Joshna Gouda v. Brundaban Gouda & Anr.

CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises out of a judgment dated 25.03.2011 of the High Court of Orissa in Writ Appeal No.114 of 2011. 3. The factual background of the litigation is as follows:- E (A) Election to the post of Sarpanch of Kulagada Gram Panchayat in the District of Ganjam, Orissa were held in the year 2007. The appellant, the first respondent and two others filed their nominations. The scrutiny of the nominations took place on 16th January, 2007. The returning officer held all the F four nominations valid. (B) Subsequently, except the appellant and the first respondent, the other two candidates withdrew from contest. Election took place on 17th February, 2007, wherein the appellant herein was declared elected. (C) The first respondent, filed an Election Petition under Section 31 read with Section 34 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 (for the sake of convenience it is called "the Act"), on the ground that the appellant herein was not eligible to JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 469 [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] contest the election in view of Section 11 (b) of the Act which A declares that no member of 'Gram Sasan' (a defined expression under Section 2(h) of the Act') shall be eligible to contest for the post of Sarpanch if he has not attained the age of 21 years. It is the specific case of the first respondent that the appellant herein was born on 20.06.1986 and had not B attained the age of 21 years by the relevant date. The 1st respondent, therefore, sought two reliefs in the election petition that the election of the appellant herein be set aside and also that the 1st respondent be declared to have been duly elected: The appellant contested the election petition. By the judgment C dated 29.11.2008 the election petition was allowed. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, the appellant herein carried the matter in an appeal under Section 38(4) of the Act to the District Court, Ganjam. The appeal was dismissed by a judgment dated 14th September, 2009. o (D) Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein carried the matter by way of a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14356 of 2009 to the High Court of Orissa which was also dismissed by a Judgment dated 18.2.2011, and the same was challenged in E an Intra Court appeal in appeal No. 114 of 2011 without any success. By the Judgment under appeal, the writ appeal was dismissed. · 4. It is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained as there is no F legally admissible evidence on record to enable the Courts below to reach the conclusion that the appellant was born on 20th June, 1986. 5. It is recorded in the judgment rendered in the writ G petition:- "The trial court held that the date of birth of the petitioner was 20.6.1986 mainly on the basis of School Admission 1. "Gram Sasan" means a Grama Sasan established under Section 4'. H 470 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs . f2012] 1 S.C.R. i . A Register, Ext.5, the re!evarll entry of which is E"1.5/A, the Admission FormExt.6 and the Transfer Certificate oUhe petitioner Ext. 7, P. W.2, one Asst Teacher of BaSL!dev High School, Ohaugaon .produced the School Admission ,.,Register and proved, it whic;h was marked ,as Ext.5:. B 6. The question of,admissibility of the exhibits 5. 5A and 7 was rai&ed in the writ petition but rej.ected oi1 the grovnd fhat the ~ai~ documents were adm(tted in evi<;len~ without any , objection before the Trial ColJ{i~ fiowever, the learned Jud.ge c .. opioed that m~re proof ?f the above-meinti?qed ~xhibits does • not mean that the. content of t)1e said exhibits w~ also pr,9vecl. . . ' - ~ "Of course, ontibeoause thosedocumer11s·were admitted ·1 WithOut ob]eciion, it'carinbt be sclid that the contents th@feof · Were also: admitted. It ·was fhe duty of the ofilY:party to · · D · prove the contents ofihose documerits' pcirtiettlaHy, the 1 d!ite of birth o{ the petitioner entereq in Ext.5 .and the . . transfer certlfic~te ~xt.7: · - : .' · t ' ' ' ' ·'1 . . , • _7. However at para 1, it wa'S held:: I · ~: i ' .. E" I w i•i<ilt1 thepresent ca~thejlntry as per Elc.51,A wasmad~<>n, , '- the Qaf!is qf .transfer ~ifir;:ate Ext. 7:anc;I tl\e appli~tion . made by Maheswar Gouda, cousin brother of petitioner:'s . father. The trial court held that Maheswar Gouda, being the eousin br~ttier of petitioner's fatherttad special me11ns of · · knowtedge'0f the dllte of birth oUhe petitioner. Admittedly:, ' :.~said Maheswar Gc>uda has not:beell· examined". - J ' ' . ., . . . - - 8. Unfortunately, the learned judge did nptrecor~ ;:iny conclusive finding regarding the probative value of the contents G of exhibits 5, 5A or·exhibit 7, but went on to examine the evidence adduced by the appellant herein and found that the .. said material does not lend support to the .case of the appellant here.In and therefore the entry E.S/A matte in .E~. 5 is true. A strange procedure indeetl! Only mat~hed b}'th~_strai'l9e -· H · decision of the, appellantto addMP6 evk:leoce. .,. JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA:& ANR. 411;. [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] "But father ofthe petitioner has been examined as O.P.W. A . , No.3 .. As per the affidavit evidence the date of birth of the . _ PetitioneFwas incorrectly recorded in the school r~gister and schQol certificate by the teachers" which ·appears improb_able; Furthermore, ~t transpires from the evjden.ee _ 9f the pt'!titioner herself, that when she took admission in Panchayat U .P .- SchooL sl;le,was 10 years pld. she too~ admission in the said.school on 10.1.96. ,If 10,year:sis ·deducted from that date it would come _to 9..7 .1986. So, . , the evidence~ oi .the petitioner almost .allies ~h the case " '.of opp. 'pafty JJo.1 Jhat the. date of birth of the petitioner ~a~ ,20~6-1986."' . · :, •. . r- • ~;; .B C'J 'L ~."inereafterthe learned judge elaborately dl~cussed fhe evitle_nee_ df the ~ppella'ilt' h"ereiri and c:Oncluded that:-• ltWduld not improve the case bltlie petitioner as dis6ussed-eariiei"~)::O - • '":1~,_.7_ :'.' '-' ---·_11-"~- ~ · i- 1 ,.,·· t;":f: -:.~·: __ r-,1-·o-·· t: 1 o. , The Division Ben.ell noted the'•objectibn to the admissibilitr··in evidenc'e of the exhibits Si.•5A and 7 in the i following words:- ·- · · · \j 1 ... , '" ., : · ~The ground bf attack of the impugned ordetis that E .i · 1he-leamed Single Judge having held that the ddcuments ,, • telied upon by respondent No:1, namely Exts:5,5/Aand71 ~' which arethe onlydocutnentstrom.the side ofrespontlent' .. - i'ono;:\1-to·establish the:date.t)f;birth of;the appellant are tiof • ,,adrnissibl~ In evid~nee under seciio.n .35 of the E~ide~ce -~ F .:i . Act, ~the learned Single Judge erred;m further .probrng..mto -". ,.the matteranct·disrnissingJhe;writpetition: Ihe aforesaid _ · documents on the bas.is of which: the;;respondent no.t J . • soyght to establish that tbe appellant was not qualified to , . . file nomina~on having been found inadmissible/the only,,iG . alt~mative wa~ to allow the writ petition,}"•'= :. . - .);:, <) ~~ ! ... ,'.~r,..,.: ··~(:-~..,,,,,.-:-~;'~s '- '., -·.--·-. · __ , ··1 x.) ~1.i·~·-: 11 ._ The'D.iVi~ioiillenc~. did not. record any clear finding -• 'l.i. - ~ - . <, • , , t . , - '-, ,_, -~• - ! , .' ' '. '" I < - . -· • either on the admissibil1tY or tt:te J>rqbative, value Ofthe content of the ~boye~ilientione~. exhibits but s~ddenty ~w~tChed oy,er to' the 'ex~minafiori. oflhe evidence of the appellant. . . .. - H • A 12. Exts. A to H are documents produced by the appellant herein in support of her claim that her actual date of birth is 7. 7.1985 but not 20.6.1986, as contended by the first respondent. Exts. A and H are voters lists of the year 2007 and 2008 respectively. The Division Bench observed that both the B documents were prepared later in point of time to the filing of the nomination papers in the election in question and also they do not reflect the date of birth of the appellant herein. Similarly, Ext. D is a horoscope alleged to be that of the appellant herein. The Division Bench opined that the said document was rightly c not relied upon. Ext. E is a certificate of date of birth issued under the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act showing the date of birth of the appellant as 7. 7 .1985 but such an entry came to be made pursuant to an application made by the appellant herein subsequent to the nominations D in the election in question. The High Court refused to place any reliance on the said document on the ground that it was issued by an executive magistrate, who according to the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to issue the same. 13. We do not propose to examine the correctness of the E reasoning adopted by the High Court for refusing to place any reliance on the above-mentioned documents produced by the appellant herein in her bid to prove her actual date of birth as 7.7.1985. For the purpose of the present appeal, we will proceed on the basis that the High Court rightly refused to F believe those documents and, therefore, the appellant herein failed to prove her date of birth to be 7.7.1985. But that does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the assertion of the respondent No.1 that the actual date of birth of the appellant G herein is 20.6.1986 is proved. Even according to the High Court, the content of the Exs. 5, 5/A and 7 has no probative value. Ex. 5 was proved by PW.2, an assistant teacher of the Basudev High School. Ex. 6 and 7 were proved by PW.2, the headmaster of Basudev High School. It appears from the H record that PW.2 stated that Exhibit 5/A entry showing the date JOSHNA GOUDA v. BRUNDABAN GOUDA & ANR. 473 [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.] I of birth of the appellant herein as 20.6.1986 was made on the A basis of Ex. 7 which is a transfer certificate issued by the headmaster of Panchayat Upper Primary School where the appellant herein studied before joining Basudev High School. Ext.6 is an application dated 11.7.1998 for admission of the appellant in Basudev High School made by one Maheswar B Gouda, who is said to be a cousin of the appellant's father. The said Maheswar Gouda was admittedly not examined. By the judgment under appeal, the Division Bench rightly held - " ........ it was the duty of the opposite party (the first c respondent herein) to prove the contents of those documents, particularly the date of birth of the petitioner (the appellant herein) entered in Ext.5 and the transfer certificate Ext. 7" [Parenthesis supplied] D Having held so, the Division Bench reached the conclusion - "the evidence of the petitioner (the appellant herein) almost allies With the case of the opposite party No.1 (the first E respondent) that the date of birth of the petitioner was 20.6.1986." 14. We have already examined the evidence of the appellant herein. There is nothing in the said evidence to indicate that the date of birth of the appellant was 20th June, F 1986. At the worst, th.e said evidence failed to establish that the appellant's date of birth was 7.7.1985. 15. The election of the appellant was challenged on the ground that the appellant was not eliQ,ible to contest the election G on the ground that~he appellant was not 21 years of age on the relevant date because according to the election petition, the appellant was born on 20.6.1986. The burden to proof the fact thfilithe appellant.was born on 20.6.1986 rests squarely on the 474 SCJPREMEi COURT REPORTS' .· [2012} f$,C.R. A first resp0J1dent. Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Ad. makes .c it abundantly:clear. ' r u . r; i , "S.11)1. Burden of proof - Whoever cle$ires .any.Court - to give judgmeot Cl$. to any legal right or..liiibility dependent on ttie existence of facts. whicli,l;le asserts, must prove that ~bose facts exis!S: · · · · · ·· · · · ~_.' ,_. . ' . 'S ~ I 'L ') Wilen a pers~ is bounct to prove the existence· of ariy liict, it is said thafthe burden of proof lies cin that ""'Cson." " "'"' ,. J·.. 16. ·11was held in Robins Vs: National Trust & Co. Ltd., 1927 A.C. 51 S - I ' • '•' • . ; - . ·n •. · "To assert that a man who is alive wa~· botn requires no n proof. The onus is not on the person making an assertion, · betause it is self-evident that he had been born. But to .cassert tl)at he had been born po a certi¥n date, if ihe daje is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person • -tnaking the aSSfilrtion;•, ·.· . _ ·1 • ,. I • , _ , ~"'_ '. •' ~ I - ' • E Since the first respondent-fa.ii.eel, to discha~ge the l»Jrden. cast upon him, the election petition must fail. , .' . , 17. t:lowever, the learned .co,uosel for the firsti:espondent, §!irLPebasis Mjsra,,very vehemently sl.fbrnittecl that fa~ F a_drnitted need n~ be proved a11d,~he appeuant h~d adrniUed. th~J~ that the.apBElllank on-her, <>wn aQn;lission, ~ 1 O years old when she took admission in the Pancnayat l;Jpper Primary School on 10.1.1996. Learned counsel relied upon para 7 of the judgment under appeal (which is already extracted in para G 6 of this judgment bUt .for the sake· df convenience, -we repr.oduce the .same}: ' ~,, , • •' ·. ·- .· . . ~ . . -~---· ...... i! tr~spires from th~ eviqi;w~ of the. petitioner ___ s: , he.r~~f. that wtiea,s,he tqok admission in Banch~yat U.P ·• School she was 10 years old. She took admission in the / ' 1 · ! , l JOSHNA GOUDA v.· BRUNDABAN GOUDA. & ANR. 475 '.. [J. CH.ELAMESWAR, J.] . . , ·. , said school on 10.1.96. If 10 years is deducted from that A ·. ciafoitviciu1d.-comefo'9.1.19a5:, .. ·.:.:· ·:··.· .. • ... '. ' • - _- • ' .... : f. • \ · 18. Learned counsel for the appellant; on the other hand, . submitted that such a cqnclusion 'came to' tie recorded on' incorrect reading of the evidence of the appellant. Acopy of 8 the, deposition made by the appellant is placed before· us. In the cross examination, the appellant stated as follow$: . ;. : ' , \ ...... -.. ,. '·'··· .- '" -- ···--~·"41•···~---·-~-·•'''-"' ' , " Y "When I ~as five'years' ~fold'. I.joined in the schooi for the 1st time when I took admission in Dhougan 0.P:· school, I was ten yeas of old. I left that school in the year .c .. · 1998. My father Apurba Gouda is an educated m'an. l can •; \ not recollect who had taken me to Dhougan SchoolJor admission. · • . I , One outsider brought my T.C. from the Dhougan U.P. D School and get me admitted in Dhougan High School. I cannot say his name. I was thirteen years of old, when I took admission in Dhougan High School in Class VIII." · It can be seen from the above-extracted portion of the evidence E of the appellant that the appellant stated that she was 13 year old when she took ,admission in the_ High School-(obviously Basudev High School) and the admission, as we have already noticed from the evidence of PW .2, was on 11. 7 .1998. Deducting 13 years from that date would place the year of birth of the appellant in 1985. It is not clear as to the material on the F basis of which the Division Bench recorded that the admission . of the_ appellant in the Panchayat Upper Primary School was on 10.1.1996. We assume for the sake of argument that there is some basis ori record for the finding that the appellant took admission in theUpper Primary School on 10.1.1996: On her G own admission she was 10 years old on that date. Then there is an inconsistency in her evidence regarding her age with reference to her admission into the Upper Primary School and Basudev ttigh. School. In such a case, her statement that she was 10 year old on 10.1.1996, in our opinion, cannot be treated H ' 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 1 S.C.R. A as an admission that her date of birth is 20th June, 1986. An admission must be clear and unambiguous in order that such an admission should relieve the opponent of the burden of proof of the fact said to have been admitted. 8 19. For all the above mentioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. In view of our conclusion, the second <v:Jestion regarding the declaration in favour of the first respondent does not survive. C 20. Appeal is allowed. D.G. Appeal allowed.