Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Inter alia but primarily the
appellant has raised a question of law in the present appeal.
The contention is, that every demand by the husband or his
family members cannot be termed as 'dowry demand' within C
the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short referred to as 'the Act') and
consequently, the death of the deceased cannot be termed as
a 'dowry death' within the ambit and scope of Section 304-8
of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the Code') and, as such, D
the conviction and order of sentence passed against the
appellant is liable to· be set aside.
2. It is a settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the
question of law has to be examined in light of the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Thus, reference to the facts E
giving rise to the present appeal would be necessary.
3. Vipin @ Chanchal @ Rekha, the deceased and Ashok
Kumar, the appellant herein, were married on 9th October,
1986. Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased had given F
sufficient dowry at the time of her marriage according to his
means, desire and capacity. But, the appellant and his family
members i.e. Mukesh Kumar, the brother of the appellant and
Smt. Lajwanti, the mother of the appellant were not satisfied
with the dowry. They allegedly used to harass and maltreat the G
deceased and used to give her beatings. They had demanded
a refrigerator, a television etc. One week prior to the date of
occurrence, the deceased came to the house of her father at
Kaithal and narrated the story. She specifically mentioned that
her husband wanted to set up a new business for which he H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A required a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. The father of the deceased could
not manage the same due to which the appellant and his family
members particularly, Lajwanti and Mukesh alleged to have
burnt the deceased by sprinkling kerosene oil on her as a result
of which the deceased died in the hospital at about 4.00 p.m.
B on 16.05.1988. The father of the deceased received
information of the incident from his sister's son Subhash
Chand. Neither the appellant nor his family members informed
him about the said demise.
The father of the deceased moved a complaint (Ex. PA)
C before SI Randhir Mohan who made endorsement (Ex. PA/1)
on the basis of which FIR (Ex. PL:) was recorded. This was
done by SI Randhir Mohan on the basis of ruqa (Ex. PQ)
received on 16.05 1988 at about 5.45 p.m. The deceased was
brought to the hospital as a burnt case in gasping condition and
D she expired in casualty. The said officer went to the General
Hospital, completed the proceedings under Section 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (for short 'the Cr.PC') and during
those proceedings he recorded the statements of Lajwanti,
mother in law of the deceased, Ram Lal, father in law of the
E deceased, Khem Chand, Harbans Lal and one Arjun Dass.
Thereafter, the body was sent for postmortem which was
handed over to Hanbans Lal, after the post mortem. The
complaint was made by Harbans Lal (PW-1) on 17th May, 1988.
Site Plan (Ex. PW) as well as the photographs (Ex. P-14 to P-
F 17) and their negatives (Ex. P-18 to P-21) were prepared by
Photographer Satish Kumar (PW-10). Ex. PS was also taken
into possession which was half burnt small tin, containing 3
litres of kerosene oil under Ex. PH which was sealed. Certain
other goods like hammer (Ex. PK), broken piece of a wooden
G door (Ex. P-11 ), half burnt match stick, match box etc (Ex. P-
12) were also taken into possession.
4. After completing the investigation of the case and
recording the statements of the relevant witnesses, the
Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet in terms of
H Section 173 of the Cr.PC. The case was committed to the Court
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1131
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of Sessions by the learned CJM vide his order dated 18th A
October, 1988 which framed the charge under Section 304-8
of the Code read with Section 34 of the Code. Upon
completion of the evidence of prosecution, statement of the
accused under Section 313 of Cr.PC was recorded.
5. The learned Trial Court by a detailed judgment dated 8
13.01.1989/16.01.1989 held all the three accused viz., Ashok
Kumar, Mukesh Kumar and Lajwanti, guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 304-8 of the Code and vide order
of the same date, sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. C
1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of
sentence passed by the Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal o
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,
which was partially accepted. Lajwanti and Mukesh, the mother
and brother of the accused Ashok Kumar, were acquitted of
the offence under Section 304-8 of the Code while the
conviction of Ashok Kumar, accused was upheld and the order E
of sentence was also maintained by the High Court.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 16th
December, 2003, Ashok Kumar, the appellant herein, has filed
the present appeal. While impugning the judgment under appeal
and besides raising the legal contention afore noticed, it is also F
contended that the Courts below have failed to appreciate the
evidence in its correct perspective. The evidence brought on
record clearly show that there was no connection between the
death of the deceased and the alleged dowry demands or
alleged cruelty. Further, it is contended that there was delay in G
registration of the FIR and no explanation has been rendered
whatsoever in that behalf. The occurrence was dated
16.05.1988 at 4.00 p.m. and the FIR was lodged on
17.05.1988, while the deceased died in the hospital on
16.05.1988. Unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging FIR H
A (Ex. PU) creates a serious doubt on the case of the
prosecution. There were no specific allegations made in the FIR
with regard to dowry and the allegations made, in any case,
did not specify the basic ingredients of dowry demand. While
criticizing the serious contradiction between the statements of
B prosecution witnesses, it is also contended that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt
particularly, keeping in view the letters written (Ex. DB to DJ),
no offence could be established against the accused and, as
such, he is entitled to be acquitted.
C 8. On the contrary, it is argued on behalf of the State that
by virtue of cumulative effect of the statements of Harbans Lal,
the father of the deceased (PW-1), Krishna Rani, the mother
of the deceased (PW-2) and Subhash Chand (PW-3) read in
conjunction with documentary evidence and the statement of the
D Investigating Officer, the prosecution has been able to prove
the charge beyond any reasonable doubt. It is contended that
one witness, produced by the accused himself, has fully
corroborated the case of the prosecution and, as such, the
appellant was rightly convicted and sentenced by the Courts
E below and the judgment under appeal does not suffer from any
legal or other infirmity. According to the prosecution, the appeal
should be dismissed.
9. At the very outset, we would proceed to deal with the
F legal submissions made on behalf of the appellant. But before
that, we must notice that the appellant was neither charged with
the offence under Section 4 of the Act nor he has been found
guilty of the said offence. Thus, the submissions have to be
examined only from the point of view that the appellant has been
convicted for an offence under Section 304-B of the Code and
G the provisions of the Act are relevant only for examining the
merit or otherwise of the contention raised that the expression
'dowry', as per explanation to the provisions of Section 304-B
of the Code, has to be given the same meaning as in Section
2 of the Act.
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1133
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
10. The appellant was charged with an offence under A
Section 304-8 of the Code. This penal section clearly spells
out the basic ingredients as well as the matters which required
to be construed strictly and with significance to the cases where
death is caused by burns, bodily injury or the death occurring
otherwise than under normal circumstances, in any manner, B
within 7 years of a marriage. It is the first criteria which the
prosecution must prove. Secondly, that 'soon before her death'
she had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the
husband or any of the relatives of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry then such a death shall c
be called 'dowry death' and the husband or the relative, as the
case may be, will be deemed to have caused such a death.
Explanation to this section requires that the expression 'dowry'
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act. The
definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act reads as under : 0
"In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other
person,
at or before [or any time after the marriage] (in connection F
with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include]
dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation 11.--The expression "valuable security" has the G
same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)."
11. From the above definition it is clear that, 'dowry' means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly by one party to another, by parents H
A of either party to each other or any other person at, before, or
at any time after the marriage and in connection with the
marriage of the said parties but does no! include dower or mahr
under the Muslim Personal Law. All the expressions used under
this Section are of a very wide magnitude. The expressions 'or
B any time after marriage' and 'in connection with the marriage
of the said parties' were introduced by amending Act 63 of
1984 and Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 02.10.1985 and
19.11.1986 respectively. These amendments appear to have
been made with the intention to cover all demands at the time,
c before and even after the marriage so far they were in
connection with the marriage of the said parties. This clearly
shows the intent of the legislature that these expressions are
of wide meaning and scope. The expression 'in connection with
the marriage' cannot be given a restricted or a narrower
0 meaning. The expression 'in connection with the marriage' even
in common parlance and on its plain language has to be
understood generally. The object being that everything, which
is offending at any time i.e. at, before or after the marriage,
would be covered under this definition, but the demand of dowry
has to be 'in connection with the marriage' and not so customary
E that it would not attract, on the face of it, the provisions of this
section.
12. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to certain
examples showing what has and has not been treated by the
F Courts as 'dowry'. This Court, in the case of Ram Singh v.
State of Haryana ((2008) 4 SCC 70], held that the payments
which are customary payments, for example, given at the time
of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in the
society or families to the marriage, would not be covered under
G the expression 'dowry'. Again, in the case of Satbir Singh v.
State of Punjab [AIR 2001 SC 2828], this Court held that the
word 'dowry' should be any property or valuable given or
agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. The
customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other
H ceremonies are not covered within the ambit of the word
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1135
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
'dowry'. This Court, in the case of Madhu Sudan Malhotra v. A
K. C. Bhandari [(1988) Supp. 1 SCC 424], held that furnishing
of a list of ornaments and other household articles such as
refrigerator, furniture and electrical appliances etc., to the
parents or guardians of the bride, at the time of settlement of
the marriage, prima facie amounts to demand of dowry within B
the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. The definition of 'dowry'
is not restricted to agreement or demand for payment of dowry
before and at the time of marriage but even include subsequent
demands, was the dictum of this Court in the case of State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa [(2004) 4 SCC 470). c
13. The Courts have also taken the view that where the
husband had demanded a specific sum from his father-in-law
and upon not being given, harassed and tortured the wife and
after some days she died, such cases would clearly fall within
the definition of 'dowry' under the Act. Section 4 of the Act is D
the Renal Section and demanding a 'dowry', as defined under
Section 2 of the Act, is punishable under this section. As
already noticed, we need not deliberate on this aspect, as the
accused before us has neither been charged nor punished for
that offence. We have examined the provisions of Section 2 of E
the Act in a very limited sphere to deal with the contentions
raised in regard to the applicability of the provisions of Section
304-B of the Code.
14. We have already referred to the provisions of Section F
304-8 of the Code and the most significant expression used
in the Section is 'soon before her death'. In our view, the
expressions 'soon before her death' cannot be given a
restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in
their plain language and with reference to their meaning in G
common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human
behaviour and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower
meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions
of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must
receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A construction requires that the provisions have to be read in
conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the
Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would
avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the
object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.
B 15. We are of the considered view that the concept of
reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for
appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court in the
case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 2009 SC 1454),
held that the legislative object in providing such a radius of time
C by employing the words 'soon before her death' is to
emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,
has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other
words, there should be a rec:sonable, if not direct, nexus
between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment
D inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this Court in
the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2004) 3
SCC 98], where this Court stated that determination of the
period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given
case. However, the expression would normally imply that there
E has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and
the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom
would have specified any period which would attract the
provisions of this Section. However, there must be existence
of proximate link between the acts of cruelty. along with the
F demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any
specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be
applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry
should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family
members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse
G of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not
strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions
unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These
matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and
circumstances of a given case.
H 16. The cruelty and harassment by the husband or any
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1137
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
relative could be directly relatable to or in connection with, any A
demand for dowry. The expression 'demand for dowry' will have
to be construed ejusdem generis to the word immediately
preceding this expression. Similarly, 'in connection with the
marriage' is an expression which has to be given a wider
connotation. It is of some significance that these expressions B
should be given appropriate meaning to avoid undue
harassment or advantage to either of the parties. These are
penal provisions but ultimately these are the social legislations,
intended to control offences relating to the society as a whole.
Do_v1ffY is something which existed in our country for a c
considerable time and the legislature in its wisdom considered
it appropriate to enact the law relating to dowry prohibition so
as to ensure that any party to the marriage is not harassed or
treated with cruelty for satisfaction of demands in consideration
and for subsistence of the marriage. o
17. The Court cannot ignore one of the cardinal principles
of criminal jurisprudence that a suspect in the Indian law is
entitled to the protection of Article 20 of the Constitution of India
as well as has a presumption of innocence in his favour. In other
words, the rule of law requires a person to be innocent till proved E
guilty. The concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to
the criminal jurisprudence. In contradistinction to this aspect, the
legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the
provisions of Section 304-8. Where ot-her ingredients of
Section 304-B are satisfied, in that event, the husband or all F
relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. In other
words, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed
by fiction of law. Once the prosecution proves its case with
regard to the basic ingredients of Section 304-B, the Court will
presume by deemed fiction of law that the husband or the G
relatives complained of, has caused her death. Such a
presumption can be drawn by the Court keeping in view the
evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the
substantive charge under Section 304-B of the Code.
A 18. Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a rebuttable
presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading
their defence and proving that the ingredients of Section 304-
8 were not satisfied, rebut the same. While referring to raising
of presumption under Section 304-8 of the Code, this Court,
8 in the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2003
SC 3828], stated the following ingredients which should be
satisfied :
"4 .................. .
C (1) The question before the Court must be whether the
accused has committed the dowry death of a
woman. (This means that the presumption can be
raised only if the accused is being tried for the
offence under Section 304-8, IPC).
(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or his relatives.
(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her
death."
19. In light of the above essential ingredients, for
F constituting an offence under Section 304-8 of the Code, the
Court has to attach specific significance to the time of alleged
cruelty and harassment to which the victim was subjected to
and the time of her death, as well as whether the alleged
demand of dowry was in connection with the marriage. Once
G these ingredients are satisfied, it would be called the 'dowry
death' and then, by deemed fiction of law, the husband or the
relatives would be deemed to have committed that offence. The
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, while relying upon
the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), contended that the concept
of 'soon before the death' is not attracted in relation to the
H alleged harassment or cruelty inflicted upon the deceased, in
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1139
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the facts of the present case. The oral and documentary A
evidence produced by the prosecution does not suggest and
satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence.
20. Similarly, reference was also made to the judgment
of this Court in the case of Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra
[(2007) 9 SCC 721], to substantiate the contention that there B
was no co-relation between giving or taking of the property with
the marriage of the parties and, as such, the essential
ingredients of Section 2 of the Act were missing. Accordingly,
it is argued that there was no demand of dowry by the appellant
but it was merely an understanding that for his better business, C
at best, the amounts could be given voluntarily by the father of
the deceased. This fact was further sought to be substantiated
while referring to the following abstracts of the judgment in the
case of Appasaheb (supra):
"6 ........ The learned trial Judge then sought clarification
from the witnesses by putting the following question:
"Question: What do you mean by 'domestic cause'?
Answer: What I meant was that there was a demand for E
money for defraying expenses of manure, etc. and that was
the cause."
In the very next paragraph she stated as under:
"It is not true to suggest that in my statement before the
police I never said that ill-treatment was as a result of
demand for money from us and its fulfilment. I cannot
assign any reason why police did not write about it in my
statement."
xxx xxx xxx xxx
9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart
from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A circumstances, and (ii) Woman is subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband
for, or in connection with, any demand for "dowry". The
explanation appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-
8 IPC says that "dowry" shall have the same meaning as
8 in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry"
any property or valuable security should be given or agreed
to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any
time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage
of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of
property or valuable security must have some connection
with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between
the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the
marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal
provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly
well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well
settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act
is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or
transaction and words are used which everybody
conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows
or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the
words are to be construed as having that particular
meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. and
Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of lndia[(1997)
2 sec 664].) A demand for money on account of some
financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic
expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as
a demand for dowry as the said word is normally
understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution
does not, therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as
defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was
made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for
was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1141
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of A
Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not
established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be
sustained."
21. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the 8 State while relyi_ng upon the judgment of this Court in Devi Lal
v. State of Rajasthan [(2007) 14 SCC 176), argued that the
relatives and, particularly the father of the deceased, had
specifically mentioned the acts of harassment and, in any case,
the statement of the sister of the deceased, who was produced C
by the accused as his defence witness, itself clinches the entire
issue and, therefore, the offence under Section 304-8 of the
Code is made out. It was also contended that an absolute
accuracy in the statement of witnesses is not a condition
precedent for conviction. He relied upon the following dictum
of the Court in Devi Lat's case (supra) : D
"25. Indisputably, before an accused is found guilty for
commission of an offence, the court must arrive at a finding
that the ingredients thereof have been established. The
statement of a witness for the said purpose must be read E
in its entirety. It is not necessary for a witness to make a
statement in consonance with the wording of the section
of a statute. What is needed is to find out as to whether
the evidences brought on record satisfy the ingredients
thereof." F
22. Now we may proceed to discuss the evidence led by
the prosecution in the present case. In order to bring the issues
raised within a narrow compass we may refer to the statement
of the accused made under Section 313, Cr.PC. It is a settled
principle of law that dual purpose is sought to be achieved G
when the Courts comply with the mandatory requirement of
recording the statement of an accused under this provision.
Firstly, every material piece of evidence which the prosecution
proposes to use against the accused should be put to him in
clear terms and secondly, t.he accused should have ·a fair H
A chance to give his explanation in relation to that evidence as
well as his own versions with regard to alleged involvement in
the crime. This dual purpose has to be achieved in the interest
of the proper administration of criminal justice and in
accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the
B statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be used by the
Court in so far as it corroborates the case of the prosecution.
Of course, conviction per se cannot be based upon the
statement ur;ider Section 313 of the Cr.PC.
23. Let us examine the essential features of this section
C and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments of this
Court, which are the guiding factor for proper application and
consequences which shall flow from the provisions of Section
313 of the Cr.PC. As already noticed, the object of recording
the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.PC
D is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to
provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating
circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the
prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward
his own version or reason&, if he so chooses, in relation to his
E involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been
empowered to examine the accused but only after the
prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory
obligation upon the Court and besides ensuring the compliance
thereof, the Court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a
F fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the
accused to maintain silence coupled with simplicitor denial or,
in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons, for his
alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the
statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the
G other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements
made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences
and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in
accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a
direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put
H every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1143
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such A
a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be
considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences
such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial.
Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept
and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of B
criminal jurisprudence. The statement of the accused can be
used to test the veracity of the exculpatory of the admission, if
any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration
in any, enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly an evidence in the
case. The provisions of Section 313 (4) of the Cr.PC explicitly c
provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken
into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in as evidence
for or against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any
other offence for which, such answers may tend to show he has
committed. In other words, the use of a statement under Section 0 313 of Cr.PC as an evidence is permissible as per the
provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The Courts
may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find
him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him
led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under
this Section should not be considered in isolation but in E
conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. Another
important caution that Courts have declared in the
pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be
based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the
Cr.PC as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of F
evidence. In the case of Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v.
State of Bombay [AIR 1953 SC 247], the Court held as under:
"3 ........... As the appellant admitted that he was in charge
of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. G
The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring
to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as
supporting the prosecution case concerning the
possession of the godown. The contention that. the
Magistrate made use of the inculpatcry pa"' nf the
A accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part
does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section
342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and
part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The
accused admitted that he was in charge of the godown,
B he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown.
He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This
part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution
evidence and had no intimate connection with the
statement concerning the possession of the godown."
24. From various answers given by the accused to the
Court in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C., it appears that the death of the deceased is not
disputed. The allegation with regard to cruelty was denied.
However, besides denying the case of the prosecution, the
D appellant took the stand that he was falsely implicated in the
crime. According to him, the deceased was not happy with the
marriage inasmuch as she was in love with some other boy and
wanted to marry him which was not permitted by her family and
that is why she committed suicide. As would be evident from
E this admitted position, the death of the deceased by burning
is not an issue. The limited question was whether the deceased
committed suicide simplicitor for the reasons given by the
accused or in the alternative, the prosecution story, that it was
a dowry death relatable to the harassment and cruelty inflicted
F upon her by the accused and his family members, is correct.
25. In the postmortem report it was noticed that the cause
of death was shock and dehydration which resulted from
extensive burn injuries, which were ante-mortem. The
postmortem report (Ex. PO) and the body sketch (Ex. P0/1)
G clearly demonstrate that practically the entire body had been
affected by the burn injuries. The prosecution had examined
Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased (PW-1), who stated
that immediately after the marriage of deceased with the
accused, both were living happily and he had given dowry
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1145
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
according to his capacity, but six months after her marriage, A
her husband and her in-laws started teasing her and giving
taunts that she had not brought T.V. and Fridge etc. in the dowry
and whenever she used to come to him ':!he menticne:d about
the same and 20 days prior to her death she had told him thai
she was being troubled for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- so that he!
husband could change to a new business and while consoling
her, he told her that he would arrange for the money in some
time and took her at the house of her in-laws 7-8 days prior to
8
her death. He also stated that Ashok Kumar, the accused,
Lajwanti, the mother-in-law of the deceased and Mukesh, c
brother-in"law of the deceased, used to give her beatings and
he had filed the complaint (Ex.PA). Ex.PB and Ex. PC were
the letters which he had given to the police, however, this
witness was cross-examined and confronted with Ex. PA,
where the. allegation about T.V. and Fridge etc. had not been 0 recorded. He voluntarily stated that his son-in-law (the accused)
used to deal in vegetables but he wanted to change to Kariyana
business, and that is why he wanted a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. Smt.
Krishna Rani, the mother of the deceased, was examined as
PW-2. She admitted that a child was born from the marriage. E
She had also corroborated the statement of PW 1. According
to her, Lajwanti told that the deceased had expired. Subhash
Chand (PW-3) stated that he had informed Harbans Lal (PW-
1) about the death of the deceased due to burn injuries and
stated that they (the husband of the deceased and her in-laws)
used to ill-treat the deceased and were demanding dowry.
However, he did not refer to the demand of Rs. 5,000/-, as
stated by other witnesses. To prove the case Karta Ram, SI
(PW-6), Darshan Lal, H.C. (PW-7), Ranbir Mohan, SI (PW-8),
the police officials, were also examined by the prosecution
apart from Kharati Lal, Kariyana Merchant (PW-4). Dr. Manjula G
Bansal, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Jind (PW-5), was
examined to prove the death of the deceased which was
caused by burn irijuries.
26. The accused had led defence and examined as many H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A as six witnesses. Dr. Bhushan Aggarwal, lncharge Swami
Salagram Ashram Charitable Hospital, Jind (DW-1) was
examined to primarily show that a child was born on 30th
August, 1987. Vijay Laxmi (DW-3) and Lekh Raj (DW-4) were
examined to show that there were no dowry demands and
B Harbans Lal, the father of the deceased had not complained
to them about the same at any point of time. But, the most
important witness examine by the accused was Vijay Laxmi
(DW-3), who is the daughter of Harbans Lal, aged about 14
years. She mentioned that the letter (Ex. DJ) was written by her
c and she stated that sometimes Ashok Kumar, the accused
used to take the deceased to her father's house. She admitted
that two days prior to writing of the letter (Ex. DJ), her sister
and sister's son had come to her house and she stated that .
whatever is written in the letter is correct. But, in her cross-
D examination, she stated as under:
"Whenever my sister visited our home after marriage, she
would complain that her husband and in-laws demanded
dowry and also they used to give her beating. She came
to our home 20 days prior to her death. At that time she
E told that her in-laws etc. were demanded a T.V. and
Rs.5,000/-. My father took her to her husband's home. My
sister was not suffering from my disease. She was h.iving
good health."
F 27. The above statement of this witness (DW-3) in cross-
examination, in fact, is clinching evidence and the accused can
hardly get out of this statement. The defence would be bound
by the statement of the witness, who has been produced by the
accused, whatever be its worth. In the present case, DW-3 has
G clearly stated that there was cruelty and harassment inflicted
upon the deceased by her husband and in-laws and also that
a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was demanded. The statement of this
witness has to be read in conjunction with the statement of PW-
1 to PW-3 to establish the case of the prosecution. There are
H certain variations or improvements in the statements of PWs
ASHOK KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA 1147
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
but all of them are of minor nature. Even if, for the sake of. A
argument, they are taken to be as some contradictions or
variations in substance, they are so insignificant and mild that
they would no way be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
28. This Court has to keep in mind the fact that the incident . 8 had occurred on 16.05.1988 while the witnesses were
examined after some time. Thus, it may not be possible for the
witnesses to make statements which would be absolute
reproduction of their earlier statement or line to line or minute
to minute correct reproduction of the occurrence/events. The C
Court has to adopt a reasonable and practicable approach and
it is only the material or serious contradictions/variations which
can be of some consequence to create a dent in the case of
the prosecution. Another aspect is that the statements of the
witnesses have to be read in their entirety to examine their
truthfulness and the veracity or otherwise. It will neither be just D
nor fair to pick up just a line from the entire statement and
appreciate that evidence out of context and without reference
to the preceding lines and lines appearing after that particular
sentence. It is always better and in the interest of both the
parties that the statements of the witnesses are appreciated E
and dealt with by the Court upon their cumulative reading.
29. As already noticed, the expression 'soon before her
death' has to be accorded its appropriate meaning in the facts
and circumstances of a given case. In the present case, there F
is definite evidence to show that nearly 20-22 days prior to her
death the deceased had come to her parental home and
informed her father about the demand of Rs. 5,000/- and
harassment and torture to which she was subjected to by the
accused and her in-laws. Her father had consoled her ensuring G
that he would try to arrange for the same and-thereafter took
her at her matrimonial home 7-8 days prior to the incident.
30. On face of the aforesaid evidence read in conjunction
with the statement of DW-3, we are convinced that ingredients
of Section 3048 have been satisfied in the present case. It was H
A for the accused to prove his defence. He had taken up the stand
that the deceased was in love with another boy and did not want
to marry the accused and the marriage of the deceased with
the accused being against her wishes was the real cause for
her to commit the suicide. However, he has led no evidence in
B this regard and thus, the Court cannot believe this version put
forward by the a::cused.
31. The argument raised on behalf of the appellant that
there was inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the
FIR is without any substance The incident occurred at 4.00 p.m.
C on 16.05.1988 whereafter the family of the deceased was
informed. It is a normal conduct of a normal person that the
entire concentration would be upon looking after and saving the
deceased rather than to run up to the police or other persons
instantaneously. Unfortunately, she died at 9.00 p.m. on the
D same day and the FIR was lodged on the next day i.e. on
17.05.1988. The purpose of raising such a contention is to show
and prove that there was a planned effort on the part of the
complainant or the prosecution to falsely implicate the accused.
Here, such a situation does not exist. We have already noticed
E that the complaint (Ex.PA) has been lodged resulting in
registration of FIR (Ex. PU) at 7.30 p.m. on 17.05.1988 which
obviously means that the complainant had reached the police
station even prior thereto. The conduct of the complainant and
the witnesses is in line with the behaviour of a person of common
F prudeflce and the facts and circumstances of the case clearly
demonstrate proper exercise of due diligence on the part of
these witnesses. Firstly, the complainant family got the
information of the death of the deceased from a relative named
Subhash Chand (PW-3) and, thereafter, they must have tried
G to get the body subjected to the postmortem and have the
same released for performing the last rites. The incident
occurred on 16.05.1988 and the FIR was registered on
17.05.1988, therefore, there was no abnormal or inordinate
delay in lodging the FIR in the facts of this case. Even if we
H presume the delay, it is not of such a nature that would entail
ASHOK KUMAR v. S"l"ATE OF HARYANA 1149
[SWATANTER .KUMAR, J.J
any benefit to the accused. Thus, in our view, there is no A
inordinate or unexplained delay in lodging the FIR.
32. Having found no infirmity in the concurrent judgments
of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court, we see no
reason to interfere in these judgments in law or on facts. Thus, 8 we sustain the conviction of the accused.
33. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment,
there are few factors of which we must take note of. It is not
even the case of the prosecution that atthe time of occurrence,
the accused-appellant was present at home and he fatted to C
protect or save the deceased from burning which caused her
death. Secondly, the marriage itself has surv\ved for a short
period of nearly one and a half year. The cruelty and
harassment to the deceased was stated to be caused by
Lajwanti, the mother in law of the deceased and Mukesh, the D
brother in law of the deceased. As already noticed, Lajwanti
and Mukesh have been acquitted by the High Court for total
lack of evidence. Neither the State nor the complainant has
preferred an appeal against judgment of acquittal. The accused
is a young person of 48 years. Keeping in view the facts and E
circumstances of the case and in exercise of powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice,
we are of the considered view that ends of justice would be
met by awarding him the minimum sentence provided in law,
i.e. 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. Resultantly, the appeal F
is partially accepted and the accused-appellant is awarded
sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment for an offence under
Section 304-8 of the Code.
34. The appeal is disposed off in the above terms.
35. The accused is on bail. His bail bonds and surety stand
discharged. He be taken into custody to undergo the remaining
period of his sentence.
R.P. Appeal partly allow~d.