Premji Nathu v. State of Gujarat and Another
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Whether the application submitted by
the appellant under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, G
1894 (for short, 'the Act') was barred by time and Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Junagadh (hereinafter described as the
'Reference Court') rightly refused to entertain his prayer for
enhancement of the compensation determined by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer is the question which arises for H
A consideration in this appeal filed against judgment dated
16.8.2011 of the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High
Court.
2. The appellant's land was acquired by the State
8 Government along with other parcels of land for implementation
of Mendarda - Amrapur Road Scheme. Notification under
Section 4(1) was issued on 4.3.1982 and the declaration under
Section 6(1) was published on 7.10.1982. The Special Land
Acquisition Officer determined the amount of compensation at
the rate of Rs.110/- per Are for irrigated land and Rs.80/- per
C Are for non-irrigated land.
3. After passing of the award, the Collector issued notice
to the appellant under Section 12(2), which was received by
him on 22.2.1985. Similar notices were received by the other
D landowners on 22.2.1985 and 23.2.1985. As the copy of the
award was not annexed with the notice, the appellant obtained
certified copy thereof through his Advocate and then submitted
an application dated 8.4.1985 to the Collector for making a
reference to the Court for award of higher compensation with
E solatium and interest. The reference made by the Collector in
the appellant's case was registered as LR Case No.1/2000.
The references made at the instance of the other landowners
were registered as LR Cases Nos.2/2000 to 15/2000. In their
claim petitions, the appellant and other landowners pleaded that
F their land had irrigation facilities; that they were taking crops
of groundnut, wheat, fodder etc. and they are entitled to
compensation at the rate of Rs.1500/- per Are. In the reply filed
on behalf of the State Government, it was pleaded that the
Special Land Acquisition Officer had correctly fixed market
G value of the acquired land after taking into consideration the
location, type and fertility of the acquired land. It was also
pleaded that the landowners are not entitled to higher
compensation because they had accepted the award without
any protest.
H 4. It is not clear from the record whether in the reply filed
PREMJI NATHU v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1049
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
on behalf of the State Government, an objection was taken to A
the maintainability of the applications filed by the appellant and
other landowners on the ground that the same were barred by
time but the Reference Court did frame an issue in that regard.
This is evident from the tenor of the issues framed by the
Reference Court, which are extracted below: B
"(1) Whether applicant proves that the compensation
awardedis inadequate ? How much ?
(2) What additional compensation, if any, he is entitled
·~? c
(3)
(4)
Whether this application is in time ?
Whether this court has jurisdiction to try this
reference case ?
(5) Whether this reference case is barred by S. 25 of
L.A. Act.?
(6) Whether the applicants have accepted the
awarded amount without raising any objection ? If E
yes, what is the effect ?
(7) Whether the applicant is entitled to get the amount
of solatium & interest?
(8) What order ?"
5. After considering the oral and documentary evidence
produced by the parties, the Reference Court concluded that
the landowners are entitled to Rs.450 per Are for the irrigated
land and Rs.280 per Are for non-irrigated land with an additional G
amount of Rs.2 per square meter, but declined relief to the
appellant and other landowners on the ground that the
applications filed by them were beyond the time specified in
Section 18(2)(b) of the Act.
6. The appellant and three other landowners challenged H
A the judgment of the Reference Court by filing appeals under
Section 54 of the Act which were dismissed by the !earned
Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated 16.8.2011,
who relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court
in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Himatnagar v. Nathaji
B Kacharaji, 2001 (3) GLH 312 and held that the applications filed
by the appellant and other land owners were barred by time.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the
application filed by his client was within the period prescribed
under Section 18 (2)(b) of the Act and the Reference Court and
C the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious
error by refusing to enhance the compensation by erroneously
thinking that the application made on 8.4.1985 was barred by
time. He submitted that 5th and 6th April, 1985 were holidays
and, as such, the application filed by the appellant on 8.4.1985
D could not have been treated as barred by time. Learned
counsel further submitted that due to hyper-technical approach
adopted by the Reference Court and the learned Single Judge,
the landowners have been rendered remediless.
E 8. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned counsel for the
respondents produced copy of the calendar of Gujarat for 1985
to show that 5th April was holiday being Good Friday but 6th
April was a working day and argued that if the period of six
weeks is counted from the date of receipt of the notice issued
F under Section 12(2), the conclusion recorded by the Reference
Court and the learned Single Judge that the applications filed
by the appellant and other landowners were beyond the time
prescribed under Section 18(2)(b) of the Act cannot be faulted.
9. We have considered the respective arguments and
G carefully perused the record. Sections 12 and 18 of the Act,
which have bearing on the decision of this appeal read as
under:
"12. Award of Collector when to be final. - (1) Such award
H shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as
PREMJI NATHU v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1051
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as A
between the Collector and the persons interested, whether
they have respectively appeared before the Collector or
not, of the true area and value of the land, and the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested. B
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award
to such of the persons interested as are not present
personally or by their representatives when the award is
made.
18. Reference to Court.- (1) Any person interested who
has not accepted the award may, by written application to
the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the
Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount D
of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or
the apportionment of the compensation among the
persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which E
objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,-
(a) if the person making it was present or represented
before the Collector at the time when he made his award, F
within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the
notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2),
or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, G
whichever period shall first expire."
10. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows
that by virtue of Section 12(1), an award made by the Collector
is treated final and conclusive evidence of the true area and
value of the land and apportionment of the compensation H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A among the persons interested. In terms of Section 12(2), the
Collector is required to give notice of his award to the
interested persons who are not present either personally or
through their representatives at the time of making of award.
Section 18(1) provides for making of reference by the Collector
B to the Court for the determination of the amount of
compensation etc. Section 18(2) lays down that an application
for reference shall be made within six weeks from the date of
the Collector's award, if at the time of making of award the
person seeking reference was present or was represented
c before the Collector. If the person is not present or is not
represented before the Collector, then the application for
reference has to be made within six weeks of the receipt of
notice under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date
of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
D 11. The reason for providing six months from the date of
the award for making an application seeking reference, where
the applicant did not receive a notice under Section 12(2) of
the Act, while providing only six weeks from the date of receipt
of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act for making an
E application for reference where the applicant has received a
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act is received, the landowner or
person interested is made aware of all relevant particulars of
the award which enables him to decide whether he should seek
F reference or not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know
that an award has been made, he would require further time to
make enquiries or secure copies so that he can ascertain the
relevant particulars of the award. What needs to be emphasised
is that along with the notice issued under Section 12(2) of the
G Act, the land owner who is not present or is not represented
before the Collector at the time of making of award should be
supplied with a copy thereof so that he may effectively exercise
his right under Section 18(1) to seek reference to the Court.
H 12. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition
PREMJI NATHU v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1053
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, this Court was called upon to A
decide whether the expression 'date of award' is to be
interpreted with reference to the time when the award is signed
by the Collector or from the date the affected party comes to
know about the same and held as under:
''Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no
more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to
the owner of the property then the making of the award as
properly understood must involve the communication of the
offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement C
under the contract law and its applicability to cases of
award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded.
Thus considered the date of the award cannot be
determined solely by reference to the time when the award
is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office;
it must involve the consideration of the question as to when D
it was known to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and
mechanical construction of the words 'the date of the
award' occurring in the relevant section would not be
appropriate. E
There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative
decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation
of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the F
said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of
the property and in that sense, like all decisions which
affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said
decision should be communicated to the said party. The
knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either G
actual or constructive, is an essential element which must
be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force.
Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist
merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing
it or even filing it in the Office of the Collector; it must H
involve the communication of the said award to the party
concerned either actually or constructively. If the award
is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights
are affected by it it can be said to be made when
pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award
is communicated to the party and it is accordingly
pronounced on the date previously announced the award
is said to be communicated to the said party even if the
said party is not actually present on the date of its
pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its
pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not
present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the
party affected by the award, either actual or constructive,
being an essential requirement of fair play and natural
justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the
proviso must mean the date when the award is either
communicated to the party or is known by him either
actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would
be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of
the Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18
in a literal or mechanical way."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963
F SC 1604, the principle laid down in Harish Chandra's case
was reiterated and it was held:
"It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish
Chandra case is that the party affected by the award must
know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six
months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now,
knowledge of the award does not mean a mere
knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The
knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the
award. These contents may be known either actually or
constructively. If the award is communicated to a party
PREMJI NATHU v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1055
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be A
obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the
award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party
is present in court either personally or through his
representative when the award is made by the Collector,
it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the B
award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think
that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the
essential contents of the award."
(emphasis supplied) C
14. In Bhagwan Oas v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3
SCC 545, this Court interpreted Section 18 and laid down the
following propositions:
"(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person 0
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to
make the application within six weeks from the date of the
Collector's award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to E
make the application seeking reference within six weeks
of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section
12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not F
present when the award is made, and if he does not
receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector,
he has to make the application within six months of the
date on which he actually or constructively came to know
about the contents of the award. G
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section
12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date
of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the
provision for six months for making the application on the
ground that the date of receipt of notice under Section H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 3 S.C.R.
A 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents
of the award."
The Court then held:
"When a person interested makes an application for
reference seeking the benefit of six months' period from
the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove
that he (or his representative) was not present when the
award was made, that he did not receive any notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the
knowledge of the contents of the award during a period of
six months prior to the filing the application for reference.
This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath.
He is not expected to prove the negative. Once the initial
onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is
for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the
person interested was present either in person or through
his representative when the award was made, or that he
had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or
that he had knowledge of the contents of the award.
Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the
award can be established by the Collector by proving that
the person interested had received or drawn the
compensation amount for the acquired land, or had
attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering
possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the
acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or
had acknowledged the making of the award in any
document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person
interested, not being in possession of the acquired land
and the name of the State or its transferee being entered
in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can
also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the
absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim
of the person interested that he did not have knowledge
PREMJI NATHU v. STATE OF GUJARAT 1057
[GS. SINGHVI, J.]
earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling A
circumstances not to do so."
15. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the
conclusion recorded by the Reference Court, which has been
approved by the High Court that the application filed by the 8
appellant was barred by time is legally sustainable. A careful
reading of the averments contained in paragraph 2 of the
application filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows that
the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was
served upon him on 22.2.1985. Thereafter, his advocate C
obtained certified copy of the award and filed application dated
8.4.1985 for making a reference to the Court. This implies that
copy of the award had not been sent to the appellant along with
the notice and without that he could not have effectively made
an application for seeking reference. On behalf of the State
Government, no evidence was produced before the Reference D
Court to show that copy of the award was sent to the appellant
along with the notice. Unfortunately, while deciding issue No.3,
this aspect has been totally ignored by the Reference Court
which mechanically concluded that the application filed on
8.4.1985 was beyond the time specified in Section 18(2)(b). E
The learned Single Judge of the High Court also committed
serious error by approving the view taken by the Reference·
Court, albeit without considering the fact that the notice issued
by the Collector under Section 12(2) was not accompanied by
a copy of the award which was essential for effective exercise F
of right vested in the appellant to seek reference under Section
18(1 ).
16. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment and the award passed by the Reference Court are G
set aside and the respondents are directed to pay enhanced
compensation to the appellant at the rate of Rs.450 per Are
for the irrigated land and Rs.280 per Are for non-irrigated land
with an additional amount of Rs.2 per square meter. The
appellant shall also be entitled to other statutory benefits like H
A solatium and interest. The respondent shall calculate the
amount payable to the appellant and make payment within three
months from today.
17. Although, the other landowners are not shown to have
8 prosecuted lhe matter further except that three of them filed
appeals under Section 54 of the Act, we are convinced that this
is a fit case in which the Court should exercise power under
Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the respondents to pay
enhanced compensation, solatium etc. even to those who did
not file appeals before the High Court and/or have not
C approached this Court by filing petitions under Article 136 of
the Constitution. This approach is consistent with the judgments
of this Court in - 8. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore (1966) 3
SCR 682, Bhupinderpal Singh and others v. State of Punjab
and others (2000) 5 SCC 262, Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias
D Lalila v. State of Orissa and others (1993) 2 SCC 746 and B.
Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1985
(Supp) SCC 432. Therefore, we direct that the other
landowners shall also be paid enhanced compensation and
other statutory benefits within three months from today.
D.G. Appeal allowed.