Suba Singh & Anr. v. Davinder Kaur & Anr.
AFTAB ALAM, J. 1. This appeal by special leave arises
from a suit for,damages filed by the plaintiffs-respondents, the
widow ancl the minor daughter of one Surinder Singh, claiming
H a sum of rupees three lakhs as damages from the defendants-
SUBA SINGH & ANR. v. DAVINDER KAUR & ANR. 221
[AFTAB ALAM, J.]
appellants for causing the death of Surinder Singh by their A
wrongful act.
2. In an occurrence that took place on July 1, 1991,
Surinder Singh died as a result of gun shot injuries. An F.l.R
(no.166) was lodged by his father Balbir Singh, under sections 8
302/307/ 34 of the Penal Code and section 25/27 of the Arms
Act in which the two appellants, Suba Singh and Shingara
Singh, father and son respectively, were named as accused.
3. On November 16, 1991, respondent no.1 filed a suit on
behalf of herself and on behalf of her minor daughter, who was C
at that time about 4-5 years old, against the defendants
appellants claiming damages for the death of her husband and
the father of the young child. In the plaint, it was alleged that
Suba Singh and his son Shingara Singh had committed the
murder of Surinder Singh. Shingara Singh came to the place D
of occurrence armed with the licensed gun of his father and
urged by him, he fired a shot killing Surinder Singh on the spot.
At the time of death, the age of Surinder Singh was about 25
years. He was a peasant and a motor vehicle driver by vocation.
As a professional driver, he was in private service of certain e
persons named in the plaint. He also used to help his father in
agricultural operations and his income from all the sources was
about Rs.16,000/- per annum. It was stated that after the death
of Surinder Singh, the plaintiffs did not have any source of
income to maintain themselves. Hence, the claim for F
compensation by way of damages of rupees three lakhs from
the defendants.
4. The defendants contested the suit questioning its
maintainability. They denied the allegations made in the plaint
and stated that they were in no way responsible for causing the G
death of Surinder Singh. It was alleged that Surinder Singh
claimed the common wall between their houses and at the time
of the occurrence he was throwing brickbats at the defendants
causing injuries to them. In that situation Suba Singh fired a shot
A and a stray pellet hit Surinder Singh who was sitting on the wall,
resulting in his death.
5. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants were
tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa, in Sessions Trial
8 No.46 of 1991 .• charged variously of offences under sections
302, 307, 302/34, 307/34 IPC and under section 25/27 of the
Arms Act. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by his
judgment and order dated March 6, 1992, acquitted Shingara
Singh of all the charges leveled against him but found Suba
C Singh guilty of the offence under section 304 Part-I, holding that
he had exceeded his right of private defence. Accordingly, he
sentenced Suba Singh to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years
and a fine of Rs.50,000/- and in default, to rigorous
imprisonment for a further period of 2 years. The matter was
taken to the High Court in appeals preferred both by the State
D and by Suba Singh besides a revision preferred by the
informant Balbir Singh, the father of the deceased. The High
Court by a common judgment and order allowed the appeal
filed by the State and held Shingara Sin~h guilty of the offence
u'nder section 302 and 307 of the Penal Code. Suba Singh was
E found guilty and convicted under sections 302/34, 307/34 of the
Penal Code. Shingara Singh was also found guilty of the
offence under section 27 of the Arms Act. Both, Suba Singh
and Shingara Singh were sentenced to life imprisonment and
to pay fines with default clauses.
6. While the suit was pending before the trial court, the
widow of Surinder Singh plaintiff no.1 got married to his younger
brother in the year 1998 and from him, she has two children.
7. On November 27, 1999, the learned Civil Judge, Sirsa
G (Haryana) decreed the suit and awarded compensation of
rupees three lakhs to the plaintiffs-respondents along with
interest @ 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit.
The appellants filed an appeal (Civil Appeal No.191/1999)
before the District Judge, The District Judge partly allowed the
H appeal and by judgment dated March 7, 2002 reduced the
SUSA SINGH & ANR. v. DAVINDER KAUR & ANR. 223
[AFTAB ALAM, J.]
amount of compensation from rupees three lakhs to rupees two A
lakhs, thirty two thousand seven hundred, leaving the rate of
interest unchanged. The appellants took the matter in second
appeal before the High Court but the same was dismissed by
the impugned judgment and order, dated October 3, 2002,
holding that it did not raise any substantial question of law. The s
matter is now brought before this Court by grant of special leave.
8. To complete the facts it may be stated that shortly after
leave was granted in the present appeal, the appellants'
criminal appeals against the judgment and order passed by the C
Punjab and Haryana High Court (registered as Criminal Appeal
Nos.682-683 of 1996 with Criminal Appeal Nos.1345-1347 of
2003) came to be heard by this Court. By the judgment and
order dated November 4, 2003, the appeal of Shingara Singh
was allowed and he was acquitted of all the charges and the
conviction of Suba Singh was converted from one under section D
302 to section 304 Part I of the Penal Code. In other words,
this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored
the judgment passed by the trial court, though giving Suba
Singh a reduced sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment
and a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to E
further imprisonment for a period of 1 year.
9. Now, coming back to the present appeal, the judgments
of the High Court and the courts below were assailed by the
counsel for the appellants on the plea of double jeopardy. It was
submitted that the appellants were being punished twice over
for the same offence. Learned counsel also referred to section
357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submitted that there
being a specific provision there for payment of compensation,
a suit for damages would not be maintainable.
10. The rule against double jeopardy is contained in sub
article (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India which
mandates that "no person shall be prosecuted and punished
for the same offence more th~n once". Now, it is elementary
that an action for civil damage~ is not prosecution and a decree H
A of damages is not a punishment. The rule of double jeopardy,
therefore, has no application to this case.
11. The submission based on section 357 of the Cr.P.C.
is equally without substance. Section 357 of the Code reads
8 as under:
"357. Order to pay compensation.- (1) When a Court
imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a
sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court
may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part
C of the fine recovered to be applied-
(a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the
prosecution;
(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any
loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation .
is, in the opinion, of the Court, recoverable by such person
in a Civil Court;
(c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having
caused the death of another person or of having abetted
the commission of such an offence, in paying
compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 (13. of 1855), entitled to recover
damages from the person sentenced for the loss
resulting to them from such death; ,,
(d) when any person is convicted of any offence which
includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach
of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received or
retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of,
stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the
same to be stolen, in compensating any bona fide
purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such
property is restored to the possession of the person
entitled thereto.
SUSA SINGH & ANR. v. DAVINDER KAUR & ANR. 225
[AFTAB ALAM, J.]
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to A
appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period
allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or if an
appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal.
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does 8 not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment,
order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation
such amount as may be specified in the order to the
person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of
the act for which the accused person has been so C
sentenced.
(4) An order under this section may also be made by an
Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session
when exercising its powers of revision.
(5) At the time of awarding compensation in any
subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the
Court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered
as compensation under this section."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The contention made on behalf of the appellants is fully
answered by clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) and sub~
section (5) of section 357 of the Code. In those provisions there
is a clear and explicit recognition of a civil suit at the instance F
of the dependents of a person killed, against his/her killers. In
sub-section (1)(c) of section 357 there is clear indication that
apart from the punishment of fine, the person convicted of any
offence of having caused the death of another person or of
having abetted the commission of such an offence may also G
be liable to face a civil action for damages under the Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855 in a suit for damages and sub-section (5)
of section 357 of the Code makes it all the more clear by
stipulating that at the time of awarding compensation in a
subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter the court shall H
A take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation
under that section.
13. In the end, counsel for the appellants, rather feebly
submitted that the widow of Surinder Singh was not entitled to
8 any compensation because she had remarried during the
pendency of the suit. We find no substance in this submission
either. It may be noted that the first appellate court has taken
the sum of Rs.12,400/- as the annual input by the deceased
towards the maintenance of his wife and the minor child. The
C remarriage of plaintiff no.1 took place after seven years of filing
of the suit. The amount of compensation reckoned for 7 years
at the rate of Rs.12,400/-per annum would be Rs.86,800/-. The
balance being Rs.1,45,900/-, would be a modest and
reasonable amount as compensation for defendant no.2, the
minor child of the deceased till she attained majority and got
D married. We, therefore, see no scope for any interference with
the amount of compensation awarded by the first appellate
court.
14. It is indeed true that the courts below have awarded
E interest at the rather higher rate of 12% per annum. In the facts
of the case, we are satisfied that simple interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till payment
would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly, modify and
reduce the rate of interest to 6% per annum.
F 15. Having, thus, considered and disposed of all the
contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, we would like
to advert to another issue that is a cause of no little concern to
us.
G 16. We are constrained to observe that a suit for damages
for murder of a person, like the present one, is filed under the
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. As the year of its enactment shows
the Act dates back to the period when the greater part of the
country was under the control of the East India Company with
SUSA SINGH & ANR v. DAVINDER KAUR & ANR. 227
[AFTAB ALAM, J.]
the last Mughal "Emperor", Bahadur Shah Zafar as the A
ineffective, though, titular monarch on the throne of Delhi.
17. The Act is based on the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and
according to the short title given to it by the Indian Short Titles
Act, 1897, it is "An Act to provide compensation to families for 8 loss occasioned by the death of a person caused by actionable
wrong". Its Preamble reads as follows:
"Whereas no action or suit is now maintainable in any Court
against a person who, by his wrongful act, neglect or
default, may have caused the death of another person, and C
it is often-times right and expedient that the wrong-doer in
such case should be answerable in damages for the injury
so caused by him"
18. It originally consisted of three sections, but, the original 0
section 1 was renumbered as section 1A by the Part B States
(Laws) Act (3 of 1951 ), S. 3 and Schedule, with effect from April
1, 1951. Section 1A of the Act provides as follows:
"1A. Suit for compensation to the family of a person for loss
occasioned to it by his death by actionable wrong.- E
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or
default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
~amages in respect thereof,' the party who would have F
been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of
the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to
felony or other crime. G
Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of
the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person
whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be
brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator, H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 7 S.C.R.
A or representative of the person deceased; and in every
such action the Court may give such damages as it may
think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to
the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit
such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered,
B after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs
not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst
the before mentioned parties, or any of them, in such
shares as the Court by its judgment or decree shall direct."
19. Later on the operation of the Act was extended to
C different parts o·; the country and as on date it extends to the
whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
20. It is a matter of grave concern that such sensitive
matters like payment of compensation and damages for death
D resulting from a wrongful or negligent act are governed by a law
which is more than one and a half centuries old. Twenty one
years ago a Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal
Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 sec 613, a case arising from
the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, had taken note of this antiquated law
E and in paragraph 168 made the following observations:
"168. While it may be a matter for scientists and
technicians to find solutions to avoid such large scale
disasters, the law must provide an effective and speedy
remedy to the victims of such torts. The Fatal Accidents
Act, on account of its limited and restrictive application,
is hardly suited to meet such a challenge. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the old antiquated Act should
be drastically amended or fresh legislation should be
enacted which should, inter alia, contain appropriate
provisions in regard to the following matters:
(i) The payment of a fixed minimum compensation on a
"no-fault liability" basis (as under the Motor Vehicles Act),
pending final adjudication of the claims by a prescribed
forum;
SUSA SINGH & ANR. v. DAVINDER KAUR & ANR. 229
[AFTAB ALAM, J.]
(ii) The creation of a special forum with specific power to A
grant interim relief in appropriate cases:
(iii) The evolution of a procedure to be followed by such
forum which will be conducive to the expeditious
determination of claims and avoid the high degree of 8
formalism that attaches to proceedings in regular courts;
and
(iv) A provision requiring industries and concerns engaged
in hazardous activities to take out compulsory insurance
against third party ris~s." C
(emphasis supplied)
21. It is unfortunate that the observations of the Supreme
Court have so far gone completely unheeded. We hope and
trust that the Union Government would at least now take note D
of the urgent need to bring a contemporaneous and
comprehensive legislation on the subject and proceed to act
in the matter without any further delay.
22. Let a copy of this judgment be brought to the notice of E
the Attorney General for India. A copy of the judgment may also
be sent to the Law Commission of India.
23. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, subject to the
modification in the rate of interest. There will be no order as to
costs.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
I