to the society as a whole, and not employ them only for sectional advantages. D Consequently, those who benefit from this policy owe ~,;. it to society to put their newly acquired social talents back into the collective social pool. This would mean that they would automatically fall outside the scope of affirmative action programme in the future. The net would no longer E cover them as they already have socially useful assets. Indeed the society will be richer and better endowed on account of it as the beneficiaries of affirmative action will now begin to contribute to the social pool of talents. This would both release and add to social and material F ~ .. resources required for continuing with the policy aimed at the enhancement of resemblances. As- a result, society will progressively acquire a higher strike rate with the policy of affirmative action by reaching out to those who have thus far fallen outside its ambit. By increasing the number G of those who possess the minimum set of resemblances, the society has now a larger wealth of talents in a variety 't- of fields and specialities than it had before. This is how affirmative action, which is aimed at the historically most disadvantaged sections, ultimately improves the lot of H ~ ~ ~ J A everybody in society. If, on the other hand, either colour or race, which are only ready reckoners, become permanent )...- considerations, without taking into account biographical profiles of actual and potential beneficiaries, then that would inhibit fraternity and sow seeds of permanent B divisions in society. Affirmative action begins by placing the assets of the better off in a collective pool, not for redistribution, but to ~ .. create the infrastructure that is needed to enhance the minimum set of resemblances necessary for substantive citizenship. With the help of this capital, socially valuable assets are now created in sites where there were none. This measure has a strong practical dimension for out of . this collective pooling new assets are being created. The "creation of such new assets is possible because the initial D pooling of assets of the privileged section allows the society to underwrite the expenses incurred for the establishment of certain baseline similarities in society as a whole. As the most important feature in this case is not one's ascriptive badge, but the creation of socially E valuable assets, it is expected that those who have been . the beneficiaries of the scheme will gradually slip out of the net. They will cease to receive from the collective pool and instead will begin to contribute to it. As far as public policy is concerned they are no long members of certain F designated castes or communities. They are now simply citizens. " In passing it is worth putting in perspective that the difference between reservations in India and affirmative action in America is that the former talks about extirpating G caste whereas the latter is interested primarily in representing races. If the accent is on representation then the ascriptive factor becomes a permanent badge that r' can never be overcome. Again, Americans believe in race representation, not in quotas, and in not sacrificing H standards for social justice. But the great similarity between ~ ~ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF ltilDIA & ORS. 257 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] the two forms of preferential policy is that in both cases it A ~ . is the public sector where positive discrimination is effectively realized. In America, the State encourages private sector units to employ people of diverse backgrounds without specifying quotas for different races. If these enterprises can show a fair racial mix then they B can get preferential contracts from the government. The State cannot force any private sector unit to implement 1 affirmative action. It is a combination of goodwill and ., rewards that takes affirmative action forward in the private sector of America. For example, Bob Jones University c does not receive any public money and, therefore, it refuses to accept affirmative action, even of the most muted kind. It is only when organizations depend on state funding, or when they want to be rewarded by the State, that policy of affirmative action comes to life." D ~ 61. It has been rightly observed in Indra Sawhney No. 2 ~~ (supra) whether creamy layer is not excluded or whether forward classes can be excluded in the list of backward classes, the position would be the same and there will be breach not only of Article 14 but of the basic structure of the Constitution. As was E rightly observed in the said case, non exclusion of the creamy layer or inclusion of forward castes in the lists of backward classes will be totally illegal. The illegality offends the roots and foundation of the Constitution and cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. F ~ ... 62. In Nair Service Society's case (supra) this Court observed as follows: "54. This Court, thus, has categorically laid down the law that determination of creamy layer is a part of the G constitutional scheme." 63. In our view, even non exclusion of the creamy layer for -.. the purpose of admission to the educational institutions cannot be countenanced. It is inconceivable that a person who belongs to the creamy layer is socially and educationally backward. The H ~ ~ A backward status vanishes when somebody becomes part of the creamy layer. " .. 64. In Vasant Kumar's case (supra) it was aptly described that the benefits of reservation are snatched away by the top B creamy layer of the backward classes and this has to be avoided at any cost. By inclusion of the creamy layer or in other words non inclusion thereof a fresh lease of life to those who should have been left out is given. Their continuance would mean t keeping weakest amongst the weak always weak and leaving .. the fortunate ones to enjoy the benefits. If the ultimate aim is a casteless and classless society in line with the dream of the Constitution framers that has to be chewed out. As Father of the Nation had once said if the caste system as we know is an anchronism, then it must go. There is a feeling and it cannot be said without reason that reservation hits at the root of this belief D and instead of its obliteration there is perceivable perpetuation. It is true that obliteration cannot be done immediately or within ~ a short span of time but that is no answer to the lack of ..,... seriousness in seeking obliteration. E 65. In Indra Sawhney No.1 (supra) the following observations on the question of giving priority over reservation are of significance. It was held: "293. Preference without reservation may be ado12ted in favour of the chosen classes of citizens by 12rescribing for F them a longer geriod for gassing a test or by awarding additional marks or granting other advantages like ' ... relaxation of age or other minimum reguirements. (See the preferential treatment in State of Kerala and Anr. v. N.M. Thomas and Ors. (1976) 1 SCR 906). Furthermore, G it would be within the discretion of the State to provide financial assistance to such persons by way of grant, scholarships, fee concessions etc. Such preferences or advantages are like temporary crutches for additional ,~ support to enable the members of the backward and other H disadvantaged classes to march forward and compete ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 259 [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] with the rest of the people. These preferences are extended A to them because of their inability otherwise to compete effective!y in open selections on the basis of merits for appointment to posts in public services and the like or for selection to academic courses. Such preferences can be extended to all disadvantaged classes of citizens, whether B or not they are victims of prior discrimination. What qualifies persons for preference is backwardness or disadvantage of any kind which the State has a responsibility to ameliorate. The blind and the deaf, the dumb and the maimed, and other handicapped persons qualify for c preference. So do all other c!asses of citizens who are at a comparative disadvantage for whatever reason, and whether or not they are victims of prior discrimination. All these persons may be beneficiaries of preferences short of reservation. Any such preference, although 0 discriminatory on its face, may be justified as a benign classification for affirmative action warranted by a compelling state interest 294. In addition to such preferences, quotas may be provided exclusively reserving posts in public services or E seats in academic institutions for backward people entitled to such protection. Reservation is intended to redress backwardness of a higher degree. Reservation prima facie is the very antithesis of a free and open selection. It is a discriminatory exclusion of the disfavoured classes of F meritorious candidates. M.R Balaji (supra). It 1s not a case of merely providing an advantage or a concession or preference in favour of the backward classes and other disadvantaged groups. It is not even a handicap to disadvantage the forward classes so as to attain a G measure of qualitative or relative equality between the two groups. Reservation which excludes from consideration all those persons failing outside the specia!!y favoured groups, irrespective of merits and qualifications, is much more positive and drastic a discrimination - albeit H 260 to achieve the same end of qualitative equality - but unless strictly and narrowly tailored to a compelling constitutional mandate, it is unlikely to qualify as a benign discrimination. Unlike in the case of other affirmative action programmes. backwardness by itself is not sufficient to warrant reservation. What qualifies for reservation is backwardness which is the result of identified past discrimination and which is comparable to that of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Reservation is a remedial action specially addressed to the ill effects stemming from historical discrimination. To ignore this vital distinction between affirmative action short of reservation and reservation by a predetermined quota as a remedy for past inequities is to ignore the special characteristic of the constitutional grant of power specially addressed to the constitutionally recognised backwardness. xx )()( )()( 319. Reservation should be avoided except in extreme cases of acute backwardness resulting from prior discrimination as in the case of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and other classes of persons in comparable positions. In all other cases. preferential treatment short of reservation can be adopted. Any such action, though in some respects discriminatory, is permissible on the basis of a legitimate classification rationally related. to the attainment of equality in all its aspects. Xx )()( )()( 323 (16). In the final analysis, poverty which is the ultimate result of inequities and which is the immediate cause and effect of backwardness has to be eradicated not merely by reservation as aforesaid. but by free medical aid, free elementary education, scholarships for higher education and other financial support, free housing. self-employment and settlement schemes. effective implementation of land ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 261 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) reforms, strict and im12artial 012eration of the law-enforcing A ~ .. machine!Y, industrialization, construction of roads, bridges, culverts, canals, markets, introduction of trans12ort, free SUQQly of water, electricitv and other ameliorative measures 12articularly in areas densely 12012ulated by backward classes of citizens. B (underlined for emphasis) 66. Following observations in M.R. Balaji v. State of .. A. Mysore (AIR 1963 SC 649) are also relevant: "In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the c reservation made by the impugned order is in regard to admission in the seats of higher education in the State. It is well-known that as a result of the awakening caused by political freedom, all classes of citizens are showing a growing desire to give their children higher university D education and so, the Universities are called upon to face the challenge of this growing demand. While it is necessa!Y that the demand for higher education which is thus increasing from year to year must be adeguately met and 12ro12erly channelised, we cannot overlook the fact that in E meeting that demand standards of higher education in Universities must not be lowered. The large demand for education may be met by starting larger number of educational institutions vocational schools and polytechnics. But it would be against the national interest F to exclude from the 12ortals of our Universities gualified ' " and com12etent students on the ground that all the seats in the Universities are reserved for weaker elements in society. As has been observed by the University Education Commission, "he indeed must be blind who does not see G that mighty as are the political changes, far deeper are the fundamental questions which will be decided by what· happens in the universities" (p. 32). Therefore, in 't considering the question about the propriety of the reservation made by the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the reservation is made in respect of H A higher university education. The demand for technicians, scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and experts > ... for the further economic advancement of the country is so great that it would cause grave prejudice to national interests if considerations of merit are completely excluded B by whole-sale reservation of seats in all Technical, Medical or Engineering colleges or institutions of that kind. Therefore, considerations of national interest and the interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be ignored in determining the question as to whether the r .... c special provision contemplated by Art. 15(4) can be special provision which excludes the rest of the society altogether. In this connection, it would be relevant to mention that the University Educ.ation Commission which considered the problem of the assistance to backward communities, had D observed that the percentage of reservation shall not exceed a third of the total number of seats, and it has added that the principle of reservation may be adopted for a period of ten years. (p. 53). We have already noticed that the Central Government in E its communication to the State has suggested that reservation for backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may be up to 25% with marginal adjustments not exceeding 10% in exceptional cases. The learned Advocate-General has suggested that F reservation of a large number of seats for the weaker sections of the society would not affect either the depth or ,. " efficiency of scholarship at all, and in support of this argument, he has relied on the observations made by the Backward Classes Commission that it found no complaint G in the States of Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin and Mysore where the system of recruiting candidates from other Backward Classes to the reserve quota has been in vogue for several decades. The Committee further i" observed that the representatives of the upper classes H did not complain about any lack of efficiency in the offices ASHOKA KUMAR THAKt;R v ~l\ilON OF INDIA & ORS. 263 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.; recruited by reservation (p. 135) This opinion, however, A •• is plainly inconsistent with what is bound to be the inevitab!e consequence of reservation in higher university education. If admiss,;on to professional and technical colleges is unduly liberalised it would be idle to contend that the quality of our graduates will not suffer. That is not to say that B reservation should not be adopted; reservation should and must be adopted to advance the prospects of the weaker I sections of society. but in prov•:ding for special measures ...., in that behalf care shou:d be taken not to exclude admission to higher educational centres to deserving and c qualified candidates of other communities A special provision contemplated by Art 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Art. 16(4) must be within reasonable :imits The interests of weaker sections of society which are a first charge on the states D and the Centres have to be adjusted with the interests of the community as a whole The adjustment of these competing c!aims is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the guise of making a special provision, a State reserves practically all the seats available in ail the colleges, E that dearly would be subverting the object of Art. 15(4). In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally and m a broad way a special provision should be less than 50%, how much less than 50% would depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. In F ... .... this particular case it :s remarkable that when the State issued its order on .:uly 10, 1961. it emphaticaHy expressed its opinion that the reservation of 68% recommended by the Nagan Gowda Committee would not be \n the larger interests of the State. What happened between July 10, G 1961 . and July 31. 1962, does not appear on the record. But the State changed its mind and adopted the -i- recommendation of the Committee ignoring its earlier decision that the said recommendation was contrary to the larger inte•ests of the State. In our opinion, when the H l 264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A State makes a special provision for the advancement of the weaker sections of society specified in Art. 15(4) it " .. has to approach its task objectively and in a rational manner. Undoubtedly, it has to take reasonable and even generous steps to help the advancement of weaker B elements; the extent of the problem must be weighted, the requirements of the community at large must be borne in mind and a formula must be evolved which would strike a reasonable balance between the several relevant ~ ..... considerations. Therefore, we are satisfied that the c reservation of 68% directed by the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with Art. 15(4). The petitioners contend that having regard to the infirmities in the impugned order, action of the State in issuing the said order amounts to a fraud on the Constitutional power D conferred on the State by Art. 15(4). This argument is well- founded, and must be upheld. When it is said about an executive action that it is a fraud on the Constitution, it does not necessarily mean that the action is actuated by mala fides. An executive action which is patently and plainly E outside the limits of the constitutional authority conferred on the State in that behalf ·is struck down as being ultra vires the State's authority. If, on the other hand, the executive action does not patently or overtly transgress the authority conferred on it by the Constitution, but the F transgression is covert or latent, the said action is struck down as being a fraud on the relevant constitutional power. • ,. It is in this connection that courts often consider the substance of the matter and not its form and in ascertaining the substance of the matter, the appearance or the cloak, G or the veil of the executive action is carefully scrutinized and if it appears that notwithstanding the appearance, the cloak or the veil of the executive action, in substance and in truth the constitutional power has been transgressed, r-' the impugned action is struck down as a fraud on the H Constitution. We have already noticed that the impugned ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 265 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] order in the present case has categorised the Backward A ... Classes on the sole basis of caste which, in our opinion, is not permitted by Art. 15(4); and we have also held that the reservation of 68% made by the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with the concept of the special provision authorised by Art. 15(4). Therefore, it follows B that the impugned order is a fraud on the Constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15(4). The learned j Advocate-General has made an earnest and strong plea .,., before us that we should not strike down the order, but should strike down only such portions of the order which appear to us to be unconstitutional on the doctrine of c severability. He has urged that since 1958, the State has had to make five orders to deal with the problem of advancing the lot of the Backward Classes and the State is anxious that the implementation of the impugned order D should not be completely prohibited or stopped. We do • J- not see how it would be possible to sever the invalid provisions of the impugned order. If the categorisation of the Backward Classes is invalid, this Court cannot and would not attempt the task of enumerating the said E categories; and if the percentage of reservation is improper and outside Art. 15(4), this Court would not attempt to lay down definitely and in an inflexible manner as to what would be the proper percentage to reserve. In this connection, it may be relevant to refer to one fact on which the petitioners have strongly relied. It is urged for them F "\ ... that the method adopted by the Government of Maharashtra in exercising its power under Art. 15(4) is a proper method to adopt. It appears that the Maharashtra Government has decided to afford financial assistance, and make monetary grants to students seeking higher education where it is G shown that the annual income of their families is below a prescribed minimum. The said scheme is not before us -t and we are not called upon to express any opinion on it.. However, we may observe that if any State adopts such a measure, it may afford relief to and assist the advancement H \ A of the Backward Classes in the State, because backwardness, social and educational, is ultimately and ..... primarily due to poverty. An attempt can also be made to start newer and more educational institutions, polytechnics, vocational institutions and even rural Universities and B thereby create more opportunities for higher education. This dual attack on the problem posed by the weakness of backward communities can claim to proceed on a rational, broad and scientific approach which is consistent ~ with, and true to, the noble ideal of a secular welfare '-< c democratic State set up by the Constitution of this country. Such an approach can be supplemented, if necessary by providing special provision by way of reservation to aid the Backward classes and Scheduled castes and Tribes. It may well be that there may be other ways and means of D achieving the same result. In our country where social and economic conditions differ from State to State, it would be idle to expect absolute uniformity of approach; but in taking executive action to implement the policy of Art. 15(4), it is necessary for the States to remember that the policy which E is intended to be implemented is the policy which has been declared by Art. 46 and the preamble of the Constitution. It is for the attainment of social and economic justice Art. 1-5(4) authorises the making of special provisions for the advancement of the communities there contemplated even if such provisions may be inconsistent F with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 15 or )' 29(2). The context, therefore, requires that the executive .. action taken by the State must be based on an objective approach, free from all extraneous pressures. The said action is intended to do social and economic justice and G must be taken in a manner that justice is and should be done. Whilst we are dealing with this question, it would be relevant ~- to add to that the provisions of Art. 15(4) are similar to H those of Art. 16(4) which fell to be considered in the case -~ . ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 267 :oR. AR!JIT PASAYAT, J.] of The General Manager, Southern Railway v. A Rangachan ( 1962 (2) SCR 586) In that case, the majority decision of this Court held that the power of reservation which is conferred on the State under Art. 16(4) can be exercised by the State In a proper case not only by providing for reservation of appofntrnents, but also by B providing for reservation of selection posts. This conclusion was reached on the basis that it served to give effect to the intent!on of the Constitution makers to make adequate safeguards for the advancement of Backward Classes and to secure their adequate representation in the Services. c The judgment shows that the oniy point which was raised for the decision of this Court :n that case was whether the reservation made was outside Art. 16(4) and that posed the bare question about the construction of Art. 16(4). The propriety. the reasonableness or the wisdom of the 0 impugned order was not questioned because it was not the respondent's c<':.e that if the order was justified under Art. 16(4) it was 'l fraud on the Constitution. Even so, it was pointed out in the judgment that the efficiency of administration 1s of such a paramount importance that it would be u'1wise and impermissible to make any E reservation at the cost of efficiency of administration; that, it was stated, was undoubtedly the effect of Art. 335. Therefore, wliat 1s true in regard to Art. 15(4) is equally true in regard to Art. 16(4) There can be no doubt that the Constitution-makers assuried as they were entitled to, F that while IT'aking adequate reservation under Art. 16(4), care would be taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive or extravagant reservation, for that would, by eliminating general competition in a large field and by creating wide·spread dissatisfaction amongst the G employees. materially affect efficiency. Therefore, like the special provision improperly made under Art 15(4), reservation made under Art. 16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would be Hable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. In this connection it is necessary H t ~ A to emphasize that Art. 15(4) is an enabling provision; it does not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the ... 1 discretion of the appropriate government to take suitable action, if necessary." 67. To similar effect is the view expressed in K. C. Vasanth Kumar's case (supra) at para 150: "At this stage it should be made clear that if on a fresh determination some castes or communities have to go r ~ out of the list of backward classes prepared for Article c 15(4) and Article 16(4) the Government may still pursue the policy of amelioration of weaker sections of the population amongst them in accordance with the directive principle contained in article 46 of the Constitution. There are in all castes and communities poor people who if they D are given adequate opportunity and training may be able to compete successfully with persons belonging to richer classes. The Government may provide for them liberal ... ~ grants of scholarships, free studentship, free boarding and lodging facilities, free uniforms, free mid day meals etc. to E make the life of poor students comfortable. The Government may also provide extra tutorial facilities, stationery and books free of costs and library facilities. These and other steps should be taken in the lower classes so that by the time a student appears for the qualifying examination he may be able to attain a high degree of F proficiency in his studies." ,,- .. It has also been noted as follows: "I wish to add that the doctrine of protective discrimination embodied in Article 15(4) and 16(4) and the mandate of G Article 29(2) cannot be stretched beyond a particular limit. The State exists to serve its people. There are some services where expertise and skill are of the essence. For -·_.I example, a hospital run by the State serves the ailing members of the public who need medical aid. Medical H services directly affect and deal with the health and life of I ~ \ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 269 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] the populace. Profession exQertise, born of knowledge A ~ ' and exQerience, of a high degree of technical knowledge and OQeration skill is reguired of Qilots and aviation engineers The lives of citizens deQend on such Qersons. There are other similar fields of governmental activitv where [1rofessional, technological, scientific or other sgecial §kill B is called for. In such services or Qosts under the Union or State, we think where can be no room for reservation of 1 QOsts; merit alone must be the sole and decisive ,,, CQnsideration for aggointments." (underlined for emphasis) c 68. Lengthy arguments have been advanced as to the seriousness in identifying the backward classes. On the basis of Indra Sawhney No.1's judgment, the Government of India issued orders in respect of reservations of appointments or on D posts under the Government of India in favour of backward - J. classes of citizens. It was the subject matter of challenge in lndra_Sawhney No.1. In its judgment dated 16.11.1992 this Court directed the Government to constitute a permanent body by 15.3.1993 for entertaining and examining and recommending E upon requests made for inclusion or complaints of over inclusion and under inclusion in the lists of backward classes of cttizens. 69. Constituent Assembly Debates 1951 have also relevance for adjudicating the controversy. The following portion needs to be extracted: F .... ~ 70. Parliamentary Standing Committee Report at paras 36, 37 and 46 read as follows: "36. The committee notes that there is a major limitation on data about the social economic and educational profile G of our population in general and about OBCs in particular. The last caste-based census in India was done in 1931. ..... Accordingly there are no periodic data available on the demographic spread of OBCs and their access to amenities. Even the Mandal Commission had used the H 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S,C.R. 1931 Census data. Whatever limited data are available, pertain to surveys conducted by NSSO from 1998-99 onwards, which are only 's.ample surveys'. 37. The Committee found that there exists no accepted mechanism/criteria to group the people into different categories. As a result, existing list of backward castes/ communities are termed in some cases, as inaccurate. Besides, any regular process of review is also not in place. Such a review implies both 'inclusion' and ·exclusion'. The Committee, therefore, emphasizes the need for taking urgent measures/steps for identifying and removing all such lacunae and removing all such lacunae and problems by putting in place scientific and objective mechanism/ benchmarks for this purpose. xx xx xx 46. There have been suggestions/counter-suggestions on· the issue of exclusion of the 'creamy layer amongst OB Cs in the proposed legislation. On the one hand, it was argued that the concept of creamy layer did not apply in the case of reservation in admission. It was pointed out that the debate on the exclusion of the creamy layer was misplaced as the Supreme Court's observation regarding the exclusion of the creamy layer within the SCs and STs from the purview of reservation was only for public employment and promotion. The other view in this regard was that the inclusion of the creamy layer in reservation \'iOuld defeat the very purpose of providing reservation to the backward classes. It was also stated that the exclusion of the creamy layer would ensure that the intended benefits of the reservation reach to the really deserving among the backward classes. It was further stated that this in itself would not suffice and should be supplemented by categorization of the backward classes in various groups depending upon their degree of backwardness and apportioning of appropriate percentage of reservation to • t ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS 271 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] ~ . each group. It was also brought to the committee that A similar experiments in States of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra etc. have, in fact, stood the test of time and yielded the desired results." 71. One of the petitioners "Youth for Equality" had filed a B representation before the Parliamentary Committee giving certain :mportant data. Relevant portions read as follows: ' "TOP WITHOUT BASE .... The condition of infrastructure and staff at the primary and secondary level is of some concern and the government- c especially the Ministry for Human Resource and Development which has proposed increased reservations, should work towards improvement in this area for "Real" affirmative action. According to the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (in 2003) the state D -,. of affairs at the primary level was as under:- {i) In 62 996 schools in country do not have school building and are operating in tents or under the trees. {ii) In 70,739 Primary Schools - No class room. E {iii) In 95,003 primary Schools - Single Class room. {iv) In 8,269 Primary Schools - No teacher {v) In 1.15,267 Primary schools -Single teacher F .., • {vi) In more than 60.000 schools the pupil: Teacher ratio is greater than 100 : 1 while the acceptable ratio is less than 40:1. {vii) In 84,848 schools - No black board \1 {viii) In More than 1 00 000 Schools - No electricity. Apart from the above, according to the NCERT {In 1998), ... t Only 34.6% of Govt. Schools had safe Drinking water, 13.2% had urinal and 4.9% had urinals for girls and only 6.0% had a lavatory. While the government promises a H ~ , A spending of about 6% of GDP for the development of education, the reality has been to the contrary. The . ~ Government spending in the years was as under: 2000-2001 4.1% B 2001-2002 . 4.3% 2002-2004 3.8% ~ 2004-2005 3.5% r ... 72. The National Commission for Backward Classes Act, c 1993 (in short 'Backward Classes Act') was accordingly enacted. Few provisions of this Act need to be noted. 73. Section 2 (c) defines lists as follows: "Lists means lists prepared by the Government of India D from time to time for purposes of making provisions for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of that .....__ Government, are not adequately represented in the services under the Government of India and any local or E other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". 7 4. Important provisions are Sections 9 and 10 which read as follows: F "9. Functions of the Commission (1) The Commission shall examine requests for inclusion of any class of citizens ,. "' as a backward class in such lists and hear complaints of over-inclusion or under inclusion of any backward class in such lists and tender such advice to the Central Government G as it deems appropriate. (2) The advice of the Commission shall ordinarily bE! p binding upon the Central Government. ~-- 10. Powers of the Commission-The Commission shall, H while performing its functions under sub-section (1) of ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS 273 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT; J.] Section 9, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit A and in particular, in respect of the following' matters, namely:- ( a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from c any court of office; ( e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed." D 75. A periodic revision of the lists by the Central Government is a statutory mandate. Petitioners have highlighted that there is no exclusion and on the other hand there has been inclusion. On the question of castes enumeration it is emphasized that 1931 Census was not the basis for E identification of other backward classes. In fact the central OBC List is not drawn up on the basis of 1931 Census. Each State has different modalities for identification. Only for the purpose of quantum the population provides a foundation. 76. It needs no emphasis that if ultimately and indisputably F the constitutional goal is the casteless and classless society, there has to be more effective implementation of the Backward Classes Act. The exercise required to be undertaken under Section 11 of the said Act is not intended to be a routine exercise and also not an exercise in futility. It has to be not only effective G but also result oriented .. The petitioners have highlighted the lack of seriousness of the Government in carrying out the exercise. Voluminous datas have been brought on record in this regard. With reference to the reports of the Commission, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand have stressed H ~ J A on the fact that the Commission has been working with all sincerity and with the object of effectively implementing the >- 1 Backward Classes Act. One thing needs to be noted here. Concrete data about the number of backward classes in the country does not appear to be available. The survey conducted B by the National Sample Survey reveals that the percentage is not 52% as is highlighted by the respondents. 77. Section 2(g) of the Act is relevant in this regard. It reads as follows: .. c "Other Backward Classes" means the class or classes of citizens who are socially and educationally backward, and are so determined by the Central Government." 78. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Backward Classes Act in order to be wholly functional mandates D determination by the Central Government of the backward classes. for whom the Statute is intended. Undisputedly, such determ'ination has not been done. The plea is that for more than half a century enough attention has not been given for the benefit of the other backward classes in the matter of admissions to E higher educational institutions. That cannot be a ground to act with hurry and with un-determined datas. It may be as rightly contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the percentage can certainly be not less than 27%. But that is no answer to the important question as to the identity test. In the F background loom the socially and economically backward class of citizens. Poverty knows no caste. Poor has no caste. It is an ,.. ,. unfortunate class. It is a matter of common knowledge that the institution of caste is a peculiarity of Indian institution when there is considerable controversy amongst the scholars as to how G the caste system originated in this country. Originally, there were four main castes known as Vamas . But gradually castes and sub-castes multiplied as the social fabric expanded with the absorption of different groups of people who belong to various ~ cults and professing different religious faiths. The caste system H in its earlier stage was quite elastic but in course of time it ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS 275 [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] t , gradually hardened into a rigid framework based upon heredity. A The inevitable resuit was social inequality. At some point of time occupation was the background for determination of castes. May be, at some point of time it depended on the income of the mdividual. But it appears to have taken disastrous turn with difference of status of various castes. But passage of time shows B that the occupational label has lost much of its significance. But at the same time, the poor and down trodden who belong to the .. caste of their own were the founders of poor, In Indra Sawhr.ey .. No.1 this factor was noticed. 79. It is said that one must take life in ones stride, let today c embrace the past wtth remembrance and the future with long mg. 80. Don't look for the path far away, the path exists under your feet. 81. What is past and what cannot be prevented should not D ~.i. be grieved for. 82. With reference to the Office Memorandum which provides for preference in favour of "poorer sections· over other members of the backward c!asses, the expression was held to E be relatable to those who are socially and economically more backward. The use of the word 'poorer' in the context was held to be a measure of the social backwardness. It is therefore unmistakenly recognized that economic backwardness is a factor which can never be lost sight of. There are or.ly two F ""! families in the world; the haves and the have nots said lvHquel .. De Cervantes Don Qutxote de ta Mancha. Tolstoy has emphatically said "We will do anything for the poor man anything but get of his back" (quoted in Huntington Philanthrophy and Morality). 83. William Cobbett had said 'to be poor and independent G is very nearly an 1mpossibi!ity. (See His book 'Advise to Young ... ~ Men} We cannot turn Nelson's eye to the poor, those covered by all encompassing expression "economically backward classes". H ~ I 276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 4 S.C.R. A 84. Should this class of people be kept out of the '" f mainstream of governmental priorities and policies because they belong to a particular caste? As noted above, the poor have no caste. A person belonging to a higher caste should not be made to suffer for what his forefathers had done several B generations back. 85. Franklin D Roosevelt in a speech in 1940 had said "It is an unfortunate human failing that a full pocket book often .. groans more loudly than an empty stomach". The haves and the ... have nots have to co-exist. If the creamy layer has to be excluded c the economically backward classes have to be included. That would be social ~a lancing and that would be giving true meaning of the objectives of the Constitution. Social empowerment cannot be and is certainly not a measure for only socially and educationally backward classes. It also has to be for the socially D and economically backward classes. Unless this balance, which is very delicate, is maintained the system inevitably will develop a crack and this crack may after a certain point of time be difficult _..._ to be joined. Instead of lightening the society from castes or classes it will be over burdened and a point of time may come E when we shall not be able to bear the burden any further. Timely steps in this regard will save the Indian society and democracy from a catastrophe of collapse because of something which the Constitution wants to obliterate. 86. On the question of time period for the reservation, it is F submitted that length of the leap to be provided depends upon ,. the gap to be filled. It is fairly accepted by learned counsel for "' the respondents that as and when castes reach a higher level it is to be excluded from the zone of consideration. It is further submitted that traditional occupation is being pursued by G persons belonging to some castes and the system still subsists and has not broken down. In the absence of alternative occupation which may not be lucrative, the persons who used 1"' to previously carry on the traditional occupation find it difficult to take up any other occupation. ~ ~ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 277 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 87. It has been averred that consequent to several efforts, A ~ ~ India has made enormous progress in terms of increase in institutions, teachers and students in elementary education. But despite atl the efforts large population of the children in the country still remain out of school. 88. One of the contentions is that by passage of time B prolonged reservation becomes Hlicit. In Motor General Traders • and Anr v State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (1984 (1) SCC -<:) 222) following observations were made: "16. What may be unobjectionable as a transitional or c temporary measure at an initial stage can still become discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution if it is persisted in over a long period without any Justification. The trend of decisions of this Court on the above question may be traced thus. In Bhaiyalal Shukla D v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257 . ). one of the contentions urged was that the levy of sales tax in the area which was formerly known as Vindhya Pradesh (a Part 'C' State) on building materials used in a works contract was discriminatory after the merger of that area E in the new State of Madhya Pradesh which was formed on November 1, 1956 under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 as the sale of building materials in a works contract was not subject to any levy of sales tax in another part of the same new State namely the area which was formerly part of the area known as State of Madhya Pradesh (the F "( .. Central Provinces and Berar area). That contention was rejected by this Court with the following observations at pages 274-275 : The laws in different portions of the new State of G Madhya Pradesh were enacted by different Legislatures, and under Section 119 of the States ~ ' ._..,. Reorganisation Act all laws inforce are to continue until repealed or altered by the appropriate Legislature. We have already held that the sales tax H ~ ) A law in Vindhya Pradesh was validly enacted, and it ... 1 brought its validity with it under Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, when it became a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, the different laws in different parts of Madhya Pradesh can be B sustained on the ground that the differentiation arises from historical reasons, and a geographical classification based on historical reasons has been upheld by this Court in M.K. Prithi Rajji v. The State ~ ~ of Rajasthan (Civil Appeal No. 327of1956 decided c on November 2, 1960) and again in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. (Civil Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 of 1957 decided on November 30, 1960). The latter case is important, because the sugarcane cess levied in the former D Gwalior State but not in the rest of Madhya Bharat of which it formed a part, was challenged on the same ground as here, but was upheld as not affected by ....__ Article14. We, therefore, reject this argument. 89. In N.M. Thomas's case (supra) the parameters of E various clauses of Article 16 were highlighted as follows: ~ "37. The rule of equality within Articles 14 and 16(1) will not be violated by a rule which will ensure equality of representation in the services for unrepresented classes after satisfying the basic needs of efficiency of F administration. Article 16(2) rules out some basis of ,. .. classification including race, caste, descent, place of birth etc. Article 16(4) clarifies and explains that classification on the basis of backwardness does not fall within Article 16(2) and is legitimate for the purposes of Article 16(1). G If preference shall be given to a particular under- represented community other than a backward class or under-represented State in an All India Service such a rule F ~ .... will contravene Article 16(2). A similar rule giving • preference to an under-represented backward community H is valid and will not contravene Articles 14, 16(1) and 16(2). ~ I ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 279 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) Article 16(4) removes any doubt in this respect. A xx xx xx 44. Our Constitution aims at equality of status and opportunity for all citizens including those who are socially, economically and educationally backward. The claims of B members of backward classes require adequate representation in legislative and executive bodies. If members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who are said by this Court to be backward classes, can maintain minimum necessary requirement of administrative c efficiency, not only representation but also preference may be given to them to enforce equality and to eliminate inequality. Articles 15(4) and 16(4) bring out the position of backward classes to merit equality. Special provisions are made for the advancement of backward classes and 0 reservations of appointments and posts for them to secure adequate representation. These provisions will bring out the content of equality guaranteed by Articles 14, 15(1) and 16( 1). The basic concept of equality is equality of opportunity for appointment. Preferential treatment for members of backward classes with due regard to E administrative efficiency alone can mean equality of opportunity for all citizens. Equality under Article 16 could not have a different content from equality under Article 14. Equality of opportunity for unequals can only mean aggravation of inequality. Equality of opportunity admits F discrimination with reason and prohibits discrimination without reason. Discrimination with reasons means rational classification for differential treatment having nexus to the Constitutionally permissible objf;!ct. Preferential representation for the backward classes in services with G due regard to administrative efficiency is permissible object and backward classes are a rational classification recognised by our Constitution.· Therefore, differential ·treatment in standards of selection is within the concept of ~uality H 280 )()( )()( xx 56. If we are all to be treated in the same manner, this must carry with it the important requirement that none of us should be better or worse in upbringing, education, than any one else which is an unattainable ideal for human · beings of anything like the sort we now see. Some people maintain that the concept of equality of opportunity is an unsatisfactory concept For, a complete formulation of it renders it incompatible with any form of human society. Take for instance, the case of equality of opportunity for education. This equality cannot start in schools and hence requires uniform treatment in families which is an evident impossibility. To remedy this, all children might be brought up in state nurseries, but, to achieve the purpose, the nurseries would have to be run on vigorously uniform lines. Could we guarantee equality of opportunity to the young even in those circumstances? The idea is well expressed by Laski: 'Equality m·eans, in the second place, that adequate opportunities are laid open to all. By adequate opportunities we cannot imply equal opportl!nities in a sense that implies identity of original chance. The native endowments of men are by no means equal. Children who are brought up in an atmosphere where things of the mind are accounted highly are bound to start the race of life with advantages no legislation can secure. Parental character will inevitably affect profoundly the equality of the children whom it touches. So long, therefore, as the family endures - and there seems little reason to anticipate or to desire its disappearance - the varying environments it will create make the notion of equal opportunities a fantastic one'. )()( xx )()( f-: 60. Bernard A.O. Williams, in his article 'The Idea of \ ~ • 1 .. • • ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 281 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] Equality" (supra) gives an illustration of the working of the A principle of equality of opportunity: 'Suppose that in a certain society great prestige is attached to membership of a warrior class, the duties of which require great physical strength. This class has in the past been recruited from certain wealthy 8 families only, but egalitarian reformers achieve a change in the rules, by which warriors are recruited from all sections of the society, on the result of a suitable competition. The effect of this, however, is that the wealthy families still provide virtually all the C warriors, because the rest of the populace is so undernourished by reason of poverty that their physical strength is inferior to that of the wealthy and well nourished. The reformers protest that equality of opportunity has not really been achieved; the wealthy D reply that in fact it has, and that the poor now have the opportunity of becoming warriors - it is just bad luck that their characteristics are such that they do not pass the test- "We are not", they might say, "excluding anyone for being poor; we exclude people E for being weak, and it is unfortunate that those who are poor are also weak'. xx xx xx 67. Today, the political theory which acknowledges the F obligation of government under Part IV of the Constitution to provide jobs, medical care, old age pension, etc., extends to human rights and imposes an affirmative obligation to promote equality and liberty. The force of the idea of a state with obligation to help the weaker sections G of its members seems to have increasing influence in Constitutional law. The idea finds expression in a number of cases in America involving social discrimination and also in the decisions requiring the state to offset the effects of poverty by providing counsel, transcript of appeal, expert H witnesses, etc. Today, the sense that government has affirmative responsibility for elimination of inequalities, social, economic or otherwise, is one of the dominant forces in Constitutional law. While special concessions for the under-privileged have been easily permitted, they have not traditionally been required. Decisions in-the areas of criminal procedure, voting rights and education in America suggest that the traditional approach may not be completely adequate. In these areas, the inquiry whether equality has been achieved no longer ends with numerical equality; rather the equality clause has been held to require resort to a standard of proportional equality which requires the state, in framing legislation, to take into account the private inequalities of wealth, of education and other circumstances. xx xx xx 89. The ultimate reason for the demand of equality for the members of backward classes is a moral perspective which affirms the intrinsic value of all human beings and calls for a society which provides these conditions of life which men need for development of their varying capacities. It is an assertion of human equality in the sense that it manifests an equal concern for the well being of all men. On the one hand it involves a demand for the removal of those obstacles and impediments which stand in the way of the development of human capacities, that is, it is a call for the abolition of unjustifiable inequalities. On the other hand, the demand itself gets its sense and moral driving force from the recognition that "the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he". 90. 'Equality' and 'excellence' are two conflicting claims difficult to be reconciled. The Constitution, in order to ensure true equality provides for special treatment to socially and educationally backward classes of citizens which is obviously desirable for providing social justice, though at the cost of merit. .. ~ . I ) ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 283 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] However, the Constitution does not provide at all for 'institutional A ~ • reservation.' Therefore, it's constitutionality is to be judged on the touchstone of Article 14. A large number of cases cropped up in this area concerning the institutional prefere~ce for admission into postgraduate medical education and super specialties. The judiciary came forward and laid down detailed 8 principles covering the need of such preference and to Hmit the extent of such reservation in view of the importance of merit in 1 the context of national interest and international importance of ""(> universal exce!lence in super specialties. 91. lt is to be noted that the foundation for fixing 27% c appears to be the view that 52% of the population belong to OBC. There is no supportable data for this proposition. In fact, different Commissions at different points of time have different figures. It is the stand of the respondents that no Commission has fixed the percentage below 52% and, therefore, there is D nothing wrong in fixing the percentage at 27%. This is not the ·- . correct approach. It may be that in no case the percentage of persons belonging to OBC is less than 27% but supposing in a given case considering the fact that the actual percentage is 40% a figure less than 27% should have been fixed. The E Commission set out pursuant to the directions of this Court seems to have somewhat acted on the petitions filed by the people claiming exclusion or inclusion. That was not the real purpose of this Court's decision to direct appointment of Commission. The very purpose was to identify the classes. This F .. was the exercise which was to be undertaken apart from ,.. considering the applications for inclusion or exclusion as the case may be. As has been conceded at the beginning of the case affirmative action is not under challenge. Affirmative action is nothing but a crucial component of social justice in the G constitutional dispensation but at the same time it has to be kept in view that the same does not infringe the principles of ... .,,. equality of which it is a part and/or unreasonably restraint or restrict other fundamental freedoms and that it does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. H 92. It needs no emphasis that Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) have to comply with the requirements of Article 14 and the discipline imposed in several other provisions like Articles 15(4)(a) and 15(4)(b), though, they form a part of the equality concept, each of which is so found in our Constitution. 93. It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. 94. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis Price 0 Waterhouse and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74). The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results ·in rejection of words as E meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1 ), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai F Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is G meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. H Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847). ~ I • • ~ l ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 285 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 95. The question is not what may be supposed and has A b • been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lemgh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union B of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama {AIR 1990 SC 981). .. 96. In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v Dy. Transport , .Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori c determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. D - ;. 97. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, 1t is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. E (See Commissioner of Sa/es Tax, MP v Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 511). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 98. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole F 4 - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus ,, omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a c~sus omlssus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a G statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context .... " and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular H ~ I 286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 4 S.C.R. A clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention • ' to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute ifthere is some other construction available". Where B to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord .. Reid in Luke v. /RC (1963 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also .. c observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". 99. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further D than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to J., ., an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens E but seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton (1858) XI Moore, P.C. 347). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit F praeterunt /eg1slatores (legislators says pass over that which happens only once or twice), the rule is that the particular case. ~ thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the .. law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," G observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws" 100. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in ...... fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: 'The H grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered ' ~ ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 287 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance A f> ' or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson (1857 (6) H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with 8 much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound •p to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or c obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378). D 101. Classifications on the basis of castes in the long run ..... has tendency of inherently becoming pernicious. Therefore, the test of reasonableness has to apply. When the object is elimination of castes and not perpetuation to achieve the goal of casteless society and a society free from discrimination of E castes judicial review within the permissible limits is not ruled out. But at the same time compelling State interest can be considered while assessing backwardness. The impact of poverty on backwardness cannot be lost sight of. Economic liberation and freedom are also important. In Nagaraj's case F .. (supra) it was inter alia observed as follows: ~ "44. The above three concepts' are independent variable concepts. The application of these concepts in public employment depends upon quantifiable data in each case. Equality in law is different from equality in fact. When we G construe Article 16(4), it is equality in fact which plays the dominant role. Backward Classes seek justice. General .... class in public employment seeks equity. The difficulty comes in when the third variable comes in, namely, efficiency in service. In the issue of reservation, we are H 288 being asked to find a stable equilibrium between justice to the backwards, equity for the forwards and efficiency for the entire system. Equity and justice in the above context are hard concepts. However, if you add efficiency to equity and justice, the problem arises in the context of the reservation. This problem has to be examined, therefore, on the facts of each case. Therefore, Article 16(4) has to be construed in the light of Article 335 of the Constitution. Inadequacy in representation and backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are circumstances which enable the State Government to act under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. However, as held by this Court the limitations on the discretion of the Government in the matter of reservation under Article 16(4) as well as Article 16(4-A) come in the form of Article 335 of the Constitution. xx xx xx 46. The point which we are emphasising is that ultimately the present controversy is regarding the exercise of the power by the State Government depending upon the fact situation in each case. Therefore, "vesting of the power" by an enabling provision may be constitutionally valid and yet "exercise of the power" by the State in a given case may be arbitrary, particularly, if the State fails to identify and measure backwardness and inadequacy keeping in mind the efficiency of service as required under Article 335. xx xx xx 48. It is the equality "in fact" which has to be decided looking at the ground reality. Balancing comes in where the question concerns the extent of reservation. If the extent of reservation goes beyond cut-off point then it results in reverse discrimination. Anti-discrimination legislation has a tendency of pushing towards de facto reservation. Therefore, a numerical benchmark is the surest immunity ~ I