Kanhaiya Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan
.
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The case of the prosecution depicts
B a macabre chain of events that occurred in the intervening night
of 28th and 29th June, 2001 which eventually led to the
massacre of five persons, namely, Purshottam, Ram Kumar
Dhaka, Kalu Lal Mali and Lakendra Sharma, all residents of
village Railgaon, and Heera Lal Meghwal, resident of
C Rampuria, Kota. The extermination of five lives had its genesis
in an incident that had occurred sometime prior to the date of
occurrence where Kishan Chand, son of Ram Narayan,
Sarpanch of the village, was murdered and the father nurtured
deep rooted suspicion that the deceased persons had not only
D masterminded a well thought out plan but also executed the
11ame and the seeds of the unquenched anger gradually got
inflamed and took the shape of revenge ultimately resulting in
the extinction of the life-spark of five persons. From the
uncurtaining of the gruesome events, it is manifest that on the
E date of the occurrence, the night slowly and intensely developed
into real darkness of revenge that reigned with avenge.
Revenge, the pleasure of morbid minds, knows no bounds and
the accused persons, clinging to the fire of revenge, possibly
thinking it to be sweetest thing to relish, marched ahead on the
F escalator of bitterness and the ultimate eventuate was five
deaths, trial of 29 persons and conviction of 17 accused out of
which six accused persons, namely, Yuvraj, Hemraj, Hansraj,
Radhey Shyam, Modu Nath and Mohan were imposed death
sentence and the rest 11 accused, namely, Lal Chand,
G Dhanpal, Kanyaiyalal, Naval, Revdi Lal, Ram Lal, Babu Lal,
Mangi Lal, Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam s/O Prahalad, and
Radhey Shyam s/o Shankar Lal, were sentenced with rigorous
imprisonment of life by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Fast Track, in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2002. Be it noted, the
rest of the accused persons were acquitted of the charges.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 371
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
2. As is demonstrable, all the accused persons were sent A
up for trial for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,
302, 342, 427, 435 and 460 read with 149 IPC. Filtering the
unnecessary details, the facts which are necessitous to be
stated for disposal of these appeals are that on 28.6.2001,
about 5.00 p.m., Purshottam, brother of the informant, Ram B
Kumar Dhakad, Kalu Lal Mali, Lakendra Sharma, and Heera
Lal Meghwal had come on two motorcycles to the house of
Purshottam and no sooner had they arrived in the village than
Ram Narayan, Mohan Lal, Yuvraj, Hansraj, Lalchand, Dhanpal,
Kanhaiya Lal, Naval, Revdi Lal, Hemraj, Radhey Shyam s/o c
Gopal, Bhojraj, Ramesh Chand, Ram Singh, Babu Lal Meena,
Mangilal, Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam s/o Prahalad, Modula!,
Radhey Shyam s/o Shankar Lal, Jagdish, Shambhu Dayal,
Amar Lal and Sita Ram along with 15-20 others came being
armed with Gandasis, Swords, Sabals and sticks. They 0 surrounded the house of Purshottam who was in the house
along with children. The accused persons scaled the house of
Purshottam and started pelting stones as a consequence of
which the roof sheets and the tiles of the house of Purshottam
were broken. Purshottam and his four other companions E
jumped the common wall situate in between the houses of
Purshottam and Radhey Shyam, brother of Purshottam, and
stayed in one room of the informant. As the evening progressed,
the evil designs became more animated and the deadly desires
sprang into action and at midnight, the accused persons took
the informant, his wife Badribai, mother Panabai and Nirmala F
Bai, wife of Purshottam, and made them sit in the thatched roof
of one Prabhulal Meena. Almost after half an hour, the relatives
of Ram Narayan Gujjar, Sarpanch of the said village, came in
a jeep along with 15-20 persons in front of the house of the
informant, broke open the door, entered the house and, in the G
house itself, inflicted blows with Swords, Gandasis and sticks,
as a result of which Kalu Lal Mali, Lakendra Sharma and Heera
Lal Meghwal breathed their last inside the house. The accused
dragged Purshottam and Ram Kumar outside and assaulted
them with Gandasis and swords on their heads, faces, hands H
A and feet and, eventually, those two succumbed to their injuries.
They took both the motorcycles in the passage and burnt the
same and, after the inhumane and barbaric act, left the scene.
3. The FIR, as is perceptible from the material brought on
8 record, was not lodged immediately but was lodged at 6.45
a.m. on 29.6.2001. During investigation, the investigating
agency prepared the site plan, got the autopsy done in respect
of !he dead bodies, seized the blood stained clothes, recorded
the statements of the witnesses and, on the basis of the
information furnished by the accused persons, while they were
C in custody, recovered the weapons used in the commission of
the crime and, after following the other formalities of
investigation, submitted the charge-sheets on different dates
before the Judicial Magistrate, Digod, who, in turn, committed
the matter to the Court of Session. After committal of the case
D Ill the Court of Session, the learned trial Judge, on 3.4.2002,
framed charges under Sections 147, 427, 435, 148, 302, 460
and 342 IPC and in respect of 435/149 IPC against accused
numbers 1, 5-9, 11, 12, 16, 21, 23, 24 and 26. As far as the
other three sets of accused persons are concerned, almost
E · similar charges were framed on 21.09.2002. The accused
persons denied their involvement in the crime, pleaded
innocence and claimed to be tried.
4. In order to substantiate the offences against the
F accused persons, the prosecution examined 45 witnesses, got
number of documents exhibited and various material objects
marked. The accused persons in their defence examined 15
witnesses.
5. The learned trial Judge formulated four questions,
G namely, whether the accused in furtherance of the common
object caused the death of the deceased persons and
assaulted the other persons; whether all of them by throwing
stones on the house of Purshottam and burning the Motorcycles
in possession of the deceased persons committed mischief;
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 373
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
whether the accused persons with common object to commit A
murder of the deceased persons committed lurking trespass
into the house of Rad hey Shyam in the night; and whether the
offences were committed by all the accused persons. The
learned trial Judge addressed the questions one to three, as
formulated by him, in a composite manner and, appreciating B
the evidence on record, came to hold that the accused Mohan
Lal, Yuvraj, Hansraj, Hemraj, Radhey Shyam s/o Gopal and
Modu Nath were guilty of the offences under Sections 148, 427,
342, 460 and 302 IPC and, accordingly, convicted them to
undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of c
Rs.500/-, two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/
-, one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/-, ten
years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2000/- and death
sentence respectively with further stipulation of consequences
in default of payment of fine respectively. Accused Lal Chand, 0 Revdi Lal, Ghanshyam and Radhey Shyam, s/o Prahlad, were
convicted for offences punishable under Sections 148, 427, 342,
460 and 302/149 IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.500/-, two years
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/-, one year rigorous E
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/-, ten years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2000/- and life imprisonment and
a fine of Rs.2000/- respectively with the consequences
enumerated in case of default of payment of fine respectively.
Accused Dhanpal, Kanhaiya Lal, Naval, Ram Lal, Babu Lal,
Mangi Lal, Radheysham and four others were found guilty of F
the same offences and imposed various sentences with a
default clause. The maximum sentence was imprisonment for
life and a fine of Rs.2000/- under Section 302/149 IPC. The
rest of the accused stood acquitted.
6. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Ram Narayan,
. Sarpanch of the village Railgaon, who was sen~ up for trial,
expired during the pendency of the trial and, accordingly, the
trial was closed against him.
A 7. The accused appellants preferred seven criminal
appe~ls, namely, Criminal Appeal Nos. 464 of 2003, 421 of
2003, 621 of 2003, 622 of 2003, 670 of 2003, 474 of 2003
and 520 of 2003. The State represented its case in Death
Reference No. 1 of 2003, but did not question the defensibility
B of the acquittal recorded against 11 other accused persons.
The accused-appellants before the High Court assailed the
conviction in respect of all the offences and the sentence and
the State defended the judgment passed by the court below.
8. The Division Bench of the High Court dealt with all the
C appeals and disposed all of them by a singular judgment dated
2.6.2005. The High Court, appreciating the evidence,
sc~utinizing the material on record and bestowing anxious
consideration while dealing with the submissions canvassed by
the learned counsel for the parties, partly allowed the appeals
D preferred by Mohan Lal and others, who were convicted under
Sections 302 and 460 IPC and sentenced to death, acquitted
Mohan Lal of the charges framed against him under Sections
302 and 460 IPC and as far as the other accused persons of
tbe same category are concerned, the sentence of death was
E converted to life sentence and, resultantly, the death reference
was declined. The accused persons, namely, Lal Chand, Revdi,
(3hanshyam, Radhey Shyam, Mangilal and Babula! were given
benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charges framed against
them under Sections 302 and 460 IPC. As far as the other
F accused persons, namely, Kanhaiyalal, Naval, Ram Lal and
Radhey Shyam, s/o Shankar Lal, are concerned, the conviction
and sentence imposed by the trial court was maintained.
9. The High Court, on x-ray of the evidence, came to hold
G that all the deaths were homicidal; that imposition of death
sentence by the learned trial Judge was not justified; that there
was no unexplained delay in lodging the FIR; that the provisions
enshrined under Section 149 of IPC were clearly attracted to
the case at hand; that the plea of the defence that the
prosecution had chosen only the relatives of the deceased
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 375
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
persons who are highly interested witnesses and, hence, their A
version did not deserve acceptance was without any merit; that
the whole crime was committed in a planned design; that the
proponement that no independent witnesses had been
examined was bereft of any substratum because the witnesses
could not have dared to depose against the Sarpanch who, on B
mere suspicion, had set himself on such a massacre and self
preservation being the basic instinct in such a situation had
ruled supreme; that Dhanpal s/o Ram Pratap, accused no. 5
before the High Court, having expired, appeal at his instance
abated; that the involvement of Lalchand, Revdi Lal, c
Ghanshyam, Radheyshyam s/o Prahlad, Mangi Lal, Babu Lal,
and Mohan was doubtful and, accordingly, they deserved to be
acquitted; that the other accused-appellants were involved in
the commission of crime and, therefore, the conviction under
Section 302 could not be interfered with. As far as the death 0 reference is concerned, it opined that it is not a rarest of rare
case warranting imposition of death sentence and, accordingly,
modified it to rigorous life imprisonment. Recording such
conclusions, the High Court disposed of the bunch of appeals.
10. We have heard Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain, learned counsel E
for the accused-appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 1108 of
2006, and Mr. lmtiaz Ahmed, learned counsel for the State in
all the appeals.
11. The first submission of Mr. Jain is that the prosecution F
version deserves to be thrown overboard inasmuch there is
delay in lodging of the FIR and the explanation offered for such
delay is unacceptable, regard being had to the duration of the
occurrence, proximity of the police station and the implication
of number of accused persons which is indicative of
embellishment. Learned counsel would further contend that G
innocent persons were dragged into trial and suffered
immensely and hence, such a story should not be given
credence to.
12. It is settled in law that mere delay in lodging the First H
A Information Report cannot be regarded by itself as fatal to the
case of the prosecution. However, it is obligatory on the part
of the court to take notice of the delay and examine, in the
backdrop of the case, whether any acceptable explanation has
been offered, by the prosecution and if such an explanation has
B been offered whether the same deserves acceptance being
found to be satisfactory. In this regard, we may refer with profit
a p;;issage from State of H.P. v. Gian Chand1, wherein a three
.Judge Bench of this Court has expressed thus: -
"Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic
formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding
the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first
information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court
on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered
for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not.
If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and
there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution
version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal
to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to
the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be
a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire
prosecution case."
13. In Ramdas and others v. State of Maharashtra2, this
Court has observed that mere delay in lodging the first
F information report is not necessarily fatal to the case of the
prosecution. However, the fact that the report was lodged
belatedly is a relevant fact of which the court must take notice.
This fact has to be considered in the light of other facts and
circumstances of the case, and, in a given case, the court may
G be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been
sufficiently explained. In the light of the totality of the evidence,
the court has to consider whether the delay in lodging the report
adversely affects the case of the prosecution. That is a matter
1. (2001) s sec 11.
H 2. (2007) 2 sec 110.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 377
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where there A
is direct evidence to explain the delay. Even in the absence of
direct explanation, there may be circumstances appearing on
record which provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.
There are cases where much time is consumed in taking the
injured to the hospital for medical aid and, therefore, the B
witnesses find no time to lodge the report promptly. There may
also be cases where on account of fear and threats, witnesses
may avoid going to the police station immediately. The time of
occurrence, the distance to the police station, mode of
conveyance available, are all factors which have a bearing on C
the question of delay in lodging of the report. It is also possible
to conceive of cases where the victim and the members of his
or her family belong to such a strata of society that they may
not even be aware of their right to report the matter to the police
and seek legal action, nor was any such advice available to 0 them.
14. In Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P.3 , a two-Judge Bench
of this Court has observed that FIR in a criminal case and
particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of
evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at E
the trial and the object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the
FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the
circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the
names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the
weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, F
if any, for delay in lodgment of the FIR results in embellishment
which·is a creation of afterthought. Emphasis was laid on the
fact that on account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the
advantage of spontaneity but also danger of introduction of a
coloured version or exaggerated story. G
15. Thus, whether the delay creates a dent in the
prosecution story and ushers in suspicion has to be gathered
by scrutinizing the explanation offered for the delay in the light
3. (1994) 5 sec 188. H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 6 S.C.R.
A of the totality of the facts and circumstances. Greater degree
of care and caution is required on the part of the court to
appreciate the evidence to satisfy itself relating to the
explanation of the factum of delay. In Kilakkatha Parambath
Sasi and others v. State of Kerala4, it has been observed that
8 when an FIR has been lodged belatedly, an inference can rightly
follow that the prosecution story may not be true but equally on
the other side, if it is found that there is no delay in the recording
of the FIR, it does not mean that the prosecution story stands
immeasurably strengthened.
C 16. The present factual scenario is to be tested on the
touchstone of the aforesaid principles. On a careful perusal of
the material on record, it is clear as crystal that the occurrence
had taken place at night. True it is, the house of Purshottam
was surrounded sometime at 5.00 p.m. on 28.6.2001, but the
D real crime, the assault and the murder tool< place after midnight.
The ghastly and gruesome crime must have sent a shiver in the
spine and shattered the brains and bones of the witnesses to
the crime and shock, panic and inequilibrium would have
reigned simultaneously to leave them totally confounded. No
E one could have dared to move an inch towards the police
!ltation, for man's basic instinct prompts him to survive first and
then think about any other action. The informant, brother of the
deceased, has clearly deposed that he and others were in a
terrible state of trauma to proceed to the police station to lodge
F an FIR. After the day broke, they mustered courage and
proceeded towards the police station and lodged the FIR at
6.45 a.m. on 29.6.2001. The learned counsel for the appellants
would contend that they could have lodged the FIR when the
house was seized and not after the whole episode was over.
G We are not impressed by the said submission and we think that
the explanation offered, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded implausible. As noticed earlier, a delayed FIR can
usher in craftsmanship, manipulation and embellishment and
may make the prosecution story vulnerable, but when the delay
H 4. AIR 2011 SC 1064.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 379
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
has been adequately explained, the same deserves acceptation A
and, accordingly, we do so.
17. The next limb of argument of Mr. Jain, learned counsel
for the appellants, is that all the alleged eye witnesses are
closely related to the deceased Purshottam arid the B
prosecution has chosen not to examine any independent
witness despite number of houses situate in the close vicinity
of the house of Purshottam and that itself creates a dent in the
version of the prosecution. When relatives, who are alleged to
be interested witnesses, are cited by the prosecution, it is the C
obligation of the court to scrutinize their evidence with care,
caution and circumspection. In the case at hand, the entire
occurrence took place in and around the house of Purshottam.
Five people had been done to death. In such a circumstance,
it is totally unexpected that other villagers would come forward 0 to'·give their statements and depose in the court. It is to be
borne in mind that Ram Narayan, Sarpanch of the village, solely
on the basis of suspicion, had seen to it that five persons meet
their end. Such a situation compels one not to get oneself
involved and common sense give consent to such an attitude.
Thus, no exception can be taken to the fact that no independent E
witness was examined. As far as the relatives are concerned,
Radhey Shyam, PW-1, is the brother of the deceased, Ram Lal,
PW-2, is the brother of Radhey Shyam, Panna Bai, PW-3, is
the mother of Purshottam and Nirmala Bai, PW-5, is his wife,
and Anita, PW-5, Badribai, PW-8, Manisha, PW-9 and F
Kaushalya, PW-10, are also close relatives and these
witnesses have been cited as eye witnesses.
18. In Hari Obula Reddy and others v. The State of
Andhra Pradesh5, a three-Judge Bench has opined that it G
cannot be laid down as an invariable rule that interested
evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless
corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by
independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence
5. (1981) 3 sec 675. H
A of the interested witnesses should be subjected to careful
scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the
interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or
inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the
circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction
B thereon.
1 ~- In Karlik Ma/har v. State of Biha~. this Court has
stated that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be
regarcjed as an interested witness, for the term "interested"
C postulates that the witness must have some interest in having
the aC)Cused, somehow or the other, convicted for some animus
or for some other reason.
20. In the case at hand, the witnesses have lost their father,
husband and a relative. There is no earthly reason to categorise
D them as interested witnesses who would nurture an animus to
see that the accused persons are convicted, though they are
not Involved in the crime. On the contrary, they would like that
the real culprits are prosecuted and convicted. That is the
normal phenomena of human nature and that is the expected
E human conduct and we do not perceive that these witnesses
harboured any ill motive against the accused persons, but have
deposed as witnesses to the brutal incident. We may proceed
to add, as stated earlier, that this court shall be careful and
cautious while scanning their testimony and we ·proceed to do
F SQ.
21. Radhey Shyam, the informant, has deposed with
regard to the threat, climbing of some of the accused on the
roof, surrounding of the house, pelting of stones, carrying of
lethal weapons like swords, gandhasis, sabals and sticks, the
G assault inside the house, dragging of the two deceased
persons and the ultimate death of the deceased. The plea that
he could not have witnessed the incident as it was night and
he was inside a thaiched house (chhappar), has been
H 6. (1996) 1 sec 614.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 381
[DIPAK MISRA. J.]
disbelieved by the learned trial Judge as well as by the: High
Court. Mr. Jain. learned counsel for the appellants. made a
fragile attempt to highlight that he could not have seen the
assault. but on a scrutiny of the evidence, it is manifest that there
was not complete darkness. as an electric bulb was burning at
that time and he had the occasion to see the incident. Similar
is the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses, which has
been analysed with great anxiety by the High Court. On a careful
perusal of the same. we do not find any reason to differ with
the said evaluation solely on the ground that they are related
to the deceased persons or that they could not have seen the
occurrence. In a case of this nature, it is the relatives who would
come forward to depose against the real culprits and would not
like to falsely implicate others. They have witnessed the brutish
crime committed and there is nothing on record to discard their
testimony as untrustworthy. We find that their evidence is
reliable and credible and it would not be inapposite not to act
upon the same. Nothing has been elicited in the cross
examination to record a finding that the evidence is improbable
or suspicious and deserves to be rejected. They have no
motive to falsely implicate the accused and, that apart, their
testimony have withstood the rigorous cross-examination in
material particulars and received corroboration from the
evidence of the doctor. That apart, the weapons seized lends
credence to the prosecution story. Quite apart from the above,
it is almost well nigh impossible to perceive that they have any
animosity for some reason to see that the accused persons are
convicted. Their family members have been done to death in
ghastly manner, and in these circumstances, it cannot be
thought of that they would leave the real culprits and implicate
the accused persons.
22. It is next contended by Mr. Jain that the witnesses have
not specifically stated about the exact role played by each of
the accused persons inasmuch as they have not mentioned who
assaulted on which part of the body and with what weapon. On
a perusal of the evidence. it transpires that the witnesses have H
A mentioned about the weapons 1Jsed, the assault made and the
parts of the body where injuries were inflicted. True it is, there
are some discrepancies but they are absolutely minor. That
apart, they had formed an unlawful assembly with a common
object to put an end to the lives of the deceased persons. Their
B common object is writ large because they had the knowledge
and they shared the common object from the beginning to the
end. Applying the principles laid down in Masalti and others
v. The State of Uttar Pradesh7, Lalji and others v. State of
U.P.8 and Ramachandran and others v. State of Kera/a9 , we
c conclude that all the accused persons were a part of the
unlawful assembly with the knowledge of the common object
and, accordingly, we unhesitatingly repel the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants.
23. Presently, we shall advert to the appeals wherein the
D High Court has acquitted the accused persons. It is apt to
me:ntion here that the State had not preferred any appeal
before the High Court assailing the judgment of acquittal by the
learned trial Judge. As is seen, the High Court has acquitted
seven accused, namely, Mohan, Lal Chand, Revdilal, Babulal,
E Mangilal, Ghanshyam and Radhey Shyam, in various criminal
appeals. Before we advert to the correctness of the view taken
by the High Court, we would like to state the role of the court
while dealing with a judgment of acquittal.
24. In Jadunath Singh and others v. State of U.P.10, a
three-Judge Bench, while dealing with an appeal against
acquittal, has held thus: -
"22. This Court has consistently taken the view that an
appeal against acquittal the High Court has full power to
review at large all the evidence and to reach the conclusion
7. AIR 1965 SC 202.
8. (1989) 1 sec 437.
9. (2011) 9 sec 257.
H 10. AIR 1972 SC 116.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN · 383
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be A
reversed. This power of the appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal was formulated by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King
Emperor, 61 Ind App 398 = (AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)) and
Nur Mohammad v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 151. These B
two decisions have been consistently referred to in
judgments of this Court as laying down the true scope of
the power of an appellate court in hearing criminal
appeals: see Surajpal Singh v. State, 1952 SCR 193 =
(Al R 1952 SC 52) and Sanwat Singh v. State of c
Rajasthan, (1961) 3 SCR 120 =(AIR 1961 SC 715)."
25. In Sohrab and another v. The State of Madhya
. Pradesh11, this Court opined that under the Code of Criminal
' Procedure, the High Court has full power to review at large the
!evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and to D
reach the conclusion that on proper appreciation of the .
evidence, the order of acquittal should be reversed. No
limitation should be placed upon that power unless it is
expressly stated in the Code. After so stating, the two-Judge
Bench expressed thus: - E
"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and
before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court,
should and will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial F
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to
the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an G
appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."
11. AIR 1972 SC 2020.
A 26. In State of M.P. v. Bacchudas alias Bairam and
others12, after referring to Bhagwan Si'l1gh v. State of M.P. and
other13 pronouncements, it has been stated that the principle
to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal
against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there
B are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the
impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and
convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the
process, it is a compelling reason for interference.
27. In State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Home
C Department v. Abdul Mannan14, this Court has stated that when
an accused is acquitted of a criminal charge, a right vests in
him to be a free citizen and this Court is very cautious in taking
away that right. The presumption of innocence of the accused
is further strengthened by the fact of acquittal of the accused
D under our criminal jurisprudence. The courts have held that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
then the one favourable to the accused, may be adopted by the
court. However, this principle must be applied keeping in view
the facts and circumstances of the case and the thumb rule is
E whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging its onus, and the error in appreciation of the
evidence is apparent on the face of the record, then the court
can interfere in the judgment of acquittal to ensure that the ends
F of justice are met. This is the linchpin around which the
administration of criminal justice revolves.
28. In State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu
Dutta15 , after survey of the earlier pronouncements, it has been
G observed that there is a very thin but a fine distinction between
an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on
12. c2007) s sec 135.
1 a. c2003J 3 sec 21.
t4. c2011i a sec 65.
H 15. c2012i 1 sec 602.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 385
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court A
is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal
against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that
while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Court keeps
in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour
· of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view B
adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the
conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the
materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with.
Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court
while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that c
the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent
miscarriage of justice where interference is imperative and the
ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the
judicial conscience.
29. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we proceed D
to analyse the reasons ascribed by the High Court while
recording the acquittal. In the case of Lal Chand @ Ram Niwas,
the High Court has opined that though he was named along with
other persons who constituted a group of 25-26 persons and
had surrounded the house of Purshottam, yet none of the E
witnesses had mentioned that he had gone on the roof of the
house or damaged the roof and, therefore, his participation in
the crime appears to be doubtful. While addressing the
conviction relating to Revdi Lal, the High Court has noticed that
the only evidence against him is that he had gone to the house F
of Purshottam and thrown stones, but no other witnesse has
named him barring Ramlal, PW-2. The High Court has found
that in all possibility, there was exaggeration or embellishment
and, accordingly, given him benefit of doubt. Dwelling upon the
conviction of Ghanshyam, the Division Bench has observed that G
the allegations against him are omnibus in nature and do not
inspire confidence and, accordingly extended benefit of doubt.
On similar analysis, Radhey Shyam s/o Prahlad, Mangi Lal and
Babu Lal S/o Dev Lal have been extended the benefit of doubt.
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 6 S.C.R.
A As far as Mohan Lal is concerned, the High Court perceived
that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the
witnesses pertaining to the involvement of Mohan Lal and,
henoe, felt that it was not safe to convict him and, accordingly,
on proper scrutiny of the evidence, gave him the benefit of
B doubt. Applying the principles laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid authorities, it is very difficult to hold that there are
'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient
grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions'
or 'glaring mistakes', and the prosecution has discharged the
c onus and, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
view expressed by the High Court does not suffer from any such
infirmity. We are inclined to think that the approach of the High
Court cannot be said to be totally implausible. It has taken note
of the involvement of number of persons and, after filtering the
0 grain from the chaff and on due consideration of the material
on record, has extended the benefit of doubt to the accused
persons who have been acquitted. Thus, we are not disposed
to dlslodge the conclusions arrived at by the High Court in
recording the acquittal.
E 30. The next issue that emerges for consideration is
whether the High Court has fallen into error by commuting the
death sentence to that of life imprisonment. The High Court,
while dealing with the Death Reference, has opined that when
specific overt acts have not been attributed and similarly placed
F accused persons have been given life sentence and Ram
Narayan, who had engineered the incident, has breathed his
last, it would not be appropriate to impose death sentence. The
High Court has observed that the three sons of Ram Narayan
had been awarded death sentence and the other two are
G villagers and in the backdrop of the situation, there were
mitigating factors for commutation of the sentence.
31. Apart from the reasons ascribed by the High Court, we
think it apposite to consider the circumstances whether in the
present case, death sentence is warranted. In Bachan Singh
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 387
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
v. State of Punjab 16, the Constitution Bench has held as A
follows:-
"A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life
postulates resistance. to taking a life through law's
instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the B
rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is
unquestionably foreclosed."
32. In Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab", the
Court, after stating the feeling of the community and its desire
for self preservation, expressed that in every case, the C
commur.:ty does not desire to withdraw the protection of self
preservation by sanctioning the death penalty. It may do so in
.. "rarest of rare cases" when its collective conscience is so
shocked that it would expect the holders of the judicial power
centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal D
opinion as regards the desirability or otherwise of retaining
death penalty. After so stating, the three-Judge Bench culled
out the propositions envisaged from Bachan Singh's case
which are as follows: -
"(1) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted
except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(it) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances
of the 'offender' also require to be taken into consideration
along with the circumstances of the 'crime'.
(iit) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed
only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether
inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant G
circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only
provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment
for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard
16. (1980) 2 sec 684.
11. (1983) 3 sec 410. H
388
to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the
releyant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before
the option is exercised."
33. In Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharshtra 18,
c the Bench referred to the principles in Bachan Singh (supra)
and Machhi Singh (supra) and proceeded to state as follows:-
C3
• "The rarest of the rare case" comes when a convict would
be a menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful
coexistence of the society. The crime may be heinous or
brutal but may not be in the category of "the rarest of the
rare case". There must be no reason to believe that the
accused cannot be reformed or rehabilitated and that he
is likely to continue criminal acts of violence as would
constitute a continuing threat to the society. The accused
may be a menace to the society and would continue to be
so, threatening its peaceful and harmonious coexistence.
The manner in which the crime is committed must be such
that it may result in intense and extreme indignation of the
community and shock the collective conscience of the
society. Where an accused does not act on any spur-of
the-moment provocation and indulges himself in a
deliberately planned crime and meticulously executes it,
the death sentence may be the most appropriate
punishment for such a ghastly crime. The death sentence
may be warranted where the victims are innocent children
and helpless women. Thus, in case the crime is committed
in a most cruel and inhuman manner which is an extremely
brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting and dastardly
manner, where his act affects the entire moral fibre of the
H 1a. c2011) 12 sec ss.
KANHAIYA LAL & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 389
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
society e.g. crime committed for power or political A
ambition or indulging in organised criminal activities, death
sentence should be awarded. (See C. Muniappan v. State
of T.N. 19, Dara Singh v. Republic of lndia20, Surendra Kofi
v. State of U.P. 21, Mohd. Mannan v. State of Biha~
2
and
Sudam v. State of Maharashtra23 .}" B
34. In Ram Pal v. State of U.P.24, a two-Judge Bench took
note of the fact that there has been termination of life of number
of people and opined that the number of deaths cannot be the
sole criterion for awarding the maximum punishment of death. C
It further ruled that while in a given case, death penalty may be
the appropriate sentence even for a single murder, it would not
necessarily mean that in every case of multiple murders, death
penalty has to be the normal rule. The Court took note of the
guidelines stated by the Constitution Bench in the case of
Bachan Singh (supra), the aggravating circumstances and the D
mitigating circumstances postulated therein and opined that the
incident had taken place as a sequel to the murder of close
relative of the appellant and the other principal accused which
was suspected to have been committed by the members of the
victims' family. The two-Judge Bench expressed the view that E
the circumstance could be treated as a circumstance which
amounted to a provocation from the victim side. That apart, the
two-Judge Bench observed that the appellant therein was
similarly placed with the other accused persons who had been
imposed sentence for life imprisonment and further, they had F
spent nearly seventeen years in custody.
35. In the present case, as we notice from the factual
matrix, the crime had taken place because Ram Narayan had
1s. (2010) s sec 567.
20. c2011) 2 sec 490.
21. (2011) 4 sec so.
22. (2011) 5 sec 509.
23. (2011) 1 sec 125.
24. (2003J 1 sec 141.
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 6 S.C.R.
A suspected that the deceased persons were responsible for
extinguishing the life spark of his son. It is also seen that
similarly placed persons have been imposed life sentence.
Quite apart from that, all the accused persons have almost
spent thirteen years in custody. Regard being had to the totality
B of the circumstances, it cannot be said that imprisonment for
life is inadequate .and the circumstances are so grave that it
calls for a death sentence. When we adjudge the whole
scenario in proper perspective, we are inclined to think that it
is not a case which can be treated to be a case of extreme
c culpability and there is no other option but to impose death
penalty. Thus, we do not find any error in the decision of the
High Court by which it has commuted the death sentence to
life imprisonment.
· o 36. Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused-
appellants and the appeals filed by the State for enhancement
of penalty and reversal of the judgment of acquittal rendered in
favour of the accused persons are dismissed.
B.B.B. Appeals dismissed.