Goudappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. Appellant No. 1,
Goudappa (Accused No.3), Appellant No.2, Chhannappa @
Ajjappa (Accused No.4) and Appellant No. 3, Mahadevappa
(Accused No.5) aggrieved by their conviction and sentence, F
have preferred this appeal with the leave of the court.
2. Altogether five brothers namely, Basappa,
Vipakshappa, Goudappa, Channappa @ Ajjappa and
Mahadevappa were put on trial for offence under Section 143,
148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and 506 read with Section 149 G
of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court acquitted accused no.
1, Basappa and accused no. 2 Vipakshappa of all the charges.
Accused no. 3, Goudappa and accused no. 4, Channappa @
Allappa were, however, held guilty under Section 304, Part II
A read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. Accused no. 5,
Mahadevappa has been convicted under Section 304, Part II
of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for five years. They have, however, been acquitted
B of all other charges.
3. State of Karnataka, aggrieved by the order of acquittal
of the aforesaid two accused and conviction of other three only
under Section 304, Part II, instead under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code and those convicted and sentenced also
C preferred separate appeals before the High Court. Both the
appeals were heard together and disposed of by a common
judgment. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order
has set aside the judgment of acquittal and held all the accused
guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and
D sentenced them to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count with a
default clause. Those three found guilty under Section 304, Part
II read with Section 109 or under Section 304, Part II of the
Indian Penal Code simplicitor have, instead, been convicted
under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
E to undergo imprisonment for life with default clause.
4. Matrimonial discord between deceased Channappa
and Kalavathi, daughter of accused no. 1, Basappa is the cause
of the crime. All the accused are brothers and reside in Village
F Navalur within Dharwad District of the State of Karnataka.
Kalavathi was married to deceased Channappa, who was also
the resident of the same village, houses of both being situated
within a distance of 100 ft. from each other. Marriage between
them had taken place on 5th of May, 1996. The relationship
G between the couple was not cordial and, according to the
prosecution, as usual the elders of the village convened a
Panchayat in which the father of Kalavathi i.e. accused no. 1
Basappa wrote an undertaking (Exh. P-6) to counsel his
daughter and not to blame anyone else, if any untoward incident
happens. However, this did not bring peace and matrimonial
GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 553
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
harmony and Kalavathi left the matrimonial house without A
informing anybody. This was not liked by her husband,
Channappa and he stopped her entry in the matrimonial house.
All the accused thus nurtured ill-will against him.
5. According to the prosecution, on 9th of January, 1998
at about 9.30 P.M. the deceased Channappa, his brother 8
Manjunatha (PW-1), mother Siddawwa (PW-2) and grandson
of PW-2, Manjunath (PW-3) were watching TV. The deceased
Channappa at that time was chewing paan and came out of the
house to spit. Accused Basappa started abusing him alleging
that he failed to keep his daughter, whereupon all the accused C
entered the house and accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused
No. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa caught hold of the deceased and
accused no. 5 Mahadevappa stabbed him with jambia over the
left side of the chest. The blow was so severe that it penetrated
into the heart and liver. Prosecution has further alleged that D
accused no. 1, Basappa pelted stone over the door of the
house whereas accused no. 2 Vipakshappa damaged its front
door with an axe. Manjunatha (PW-1), Siddawwa (PW-2) and
Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to have seen the incident.
Manunatha (PW-1) conveyed the message to the Police Control E
Room and called Dr. Shamsuddin Kasimsab Jamadar (PW-18)
for treatment, but noticing profuse bleeding, he advised to shift
the injured to the Government Hospital. While arrangement to
shift the injured was being made, Shashidhar (PW-24), the
police constable, Manappa Siddappa Arer (PW-27), the Sub- F
Inspector of Police of Vidhyagiri Police Station and other two
police constables came to the spot and the injured was shifted
to Civil Hospital, Dharwad. He was examined by the doctor and
declared dead. Manjunatha (PW-1) gave report to Manappa
Siddappa Arer which led to registration of Crime No. 14of1998 G
under Section 143, 147, 148, 323, 427, 452, 302, 504 and 506
read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. After usual investigation, police submitted the charge
sheet and all the five accused were ultimately committed to the
A Court of Sessions to face the trial. The trial court framed
charges under Section 143, 148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and
506 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring
home the charge, the prosecution has altogether examined 28
8 witnesses and a large number of documents (Exibits P-1 to P-
24) and material objects (M.Os. 1 to 14) were exhibited. Out
of the aforesaid witnesses, Manjunatha (PW- 1 ), Siddawwa
(PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to be the eye-witnesses
of the occurrence. Dr. Rajashekara (PW-6) has conducted the
C post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased.
The defence of the accused is of total denial and they have led
no evidence. There is consistent evidence of Manjunatha (PW-
1 ), Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) that relation of
Kalawathi, daughter of accused no. 1 Basappa and her
husband, the deceased Channappa was strained and the
D accused have virtually accepted this part of the prosecution
story. Manjunatha (PW-1), has stated in his evidence that while
he along with the other two eye-witnesses, Siddawwa (PW- 2)
and Manjunath (PW-3) and the deceased Channappa were
watching TV, all the accused had assembled in the house of
E accused no. 3, Goudappa and were hurling abuses. According
to this witness, the deceased Channappa was in the habit of
chewing paan and, therefore, he had gone out of the house to
spit. At that time accused no. 1 Basappa abused him alleging
that he is not able to lead married life with his daughter.
F Immediately thereafter, all the accused entered into the house.
At that time, accused no. 2, Vipakshappa was armed with an
axe whereas accused no. 5, Mahadevappa was carrying a
jambia. According to this witness, accused no. 3, Goudappa
and accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa caught hold of the
G deceased Channappa whereupon accused no. 5,
Mahadevappa assaulted the deceased with jambia on his
chest. It has further been stated that accused no. 1, Basappa
pelted stone over the door whereas accused no. 2,
Vipakshappa damaged the front door with an axe. lri the cross-
H examination, this witness has admitted that all of them including
GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 555
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
the deceased Channappa, were inside the house and watching A
TV when the accused have come in front of their house and
the occurrence had taken place inside the house. He has further
admitted that in the first information report he had not mentioned
about the availability of electric light in the house and in the
street, at the time of the incident. B
7. Siddawwa (PW-2), who happens to be the mother of
the deceased, stated in her evidence that all the accused came
to their house, abused and threatened them of dire
consequences as the deceased was not accepting Kalavathi
to lead a married life. She has further stated that accused no. C
3, Goudappa and accused no. 4, Channappa @ Ajjappa
caught hold of deceased's hands and accused no. 5,
Mahadevappa gave jambia blow on his chest. Evidence of
Manjunath (PW-3), the grandson of Siddawwa (PW-2), is the D
same as those of other two eye witnesses. In the cross
examination he had stated that the deceased Channappa was
inside the house when the accused came to the spot.
8. Dr. Rajashekara (PW-6), who conducted the post
mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased E
Channappa, had found the following external injuries on his
person:
"1. Punctured wound over the left side of the chest over 2,
3 and 4th intercostal space 3" below the junction of medial
1 /3rd and later 2/3rd of clavicle bone 3" lateral to midline."
9. He also found the following internal injuries on his
person:
"On· opening of the skull brain was pale in colour. On G
examination of the chest. crack fracture of 2nd rib on the
left side 3" from sterno costal junction. Plura opened at the
site of the wound, which was described above. Containing
blood with some clots and blood was about 1000 ml:
Laryanx and treachea was intact and pale. H
A Lungs were intact and pale. Plura was opened over tile
left atrium of the heart.
Punctured wound over left atrium 1 %" x 1" clot blood at the
margins and reddish in colour."
10. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Senior Advocate appears
on behalf of the appellants, whereas the respondent-State of
Karnataka is represented by Ms. Anitha Shenoy.
11. Mr. Patil submits that the claim of Manjunatha (PW-1 ),
C Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) to be the eye
witnesses to the occurrence and having witnessed the incident
is fit to be rejected as, according to their own evidence, they
were watching the television inside the house (PADASALE) at
the time of occurrence, whereas the occurrence has taken place
D near the front door inside the house. In this connection, he has
drawn our attention to the sketch map and points out that from
the place where these witnesses were watching the television,
the place where the deceased was assaulted is not visible. Ms.
Shenoy, however, submits that the house where the incident had
E taken place is a small house and the distance between the
place of occurrence and the PADASALE where they were
watching TV is hardly 20 ft. She further submits that after the
accused persons entered into the house and saw the deceased
Channappa, the latter had raised an alarm which attracted the
F attention of the witnesses and they came to the spot and,
hence, witnessed the occurrence.
12. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and we find substance in the submission of Ms.
Shenoy. The house in question is a small house and the
G distance between the place where they were watching TV and
the place of occurrence is about 20 ft. Further, there was an
alarm raised by the deceased Channappa which attracted the
witnesses and, thus their claim of being eye-witnesses of the
occurrence cannot be rejected on this ground.
GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 557
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
13. Mr. Patil then submits that, according to the evidence A
of the prosecution witnesses, when the deceased came out of
the house to spit, the occurrence has taken place, but the dead
body was found inside the house and, therefore, prosecution
has not been able to prove the place of occurrence beyond all
reasonable doubt. According to him, the consistent case of the
prosecution is that the deceased along with other eye-witnesses
were watching TV in the PADASALE and the deceased was
assaulted when he came out of the house to spit. In this
connection, he has drawn our attention to the sketch map which
· gives the details of the house and the place of occurrence. This, C
according to Mr. Patil, clearly shows that the occurrence has
taken place inside the house. We do not find any substance in
the submission of Mr. Patil and the same is fit to be rejected.
For appreciation of this submission one has to bear in mind
that the house where the occurrence has taken place is a small
house and the dead body was found 7 ft. inside the front door. D
It is the consistent evidence of the prosecution witnesses that
the deceased Channappa was chewing paan and came out of
the house to spit when accused no. 1 Basappa abused him
alleging that he failed to keep his daughter whereupon all the
accused persons entered the house and the crime was
committed. As stated earlier, the dead body was found 7 ft.
inside the front door, we do not find any inconsistency in regard
to the place of occurrence.
14. Mr. Patil lastly submits that, according to the
prosecution itself, role attributed to accused no. 3 Goudappa
and accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa is that they had
caught hold of the deceased Channappa and from that it cannot
be inferred that the crime was committed in furtherance of
common intention. According to him, these appellants had not
intended to cause the death of the deceased and, hence, G
cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 with the
aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In support of the
submission reliance has been placed on the judgment of this
Court in the case of Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar,
(1999) a sec 555: H
"This being the requirement of law for applicability of
Section 34 IPC, from the mere fact that accused Ram
Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav came and caught
hold of Tapeshwar, whereafter Samundar Yadav and Sheo
Layak Yadav came with gandasa in their hands and gave
blows by means of gandasa, it cannot be said that the
accused Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav
shared the common intention with accused Samundar
Yadav and Sheo Layak Yadav. Consequently, accused
Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav cannot be held
guilty of the charge under Sections 302/34 IPC but
accused Samundar Yadav and Sheo Layak Yadav did
commit the offence under Sections 302/34, having
assaulted deceased Tapeshwar on his head by means of
gandasa on account of which Tapeshwar died. The
accused Ram P•avesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav are,
therefore, acquitted of the charges levelled against them
and they be set at liberty forthwith."
15. Ms. Shenoy, however, submits that from the manner
in which the crime has been committed and the role played by
E the aforesaid two appellants clearly show that the criminal act
was done by several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all and, hence, each of such person shall be liable
for the criminal act in the same manner as if it was done by
him alone. Reference, in this connection, has been made to a
F decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh v. State
of A.P., (2004) 11 sec 305.
16. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and the submission made by Ms. Shenoy
G commend us. Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for
a criminal act done by him. No man can be held responsible
for an independent act and wrong committed by another. The
principle of criminal liability is that the person who commits an
offence is responsible for that and he can only be held guilty.
However, Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code makes an
GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 559
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)
exception to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability A
in the doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to
be found in the existence of common intention, animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of
such intention. It deals with the doing of separate acts, similar
or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of B
common intention. In such situation, each person is liable for
the result of that as if he had done that act himself. Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code thus lays down a principle of joint
criminal liability which is only a rule of evidence but does not
create a substantive offence. Therefore, if the act is the result c
of a common intention that every person who did the criminal
act share, that common intention would make him liable for the
offence committed irrespective of the role which he had in its
perpetration. Then how to gather common intention? The
common intention is gathered from the manner in which the 0 crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon
before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern
with which the crime was committed, the weapon carried by the
accused and from the nature and injury caused by one or some
of them. Therefore, for arriving -at a conclusion whether the E
accused had the common intention to commit an offence of
which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances must
be taken into consideration.
17. Bearing in mind the principle aforesaid, when we
proceed to consider the case of these two appellants namely, F
accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused no. 4 Channappa @
Aliappa, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that
the deceased Channappa was done to death in furtherance of
their common intention. All the accused had assembled at one
place and the moment deceased came out of the house to spit, G
one of the accused started abusing him. They were armed with
axe and jambia and by catching and immobilizing the deceased
these two accused facilitated the assault by accused no. 5.
Accused no. 5 stabbed the deceased with jambia over the left
side of the chest and the blow was so severe that it penetrated H
A into the heart and liver. The fact that these appellants held the
deceased and facilitated the other accused to give the fatal
blow and made no effort to prevent him from assaulting the
deceased leads to irresistible and inescapable conclusion that
these two appellants shared the common intention with accused
B no. 5. The intention of accused no. 5 is clear from the nature of
weapon used and the severity of attack which was in the area
of chest penetrating deep inside up to heart and liver which
caused the death of the deceased.
18. The view which we have taken finds support from the
C judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh (supra) in
which it has been observed as follows:
"Once the prosecution evidence tendered through
PWs 1 to 3 is accepted, then it is clear that when A-2 and
D A-3 held the hands of the deceased, they had some
intention in disabling the deceased. This inference is
possible to be drawn because the appellants in their
statement recordad under Section 313 CrPC did not give
any explanation why they held the hands of the deceased
E which indicates that the appellants had the knowledge that
A-1 was to assault the deceased. The fact that the
appellants continued to hold the deceased all along without
making any effort to prevent A-1 from further attacking, in
our opinion, leads to an irresistible and an inescapable
F conclusion that these accused persons also shared the
common intention with A-1."
19. However, we hasten to add that each case rests on
its own facts and mere similarity of the facts in one case cannot
be used to determine a conclusion of fact in another. Whether
G the crime was committed in furtherance of common intention
is determined on appreciation of evidence laid in that case and
the similarity of facts in one case may not be decisive to come
to a definite conclusion of fact in another. Hence, answer of
such question has to be found in the facts of a given case. In
H this connection, it is apt to reproduce the following passage
GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 561
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
from the case of Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 A
SC 216:
"But to say this is no more than to reproduce the
ordinary rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no
special rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom,
it is a question of fact in every case and however similar
the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a
precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in
another. All that is necessary is either to have direct proof
of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which
necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put C
it in the time- honoured way, 'the incriminating facts must
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
incapable of explanation on any other reasonable
hypothesis'. (Sarkar's Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30)"
,
20. From the discussion aforesaid, it is evident that the
High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the
judgment of acquittal and holding all the accused guilty under
Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and convicting
the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code
and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life with
default clause.
21. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and
it is dismissed accordingly.
B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.