State of M.P. v. Ramesh and Anr.
A DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the judgment and
order dated 31.3.2004 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur (Gwalior Bench) in Criminal Appeal No.
262 of 1997, reversing the judgment and order dated
B 16.8.1996 passed by the Sessions Court, Guna in Sessions
Trial No. 155/1995, convicting the respondent No.1 under
Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as
'IPC') and respondent No.2 under Section 302 read with
Section 120-B IPC, and sentencing them to life imprisonment.
2. FACTUAL MATRIX:
(A) Respondent No.2 Bhaggo Bai filed an FIR dated
31.1.1995 in Police Station, Ashok Nagar, mentioning her
name as Madhav Bai stating that her husband Chatra died
after falling during a spell of giddiness at about 11.00 p.m.
In respect of the same incident, another complaint was
lodged by Munna Lal (PW.2) along with Ran nu Bai (PW.1 ),
daughter of deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai, aged about
8 years stating that both the respondents-accused had
murdered Chatra. After having a preliminary investigation,
the Investigating Officer arrested respondent No.2 Bhaggo
Bai and lodged the FIR formally on 4.2.1995.
(B) After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was
filed against both the accused for committing the murder
of Chatra. A large number of witnesses were examined by
the prosecution. Both the respondents-accused examined
themselves as defence witnesses alongwith some other
witnesses. After concluding the trial, both the respondents
accused were convicted and sentenced, as mentioned
hereinabove, by the Sessions Judge vide judgment and
order dated 16.8.1996.
(C) Being aggrieved, both the respondents -accused filed
Criminal Appeal No.262/1997 which has been allowed by
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 11
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the impugned judgment and order and both of them stood A
acquitted. Hence, this appeal.
3. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant-State, has submitted that the judgment and order
of the High Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High 8 Court has gravely erred in showing unwarranted sympathy
towards the accused and dis-believed ·the prosecution case
brushing aside the statement of Ran nu Bai (PW.1 ), merely
being a child witness and pointing out that there was
contradiction in the medical and ocular evidence regarding the
injuries found on the person of Chatra, deceased. The High C
Court further erred in holding that there was enmity between the
accused Bhaggo Bai and Ramesh. At the time of death of
Chatra, Ramesh accused was facing trial for committing rape
on Bhagoo Bai; thus, question of conspiracy between the said
two accused could not arise; several cases were also pending D
in different courts between Munna Lal (PW.2) and his wife
Kusum Bai on one hand, and Chatra and Bhaggo Bai on the
other hand. Thus, there was a possibility of false implication of
Ramesh accused. Chatra died because of a fall when he went
to urinate, as he was suffering from giddiness all the time · E
because he used to take 'dhatura' and had become a Lunatic.
Chatra used to eat soil etc. Rannu Bai (PW.1) though a child,
was able to understand the questions put to her and her duty
to speak the truth. She could not have any enmity with either of
the accused. The rape case filed by deceased Chatra and F
Bhaggo Bai against accused Ramesh remained pending for
a long time and Ramesh got acquitted after the death of
Chatra, deceased. The Trial Court after appreciating the
documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that
accused Ramesh committed rape upon Bhaggo Bai during the G
period between 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994. In fact, they were
having illicit relationship for a period of more than 3 years. The
High Court brushed aside the said finding without giving any
cogent reason. The allegation that Ran nu Bai (PW.1) had been
tutored by Munna Lal (PW.2) could not be spelled out from her H
A statement. The neighbours had come at the place of
occurrence after being called by Rannu Bai (PW.1) and Munna
Lal (PW.2). In spite of the fact that some of them had declared
hostile, part of their evidence still could be relied upon in support
of the prosecution case. Therefore, the judgment and order of
B the High Court, impugned is liable to be set aside, and appeal
deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Ms. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents, has submitted that the facts and
C circumstances of the case do not warrant interference by this
Court against the judgment and order of acquittal by the High
Court. The High Court being the first appellate court and the
final court of facts had appreciated the entire evidence on
record and came to the conclusion that it was not possible that
Bhaggo Bai could have hatched a conspiracy with Ramesh
D accused for committing the murder of her husband Chatra
during the pendency of the case filed by her against Ramesh
under Section 376 IPC. Munna Lal (PW.2), his wife and son
had also assaulted the deceased Chatra and Bhaggo Bai,
accused and wanted to grab their property and so many civil
E and criminal cases were pending between them, his evidence
cannot be relied upon. As per the medical evidence, it was
possible that the injuries suffered by Chatra could have been
received by fall caused by giddiness. More so, Chatra had
become a lunatic and could not understand right or wrong. The
F testimony of Ran nu Bai (PW.1 ), has been rightly dis-believed
by the High Court as she had been tutored by Munna Lal
(PW.2). Admittedly, she had been living with him since the
death of her father Chatra. The High Court has rightly believed
the defence version and appreciated the depositions of defence
G witnesses, including Radha Bai (D.W.1 ), elder daughter of
Bhaggo Bai accused, in the correct perspective. The appeal
lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
H learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR.
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
CHILD WITNESS:
13
6. In Rameshwar S/o Kalyan Singh v. The State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, this Court examined the
provisions of Section 5 of Indian Oaths Act, 1873 and Section
118 of Evidence Act, 1872 and held that every witness is 8 competent to depose unless the court considers that he is
prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from
giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme old
age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of
the same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the C
Court considers otherwise.
The Court further held as under:
" ..... It is desirable that Judges and magistrates should
always record their opinion that the child understands the D
duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that,
otherwise the credibility of the witness may be seriously
affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be
necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether
the Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I E
think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is
no formal certificate .... "
7. In Mangoo & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1995 SC 959, this Court while dealing with the evidence of a
child witness observed that there was always scope to tutor the F
child, however, it cannot alone be a ground to come to the
conclusion that the child witness must have been tutored. The
Court must determine as to whether the child has been tutored
or not. It can be ascertained by examining the evidence and
from the contents thereof as to whether there are any traces of G
tutoring.
8. In Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1998 SC 2726,
this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its
earlier judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness H
A must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on.
However, it is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law. It
cannot be held that "the evidence of a child witness would
always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a
witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is
B found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must
be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection
because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others
tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring."
9. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate & Ors. v. State of
C Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460, this Court dealing with the
child witness has observed as under:
"The decision on the question whether the child
witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the
trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent
possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may
resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his
capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court
may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what
is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion
was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child
witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world
of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that
child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are
pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and
moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful
scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion
that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle
in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness."
10. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able
to discern between right and wrong and the court may find out
from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could
bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 15
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
between right and wrong. The court may ascertain his suitability A
as a witness by putting questions to him and even if no such
questions had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence
as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he
was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff
cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand B
the sanctity of giving evidence on a oath and the import of the
questions that were being put to him. (Vide: Himmat Sukhadeo
Wahurwagh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC
2292).
11. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors., AIR 2010 C
SC 3071, this C:::ourt held that there is no principle of law that it
is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able
to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always
receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and
would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child D
may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked
about the same in the future. In case the child explains the
relevant events of the crime without improvements or
embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the Court,
his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. E
The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or
ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something
on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone wrong
between the date of incident and recording evidence of the
child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the F
accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.
12. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored,
can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from
untutored part, in case such remaining untutored part inspires
confidence. In such an eventuality the untutored part can be G.
believed or at least taken into consideration for the purpose of
corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness. (Vide: Gagan
Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516).
A 13. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarized to the effect that the deposition of a child witness
may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires
the confidence of the court and there is no embellishment or
improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The
B evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully
with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to
tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that
a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement
partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has
c been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his
deposition.
APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL:
14. We are fully alive of the fact that we are dealing with
D an appeal against acquittal and in the absence of perversity in
the said judgment and order, interference by this Court
exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. It is
settled proposition of law that the appellate court being the final
court of fact is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and
E review the evidence and take its own decision. Law does not
prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own
conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for
presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of
F innocence is available to the person and in criminal
jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless
he is proved guilty by the competent court and there can be no
quarrel to the said legal proposition that if two reasonable
views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
·G appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal.
INJURIES:
15. Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) has performed Post Mortem of
Chatra, deceased. He found following injuries on his person
H vide Post Mortem Report Ex.P-8:
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 17
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(i) A contusion of size 1 cm x 1 cm on the L of A
mandible on right side with an abrasion on upper
part of contusion 1 cm x 0.3 cm obliquely. Sub-
cutaneous haemorrhage present.
(ii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1-1/2" below B
the above contusion over neck. Sub-cutaneous
haemorrhage present.
(iii) An abrasion of size 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm 1.5 cm below
and lateral to L of mandible right on neck.
(iv) An a~rasion of size 3.5 cm x 0.5 cm over left side
of neck posterior laterally on upper part,
transversely oblique going upwards. Sub-cutaneous
haemorrhage present.
(v) A contusion over lower lip right side near to L of D
mouth of size 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm sub-cutaneous
haemorrhage present.
(vi) An abrasion over right shoulder posterior laterally
of size 4 cm x 1.5 cm post mortem in nature. E
Dr. D.K. Jain (P.W.8) opined that injury No.(vi) was after
the death. On internal examination, he found the right pleura
adherent to lung parietes. Both the lungs were enlarged. On
further dissection, he found a sub-cuta~eous haemorrhage F
present in supra sternal notch area. Blood mixed fluid with froth
stood discharged through mouth and noise. According to the
doctor, cause of death was on account of 'asphyxia' as a result
of throttling. No piece of cloth or thread was found inside the
mouth of the deceased. The deceased had an ailment of the G
lungs.
16. The Trial Court after considering the entire evidence
on record came to the conclusion that the injuries found on the
person of the deceased could not have been received from a
fall on the ground. The injuries found on his body are in H
A consonance with the deposition of Rannu Bai (P.W.1 ), who has
stated that after hearing the noise, she woke up and saw that
accused Ramesh was beating her father with "Gumma" (a hard
object made of cloth), and her mother had caught hold of the
deceased by his legs. The doctor had found that blood had
B oozed from his mouth and such injury could be possible as per
the case of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, Munna Lal (PW.2)
has deposed that Ramesh had caused injuries with the knife.
The High Court has given undue weightage to his statement.
In fact, as per the prosecution case, Munna Lal (PW.2) was not
C an eye witness. He was called by Rannu Bai (PW.1) and
reached the place of occurrence along with some other
persons.
17. In Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507, this
0 Court has explained the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 observing that it is an exception to the general rule
whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible.
However, such evidence must be almost contemporaneous with
the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow
E fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore,
as forming part of res gestae, must have been made
contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The
essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue,
is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the
same transaction" that it becomes relevant by itself.
18. Applying the ratio of the said judgment to the evidence
of Munna Lal (PW.2), we reach the conclusion that his statement
indicating that Rannu Bai (PW.1) had come to him and told that
her father was beaten by Ramesh with the help of her mother,
G is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
19. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents has drawn our attention to certain minor
contradictions in the statement of Ran nu Bai (PW.1) and Munna
H Lal (PW.2). She has placed a very heavy reliance on the
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 19
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
statement of Rannu Bai (PW.1) that first she had gon.e to the A
house of her grandfather Lala and the trial Court committed an
error reading it as Munna Lal (PW.2). In view of the fact that
Bhaggo Bai, respondent/accused herself stated in her cross
examination while being examined under Section 315 Cr.P.C.
that she had sent Rannu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna Lal (PW.2), B
such argument looses the significance. Even otherwise, the
omissions/contradictions pointed out by Mrs. K. Sarada Devi
are of trivial nature and are certainly not of such a magnitude
that may materially affect the core of the prosecution case.
20. The witness examined by the prosecution supported C
its case to the extent that the door of the room wherein the
offence had been committed was bolted from inside. It was only
when Ram Bharose, village Watchman (P.W.5) threatened
Bhaggo Bai, accused saying he would call the police, the door
was opened and, by that time, accused Ramesh had left the D
place of occurrence and Chatra had died. Thus, there is no
conflict between the medical and ocular evidence. The
prosecution case is fully supported by Ram Bharose (PW.5)
and partly supported by Hannu (PW.7) and Anand Lal (PW.3).
Even the part of the depositions of hostile witnesses, particularly E
Basori Lal, Sarpanch (PW.4) can be relied upon to the extent
that on being called, he reached the place of occurrence and
found that the room had been bolted from inside. It is also
evident from the evidence on record that Rannu Bai (PW.1) and
Munna Lal (PW.2) had called the persons from their houses F
and after their arrival, they found that the room had been bolted
from inside. So to that extent, the version of these witnesses
including of the hostile witnesses, can be believed and relied
upon. The post mortem report clearly explained that Chatra died
of 'Asphyxia' and this version has been fully supported by Dr G
D.K. Jain (PW.8).
21. Bhaggo Bai, accused/respondent has admitted in her
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as 'Cr.P.C.') that Rannu Bai
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.
A (PW.1) was present inside the room/place of occurrence and
she further admitted that Rannu Bai, (PW.1) had gone to call
Munna Lal (PW.2) at the relevant time. Thus, it is evident from
the aforesaid admission of the said accused itself that both the
persons were present inside the room and are well aware of
B the incident.
22. Undoubtedly, there had been some minor
contradictions in the statements of witnesses in regard to the
fact as to who had reached the place of occurrence first. All
C the witnesses have affirmed in one voice that Munna Lal (P.W.2)
had entered the room and after coming out, he disclosed that
Chatra has died. In fact, this fact had been affirmed by all the
witnesses. In view of the contradictions in the statements of
witnesses as to whether torch was used to create artificial light
in the room or not to find out the scene therein, becomes
D immaterial. It is evident from the material available on record
that there was only one room house where the incident took
place and no other space was available. Thus, in case the other
witnesses had not deposed that Radha Bai (D.W.1) was also
present in the house along with accused Bhaggo Bai, remains
E immaterial for the reason that her presence is natural.
23. The Trial Court after taking note of rulings of various
judgments of this Court as what are the essential requirements
to accept the testimony of a child witness held as under:
"In the present case, statement of child witness gets
affirmed by the circumstances of the incident, facts and
from the activities of the other witnesses carried out by
them on reaching at the place of occurrence. Thus, on the
basis of above-said law precedents, statement of witness
Rannu Bai not being unreliable in my opinion are absolutely
true and correct. ..... Statement of child witness Ran nu Bai
gets affirmed by the statements of Munna and witness
Hannu and from the medical evidence. Therefore, facts of
the above-stated law precedents are not applicable to the
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR.
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
present case."
21
In view of the above, it is evident that the statement of
Rannu Bai (P.W.1) is affirmed by the statements of other
witnesses, proved circumstances and medical evidence. Her
deposition being precise, concise, specific and vivid without B
any improvement or embroidery is worth acceptance in toto.
24. A very heavy reliance has been placed by defence
counsel Ms. K. Sarada Devi on the statements of defence
witnesses, particularly, Radha Bai (D.W.1). However, it may be
relevant to point out the initial part of her statement made in C
examination-in-chief:
"In view of the witness's age before she was sworn
she was asked as under:
a. Are you literate? Have you gone to school for
reading?
A. No.
Q. Do you understand right or wrong?
A. I do not understand.
Q. Do you understand Saugandh or Sau (Oath or
hundred)
A. I do not know.
Considering the said answers of the witness it
appears that the witness does not understand right, wrong
or oath, therefore the witness was not sworn.•
(Emphasis added)
In view of the above, we are of the view that it cannot be
safe to rely upon her evidence at all.
A 25. So far as the deposition of Budha (DW.2). father of
Bhaggo Bai, accused, is concerned, he was 80 years of age
at the time of examination and not the resident of the same
village. He has deposed only on the basis of the information
he had received from his daughter Bhaggo Bai, accused. Thus.
B he is not of any help to the defence as we see no reason to
believe the theory put forward by the defence.
26. Complaint was lodged promptly at 6.00 a.m. on
1.2.1995 in the Police Station, Ashok Nagar at a distance of
C 8.00 K.Ms. It may also be relevant to mention herein that formal
FIR was lodged on 4.2.1995 after having preliminary
investigation and arresting Bhaggo Bai accused. Bhaggo Bai
herself has reached the Police Station and lodged the complaint
that her husband Chatra died because of falling from giddiness
when he went to ease himself outside the house. This version
D has been dis-believed by the 1.0. as well as by the Trial Court.
In our considered opinion, Bhagoo Bai would not have moved
in the night for 8 K.Ms. to lodge the FIR, if she was not at fault
or having a guilty mind. Secondly, she lodged the complaint in
the name of Madhav Bai and not in her own name Bhaggo Bai.
27. The cumulative effect of reading the provisions of
Article 20(3) of the Constitution with Sections 161(2); 313(3);
and proviso (b) to Section 315 Cr.P.C. remains that in India,
law provides for the rule against adverse inference from silence
F of the accused.
Statement of the accused made under Section 313
Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration to appreciate the
truthfulness or otherwise of the prosecution case. However, as
such a statement is not recorded after administration of oath
G and the accused cannot be cross-examined, his statement so
recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can not be treated to be
· evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act,
' 1872.
H Section 315 Cr.P.C. enables an accused to give evidence
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 23
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
on his own behalf to disprove the charges made against him. A
However, for such a course, the accused has to offer in writing
to give his evidence in defence. Thus, the accused becomes
ready to enter into the witness box, to take oath and to be cross
exa mined on behalf of the prosecution and/or of the
accomplice, if it is so required. (Vide: Tukaram G. Gaokar v. B
R.N. Shukla & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1050; and Deha/ Singh v.
State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 85).
In such a fact-situation, the accused being a competent
witness, can depose in his defence and his evidence can be c
considered and relied upon while deciding the case.
28. Bhaggo Bai, accused examined herself as a defence
witness (DW.3) and entered into the witness box. She has also
been cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as
0 on behalf of co-accused Ramesh. Bhaggo Bai/accused (DW.3)
deposed that accused Ramesh had committed rape upon her
6 years ago and in that case, criminal prosecution was launched
against him. She has further deposed that after her husband
Chatra fell from giddiness, she had brought him inside the room
with the help of her elder daughter Radha Bai (DW;1) and put E
him on the bed. She herself sent her younger daughter Rannu
Bai (PW.1) to call Munna. Murn1a came and saw Chatra. The
relevant part of her deposition reads as under:
" ... Then he (Munna) bolted the door from outside. He F
called the watchman. The watchman and Munna seeing me
in the room went to the police station ..... It is right that for
the last 8-10 years, I, Chatra and Munna had no contact
with Ramesh ..... ! got my name to be written as Bhaggo
Bai at the time of report Ext.D-7. My name is not Madhav G
Bai. The Policemen recorded the report in the name of
Madhav Bai. I sent Rannu Bai to call Munna because
Munna was my husband's elder brother.
A Q.17 Had you illicit and immoral relations with the accused
Ramesh when Chatra was alive?
A. What can I say?
Q. We are saying that you had given twisting statement in
a rape case on which the accused Ramesh was
acquitted?
c A. I gave statement."
Her aforesaid statement is not worth acceptance for the
reason that all the witnesses including those who turned hostile
had admitted that the room was bolted from inside and her
statement that Munna had bolted the room from outside has not
D been corroborated by any person. In case she and her husband
Chatra were not having any relation with Munna (PW.2) for the
last 8-10 years, it would be un-natural that she would send her
daughter Ran nu Bai (PW.1) to call Munna because he was her
husband's elder brother. While lodging report Ext. D-7 she told
E her name as Madhav Bai. However, in cross-examination she
has stated that police men recorded her name as Madhav Bai
though her name is Bhaggo Bai. More so, she has not
specifically denied having illicit relationship with Ramesh
accused, nor she has denied that she made a twisting
F statement to help the accused Ramesh to get acquitted in the
rape case.
29. The Trial Court after examining the entire material on
record, particularly the documentary evidence came to the
G conclusion as under:
"43 .... lt appears on viewing all the above documents Exh.
D-8 to D-42 that all these documents are related to incident
of rape of Bhaggo Bai committed by accused Ramesh for
the period 24.6.1991 to 17.9.1994 ... "
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESH AND ANR. 25
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
The High Court did not deal with this aspect at all. A
30. All the witnesses examined by the prosecution
including those who have turned hostile are admittedly the
neighbours of Chatra deceased and Munna Lal. Thus, they are
the most natural witnesses and the Trial Court has rightly placed 8
relianc~ on their testimonies.
31. After appreciating the entire evidence on record, we
came to the inescapable conclusion that the High Court has
completely ignored the most material incriminating
circumstances which appeared against the respondents/ C
accused. The findings so recorded by the High Court are
contrary to the evidence on record and thus, are held to be
perverse.
32. In view of the above, the appeal deserves to be allowed D
and it is hereby allowed. The judgment and order of the High
Court dated 31.3.2004 in Criminal Appeal No.262 of 1997 is
hereby set aside and the judgment and order of the trial Court
dated 16.8.1996 convicting the respondents/accused under
Section 302 I PC in Sessions Trial No.155/1995 is hereby E
restored. A copy of the judgment be sent to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Guna, M.P. to take the said respondents into
custody and to send them to jail to serve the remaining part of
the sentence.
B.B.B. Appeal allowed. F