Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
- Tarak Nath Gupta & Anr vs State Of Delhi & Anr · 2023:DHC:001777
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In these appeals, the common order passed by the
c Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in three Criminal
Revisions, is in challenge. By the instant order, the Learned
Single Judge set aside the three orders passed by the Trial
Court dated 26.7.2004 in Crl.M.P. No. 3057 of 2004 in CC.
No. 216 of 2003 and dated 1.4.2004 in Crl.M.P. Nos. 4184 and
4185 of 2004 in C.C. No. 215 of 2003, and allowed those
Crl.M.Ps. Shortly stated, the appellant herein had filed a criminal
complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.PC.' for short), complaining
therein that a cheque signed by the respondent and given for
returning the amount of Rs.2 lakhs, which was a loan, was
bounced and inspite of the notice given thereafter, the accused
(respondent herein) had failed to return the money. A Trial ..
ensued on the basis of this complaint and the complainant
(appellant herein) was examined as a first witness for the
prosecution on 24.8.2004. He was cross-examined also. On
20.9.2004, the respondent herein filed applications under
Section 91 Cr.P.C. and Section 311 Cr.P.C . seeking directions
to produce the Bank Pass Books, Income Tax Accounts and
the L.D S. deposit receipts of the appellant, as also for recalling
him for cross-examination. This was objected to by a Reply
dated 24.9.2004. The Court passed an order on 1.10.2004,
rejecting the applications made by the respondent/accused. The
respondent/accused filed Criminal Revisions before the High
Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the High Court, by the
)
SETHURAMAN V. RAJAMANICKAM
[V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.)
513
impugned common order, proceeded to allow the same. It is A
this order, which has fallen for co·nsideration before us in these
appeals.
3. Very strangely, the High Court did not even issue notice
to the appellant/complainant, on the spacious ground that the B
production of the documents, which was sought for by the
accused, would cause no prejudice to the appellant/complainant:
We fail to understand this logic. After all, if the documents in
possession of the appellant/complainant, which were his
personal documents, sought for by the accused and the C
production of which was rejected by the Trial Court, and which
were ordered to be produced by the High Court, at least a
hearing should have been given to the appellant/complainant.
He could have shown, firstly, that no such documents existed or
that there was no basis for the production of those documents, D
particularly, in view of the fact that he was not even cross
examined in respect of those documents. On this ground, the
order of the High Court would have to be set aside.
4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order E
passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and
rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were
interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those
orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial
Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the F
cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and
the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques
were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used
one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that G
the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any
manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e.,
one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production
of documents and other on the application under Section 311
Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.
A nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly
not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge
could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The
impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have
to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are
B allowed.
R.P. Appeals allowed.
)