Ranjit Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
against the judgment and order dated 20.10.2005 passed by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore-Bench) in Criminal
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 143
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Appeal Nos.149 and 180 of 1995, by which the High Court has A
dismissed the appeals against the judgment and order dated
8.2.1995 passed by the Sessions Court convicting the
appellants under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called the
'IPC'), and awarded them life imprisonment along with other B
punishments.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:
(A) That on 21.1.1988, the First Information Repovrt
(hereinafter called as FIR) bearing No.18/88 was lodged C
at 9 A.M. under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
149 IPC in the Police Station, Namli District, Ratlam by
Nagu, informant/complainant, stating that on 19.1.1988
Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) had gone to the District
Court, Ratlam to attend a case and at about 3 P.M. the D
accused persons, namely, Ranjit (A.3), Kamal Das (A.12),
Vikramsingh (both of whom died during the course of trial),
Ramesh Patidar (A.4), Shantilal (A.6) and Pooran Das
(A.2) reached the court compound and took Nagu and
Gangaram (PW.24) on their bicycle to an iron factory on E
the pretext of reaching some compromise in the case and
thereafter they had been taken in a truck loaded with sand
to the outskirts of village Amleta. From there they had been
taken to village Bhaisatiya. Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24)
were assaulted by the accused persons with lathis and
were asked the whereabouts of Shantilal, Shambhu and
Mohan. Nagu disclosed that Shantilal was in village
Bamankhedi and Shambhu, Kailash and Mohan were in
village Budheda. The accused persons wrongly confined
Nagu inside the house of Nandu and took away Gangaram G
(PW.24) with them. They brought Shantilal in a tractor in
the night at 2 A.M. and put him inside the room with Nagu
and locked the room from outside. On the next day, i.e.,
20.1.1988 at about 8-9 A.M., they brought Kailash
(PW.25), Shambhu and Gangaram (PW.24) and confined H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
them also in the same room along with Nagu and
Shantilal. After some time, they took all of them to the well
of Gopal Maharaj situated at village Panched and the
accused persons assaulted Shantilal with lathis as a
consequence of which Shantilal became unconscious.
Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu were also assaulted.
Again they took Shantilal (in unconscious condition) in the
field of one Dhula Chowkidar and they assaulted Shantilal,
Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu with lathis. Shantilal died
. on the spot. Shambhu also received grievous injuries on
his person. The accused persons left the injured persons
and moved to a distance watching for the consequences.
After some time, the accused persons reached near
Shantilal and checked whether he was dead or alive and
once they were satisfied that Shantilal was no more, they
fled.
(B) The FIR lodged by the complainant, Nagu was recorded
by SHO Govardhan Singh (PW.30) vide Ex.P-63.
Shailendra Kumar Shrivastava (PW.29) and another Police
Officer reached the spot and found Shantilal dead whereas
Shambhu, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) were
lying there in injured condition. Shailendra Kumar
Shrivastava (PW.29) prepared the inquest (Ex.P-5) of the
deceased Shantilal, seized blood-stained cloth, and
collected earth and blood-stained. earth. He sent the dead
body of Shantilal for post-mortem examination. The injured
persons, namely, Nagu, Shambhu, Kailash (PW.25) and
Gangaram (PW.24) were sent for medical examination to
Government Hospital, Ratlam. Kanhaiya Lal Dharia, Naib
Tehsildar (PW.26) recorded the statement of the injured
witness, Kailash (PW.25). On 21.1.1988, Dr. M.A. Qureshi
(PW.1) performed the autopsy of the deceased Shantilal
and prepared the report (Ex.P-3). He also examined on
the same day the injured Kailash (PW.25) and Nagu. On
the same day, i.e., 21.1.1988 Dr. Virendra Singh (PW .. 15)
examined Shambhu and also took his X-ray and found
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 145
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
fractures of the fifth metacarpal bone of left hand, right A
humerus and radius bones. On the same day, Dr. Jayant
Mukund Subedar (PW.16) medically examined Shambhu.
However, he died in the night at 11.25 P.M. in the hospital.
Dr. Jayant Mukund also examined Gangaram (PW.24). Dr.
Uday Yarde (PW.17) performed post mortem of the B
deceased Shambhu and prepared the post-mortem report.
(C) The investigation proceeded, a large number of
,persons were apprehended and after completion of the
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against 34 persons C
out of which two, namely, Vikram Singh (A.33) and Ranjit,
son of Rattan Lal Patidar (A.34) died during the trial and
thus, the remaining 32 accused were put to trial. The
prosecution examined in total 31 witnesses and got 79
documents proved. The trial court vide judgment and order
dated 8.2.1995 acquitted 22 accused and convicted 10 D
including the present appellants.
{D) All the said 10 convicts preferred Criminal Appeal
Nos.149 and 180 of 1995. Both the said appeals were
heard together and disposed of by common judgment and E
order dated 20.10.2005. The High Court acquitted two
accused/appellants, namely, Pooran Das (A.2) and
Mukesh (A.20). However, it dismissed the appeal of the
remaining 8 appellants maintaining their conviction and
sentences. Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts F
approached this Court by filing this appeal and Bagadi
Ram Qas (A.1 ), Kamal Das (A.12) and Ratan (A.24) did
not prefer any special leave petition against the
confirmation of their conviction by the High Court. During
the pendency of this appeal, Gopal Das (A.17) died. So, G
at present, we are concerned only with four appellants,
namely, Ranjit Singh (A.3), Balaram (A.14), Ramchandra
(A.18) and Shambhu (A.22).
3. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants, has submitted that the deceased persons/ H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A complainant party had been involved in a large number of
criminal cases and had created a menace as all of them were
involved in cases of theft. Complaints had been filed against
them and villagers had been afraid of the complainant party.
The Police had been investigating theft cases against them. In
B fact, the complainanUdeceased party had been absconding
because of the pendency of cases of theft against them. One
police Constable had been posted in the village to keep an eye
on them. The name of Ramchandra (A.18) was not mentioned
in the FIR. None of the other appellants had been named by
c more than one witness as being involved in the case and in
respect of some of the accused the evidence of the witness
had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus, it was not
proper for the High Court to maintain the conviction of the
appellants on the basis of the same evidence against the
D present appellants. All the witnesses were partisan and had
falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity. Nagu, who
lodged the FIR, could not be examined as died during the
course of trial and therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not
be relied upon. The FIR which could have been relied upon was
E by Dhula Chowkidar (PW.5). There was no intention on the part
of the appellants to cause death, otherwise they could have
eliminated the deceased persons on the very first day.
According to the prosecution, some of the accused were
armed with deadly weapons. The same had not been used as
the deceased and other injured persons had allegedly been
F beaten with sticks and lathis. Injuries had been caused on non
vital parts of their bodies. Thus, their conviction cannot be
maintained under section 302 IPC even with the aid of Section
149 IPC. The prosecution case is to be disregarded as a whole.
Thus, appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the
State of Madhya Pradesh, has vehemently opposed the appeal
contending that no case was pending against the deceased/
complainant party and none of them had been absconding. The
H appellants had caused injuries which were sufficient to cause
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 147
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
death of two persons. The appellants also caused injuries to A
the other eye-witness. Statement of Kailash (PW.25) was
recorded by a Magistrate under the apprehension of his death,
so his statement is to be considered as a statement made
under section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called Cr.P.C.). Deposition of the injured witnesses B
is to be given due weightage. The Court has a duty to separate
the grain from the chaff and in case, some of the accused
persons had been acquitted by the trial court and some by the
High Court, that does not mean that the deposition of the
witnesses cannot be relied upon for conviction of the appellants. c
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
Legal Issues:
Accused-not named in the FIR:
6. In Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64,
this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under: E
"The first information report, as is well known, is not an
encyclopaedia of the entire case. It need not contain al! the
details. We, however, although did not intend to ignore the
importance of naming of an accused in the first information F
report, but herein we have seen that he had been named
in the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that
PW 1 did not name him in the first information report, we
do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement of Mooli
Devi, PW 6. The question is as to whether a person was G
implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged
having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the
case. PW 6 received as many as four injuries."
7. In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 1997 SC 768, this
Court held as under: H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
"Omission of the said detail is there in the First Information
Statement, no doubt. But Criminal Courts should not be
fastidious with mere omissions in First Information
Statement, since such Statements cannot be expected to
be a chronicle of every detail of what happened, nor to
contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took
place. The person who furnishes first information to
authorities might be fresh with the facts but he need not
necessarily have the skill or ability to reproduce details of
the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some
may miss even important details in a narration. Quite often
the Police Officer, who takes down the first information,
would record what the informant conveys to him without
resorting to any elicitatory exercise. It is the voluntary
narrative of the informant without interrogation which usually
goes into such statement. So any omission therein has to
be considered along with the other evidence to determine
whether the fact so omitted never happened at all."
(See also Podda Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sone Lal v. State of U.P: AIR 1978
SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh & Ors., AIR
1981 SC 631; and Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v. State of
Assam, (2009) 12 SCC 342).
8. While dealing with a similar issue in Animireddy
F Venkata Ramana & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 368, this Court held as under:
"While considering the effect of some omissions in the first
information report on the part of the informant, a court
cannot fail to take into consideration the probable physical
and mental condition of the first informant. One of the
important factors which may weigh with the court is as to
whether there was a possibility of false implication of the
appellants. Only with a view to test the veracity of the
correctness of the contents of the report, the court applies
certain well-known principles of caution."
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 149
PRADESH [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
9. Therefore, from the law referred to hereinabove, it is A
evident that in case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.
Falsus in Uno. Falsus in Omnibus: 8
10. In Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC
1962, this Court observed as under:-
"lt is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel c
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 15, and other
cases which have followed that case, the Court must make
an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from
the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth
i~ separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot D
be separated from the chaff because the grain and the
chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of
separation the Court would have to reconstruct an
absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the
essential details presented by the prosecution completely E
from the context and the background against which they
are made, then this principle will not apply."
11. In Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC
277, this Court held as under:-
" The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one
thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of law nor
a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness
whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at
any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. G
It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the
evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor,
separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously
disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of
its own out of the rest."
12. A similar view was taken in Nathu Singh Yadav v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 10 SCC 366.
13. The maxim has been explained by this Court in Jakki
@ Selvaraj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP, Coimbatore,
(2007) 9 sec 589, observing:-
"The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ha~ not
received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to
occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may
be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The
doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence
which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,
but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of
evidence'."
14. It is well settled in law that the maxim fa/sus in uno,
fa/sus in omnibus (false in one false in all) does not apply in
E criminal cases in India, as a witness may be partly truthful and
partly false in the evidence he gives to the Court. (Vide:
Ku/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 455;
Ganesh v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 152;
Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 12 SCC 275; Mani
F @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of
Police, (2009) 12 SCC 288; and Balraje@ Trimbak v. State
of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).
15. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court
G in Prem Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 14 SCC 494,
wherein the Court clearly held as under:
"It is now a well-settled principle of law that the doctrine
"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in
India."
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 151
PRADESH.ff)R. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
16. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to A
the effect that the aforesaid legal maxim is not applicable in
India and the court has to assess to what extent the deposition
of a witness can be relied upon. The court has to separate the
falsehood from the truth and it is only in exceptional
circumstances when it is not possible to separate the grain from B
the chaff because they are inextricably mixed up, that the whole
evidence of such a witness can be discarded.
Number of witnesses required to prove the offence by
members of a large unlawful assembly:
17. This question has been definitively dealt with by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202, wherein the Court observed as
under:
" ... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence
given by a single witness would be enough to convict an
accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen
witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to
sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a E
criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the
commission of an offence involving a large number of
offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to
adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only
if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who
give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the
test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to
see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable."
(Emphasis added)
18. In Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1978 SC 1647, this Court explained the aforesaid judgment by
stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked
by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large
number of persons, the court should carefully consider the
A question of the credibility of such a witness. Where the court is
of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts
and circumstances of the case not reliable, it should insist that
such testimony be corroborated by one or more other witness
before it can be accepted by the court.
19. A similar view has also been taken by this Court in
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 322,
wherein the Court has held:-
''There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be
based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses
have identified a particular accused as a member of the
unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to
be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of
eviCfence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony
of 'one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to
establish the identification of an accused as a member of
an unlawful assembly. All the same, when the size of the
unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many
persons would have witnessed the incident, it would be a
prudent exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses
to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a
participant in the rioting."
(Emphasis added)
20. Similarly, in Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 701, this Court observed:
"Taking into consideration the nature of attack and the
possibility or otherwise of the identification of these
accused persons by the prosecution witnesses and
bearing in mind the principles laid down by this Court in
the above-cited judgments, we are of the opinion that it is
not safe to rely on the evidence of witnesses who speak
generally and in an omnibus way without specific
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 153
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
reference to the identity of the individuals and their A
specific overt acts in regard to the incident ... "
(Emphasis added)
Consequently, the Court took the view that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, as a lot of witnesses had referred 8
to the accused in a vague and general manner rather than
making specific reference to the identity of the individuals and
their specific overt acts in the incident, prudence dictated that
it was necessary to fix a minimum number of witnesses needed
to accept the prosecution case to base a conviction. C
21. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Chandra Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC
690.
22. Thus, from the above, the law on the issue remains that D
in a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eye-witness,
unless that the court is of the view that the testimony of such
sole eye-witness is not reliable. Though, generally it is a rule E
of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may not
be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident in a fit case the
court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his testimony
he makes specific reference to the identity of the individual and
his specific overt acts in the incident. The rule of requirement
of more than one witness applies only in a case where a
witness deposes in a general and vague manner, or in the case
of a riot.
Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured witness
survives:
23. In Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC
940, this Court dealt with the issue and held:
H.
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
" .......... that immediately after PW.1, injured witness was
taken to the hospital and his statement was recorded as
a dying declaration which, consequent upon his survival,
is to be treated only as a statement recorded under
Section 164 Cr.PC and can be used for corroboration or
contradiction. This statement recorded by the Magistrate
at the earliest available opportunity clearly discloses the
substratum of the prosecution case including the names
of the appellants as assailants and there is not an iota of
material on record to show that this was the upshot of his
tutoring. On the contrary, this statement was made at a
point of time when PW.1 was in a critical condition and it
is difficult to believe that he would falsely implicate the
appellants leaving aside the real culprits ..... that there was
only some minor inconsequential contradictions which did
not at all impair his evidence. Then, again, as already
noticed, the evidence of the doctors fully supports his
version of the incident."
(Emphasis added)
E 24. In Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC
126, this court dealt with a similar issue wherein a person who
had made a statement in expectation of death did not die. The
court held that it cannot be treated as a dying declaration as
his statement was not admissible under Section 32 of the Indian
F Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it was
to be dealt with under Section 157 of the Act 1872, which
provides that the former statement of a witness may be proved
to corroborate later testimony as to the same fact.
A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in
G Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1969, as
the Court held:
"Be that as it may, the question is whether the Court could
treat it as an item of evidence for any purpose. Section
H 157 of the Evidence Act permits proof of any former
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 155
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
statement made by a witness relating to the same fact A
before "any authority legally competent to investigate the
fact" but its use is limited to corroboration of the testimony
of such a witness. Though a police officer is legally
competent to investigate, any statement made to him
during such an investigation cannot be used to corroborate B
the testimony of a witness because of the clear interdict
contained in Section 162 of the Code. But a statement
made to a Magistrate is not affected by the prohibition
contained in the said section. A Magistrate can record the
statement of a person as provided in Section 164 of the C
Code and such a statement would either be elevated to
the status of Section 32 if the maker of the statement
subsequently dies or it would remain within the realm of
what it was originally. A statement recorded by a
Magistrate under Section 164 becomes usable to
corroborate the witness as provided in Section 157 of the D
Evidence Act or to contradict him as provided in Section
155 thereof."
25. This has also been reiterated in Gentela
Vijayavardhan Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1996 SC 2791; and State of UP. v. Veer Singh & Ors., AIR
2004 SC 4614.
Thus, in view of the above, it can safely be held that in such
an eventuality the statement so recorded has to be treated as
of a superior quality/high degree than that of a statement
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and can be used as
provided under Section 157 of the Act 1872.
26. The instant case requires to be considered in the light
of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
27. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives and three
were injured. Nagu, complainant/informant, died before the trial
could commence and thus, the contents of the FIR could not
be substantiated by him as he could not be examined.
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A However, the two injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and
Kailash (PW.25) had deposed alongwith other eye-witnesses
about the incident. Sohan Bai alias Soni Bai (PW.2), Shaku
Bai (PW.3) and Rambha Bai (PW.8) were examined. Post
mortem was conducted on the body of Shantilal (deceased) by
8 Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1). Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17) conducted
the post mortem on the body of Shambhu (deceased). Dr.
Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) had medically examined
Gangaram (PW.24). Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) had medically
examined Kailash (PW.25). The injuries on the persons of
C deceased, as well on the injured persons had been noted by
the courts below.
28. Injuries:
(A) The following injuries were found on the body of
D Shantilal (deceased):
1. One lacerated wound ~" ~ inch flesh deep full with
blood on right forearm.
2. One incised injury - dimension 3x3 inches on left elbow.
3. Lacerated wound dimension 3x3 inches flesh deep on
upper portion of right arm.
4. One lacerated would 3x2 inches muscle deep on left calf.
F 5. Lacerated would 4x3 inches skin deep on frontal region
in which blood clot was present.
(B) The following injuries were found on the body of
Kailash (PW.25):
1. One lacerated wound on right elbow internal side 3x2
inches, blood was coming out on its pressing. Swelling
in upper and lower portion of elbow. X-ray was advised
for this injury.
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 157
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
2. Swelling on right hand - pain on pressing, x-ray was A
advised for this also.
3. One incised wound 4x1-1/2 inches present on left hand
between index and middle finger. It was flesh deep.
4. Swelling on left hand and forearm - pain on pressing.
X-ray was advised for it also.
5. Pain on pressing front and back of chest and right
shoulder. Therefore, he was advised X-ray of chest and
shoulder.
(C) The following injuries were found on the body of Nagu:
1. Fracture of humerus bone of left hand and X-ray was
advised.
2. Abrasion on left knee 3x3 inches.
3. One abrasion present on left side of face and on left ear.
4. One abrasion Y:i"x1/2" on left hip joint was present.
(0) The following injuries were found on the body of
Shambhu:
1. Entire left hand, from right shoulder to the hand was
swelled and was red due to swelling and much pain for
which X-ray was advised for left shoulder, left humerus F
bone, left forearm and left hand front all the four porlions.
2. Third upper bone in upper portion of the left hand was
fractured.
3. Fracture seemed to be in the right hand radius. Ulna
bone for which also X-ray was advised.
4. Swelling present in entire right hand and elbow.
A 5. (Contusion) in forearm of left hand several marks of
abrasion were present.
6. Lacerated wound in middle front part of left leg 2x2
inches skin deep.
7. Lacerated wound 1.5x1 inch skin deep in front middle
part of right leg.
(E) The following injuries were found on the body of
Gangaram (PW.24):
1. Swelling 4x2 inches back of left knee, colour was red
and black, pain on the injury.
2. Abrasion 3.5x1 inch on left elbow, colour was black-red.
'
D 3. He was mentioning pain on his knees but there was no
mark of any other injury.
29. Prosecution examined Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1 ), Dr.
Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) and Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17)
before the trial Court and they have all supported the case of
E the prosecution and proved the injury reports. So far as the eye
witnesses are concerned, Gangaram (PW.24), had named
Ranjit but did not name either of the three other appellants
before us. However, he had stated that Ranjit had beaten him
and the complainant, Nagu. Kailash (PW.25), attributed serious
F roles to the appellant, Ranjit Singh, and other co-accused who
did not prefer special leave petitions or had been acquitted by
the trial Court. He also named Balaram, Ramchandra and
Shambhu. These two injured witnesses had supported the
prosecution case giving a complete narration of the incident
G from the beginning till the end. Gangaram (PW.24) also clarified
that the appellant before us, Ranjit Singh, had beaten them and
not the other accused named Ranjit, who died during the trial.
In addition thereto, there is evidence by Sohan Bai (PW.2),
daughter-in-law of Nagu and sister of Shantilal (deceased)
H involving Ranjit Singh, Shambhu and Ramchandra, appellants.
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA 159
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
She also deposed that she knew Ramchandra and Shambhu A
before the occurrence of the incident. Shaku Bai (PW.3), sister
of Shantilal (deceased) had also named Ranjit Singh and
Shambhu, alongwith the other co-accused who either had been
acquitted by the courts below or convicted but did not approach
this court in appeal. Rambha Bai (PW.8), sister of Shantilal B
(deceased) named Shambhu, Ramchandra and Ranjit Singh,
alleging that they had made forced entry into her house
alongwith 4-5 other persons in the presence of Sohan Bai
(PW.2) and Shaku Bai (PW.3). She identified them in the court
also. All these witnesses had faced gruelling cross- c
examinations by the defence, but nothing could be elicited from
either of them which may discredit their testimony. Out of these
witnesses, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) are
injured witnesses. The injuries found on the person of Kailash
(PW.25) were of a grievous nature. Their evidence had to be 0
given due weightage as they are the stamped witnesses. (Vide:
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3652; State
of U.P. v. Jagdeo & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 456; State of U.P. v.
Kishan Chand & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 629; Krishan & Ors. v.
State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy E
Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
2009 SC 2661; and Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of
Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).
30. The statement of Kailash (PW.25) had been recorded
by the Magistrate under the apprehension that he may die. F
Therefore, his evidence is to be given due weightage, as per
the law referred to hereinbefore, and generally cannot be
brushed aside on any ground.
31. The evidence on record and the manner in which the G
offence has been committed makes it crystal clear that the
appellants intended to kill Shantilal and Shambhu (both
deceased). The injuries caused to both the deceased had been
grievous in nature and inflicted on vital parts of their bodies.
These injuries were sufficient to cause the deaths of the H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A deceased persons, as revealed by the medical evidence.
Kailash (PW.25) in his statement has made it clear that in spite
of the fact that Shantilal had died, the appellants twisted his
body just to see whether he was dead or alive and after
ascertaining the fact that he was dead he was given 2-3 lathi
8 blows just to insult him and they made derogatory statements
to Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu (deceased) who was still
alive at that time.
32. Undoubtedly, all the eye-witnesses including the injured
witnesses are closely related to the deceased. Thus, in such a
C fact- situation, the law requires the court to examine their
evidence with care and caution. Such close relatives and
injured witnesses would definitely not shield the real culprits of
the crime, and name somebody else because of enmity. The
defence did not ask the injured witnesses as to how they
D received the injuries mentioned in the medical reports. (See:
Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270;
Arjun Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 604; and Akhtar
& Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722).
E 33. The courts below have already examined the evidence
with care and caution and separated the grain from chaff and
acquitted a large number of persons. More so, i.t may be
pertinent to mention that the High Court had acquitted Puran
Das (A.2) and Mukesh (A.8) as they have not been named by
F the injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25).
The trial Court had acquitted all those who had not been
attributed any specific role in causing injuries to the deceased
ar.d/or the injured witnesses. Therefore, the persons involved
in rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was assigned
to any of them. The case of the present appellants is quite
G distinguishable from· the cases of those who have been
acquitted by the courts below.
Merely, because some of the accused have been
acquitted by the trial Court and some by the High Court, it does
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MA)DHYA 161
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
not mean that statements of these witnesses are liable to be A
disregarded as a whole.
34. There are claims and counter-claims regarding the
character and involvement of the claimant party/deceased
persons in criminal cases. However, Goverdhan Singh, 8 Investigating Officer (PW.30) in his deposition had made it
clear that no criminal case was pending against the claimant
party/deceased persons. He also produced the crime register
to substantiate his statement and he was not aware of whether
any person of the claimant party/deceased persons had ever
been sentenced for committing any offence prior to his joining C
the said police station. No complaint against the claimant party
had come before him for investigation. Be that as it may, even
if some of them had been involved in criminal cases that could
not permit the appellants to become the law unto themselves
and punish the said persons. D
35. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reasons
to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High
Court. The appeal lacks merit and, is accordingly, dismissed.
8.8.B. Appeal dismissed. E