M/S Cable Corporation of India Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Labour and Ors.
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to
H the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
. ..
M/S CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD·. v. ADDITIONAL 1185
COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
upholding the view of a learned Single Judge that once the re- A
view application in terms of Section 25-N(6) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7 (in short the 'Act') is rejected, the appropri-
ate GovernmenUspecified authority is not precluded from mak-
ing a reference for adjudication under the said provision.
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: B
The appellant company was established in 1957 for the
manufacture of high voltage electric cables and wires. The cpm
pany has manufacturing units at Borivli and Nasik. In the present
case we are concerned with the Company's unit at Borivli. The c
company made an application in terms of Section 25-N(2) to
the Specified Authority on 16.1.2003 to retrench 280 workmen
out of 509 workmen working at its Borivli Unit. The Specified
Authority, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the com
pany, workmen and other interested persons, including work- D
ers unions and after conducting an inquiry, by a reasoned order
dated 29.4.2003 partly allowed the application preferred by the
company by granting permission to retrench 276 workmen out
of 509 workmen on conditions mentioned in the order. The cor
rectness of that decision was put in issue by the workers unions,
the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein by filing applications under E
Section 25-N(6) of the Act for review of the decision or to refer
the matter for adjudication. By an order dated 9.7.2003 the ap
plications preferred by the Unions were rejected on the ground
that such applications could be preferred only by workmen
whereas the same have been made by the Unions. Besides, it F
was observed that no new point was raised in the review pro
ceedings which warranted fresh examination. Accordingly, both
the applications for review/reference came to be rejected.
The aforesaid order of the Specified Authority was chal- G
lenged through Writ Petition No. 1947 of 2003 by the 2nd re-
+- spondent-union, which came to be partly allowed by the learned
Single Judge, vide order dated 2.8.2004. The learned Single
Judge held that finding of the Specified Authority that unions
had no locus as all the aggrieved workmen were not made par- H
A ties to the application was contrary to law laid down by this Court -~
in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Mis Abdulbhai
Faizul/abhai and Ors. (AIR 1976 SC 1455). The learned Single
Judge further held that the right of review is possible only on
limited grounds and since no new points have been raised by
B the unions, the prayer for review was rightly rejected. The learned
Single Judge relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of
Gujarat High Court in Rajya General Kamgar Manda/ and Ors.
v. Vice President, Packart Press Div. Amba/al Sarabhai En-
terprises, Baroda and Ors. (1995 II CLR 613) further held that
c merely because review application is rejected, reference can-
not be said to be barred under Section 25-N(6) of the Act and,
accordingly, directed the specified authority to refer the matter
for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal in accordance with
Section 25-N(6) of the Act.
D Stand of the appellant both before the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench was that once the review application is
disposed of, there is no scope for further making a reference in
view of the clear language of Section 25-N(6) which provides
for the alternatives and does not empower a reference after the
E review petition is rejected. Both learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench held to the contrary.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench lost sight of the
fact that the language of the provision is very clear and the de-
F terminative expression used is "or". It is submitted that if the
view of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is ac-
cepted it would mean substitution of the word 'and' for 'or'.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
G submitted that the position is no longer res integra and in view
of the decision· of this Court in Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v.
State of Orissa and Ors. (2002 (2) sec 578), it is submitted, ...
the view of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench does
not suffer from any infirmity. The reference is intended as an
additional protection. Considering the fact that though the scope
M/S CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD. v. ADDITIONAL 1187
COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
for review is limited, which is evident from the fact that unlike A
other reference a period of 30 days is provided. This indicates
the urgency.
5. The factual position need not be referred to in detail in
view of the fact that fate of this case depends upon interpreta-
B tion of Section 25-N(6).
,.
6. Section 25-N(6) of the Act reads as follows:
"The appropriate government or the specified authority
may, either on its own motion or on the application made
by the employer or any workman, review its order granting c
or refusing to grant Qermission under sub-section (3} or
refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be
referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.
Provided that where a reference has been made to a D Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award
within a period of thirty days from the date of such
reference."
(Underlined for emphasis)
7. In Excel Wear v: Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC E
224) this Court considered the legality of Section 25-0 and 25-
Ras it stood then. It was held that those provisions were viola-
tive of Section 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in
short the 'Constitution'). It was held that steps under Section
F 25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-0.
8. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v.
Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr (1992 (3) SCC 336) the scope
and ambit of Section 25-N as it stood then prior to its substitu-
lion by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was consid- G
i ered. Section 25-0 was recast with effect from 21. 8.1984 by
Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought in Section 25-
N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984. Und9r Section 25-N(5)
finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A plain reading of the
provision shows that two options are available i.e. to decide
A itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Tribunal is ,;.
an additional forum for fresh look at the matter.
9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitu-
tional validity of Section 25-0 of the Act was under consider-
ation.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great
reliance on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment to con-
" tend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given by the
High Court.
c 11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the
said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall
for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the pro-
visions for amended Section 25-0 relates to review and refer-
ence would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or
D Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering
the question as to whether provisions for review and reference
were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are
cumulative and not alternative.
12. The word 'or' is normally disjunctive and 'and' Is nor-
mally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to
give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as dis-
closed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do
sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do not do it
unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean
'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'. And as pointed
out by Lord Halsbury the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not to be
resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the
clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal
reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result
G 'and' may be read for 'or' and 'or' for 'and' even though the re-
suit of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject ..
provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite
clear. Conversely if reading of 'and' as 'or' produces grammati-
cal distortion and makes no sense of the portion following 'and',
H 'or' cannot be read in placed 'and'. The alternatives joined by
MIS CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD. v. ADDITIONAL 1189
COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'or' need not always be mutually exclusive.
13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1)
SCC 7 41) it was held that the word 'or' is normally disjunctive.
The use of the word 'or' in a statute manifests the legislative
intent of the alternatives prescribed under law.
14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could
be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals
with the review power, it would have said so specifically by spe-
. cific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The
parameters of review are different from a reference.
15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position
clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the ap
propriate Government to either on its own motion or on an ap
plication made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribu
nal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted D
depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circum
stances and several other relevant factors.
16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the
appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its
order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-sec- E
tion (3).
17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unam
biguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one mean
ing, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespec- F
tive of consequences. [See: State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh
(AIR 2005 SC 294), Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (2)
sec 271)).
18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl&F 85, at page
143 Tindal C.J. observed as follows: G
"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.
A the intent of the lawgiver."
)L
+
19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and ad-
mits of only one meaning no question of construction of a stat-
ute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.
B 20. As observed in Nathi Devi's case (supra) if the words
"
used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open
to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on ..
the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may
c well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit
can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain
language of the sections of the Act.
21. In view of analysis made above, the inevitable result is
that the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct.
D R.P. Appeal allowed. ~