Jayanta Sil v. State of Assam
ORDER
This is a statutory appeal arising out of the judgment of the
F High Court dated 5th January, 2007.
The prosecution story is as under:
At about 10.00 p.m. on 28th August 1994 Jayanta Sil the
G appellant and Dimbeswar Sil (since acquitted) were returning
from the house of Kripa Das after attending a feast. They were
also accompanied by the deceased Kandarpa and as the three
were near the house of the deceased on PWD Road the
appellant assaulted the deceased with a sharp cutting weapon.
Hearing the cries of the deceased, the complainant, PW.1-
JAYANTA SIL v. STATE OF ASSAM 617
Bhadrata Das, the wife of the deceased, came out from her A
house and saw the accused running away. Her shouts attracted
several other persons to the spot including Mridul Das-PW.5
and Daya Chand-PW.6 who too saw the accused running away.
It also appears that soon after the incident Biswajit Das- 8
PW.2 and Uday Dutta-PW.3 also reached the place from their
houses some distance away and they too were told by PW.1
as to what had transpired. The evidence further is that Jayant,
the appellant herein, rushed to the house of Nisikanta-PW.11
in the same village and requested him to let him stay for the C
night and when he left early the next day, PW.11 saw that he
had left behind a khukri and a torch. The appellant and
Dimbeshwar were accordingly brought to trial for an offence
punishable under Sec.302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The
Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence held that the
statement of PW.1 could not be taken at its face value as there D
were discrepancies in her statement made in the FIR vis.-a-
vis. the statement in Court and it appeared that she had not in
fact seen the incident nor had seen the accused running away
after committing the murder. Likewise it was held that the
statements of PW.5 and PW.6 could not be believed as they E
were not eye-witnesses and were not clear as to the exact
place where the incident had happened as there appeared to
be some uncertainty as to whether it had taken place outside
the house of the deceased or on the road opposite the gate.
The Trial Court also opined that it was not believable that an F
accused would hang around long enough so that he could be
identified by PWs 5 and 6 as this was against normal human
conduct. It was further held that the story with regard to the
recovery of a torch and the khukry from the house of PW.11
could not be believed more particularly as the weapon had not G
been sent to the laboratory to find out if it bore any bloodstains.
The Trial Court accordingly acquitted the accused.
An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court. The High
Court has, by the impugned judgment, upheld the judgment of H
A acquittal with respect to Dimbeswar Sil but has reversed the
judgment qua the appellant and convicted and sentenced him
herein for an offence punishable under Section 302. The High
Court has held that there was no reason whatsoever to
disbelieve PW.1 or PWs. 5 and 6 as they had no animus against
B the accused. The High Court also observed that positive
prosecution story was that the appellant had used a cutting
weapon to cut the neck of the deceased and the medical
evidence was that the major structures in the neck including the
carotid artery and jugular vein, the trachea etc. had been cut
c through and through.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We see
that PW.1 is the wife of the deceased. Admittedly she had no
animus against the appellant and had been attracted to the
place after hearing her husband's cries for help. We have also
D seen the site plan and find that the occurrence took place on
the road virtually opposite the house of the deceased. In this
situation it would make no difference if it was near the gate or
on the main PWD road as it is the admitted position that the
incident had happened right outside the house belonging to the
E deceased.
The presence of the PWs. 5 and 6 cannot also be doubted.
The deceased as well as these two witnesses had attended
the Shradh feast and the murder had taken place as all three
F were returning from that place. We have also gone through the
evidence of PWs 5 and 6 and find that there is no suggestion
of any kind of animus or rancour between the appellant and
them. The statements of these three witnesses are further
corroborated by the statement of PWs 2 and 3 to whom PW.1
G had given the information and told them that the appellant and
Dimbeshwar had murdered her husband. The statement of
PW.11 is equally important even if the recovery of the torch or
the alleged murder weapon is ruled out there is absolutely no
doubt that his statement with regard to the visit of the appellant
H to his house late at night with a request that he be allowed to
JAYANTA SIL v. STATE OF ASSAM 619
stay on cannot be disbelieved. This was indeed a strange A
request as we find that the appellant and PW.11 belonged to
the same village and there is no plausible explanation as to why
the appellant chose to stay for the night in the house of PW.11
and not to return to his own house a short distance away.
Mr. Soumyajit Pani the learned counsel for the appellant 8
has however cited Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh [(2009) 11 sec 334] to contend that if two views were
possible on the evidence and the Trial Court had taken one in
favour of an accused the High Court would ordinarily not be
justified in interfering in the matter. It has been pleaded that the C
Trial Court had on a deep consideration of the evidence taken
a decision and acquitted the accused and a contrary opinion
was thus not called for. As against this learned State counsel
has pointed out that it was equally well settled that while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal, the High Court was fully D
justified in reappraising the evidence and to interfere if the view
taken by the Trial Court was not possible on the evidence and
was on the contrary perverse and not to do so would amount
to a miscarriage of justice, and that the interests of the accused
as well as the interest of the State and the prosecution must E
be balanced in such matters.
From a perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court we find
that the view taken by the Trial Court was not justified on the
evidence. The Trial Court has completely misread the F
implication of the evidence given by five witnesses, three of
them were virtually eye witnesses and two of them being totally
independent. The prosecution evidence is further corroborated
by the Doctor's evidence that the neck had been almost
severed from the body by a cutting weapon such as a khukri.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.