C. Muniappan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu
DR. B.S; CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted in Special D
Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 1482-1484 of 2008.
2. These appeals have ~een preferred against the
Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2007 of the High Court of
Madras in Crl. Appeal Nos. 226, 266 and 267 of 2007, and
Death Sentence Reference in Trial No. 1 of 2007. E
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases are
that on 22.1.2000, the students of the Horticulture College and
Research Centre, Periakulam, affiliated to the Tamil Nadu
Agricultural University, Coimbatore (hereinafter called the
'University'), left for an educational tour in two buses. One bus
was carrying male students and the other bus was carrying 47
female students. After completing the educational tour, the
students came to Paiyur, near Dharmapuri, on 1.2.2000, at
about 12.00 midnight, and stayed in the Regional Agricultural
Research Centre. On the next day, after visiting the research G
centre, they left for a tour to Hogenakkal from Dharmapuri,
which was the last leg of their tour as per their revised tour
programme. They visited a nursery garden on 2.2.2000 and
reached Dharmapuri at 12.30 p.m. and parked their buses in
front of Saravanabhavan Hotel. The students and the two H
A teachers accompanying them went to the Saravanabhavan
Hotel to take their meals and to purchase parcels of food. Some
of the students remained .in the bus itself.
4. In view of naxalite movement and activities around
Dharmapuri, the Deputy Superintendent of Police at 8 Dharmapuri had promulgated a prohibitory order under
Sections 30-A and 61 of the Indian Police Act, 1861, which
expired on 31.1.2000, and thus, a fresh prohibitory order was
issued on 31.1.2000, for fifteen days. On 2.2.2000, former Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu, Ms. J. Jayalalitha, along with four others
C was convicted and sentenced to undergo one year
imprisonment in the Pleasant Stay Hotel, Kodailkanal, case.
According to the prosecution, when the news of her conviction
spread, the AIADMK party members resorted to dharnas and
took out processions in Dharmapuri and compelled the shop
D keepers to close their shops by pelting stones. The news of
conviction and sentence of the former Chief Minister of Tamil
Nadu was being broadcast on T:V. and radio, thus, the students
and teachers also came to know about it. ...
E 5. According to the prosecution, a procession of 100 to
150 party workers having flags of AIADMK party, armed with
sticks and stones passed on the roads nearby the buses,
raising slogans. The girl students witnessed the procession but
remained in the bus. Dr. Latha (PW.1). the teacher
accompanying the students, contacted the Vice-Chancellor of
F the University and told the students that the Vice-Chancellor had
instructed them to stay at a safe place and return to Coimbatore
after the situation becomes normal: On this advice, the drivers
of both the buses made an attempt to take the buses to the
District Collector's office. However, the buses could not reach
G there because of the obstruction of the traffic on the way, as
the political workers staging dharna came on the road. Mr. P.
Kandasamy (PW.4), driver of bus no. TN-38-C-5550, which
was carrying the girl students, moved the bus to some distance
and parked it in a vacant place near an old petrol bunk. The
H bus carrying the boys was also moved there. The accused,
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 283
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
along with other political workers formed an unlawful assembly A
indulging in a 'road roko agitation', under the leadership of D.k.
Rajendran (A.1 ), violating the prohibitory order at lllakkiampatti,
near the MGR statue on the Salem-Bangalore National
Highway, prevented the free flow of traffic and caused nuisance
to general public a_t large. They damaged the government B
buses having registration nos. TN-29-N-1094, TN-29-N-0543
and TN-29-N-1011 by breaking their glasses and also set fire
to the three seats of one of the buses (being a town bus with
Route No. 7-B).
6. As per the Prosecution, Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), C
Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) having the
commo'n object· to cause damage to the buses, left the
aforesaid place and went to the motor workshop of B. Kamal ·
(PW.86), namely "Majestic Auto Garage", and procured petrol
in two plastic cans and came to the place where the bus in D
which the girl students were travelling was parked. It is alleged
that Nedu· (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) sprinkled petrol inside the bus
through ~the first two shutters on the left-side and Nedu (A.2) lit
a match stick and threw it inside the bus. Nedu (A.2) and
Madhu (A.3) went towards the motor bike which was already E
kept ready for running by C. Muniappan (A.4) and escaped from
the scene. The fire lit at the front-side of the bus spread
backwards. Dr. Lath a (PW.1) and Akila (PW.2) (both teachers)
managed to get down from the bus from the front door along
with some students. Some girl students stretched their heads F
and hands through the shutters and the boy students pulled them
out. However, three students, namely; Kokilavani, Hemalatha
and Gayathri could not escape from the burning bus. They were
burnt alive inside the bus. Some of the girl students got burn
injuries while getting down from the bus and some were injured G
while they were being pulled out through the shutters. The injured
students were taken to the Government Hospital, Dharmapuri,
where they were treated by Dr. K.S. Sampath (PW.30).
7. On the same day, an FIR was lodged at about 1.30 p.m.
in the police station regarding the occurrence of the incident H
A involving the Town Bus with route no.7-B. In respect of the other
incident, i.e. the Bus burning, an FIR was lodged at about 3.30
p.m. vide written complaint (Exh. P.120) and a case under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 436 and 302 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the 'IPC') and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Tamil .
B Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage & Loss) Act, 1992 (in
short as ''TNP (PDL) Act") was registered. In the said FIR, the
name of C. Muniappan (A.4) was not mentioned. A general
statement was made that "some persons shouting slogans
surrounded the bus and broke down the window panes" and
c Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) poured the petrol from the front
entrance of the bus and set it on fire. As far as the damage
caused to the government buses at lllakkiampatti is concerned,
on 2.2.2000, Elangovan (PW.60), a Senior Assistant Engineer
in the Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation, Dharmapuri, at 8.00
0 p.m. submitted a written complaint (Exh. P.82) under Sections
147, 148, 341, 436 and 506(ii) IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of
the TNp (PDL.) Act.
8. dn these complaints, investigations were carried out by
Ayyasamy, Inspector of Police (PW.81), and he inspected the ·
E place of occurrence at about 10.30 p.m. in the presence of
witnesses Velayutham (-PW.67) and Vetrivel (PW.68) and
prepared an Observation Mahazar (Ex. P .107). He also
prepared a rough sketch and recovered broken glass and brick
pieces from the place under the Seizure Mahazar (Ex. P .109).
F The buses were inspected on the next day by Motor Vehicles ·
Inspector and he prepared reports in respect of the same (Exs.
P.116 to P.119).
9. Dr. A.C. Natarajan (PW:31) conducted an autopsy on
the body of Kokilavani, Dr. N. Govindaraj (PW.35) conducted
G an autopsy on the body of Gayathri and Dr. Rajkumar (PW.38)
conducted an autopsy on the body of Hemalatha and issued
Exs. P .23, P .33 and P .28, Post mortem certificates,
respectively. ·
H 10. In respect of the second incident, regarding bu~ no.
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 285
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
TN-38-C-5550, Crime No. 188 of 2000 was registered on the A
basis of the complaint given by Village Administrative Officer,
C. Ramasundaram (PW.87). Since the officer-in-charge of
police station was on court duty, Shanmugaiah, Inspector of
Police (PW.116) took up the investigation. However, after two
days, i.e. on 4.2.2000, Vilvaranimurugan, Inspector of Police B
(PW.119) took over the investigation from Shanmugaiah
(PW.116). On 6.2.2000, investigation was transferred to the
CBCID and R. Samuthirapandi, Additional Superintendent of
Police (PW.123), became the Investigating Officer.
11. After completing the investigation, a report under C
Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called as "Cr.PC"), was filed on 28.4.2000,
arraying 31 persons as accused. The case was committed to
the Sessions Court, Krishnagiri, vide Order dated 25.7.2000.
The Sessions Court, Krishnagiri, framed 21 charges against D
all accused persons vide order dated 8.10.2001 under Sections
147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 307 read with Sections 302, 114 IPC
and Sections 3 and 4 TNP (POL) Act. During the course of trial,
10 out of 11 witnesses, who had been examined, turned hostile,
including C. Ramasundaram (PW.87) who had lodged the E
complaint in respect of second incident. Being dissatisfied and
aggrieved, Veerasamy, father of one of the victims, namely,
Kokilavani, approached the High Court of Madras by filing Cr.
O.P. No. 23520 of 2001 under Section 407 Cr.PC seeking
transfer of the trial from Krishnagiri to Coimbatore on various F
grounds, inter-alia, that all the accused were from the AIADMK
party and were holding the party posts; most of the witnesses
who had been examined had turned hostile, including the
complainant C. Ramasundaram; all the accused and most of
the witnesses were from the Coimbatore District and thus, they G
would be won over by the accused. Therefore, conduct of an
impartial trial was not possible at Krishnagiri. The High Court
allowed the said Transfer Petition vide order dated 22.8.2003
issuing some directions, including the appointment of the
Special Public Prosecutor and to have a de-novo trial. The H
A said order of transfer was challenged by D.K. Rajendran (A.1),
by filing SLP(Crl.) No. 4678 of 2003. However, the said SLP
was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 17.11.2003.
12. The Special Public Prosecutor was appointed after
filing of a contempt petition before the High Court for not
B complying with its order dated 22.8.2003. The State
Government initiated Departmental Proceedings against the
Village Administrative Officer, C. Ramasundaram (PW.87), the
complainant, who had been examined at Krishnagiri Court, for
not supporting the case of the prosecution. After a long delay,
C vide order dated 14.3.2005, the Sessions Court, Salem,
framed 22 charges against the 31 a·ccused, as the trial was
being conducted de-novo. During the trial, 123 witnesses were
examined and after assessing the facts and the legal issues,
the Trial Court delivered the judgment and order dated
D 16.2.2007. .
In total, 31 accused w.ere put to trial. R. Chellakutty (A.22)
died during trial. S. Palanisamy (A.15) and A. Madesh @
Madesh Mastheri (A.27) stood acquitted. The remaining 28
accused were convicted under Sections 188, 341 IPC and 3
E & 4 of TNP (POL) Act r/w 149 IPC. In addition, all of them except
accused No. 24, Mani @ Member Mani, were convicted for
offence u/s 147. IPC, whereas accused No. 24, Mani @
Member Mani was convicted, for an offence u/s 148 IPC. Apart
from that accused No. 2, Nedu @ Nedunchezhian, and accused
F No. 3, Madhu @ Ravindran, were convicted for offences u/s 302
IPC (3 counts) and accused No. 4, C. Muniappan, u/s 302 r/w. ·
114 IPC (3 counts) and the accused Nos.2 and 3 were
convicted also for offences u/s 307 IPC (46 counts) and C.
Muniappan (A4) for offences u/s 307 r/w 114 IPC for 46 counts.
G Accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were sentenced to death.
The sentences imposed on accused Nos. 1, 5 to 14, 16
to 21, 23 to 26 and 28 to 3:t'were ordered to run consecutively
which extended to 7 years and 3 months and sentence of 7
years and 9 months to accused No. 24.
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 287
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
13. All the 28 convicts filed appeals before the High Court A
of Madras. The death sentence references in respect to Nedu
(A.2), Madhu (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) were also made.
Crl. Revision No. 777 of 2007 was filed by R. Kesava Chandran
@ Moorthy, the father of one of the deceased, namely,
Hemalatha, for enhancement of punishment imposed on all the . B
accused. As all the appeals, references and Crl. Revision arose
out of a common judgment, they were taken up jointly and
disposed of by the High Court vide impugned judgment and .
order dated 6.12.2007. · ·
On hearing the aforesaid Crl. Revision and appeals, the C
·High Court modified.the conviction of accused No. 24'under·· ·
section 148 IPC as being under section 147 IPC. Accused nos.
1, 5 to 14, 16 to 21, 23 to 26 and 28 to 31 were awarded
different punishment for different offences, however, maximum
punishment remained two years as all the sentences were D
directed to run conc.urrently.
Conviction and sentence of death against accused Nos.
2 to 4 was confirmed by the High Court along with all other
sentences under different heads.
14. Hence, these seven appeals.
15. Shri Sushil Kumar and Shri Udai U. Lalit, learned senior
counsel appearing for all these appellants, have submitted that
the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant any trial.
The case of the prosecution had been inherently improbable. F
There had been material. contradictions in the statements of
witnesses in respect of the involvement of the accused and the
nature of offences committed by them. The inquest reports were
not consistent with the charge-sheets. Confessional statements
made by some of the accused before the police, could not be G
relied upon nor read as a whole in the court, as it is not
permissible in law. The reading of the full text thereof, had
materially prejudiced the mind of the court.Two separate FIRs,
i.e., in respect of Crime No.188/2000 and 190/2000 could not
be clubbed, resulting in one consolidated charge sheet. All the H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 10 S.C.R.
A accused had been charged by the Salem Court even for the
offence under Section 188 IPC. In this respect, as no complaint
had been filed by the competent officer whose prohibitory order
had been violated, the charge could not have been framed. In
any case, as it was not permissible for the trial court to frame
B any charge under Section 188 IPC in absence of any written
complaint by the public servant concerned, the genesis of the
prosecution case becomes doubtful and the appellants become
entitled to the benefit of doubt. Further, cases under Section
188 l.P.C. are triable by the Magistrate. In this case, it has been
c tried by the Sessions Court. Such a course has caused great
prejudice to the appellants. The statements made by the
witnesses particularly, by Dr. Latha (PW.1), Akila (PW.2), P.
Kandasamy, Driver (PW.4) and N. Jagannathan, Cleaner (PW.
5), were full of contradictions and could not be relied upon.
D Identification of the accused was on the basis of the
photographs taken and published by the media. C. Muniappan
(A,.4) was arrested on 3rd February, 2009, ir:i respect of some
other case and, therefore, his arrest shown on 7th February,
2009, was only an act of jugglery. The Forensic Report did not
support the case of the prosecution that kerosene oil or petrol
E had been put to set the bus ablaze. Some of the most material
witnesses of the prosecution, like B. Kamal (PW.86), turned
hostile, thus could not be relied upon.
16. Four different versions have been given by the different
F witnesses disclosing the genesis of the main incident.
First, as revealed by the complaint lodged by C.
Ramasundaram (PW.87), the incident occurred at 3.30 p.m. on
2.2.2000. According to the complaint, 20 persons named in the
F.l.R. armed with wooden sticks and iron rods, shouted slogans
G and caused damage to the bus. They threatened the girl
students, who were travelling in the bus, with dire
consequences. Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) brought the petrol
and sprinkled the same inside the bus as well as on the
platform. D .K. Rajendran (A.1) ordered that no one should be
H allowed to get down from the bus and threatened that the bus
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 289
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
will be set on fire along with the inmates. Immediately, both A
Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) set the bus on fire with match
sticks. Suddenly, the fire engulfed the entire bus and all the
accused ran away from the scene. Some girls were trapped
inside the bus and charred to death. C. Muniappan (A.4) was
not named in the first version. B
The second version is as per the evidence of P.
Kandasamy (PW.4), driver of the vehicle and N. Jagannathan
(PW.5), Cleaner. According to them, the incident occurred on
2.2.2000, wherein, two persons came on a motor bike and
stopped in front of the bus. One of them sprinkled the petrol C
through left side window and set the bus on fire and went away
on the motorbike.
The third version has been as revealed by the Report
(Ex.D.14) submitted by P. Kandasamy (PW.4), Driver, dated 0
7.2.2000, according to which, two persons came on a motor
bike and stopped in fro.nt of the bus. One of them sprinkled
petrol through ~he left ~ide window and set the bus on fire.
The fourth version is based on the Report (Ex.D.12), dated
6.3.2000, by Dr. Latha (PW.1 ), according to which, when the E
bus was parked, at about 2.25 p.m., after two minutes thereof,
one person poured the petrol on the front seats and set the bus
on fire.
All the aforesaid versions are contradictory to each other.
Thus, the case of prosecution is not trustworthy. F
Thus, in view of the above, appeals deserve to be allowed.
17. Per contra, Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned senior counsel
appearing for the State, has tried to defend tbe prosecution's
case submitting that the contradictions were trivial in nature. He G
has submitted that framing of charges under Section 188 IPC
in absence of written complaint of the public servant concerned,
could not be fatal to the prosecution's case. The entire
prosecution case cannot be discarded merely on the grounds
of improperly framing the charges under Section 188 l.P.C. H
A Clubbing the two crimes, i.e., 188/2000 and 190/2000 did not
cause any prejudice to any of the accused. Both the crimes
were found to be parts ,of the same'incident. The court has to
examine the facts' Jn. a proper petspeCtive where the said
ghastly cri.me had beeh co1T1mitted, where three university girl
B studentsSt()O~ roaste~f anq 18 girl. students suffered burn.
injurjes, At]he~initial stage,' the investigation was conducted by
Sh ti·. S}iarimuga!ah ·(PW.116), 'as the Inspector, Shri
Vilvaranimurligari (PW.119) was on court duty on 2.2.2000.
Thus; PW .119 took over the investigation after being free from
c the court duty.· 'Considering the gravity of the offences, the
. investigation Was,handed over to the CBCID, thus, the change
of Investigating Officer was' inevitable. The Test Identification
Parade was conducted by the experienced Judicial Officer in
accordance with law and there was no haste in conducting the
0 same. There is no rule of law that deposition of a hostile witness
is to be discarded in toto. The appeals lack merit and are liable
to be dismissed.
18. We have considered the rival submissions made by.
learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
E Charges under Section 188 IPC:
19. Section 195 Cr.PC reads as under:
"195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public
servants, for offences against public justice and for
offences relating to documents given in evidence - (1) No
Court shall take cognizance -
(a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188
(both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or
except on the complaint in writing of the public servant
concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate;"
H 20. Section 195(a)(i) Cr.PC bars the court from taking
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 291
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC A
or abetment or attempt to committhe same, unless, there is a
written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt
of his lawful order. The object of this provision i$ to provide for
a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful
authority of the public servant. The court la9~s competence. to B
take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated
therein. The legislative intent behind such/a provision has been
that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted
upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill-will
or frivolity ~c:>f disposition and to save the time of the criminal c
courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision
has been carved out as an exception to the general rule
contained under Section 190 Cr.PC that any person can set
the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court
from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a 0 complaint has been made by some particular authority or
person. Other provisions in the Cr.PG like sections 196 arid
198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only
create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with,
the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in
those Sections. (vide Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar, AIR E
1971 SC 1708; Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of
Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1935; Surjit Singh & Ors. v. Balbir
Singh, (1996} 3 SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr.,
(199~} 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy
& Ors., (2005} 7 SCC 352; and Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. F
Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 2119).
21 ~ The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance
of Section 195 Cr.PC or not, is whether the 'tacts disclose
primarily and essentially an offence for Which a complaint of the G
court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq & Ors.
v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293; and
Durgacharan Naik & Ors v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC
1775, this Court held that the provisions of this Section cannot
be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable H
A under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substanqe,
the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 Cr.PC.
Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by mis
describing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
22. In M.S. Ah/awat v. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 2000 8 SC 168, this Court considered the matter at length and held
as under: ·
" .... Provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory
and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any
c of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a
complaint in writing as required under that section."
(Emphasis added)
23. In Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr.,
(1998) 2 SCC 493, this Court while dealing with thi_s issue
D observed as under :
"7 ... Section 190 of th~ Code empowers "any
magistrate of the first class" -to take cognizance of "any
offence" upon receiving a co·mplaint, or police report or
information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195
restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the
general right of a person to move the court with a complaint
to that extent curtailed. It is a well-recognised canon of
interpretation that provision curbing the general
jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict
interpretation unless the statute or the context requires
otherwise." (Emphasis supplied)
24. In Dau/at Ram v_ State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206,
this Court considered the nature of the provisions of Section
G 195 Cr.PC. In the said case, cognizance had been taken on
the police report by the Magistrate and the appellant therein had
been tried and convicted, though the concerned public servant,
the Tahsildar had not filed any complaint. This Court held as
under:
H 'The cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 293
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
assumed by the court without the complaint in writing of A
the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The
trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the
conviction cannot be maintained. The appeal is,
therefore, allowed and the conviction of the appellant and
the sentence passed on him are set aside." (Emphasis . B
added)
25. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized
to the effect that there must be a complaint by the pubic servant
whose lawful order has not been complied with. The complaint
must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC are C
mandatory. Non-compliance of it would vitiate the prosecution
and all other consequential orders. The Court cannot assume
the ·cognizance of the case without such complaint. In the
absence of such a complaint, the trial and conviction will be void
ab initio being without jurisdiction. D
26. Leam~d counsel for the appellants have submitte~ that
no charge could have been framed under Section 1'88· IPC,in
the absence of awritten complaint by the officer authorised for
that purpose, the conviction under Section 188 IPC is not
sustainable. More so, it falsifies the very genesis of the case E
of the prosecution as the prohibitory orders had not been
violated, no subsequent incident could occur. Thus, entire
prosecution case falls.
27. Undoubtedly, the law does not permit taking F
cognizance of any offence under Section 188 IPC, unless there
is a complaint in writing by the competent Public Servant. In the
instant case, no such complaint had ever been filed. In such an
eventuality and taking into account the settled legal principles
in this regard, we are of the view that it was not permissible G
for the trial Court to frame a charge under Section 188 IPC.
However, we do not agree with the further submission that
absence of a complaint under Section 195 Cr.PC falsifies the
genesis of the prosecution's case and is fatal to the entire
prosecution case. There is ample evidence on record to show H
A that there was a prohibitory order; which had been issued by
the competent officer one day before; it had been given due
publicity and had been brought to the notice of the public at
large; it has been violated as there is no denial even by the
accused persons that there was no 'Rasta Roko Andolan' . .,.
B Unfortunately, the agitation which initially started peacefully
turned ugly and violent when the public transport vehicles were
subjected to attack and damage. In such an eventuality, we hold
that in case the charges under Section 188 IPC are quashed,
it would by no means have any bearing on the case of the
c prosecution, so far as the charges for other offences are
concerned.
28. The submission on behalf of the appellants that two
crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed
together, has also no merit for the simple reason that if the
D cases are considered, keeping in view the totality of the
circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents
occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers and
conductorStcleaners of the vehicles involved in the fir5t incident
and the evidence of C. Ramasundaram V.A.O., (PW.87), we
E reach the inescapable conclusion that the second occurrence
was nothing but a fall out of the first occurrence. The damage
caused to the public transport vehicles and the consequential
burning of the University bus remained part of one and the same
incident. Merely because two separate complaints had been
F lodged, did not mean that they could not be clubbed together
and one charge sheet could not be filed (See : T. T. Antony v.
State of Kera/a & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 181).
Test Identification Parade :
29. In Lal Singh & Ors v. State of UP., AIR 2004 SC 299,
G this Court held that the court must be conscious of the fact that
the witnesses should have sufficient opportunity to see the
accused at the time of occurrence of the incident. In case the
witness has ample opportunity to see the accused before the
identification parade is held, it may adversely affect the trial and H
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 295
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
in that case, the evidence as a whole is to be considered. The A
prosecution should take precautions and should establish
before the Court that right from the day of his arrest, the
accused was kept "baparda" so as to rule out the possibility of
his face being seen while in police custody.
30. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 B
SC 2420, this Court held that the object of conducting Test
Identification Parade is to enable witnesses to satisfy
themselves that the accused whom they suspect is really one
who was seen by them in connection with commission of crime
and to satisfy investigating authorities that suspect is really the C
person whom witnesses had seen in connection with said
occurrence. It furnishes an assurance that the investigation is
proceeding on right lines, in addition to furnishing corroboration
of the evidence to be given by the witness later in court at the
trial. Therefore, the Test Identification Parade is primarily meant D
for investigation purposes. (vide Ma/khan Singh v. State of
M.P., AIR 2003 SC 2669; Ankush Maruti Shinde & Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667; and Jarnai/ Singh
& Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719).
But the position would be entirely different when the E
accused or culprit who stands trial has been seen a number of
times by the witness, as it may do away with the necessity of
identification parade. Where the accused has been arrested
in presence of the witness or accused has been shown to the
witness or even his photograph has been shown by the
Investigating Officer prior to Test Identification Parade, holding
an identification parade in such facts and circumstances
remains inconsequential. (vide Shaikh Umar Ahmed Shaikh
& Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 1922; Lalli@
Jagdeep Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 666; G
Dastagir Sab & Anr. v. State of Kamataka, (2004) 3 SCC 106;
Maya Kaur Baldevsingh Sardar & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 12 pCC 654; and Aslam @ Deewan v.
State of Rajasthan, (2008) 9 SCC 227).
A . 31. In Yuvaraj Ambar Mohite v. State of Maharashtra,
(2006) 12 sec 512, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier
judgment in 0. Gopalakrishnan v. Sadanand Naik & Ors., AIR
2004 SC 4965, and held t!Jat if the photograph of the accused
has been shown to the witness before the Test Identification
B Parade, the identification itself looses its purpose. If the suspect
is available for identification or for video ·identification, the
photograph should never be shown to the witness.
32. Holding the Test Identification Parade is not a
substantive piece of evidence, yet it may be used for the
C purpose of corroboration; for believing that a person brought
befo're the Court is the real person involved in the commission
I
of the crime. However, the Test Identification Parade, even if
held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy
evidence on which the conviction of the accused can be
D sustained. It is a rule of prudehce which is required to be
followed in cases where the accused is not known to the
witness or the complainant. (Vide State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj AIR
1999 SC 3916). .
33. In Mui/a & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 3
E SCC 508, this Court placed reliance on Matru @ Girish
Chandra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1050;
and Santokh Singh v. /zhar Hussain & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2190
and observed as under:-
I
"The evidence of test identification is admissible under
Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Identification
parade belongs to the stage of investigation by the police.
The question whether a witness has or has not identified
the accused during the investigation is not one which is in
itself relevant at the trial. The actual evidence regarding
identification is that which is given by witnesses in Court.
There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. entitling the accused
to demand that an identificatio!l parade should be held at
or before the inquiry of the trial. The fact that a particular
witness has been able to identify the accused ·at an
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 297
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
identification parade is only a circumstance corroborative A
of the identification in Court."
34. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569,
a Constitution Bench of this Court has suo moto examined the
validity of Section 22 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987 and held that: . B
"If the evidence regarding 'the identification on the basis
of a photograph is to be held to have the sarre value as
the evidence of a test identification parade, we feel that
· gross injustice to the detriment of the persons suspected c
may result".
This Court, thus, struck down the provision of Section 22 of the
said Act.
35. The said judgment was· considered by this Court in 0 Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic
Control Bureau, AIR 1999 SC 2562, and the Court observed . . ' .
that in the said case, the evidence of a witness regarding
identification of a proclaimed offender involved in a terrorist
case was in issue. The courts below had taken a view that
evidence by showing photographs must have the same value E
as evidence of a Test Identification Parade. The Court
distinguished the aforesaid case on facts. The Court further
held that the court must bear in mind that in a case where the
accused is not a proclaimed offender and the person who had
taken the photographs was making deposition before the court F
was being examined by the prosecution as a witness, and he
identified the accused in the court, that may be treated as a
substantive evidence. However, courts should be conscious of
the fact that during investigation, the photograph of the accused
was shown to the witness and he identified that person as a G
one whom he saw at the relevant time.
36. Thus, it is evident from the above, that the Test
Identification Parade is a part of the investigation and is very
useful in a case where the accused are not known before-hand H
A to the witnesses. It is used only to corroborate the evidence
recorded in the court. Therefore, it is not substantive evidence.
The actual evidence is what is given by the witnesses in the
court. The Test Identification Parade provides for an assurance
that the investigation is proceeding in the right direction and it
B enables the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the accused
whom they suspect is really one who was seen by them at the
time of commission of offence. The accused should not be
shown to any of the witnesses after arrest, and before holding
the Test Identification Parade, he is required to be kept
c "baparda".
37. In the Test Identification Parades held in the Jail, Nedu
(A.2) was identified by P. Kandasamy (PW.4); N. Jagannathan
(PW.5); G. Gayathiri (PW.11); N. Thilagavathi (PW.13); and S.
Anitha (PW.14). Madhu (A.3) was identified by Dr. Latha
D (PW.1); and Akila (PW.2). C. Muniappan (A.4) was identified
by N. Jagannathan (PW.5); S. Anitha (PW.14); and B. Kamal
(PW.86).
· 38. In the court, Nedu (A.2) was identified by P.
E Kandasamy (PW.4); Jaganathan (PW.5); G. Gayathiri (PW.11);
Thilagavathi (PW.13); and Anitha (PW-14). Madhu (A.3) was
identified by Dr. Latha (PW.1 ); Akila (PW.2); Jaganathan
(PW.5); G. Gayathiri (PW.11); and Suganthi (PW.12). C.
Muniappan (A.4) was identified by Kandasamy (PW.4);
Jaganathan (PW.5); and Anitha (PW.14).
39. Thus, it is evident that all the accused for whom Test
Identification Parades were conducted were identified by some
of the witnesses in the jail. They were also identified by some
of the eye witnesses/injured witnesses in the court.
G Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants raised an objection that the entire proceedings
of identification on 22.2.2000 had been concluded within a
short span of 2 hours and 25 minutes. Eighteen witnesses were
there, having three rounds each. Therefore, one round was
H completed in three minutes, i.e., the Test Identification Parade
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 299
[DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
was conducted in full haste and thus, could not be treated to A
be a proper identification.
40. It is evident from the evidence of Shri Kalaimathi,
Judicial Magistrate (PW.89), who conducted the Test
Identification Parade, that all the witnesses had reached the
Central Prison, Salem, before 10.30 a.m. All preparations/ 8
arrangements had been made in advance by the Jail
authorities as per direction of the said officer. Arrangements
of standing of the accused along with other inmates in jail of
the same height and complexion had already been made. There
had been no haste or hurry on the part of Shri Kalaimathi, C
Judicial Magistrate (PW.89) to conclude the proceedings. More
so, for reasons best known to the defence, no question had
been asked to the said Judicial Magistrate (PW.89) in his
cross-examination as to how he could conclude the said
proceedings within such a short span of time. Thus, the D
submission is not worth consideration.
41. In court, B. Kamal (PW.86) did not support the case
ofthe prosecution as he deposed that during the identification
he was forced by the police to identify C. Muniappan (A.4) by E
showing his. photograph only. He was declared hostile.
42. The trial Court and the High Court have considered the
issue elaborately and discussed the statements made by the
prosecution witnesses in the court, along with the fact of
identification by the witnesses in the Test Identification Parades. F
Both the Courts came to the conclusion that identification of A.2
to A.4 by the witnesses, if examined, in conjunction with the
evidence of the Judicial Magistrate, R. Kalaimathi, (PW.89) and
his reports, particularly, the Exh. P.137 and P.142, leave no
room for doubt regarding the involvement of A.2 to A.4 in the G
crime. We do not find any cogent reason to take a view
contrary to the same. Not supporting the prosecution's case by
8. Kamal (PW.86) would not tilt the balance of the case in favour
of the appellants.
43. Serious issues have been raised by learned senior H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 10 S.C.R.
A counsel appearing for the appellants, submitting that inquest
report was defective as there has been much irregularity in the
inquest itself. Undoubtedly, three Investigating Officers, namely,
T. Shanmugaiah, Police Inspector (PW.116); S. Palanimuthu
(PW.121); and John Basha (PW.122) had conducted the
B investigation at the initial stage. The occurrence was so ugly
and awful that the I.Os. had conducted the investigation under
great anxiety and tension. The seizure memos were also
prepared in the same state of affairs. Therefore, when the
investigation had been conducted in such a charged
c atmosphere, some irregularities were bound to occur. There is
ample evidence on record to show that after burning of the
University bus, when the students came to know that three girls
had been charred and large number of girl students had suffered .
burn injuries, they became so violent that they damaged the
0 ambulance which had been brought to take bodies of the
deceased girls for conducting autopsy. The State Authorities,
a~er keeping all these factors in mind anq realizing that the
·investigation had not been conducted in proper manner, had
taken a decision to transfer t.he investigation to the CBCID.
E Therefore, the irregularities committed in the investigation by
the earlier I. Os. has too little relevance on the merits of the case.
The evidence collected by the said three I.Os. was not worth
placing reliance on and has rightly been not relied upon by the
subsequent Investigating Officer.
F 44. There may be highly defective investigation in a case.
However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse
by the 1.0. and whether due to such lapse any benefit should
be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled
that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground
G for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent
investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory
investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the
criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there
has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or
H omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investig~tion, there
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 301
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the A
prosecution evidence de hors such lapses, carefully, to find out
whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent
it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object
of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the
solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion B
of the trial in the case cannot be allowed t<? depend solely on ·
the probity of investigation. (Vide Chandra Kanth Lakshmi v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 220; Kamel Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 5 SCC 518; Ram Bihari
Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1850; Paras Yadav v. c
State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 644; State of Kflrnataka v. K.
Yai'appa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185; Amar Singh v. Ba/winder
Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1164; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of
Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1051; and Ram Bali v. State of UP.,
AIR 2004 SC 2329). D
Arrest of A-4
45. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel has raised
the issue vehemently that arrest of C. Muniappan (A.4) is totally
false. However, the evidence on record reveals that he was
arrested at 1.30 a.m. on 3.2.2000, as is evident from the E
evidence of D. Poongavanam (PW.108), according to which
when he was attending patrol duty along with other police
officials on the highway from Dharmapuri to Tirupathur, near P.
Mottupatti lake bridge, he got information that some one was
present beneath the bridge. Thus, the said witness went to the F
place along with the other officers and he was taken into police
custody in Crime No.115/2000 of Mathikonepalayam Police
Station under .Section 151 Cr.P.C. read with Section 7(1)(A)
of C.L. Act, and thus he was sent to jail. He had been released
on bail on 9.2.2000 and the 1.0. had been searching for him G
and he was arrested at New Bus Stand, Salem, where the
Dharmapuri bus was to be parked, by P. Krishnaraj (PW.109).
He tendered a confessional statement which was recorded in
presence of Revenue Inspector, Manickam and Village
Administrative Officer, C. Ramasundaram (PW.87). H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 10 S.C.R.
A There has been no cross-examination independently on
behalf of A.4 on this issue. Even in cross-examination on behalf
of other accused nothing has been elicited qua irregularity or
improbability of the arrest of A.4. Therefore, we do not see any
reason to disbelieve the arrest of C. Muniappan (A.4) as shown
B by the 1.0.
46. So far as the issue of damage to the buses and the
main incident of setting the bus on fire are concerned, both the
courts have proceeded on the finding, after appreciating the
entire evidence on record, that there was no common object
C between Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @Ravindran
(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) and the other accused regarding
murder of the students and burning of the bus. Therefore, all of
them had been convicted under different sections. However, the
High Court directed the sentence to run concurrently so far as
D A.1, A.5 to A.14, A.16 to A.21, A.23 to A.26 and A.28 to A.31
are concerned. There has been sufficient material to show
participation in- the "Rasto Roko Andolan" and indulging in the
incident of damaging the local route bus. Both courts have
recorded the concurrent findings of fact in this regard. We have
E also gone through the evidence. Their presence is established
on the spot and we do not see any reason to interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact recorded in that respect. We do not
find any material on record, which may warrant interference with
the said findings.
47. So far as A.2 to A.4 (Nedu, Madhu and C. Muniappan
respectively) are concerned, the Trial Court recorded the
following findings of fact:-
"Accused 2 and 3 had poured petrol into the bus through
the front door steps and set fire to it resulting in the death
of the abovesaid three students and causing injuries to
some of the students. Knowing that students are inside the
bus, they had set fire to the bus as stated above, knowing
fully well that some of the students or all the inmates of the
bus would meet their death inside the bus. Nobody could
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 303
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
deny this fact. There was clear intention on the part of A2 A
and A3 to kill the inmates of the bus and thus A2 and A3
have murdered three girl students with the intention of
killing them. Hence A2 and A3 are liable to be punished
u/s 302 IPC (3 counts) ................ Presence of the 4th
accused in the occurrence place has been amply proved. B
Though the fact that he gave matchbox to A2 to set fire to
the bus had not been established, yet the fact that he aided
A2 and A3 to come to the occurrence place in his motor
cycle after the occurrence is over, is clearly proved,
because he was the person who drove the motor cycle and C
thus aided A2 and A3 in the commission of the offence u/
s 4 of the TNP (POL) Act and 302 IPC and 114 IPC could
be invoked in this case since as per Section 107 IPC vide
third definition whoever intentionally aids by any act or
illegal omission the doing of the thing is an offender as 0 defined in 107 IPC. Hence, A4 Muniappan has committed
the offences punishable u/~ 4 of TNP (POL) Act r/w 114
IPC and 302 IPC r/w 114 IPC (3 counts).
Further, the High Court after appreciating the evidence on
record found that :- E
"The identification of the A2 to A4 by the witnesses
coupled with the evidence of the learned Magistrate PW-
89 and the reports of PW89 produced in Exs. P-137 and
P-142 would go a long way to show that A-2 to A-4 were
involved in the crime as spoken to by the prosecution F
witnesses."
From the record, it is evident that so far as A2 to A4 are
concerned, their involvement in the incident has been
substantiated by the evidence of PWs.61,62,63,97&99 G
(Santhamurthy, Madhaiyan, G. Manickam, Udayasuriyan and R.
Karunanidhi respectively) as some of those said witnesses had
identified D.K. Rajendran, Nedu, Madhu, C. Muniappan, D.K.
Murugesan, D.A. Dowlath Basha, (A.1 to A.6 respectively), K.
Ravi (A.9), Sampath (A.13), K. Chandran (A.21), R. Chellakutty H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [201,0] 10 S.C.R.
A (A.22), K. Mani (A.24), K. Veeramani (A.30) & Udayakumar
(A.31). All the witnesses have also deposed that some of the
members had been in the demonstration while K. Mani (A.24)
damaged the Hosur bus stand. M. Kaveri (A.23) prevented the
people from dousing the fire.
B 48. In view of the fact that Udayasuriyan (PW.97) and Ft
Karunanidhi (PW.99) had not been dis-believed by th~ court
below and their evidence was found natural and trustworthy as
they did not falsely implicate all the accused for causing
damages to the bus and they were local and independent
C witnesses and knowing some of the accused persons; the High
Court held as under:
"Though, both the witnesses have spoken about the
demonstration and implicated most of the accused, they
have spoken only about Nedu (A.2) for having set fire to
the Route No.7-8 town bus and there is absolutel~o
material to show as to i,oyhy both PWs 97 & 99 sh.ould '
falsely implicate Nedu (A.2). Equally, for the same reason,
the implication of M. Kaveri (A.23) for having prevented the
persons in and around the bus from dousing the fire also
cannot be dis-believed. There is ample evidence to show
that Nedu (A.2) and M. Kaveri (A.23) were part of the
demonstrators as has been stated by some of the
witnesses. In fact, PW.62 stated that even when he saw
the demonstrators sitting on the road, he also saw the
damaged buses parked nearby. None of the witnesses
have implicated any of the accused except Nedu (A.2) and
M. Kaveri (A.23) for causing damage to the buses.
Though, PW.97 implicated K. Mani (A.24) as well for
causing damage to the bus, A.24 was not spoken to by
PW.99. In the absence of any corroboration, it cannot be
held that K. Mani (A.24) also damaged the bus.
49. Therefore, the presence of the accused had also been
established by press and media persons who were p~ent at
the scene of the occurrence, as well as by tfle complainant, and H
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 305
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
those persons had not named all the accused for setting the A
bus on fire and only few of them had been involved. But as the
said_ persons were not having any arm/weapon, the offence of
Section 148 IPC was not found sustainable and thus, their
conviction under Section 148 IPC has been rightly set aside.
Some of the accused had been convicted under Section 147 s
IPC.
50. It has been submitted that the witnesses PWs. 1, 2 and
4 have not disclosed the identities of the accused at the initial
stage of investigation. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon
for conviction of A.2 to A.4. However, it has been proved that C
there was no initial investigation and therefore the question of
disclosing identity of the accused to Shri Shanmugaiah
(PW.116), who had done the initial investigation, could not
arise. More so, as has been mentioned hereinabove, the initial
investigation was conducted in a panicked situation, therefore, D
the government thought it proper to scrap it out and hand over
to a higher officer through the CBCID. The presence of A.2 to
A.4 .with the other accused at the place of agitation stands
established.
51. R. Karunanidhi (PW.99) had spoken aboutA.2 to A.4.
He is an advocate and belongs to Dharamapuri. He has
deposed that Nedu (A.2) had set the fire to the Route No.7-B
town bus. He has also corroborated the evidence of
Udayasuriyan (PW.97) that while the bus was in flames, some
persons tried to douse the fire but they were prevented by M.
Kaveri (A.23). Nedu (A.2) remained present in the earlier
occurrence as well as the subsequent occurrence.
52. We cannot ignore one more fact, namely, that C.
Muniappan (A.4) had kept the engine of the motor cycle (M.0.5) G
running only to escape from the scene of occurrence alongwith
Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) after the occurrence. The said fact
would also indicate the mind of the accused to commit the
offence and to flee from the scene of occurrence to avoid the
clutches of law. But for PWs 1, 2, 4 & 5 and some other students H
A who became alert immediately after the bus was set on fire,
the consequence could have been disastrous and more deaths
could have occurred.
53. P. Kandasamy, the bus driver (PW.4) has deposed
that at the time of incident, a bike coming from the right side 8 of the bus stopped near the left side headlight at a distance of
about 12 ft. Three persons were riding on the said motor cycle.
Two persons who were sitting on the rear seat of the motor cycle
came towards the bus and each of them was carrying a yellow
coloured can. One of them came to the left side of the bus and
C sprinkled liquid contained in the can inside the bus through the
first window shutter. The other poured the liquid from the can
through the second window. From the smell, he could
understand that they had sprinkled petrol. Dr. Latha (PW.1) and
Akila (PW.2) begged those persons and pleaded not to do any
D harm. At that time there was a shout "set fire on them, then
only they will realise". Students started coming out of the bus
from the front entrance. The bus was put to fire immediately.
The persons who poured the petrol proceeded towards the
motor cycle and escaped.
E 54. P. Kandasamy (PW.4) has identified Nedu (A.2) and
C. Muniappan (A.4) in the court and pointed out that C.
Muniappan (A.4) was the person who was sitting on the motor
cycle, keeping engine running at the time of occurrence. He
also disclosed that the number of the maroon coloured motor
F cycle was TN-29-C-2487 and identified the vehicle parked
outside the court. In cross-examination again and again he was
asked large number of questions, but his deposition remained
trustworthy throughout.
G 55. The deposition of N. Jagannathan, cleaner (PW.5)
corroborated the evidence of P. Kandasamy (PW.4). He
identified A.2 to A.4. He also identified the motor cycle but
could not identify the colour and registration number. He has
identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade. He has
H denied the suggestion that he had ever been shown any
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 307
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
photograph of either of A.2 to A.4. He deposed that A.2 to A.4 A
were the persons who sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and
he had given a version of events explaining how the girl
students got burn injuries and some of them died because they
could not come out of the vehicle. He denied the suggestion
that he could identify A.2 to A.4 as he had been shown their B
photographs.
56. Dr. Latha (PW.1) had deposed that she had seen the
man who was pouring the petrol. She had identified A.3 in the
court as the man who sprinkled petrol in the bus. She deposed
that it was A.3 who had shouted "set fire to all, then only they C
will realize" and at that time there was a fire from the front left
side.
57. Akila (PW.2) had given same version and corroborated
the evidence of Dr. Latha (PW.1), P. Kandasamy (PW.4) and D
N. Jagannathan (PW.5) and deposed that petrol was sprinkled
near the seat which .was occupied by PW.5. She identified
Madhu (A.3) as the person who sprinkled the petrol and stated
that another person· lit the match stick and threw it in the bus
and the bus was burnt into flames. Three girl students were
charred to death. E
58. Preetha (PW.8), a B.Sc. 2nd year student, aged 19
years had deposed that she was sitting on the double seat just
before the front entrance on the window side. A man sprinkled
petrol from a yellow can which he was holding on the seat in
front of her seat through the window shutter. At the same time
another person came and poured petrol inside the bus through
the window shutter which was near the first seat. PWs. 1 and
2 begged them not to harm students. However, in the
meantime, the front side of the bus caught fire. She had G
suffered some burn injuries over her left foot. She had identified
Madhu (A.3) in the court as a person who had sprinkled petrol.
She denied the suggestion that she was deposing, falsely or
identified the accused D.K. Rajendran (A.1) and Nedu (A.2) as
she had been tutored by the police. H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 10 S.C.R.
A 59. Gayathri G. (PW.11 ), another injured witness identified
'Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) in the Court. She explained how
the petrol was sprinkled by A.2 anci A.3 and how PWs. 1 and
2 begged them not td harm the girls. However, at the same·
time, there was fire at. the place where the petrol had been
B poured. She denied any suggestion made by the defence that
she was deposing falsely or she had identified any of the
accused by showing their photographs.
60. R. Suganthi (PW.12) another injured witness had given
the same version. She had identified Madhu (A.3) in the court
C as a person who had sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and
N. Thilagavathi (PW.12) another injured witness corroborated
the genesis of the case as given by the other witnesses. She
identified Nedu (A.2) in the court as a person who had sprinkled
the petrol and denied all suggestions made by the defence.
61. S. Anitha (PW.14) supported the prosecution version
thoroughly and stat~d that two persons came to the front of th~
bus and sprinkled the petrol. She had identified A.2 to A.4 in .
Test Identification.Parade denying all suggestions made by the
defence.
62. A large number of injured witnesses (students) were
examined. They supported the prosecution case but did not
identify any person either in the Test Identification Parade or in
the Court. M. Kalaivani, M. Krithika, G. Gayathiri and R.
F Suganthi (PWs.9 to 12), R. Banuchitra, Chitra, C. Susma, S.
Thilagam, P.T. Sutha, M. Vasantha Gokilam, R. Abirami, P.
Geetha and S. Gayathiri (PWs.15 to 23), K. Sumathi, M.
Deivani and N. Anbuselvi (PWs. 26 to 28) got injuries, and were
treated in the hospital. They were examined in the 'court. Their
G seating position in the bus had been such that they could not
see as who had sprinkled the petrol in the bus. They could see
the motorcycle or C. Muniappan (A.4) on the scene. They did
not depose anything in this regard.· ···
63. R. Maruthu (PW.51 ), photographer, deposed that he
H was contacted by Dowlat Basha (A.6) to cover the "Road Roko
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 309
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Agitation" at lllakkiampatti in stills and video. He reached there A
on a motorcycle. There he found D. K. Rajendran (A.1) engaged
in an agitation with four or five persons. They were raising
slogans. He photographed and videographed the spot of the
agitation. He deposed that along with (A.1 ), Muthu (A.8), Ravi
(A.9), A.P. Murugan (A.11) and Vadivelu (A.12) were also B
present there. Their photographs and negatives were exhibited
in the court. He also photographed the burning bus. He reached
the spot when the bus was burning. Students were shouting.
The bus was full of black smoke. Some persons were trying to
break open the rear side glass panes and some were dragging c
the girls from the rear side shutters. The fire spread from the
front portion and engulfed the whole bus to the rear and he had
been taking photographs continuously. These photographs
were exhibited as Ex.P.78 and Ex.P.80. He watched the video
prepared by him in the court and identified the same. In the D
cross~examination, he denied knowing the accused persons,
particularly, Madhu (A.3), Velayutha!ll (A.7), Sampath (A.13),
Selvam (A.26), Selvaraj (A.28) and Veeramani (A.30).
However, they were shown in the ·photographs taken by him.
He was declared hostile.
64. The shirt (M.0.4), which was worn by Nec:lu (A.2) at the
time of incident, had been identified by most of the eye
witnesses in the court. It is stated that this shirt belonged to A.2.
65. In Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,
(2007) 12 SCC 230, this Court disapproved the exhibiting and
reading of confessional statement of the accused before the
police as a whole before the court, as it had not been brought
on record in a manner contemplated by law. The Court held.as
under:
"Law does not envisage taking on record the entire ~
confession by making it an exhibit incorporating both the
admissible or inadmissible part thereof together. We have
to point out that only that part of confession is admissible,
which could be leading to the recovery of dead body and/ 11
A or recovery of articles ................................ ; the
confession proceeded to state even the mode and manner
in which they allegedly killed. It should not have been done.
It may influence the mind of the Court."
66. While deciding the said case, this Court placed 8 reliance on the judgments in Pu/ukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor,
AIR 1947 PC 67; the State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath
Shinde & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1691; and Anter Singh v. State
of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865.
c 67. Thus, it is evident from the above that only the
admissible part of extra-judicial confessional statement can be
exhibited. The statement as a whole, if exhibited and relied
upon by the prosecution, leads to the possibility of the court
getting prejudiced against the accused. Thus, it has to be
0 avoided.
68. In the instant case, as has rightly been pointed out by
Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel that confessional
statement of C. Muniappan (A.4) had been exhibited in the
court in its full text. It was neither required or warranted nor was
E permissible. However, in view of the fact that there had been
other sufficient material on record to show his involvement in
the crime, we are of the opinion that full exhibition of the
statement had not prejudiced the case against him.
Hostile Witness:
69. It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a
prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because
the prosecution chose to treat him as flostile and cross examine
him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as
G effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can
be. accepted to the extent that their version is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (vide Bhagwan Singh
v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra Kumar
Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170; Syad Akbar v. State
H of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848; and Khujji @ Surendra
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 311
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853). A
70. In State of UP. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR
1996 SC 2766, this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness
would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the
prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to 8 close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is
consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be
relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Batu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC
543; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC
516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of C
UP., AIR 2006 SC 951; Sarvesh Naraian Shukla v. Daroga
Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320; and Subbu Singh v. State,
(2009) 6 sec 462.
Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the 0 evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole,
and relevarJt parts thereof which are admissible in lalJV, can be
used by the prosecution or the defence.
In the instant case, some of the material witnesses i.e. B.
Kamal (PW.86); and R. Maruthu (PW.51) turned hostile. Their E
evidence has been taken into consideration by the courts below
strictly in accordance with law.
Some omissions, improvements in the evidence of the
PWs have been pointed out by the learned cou1Jsel for the
appellants, but we find them to be very trivial in nature. F
71. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are
some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire
evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and
caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from G
untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a
conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to
convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be
attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which
do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 10 S.C.R.
A of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human
being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details
of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the
statements of witnesses. (vide Sohrab & Anr. v. The State of
M.P., AIR 1972 SC 2020; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR
B 1985 SC 48; Bharwada Bhogini Bhai Hirji Bhai v. State of
Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753; State of Rajasthan v. Om P~kash
AIR 2007 SC 2257; Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr. v. State of
Himacha/ Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 588; State of U.P. v.
Santosh Kumar & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 626; and State v.
c Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151).
Death sentence
72. The guidelines laid down by this Court for awarding
death sentence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980
0 SC 898, may be culled out as under:
(a) The extreme penalty of death may be inflicted in
gravest cases of extreme culpability;
(b)" While imposing death sentence the circumstances
of the offender also require to be taken into consideration
along with the circumstances of the crime;
(c) Death sentence be imposed only when life
imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate
punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of
the crime; and
(d) Extreme penalty can be imposed after striking the
balance between aggravating and mitigating
circumstances found in the case.
G Aggravating circumstances include:
(a) If the murder has been committed after previous
planning and involves extreme brutality; or
{b) If the murder involves exceptional depravity.
H Mitigating circumstances include:
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL l''ADU 313
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
(a) That the offence was committed under the influence of A
extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(b) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old,
he shall not be sentenced to death;
(c) The probability that the accused would not commit B
criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing
threat to society;
(d) The probability that the accused can be reformed and
rehabilitated. The State shall by ~vidence prove that the
accused does not satisfy the conditions (c) and (d) above; C
(e) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the
accused believed that he was morally justified in
committing the offence;
(f) That the accused acted under the duress or domination D
of another person; and
(g) That the condition of the accused showed that he was
mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
73. In Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983
SC 957, this Court expanded the "rarest of rare" formulation
beyond the aggravating factors listed in Bachan Singh (supra)
to cases where the "collective conscience" of a community is
so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial powers
to inflict the death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion
as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining the death
penalty, and stated that in these cases such a penalty should
be inflicted. But the Bench in this case underlined that full
weightage rriust be accorded to the mitigating circumstances G
in a case and a just balance had to be struck between
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court further
held that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration may
be motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or
the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as:- H
(i) Murder is in extremely brutal manner so as
to arouse intense and extreme indignation of
the community.
(ii) Murder of a large number of persons of a
particular caste, community, or locality, is
committed.
(iii) Murder of an innocent child; a helpless
woman, is committed.
74. In Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR
C 2002 SC 1661, this Court referred to both these cases and held
that death sentence may be warranted when the murder is
committed in an extremely brutal manner; or for a motive which
evinces total depravity and meanness e.g. murder by hired
assassin for money or reward, or cold blooded murder for
D gains. Death sentence may also be justified:
"(i) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For
instance, when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the
members of a faniily or a large number of persons or a
particular caste, community, or locality are committed.
(ii) When the victim of murder is an innocent child or a
helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person vis-a
vis, whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a
public figure generally loved and respected by the
community."
(See also Atbir v. Govt. of N. C. T. of Delhi, JT 2010 (8) SC
372).
75. In Mahesh v. State of M.P., AIR 1987 SC 1346, this
G court deprecated the practice of taking a lenient view and not
imposing the appropriate punishment observing that it will be
a mockery of justice to permit the accused to escape the
extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such
cruel acts. The court held that "To give a lesser punishment to
H the appellants would be to render the justice system of this
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS . . v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 315
[DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
country suspect. The common man will lose faith in the courts. A
· 1n such cases, he understands and appreciates the language
of deterrence more than the reformative jargon". (See also State
of Punjab v. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2009. SC 391; and Sahdev
v. Jaibar@ Jai Dev & Ors., (2009) 11 SCC 798).
In Bantu v. State of U. P., (2008) 11 SCC 113, this Court 8
placing reliance on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. AIR 1991
SC 1463, re-iterated the same view observing as under :
"Therefpre, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system to c
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and
society could not long endure under such serious threats.
I •
It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper
sentence having regard to the'.nature of the offence and
the manner in which it was executed or committed etc."
Thus, it is. evident that Criminal Lal\\' requires strict
adherence to the rule of proportionality in proViding punishment
according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct
keeping in mind the effect of not awarding just punishment on
the society. E
The "Rarest of the rare case" comes when a convict would
be a menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful co
existence of the society. Where an accused does not act on
any spur-of-the-moment provocation and he indulged himself
in a deliberately planned crime and meticulously executed it, F
the death sentence may be the most appropriate punishment
for such a ghastly crime.
76. Life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an
exception. Therefore, the Court must satisfy itself that death G
penalty would be the only punishment which can be meted out
to a convict. The Court has to consider whether any other
punishment would be completely inadequate and what would
be the mitigating and aggravating. circumstances in the case.
Murder is always foul, however, the degree of brutality, H
A depravity and diabolic nature differ in each case.
Circumstances under which murders take place also differ from
case to case and there cannot be a straitjacket formula for
deciding upon circumstances under which death penalty must
be awarded. In such matters, it is not only a nature of crime,
B but the background of criminal, his· psychology, his social
conditions, his mindset for committing offence and effect of
imposing alternative punishment on the society are also relevant
factors.
77. In the instant case, the girl students of the University,
C while on tour had been the victims of a heinous crime at the
tail end of their programme. The appellants may have had a
grievance and a right of peaceful demonstration, but they cannot
claim a right to cause grave inconvenience and humiliation to
others, merely because a competent criminal court has handed
D down a juaicial pronouncement that is not to their liking. A
demonstration by the appellants which had started peacefully,
·took an ugly turn when the appellants started damaging public
transport vehicles. Damaging the public'. transport vehicles did
not satisfy them and the appellants became the law unto
E themselves. There had been no provocation of any kind by any
person whatsoever. Some of the appellants had evil designs
to cause damage to a greater extent so that people may learn
a "lesson". In order to succeed in their mission, Nedu @
Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran(A.3) and C.
F Muniappan (A.4) went to the extent of sprinkling petrol in a bus
full of girl students and setting it on fire with the students still
inside the bus. They were fully aware that the girls might not
be able to escape, when they set the bus on fire. As it
happened, some of the girls did not escape the burning bus.
G No provocation had been offered by any of the girls. Nedu @
Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C.
Muniappan (A.4) did not pay any heed to the pleas made. by
Dr. Latha (PW1) and Akila (PW2), the teacher, to spare the
girls. As a consequence of the actions of Nedu @
H Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C.
C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 317
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Muniappan (A.4), three girls stood to death and about 20 girls A
received burn injuries on several parts of their bodies. There
can be absolutely no justification for the commission of such a
brutal offence. Causing the death of three innocent young girls
and causing burn injuries to another twenty is an act that shows
the highest degree of depravity and brutality on the part of Nedu B
@ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C.
Muniappan (A.4).
The aggravating circumstances in the case of Nedu @
Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C.
Muniappan (A.4) are that this offence had been committed after C
previous planning and with extreme brutality. These murders
involved exceptional depravity on the part of Nedu @
Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C.
Muniappan (A.4). These were the murders of helpless,
innocent, unarmed, young girl students in a totally unprovoked D
situation. No mitigating circumstances could be pointed to us,
which would convince us to impose a lesser sentence on them.
Their activities were not only barbaric but inhuman of the highest
degree. Thus, the manner of the commission of the offence in
the present case is extremely brutal, diabolical, grotesque and . E
cruel. It is shocking to the collective conscience of society. We
do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the punishment
of death sentence awarded to Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2),
Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) by the
courts below. Their appeals are liable to be dismissed. F
So far as the other appellants are concerned, the
maximum sentence to be served by them as per the Judgment
of the High Court is two years. Most of these appellants have
already served more than 14 months of their sentence and they
are presently on bail. The incident occurred on 2.2.2000, so G
more than ten and a half years have already elapsed since the
.incident. These appellants have already suffered a lot. Thus,
their sentences deserve to be reduced.
78. Before parting with this case, we would like totake note H
A of the fact that this crime occurred right in the middle of a busy
city. Innocent girls trapped in a burning bus were shouting for
help and only the male students from their University came to
their rescue and succeeded in saving some of them. There
were large number of people including the shopkeepers, media
B persons and on-duty police personnel, present at the place of
the "Rasta Roko Andolan", which was very close to the place
of the occurrence of the crime, and none of them considered it
proper to help in their rescue. Even if the common man fails to
respond to the call of his conscience, the police should not have
c r_emained inactive. The so-called administration did not bother
to find out why the police did not intervene and assist in the
rescue of the girl students. It is clear that the so-called protectors
of the society stood there and witnessed such a heinous crime
being committed and allowed the burning of the bus and
0 roasting of the innocent children without being reprimanded for
failing in their duty. If the common citizens and public officials
present at the scene of the crime had done their duty, the death
of three innocent young girls could have been prevented.
79. In view of the above, all the appeals are dismissed.
E So far as Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran
(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) are concerned, sentence of
death imposed on them is confirmed and the same be
executed in accordance with law.
However, in Criminal Appeal Nos 1632-34 of 2010
F (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1482-1484 of 2008), the
sentences are reduced as undergone. All of them are on bail,
their bail bonds stand discharged. These criminal appeals
stand disposed of accordingly.
R.P. Appeals disposed of.