Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab
Cited by 8 judgments in this corpus
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- HARPAL SINGH AND ANR. ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC. · 2022 INSC 1018
- LITTA SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN · 2013 INSC 285
- State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Shivananda Pathak & Ors · (1998) 5 SCC 513
- THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. SHIV ANANDPATHAK · 1998 INSC 83
- CHAWLA AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF HARYANA · 1974 INSC 29
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
KURIAN, J. 1. Close to be called a centenarian, the
appellant is before us challenging the conviction and sentence
E under Sections 498A/304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC').
2. Appellant is the second accused in Sessions Case No.
41/1991 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar.
F First accused is his son. The prosecution case as succinctly
summarized by the High Court in the impugned judgment is
extracted below:
"Harjit Kaur, daughter of Mohinder Singh was married with
Mohan Singh accused. Mohinder Singh along with Hari
Singh Sarpanch, who was his brother from the
brotherhood, had gone to village Gharyala to see his
daughter Harjit Kaur because the in-laws of Harjit Kaur
were in the habit of picking up quarrels with her for bringing
less dowry. The in-laws of Harjit Kaur used to pressurize
her to bring scooter, refrigerator and cash from her parents.
GURDIP SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 283
[KURIAN, J.]
On her failure to do so, they after conspiring with each A
other, threatened to kill her by giving some poisonous
substance. Gurdip Singh, father-in-law of Harjit Kaur, on
many occasions told Harjit Kaur that in case she failed to
bring the above said articles before Rabi crop, then after
murdering her, he will re-marry his son. This fact was B
disclosed to Mohinder Singh by Harjit Kaur on many
occasions but he ignored the same with the hope that Harjit
Kaur may settle in her in-laws house.
The prosecution story further is that on 6.4.1990, Mohinder C
Singh along with Hari Singh had gone to the residential
farm house of Mohan Singh accused here the dead body
of Harjit Kaur was lying on the ground. No one was present
in the house. Mohinder Singh suspected that his daughter
Harjit Kaur had consumed some poisonous substance out
of frustration or the accused have murdered her by D
administering her some poisonous substance. Hari Singh
was deputed to look after the dead body.
Mohinder Singh made his statement before the police on
6.4.1990 on the basis of which the present case was
registered.
The investigation in the case was conducted and after the
completion of investigation, challan was presented against
the appellants in the Court.
The accused were charge-sheeted under Sections 498-
A/304-B IPC to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial.
To substantiate the charge against the accused, the G
prosecution examined PW-1 Mohinder Singh, PW-2 Hari
Singh, PW-3 Gurcharan Singh, PW-4 Rishi Ram, PW-5
ASI Gulbag Singh, PW-6 Harbhajan Singh, PW-7 SI Amrik
Singh and PW-8 Dr. Ram Krishan Sharma."
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 8 S .. C.R.
A 3. The Sessions Court convicted both the accused under
Section 498A of IPC for rigorous imprisonment for a period of
two years and fine of Rs.500/- each ~nd, in default of payment
of fine, for another three months, and under Section 3048 of
IPC for rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and fine
8 of Rs.500/- each and, in default of payment of fine, for another
three months. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
The High Court, in appeal, maintained the conviction but
reduced the sentence under Section 3048 of IPC to seven
years rigorous imprisonment and confirmed the rest.
c 4. It is reported that the husband-first accused Mohan
Singh is no more.
5. "Dowry death" in the Indian Penal Code was introduced
under Section 3048 as per Act 43 of 1986. Under the said
D provision, if a married woman dies,
. F
(i) on account of burns or bodily injury or dies
otherwise than under normal circumstances.
(ii) such death occurs within seven years of marriage.
(iii) it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative.
(iv) such cruelty or harassment be soon before her
death and
(v) such cruelty or harassment by the husband or his
relative be or for or in connection with demand for
dowry,
G such death is called dowry death under Section 3048 of IPC
and the husband or relative shall be presumed to have caused
the dowry death. Section 498A of JPC deals with the offence
of cruelty by the husband or relative. If a married woman is
subjected to cruelty by the husband or his relative, he is liable
H for conviction under Section 498A. There is no requirement
GURDIP SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 285
[KURIAN, J.]
under Section 498A that the cruelty should be within seven A
years of marriage. It is also not invariably necessary under
Section 498A that the cruelty should be in connection with the
demand for dowry. It is interesting to note that Section 498A
was introduced as per Act 46 of 1983 to "suitably deal
effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases B
of cruelty to married women by their in-laws" and Section 304B
was introduced as per Act 43 of 1986 to make the penal
provisions "more stringent and effective".
(Emphasis supplied) C
6. In this context, the background for the amendments
would be a relevant reference. In the 91st Report on Dowry
Deaths and Law Reform submitted by Justice K. K. Mathew,
Chairman, Law Commission of India, on 10.08.1983, it is
stated at Paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 as follows: D
"1.3 If, in a particular incident of dowry death, the facts are
such as to satisfy the legal ingredients of an offence
already known to the law, and if those facts can be proved
without much difficulty, the existing criminal law can be E
resorted to for bringing the offender to book. In practice,
however, two main impediments arise-
(i) either the facts do not fully fit into the pigeon-hole
of any known offence: or
(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are such that proof
of directly incriminating facts is thereby rendered
difficult.
The first impediment mentioned above is aptly
illustrated by the situation where a woman takes her life G
with her own hands. though she is driven to it by ill
treatment. This situation may not fit into any existing
pigeon-hole in the list of offences recognized by the general
criminal law of the country, except where there is definite
proof of instigation, encouragement or other conduct that H
amounts to "abetment" of suicide. Though, according to
newspaper reports, there have been judgments of lower
courts which seem to construe "abetment" in this context
widely, the position is not beyond doubt.
The second situation mentioned above finds
illustration in those incidents in which even though the
circumstances raise a strong suspicion that the death was
not accidental, yet, proof beyond reasonable doubt may
not be forthcoming that the case was really one of
homicide. Thus, there is need to address oneself to the
substantive criminal law as well as to the law of evidence.
1.4. Speaking of the law of evidence, it may be mentioned
that one of the devices by which the law usually tries to
bridge the gulf between one fact and another, where the
gulf is so wide that it cannot be crossed with the help of
the normal rules-of evidence, is the device of inserting
presumptions. In this sense, it is-possible to consider the
question whether, on the topic under discussion, any
presumption rendering the proof of facts in issue less
difficult, ought to be inserted into the law.
1.5. Coming to substantive criminal law, if a deficiency is
found to exist in such law, it can be filled up only by
creating a new offence. Before doing so, of course, the
wise law maker is expected to take into account a number
of aspects, including the nuances of ethics, the ever
fluctuating winds of public opinion, the Demands of law
enforcement and practical realities."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Though the expression "presumed" is not used under
Section 3048 of IPC, the words "shall be deemed" under
Section 3048 carry, literally and under law, the same meaning
since the intent and context requires such attribution. Section
H 3048 of IPC on dowry death and Section 1138 of the Indian
GURDIP SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 287
[KURIAN, J.]
Evidence Act, 1872, on presumption, were introduced by the A
same Act, i.e., Act 43 of 1986, with effect from 19.11.1986, and
Section 498A of IPC and Section 113A of the Evidence Act
were introduced by Act 46 of 1983, with effect from 25.12.1983.
8. The amendments under the Evidence Act are only 8 consequential to the amendments under the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 and the Indian Penal Code. It is significant to note
that under Section 113A, the expression is "court may presume"
whereas under Section 1138, the expression is "court shall
presume". The Parliament did intend the provisions to be more
stringent and effective in view of the growing social evil as can C
be seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the
amending Act. ·
9. Being a mandatory presumption on the guilty conduct
of an accused under Section 3048, it is for the prosecution to o
first show the availability of all the ingredients of the offence so
as to shift the burden of proof in terms of Section 1138 of the
Evidence Act. Once all the ingredients are present, the
presumption of innocence fades away. Yet another reference
to Paragraph 1.8 in the 91 st Report of the Law Commission E
of India would be fruitful in this context:
"1.8. Those who have studied crime and its
incidence know that once a serious crime is committed.
detection is a difficult matter and still more difficult is
successful prosecution of the offender. Crimes that lead
to dowry deaths are almost invariably committed within the
safe precincts of a residential house. The criminal is a
member of the family: other members of the family (if
residing in the same house) are either guilty associates
in crime. or silent but conniving witnesses to it. In any case. G
the shackles of the family are so strong that truth may not
come out of the chains. There would be no other eye
witnesses. except for members of the family."
(Emphasis supplied) H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 8 S.C.R.
A 10. H;iiving carefufly gone through the entire evidence as
appreciated by both the Sessions Court as well as the High
Court, we are not inclined to take a different view except on
one aspect, viz., the date of marriage. As far as other aspects
regarding cruelty or harassment are concerned, it has clearly
8 been proved in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 that the
appellant/accused was also taunting the deceased demanding
dowry. They were all staying in the same premises. The issue
had also been brought before the Village Panchayat many
times. The deceased was even sent out from her matrimonial
C home on this a~count. There is also evidence that the
deceased had been harassed by both accused before two
weeks of her death. Yet with all these, for conviction under
Section 3048 of IPC, it is obligatory on the part of the
prosecution to establish that the death occurred within seven
0 years of marriage. Sans the requirement of seven years, in this
case, the offence would fall only under Section 498A of IPC.
And for that matter, sans any of the five ingredients discussed
at Paragraph 6 above herein, the offence will fall out of Section
3048 of IPC. The Sessions Court, unfortunately, has not
addressed this crucial aspect and has gone only on
E assumptions with regard to the date of marriage. It has to be
noted that the deceased had two children, the son had died
earlier and there is. a surviving daughter who is stated to be
around seven years. Whether the said age of the daughter is
at the time of evidence or at the time of the death of the
F deceased, is not clear. Neither PW-1, father of the deceased
nor PW-2 Sarpanch or any other witness has given any
evidence with regard to the date of marriage. No document
whatsoever has been produced with regard to the marriage.
There is no evidence even with regard to the date of birth of
G the children. Also, according to PW-1 father of the deceased,
the marriage had taken place five to seven years back. It has
to be noted that DW-1 elder devrani/sister-in-law of the
deceased had stated in her evidence that the marriage had
1
taken place around eleven years back. Nobody has even
H spoken on the exact date of marriage~ The death reportedly
GURDIP SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 289
(KURIAN, J.]
took place on 06.04.1990. The evidence was recorded in 1996.
The High Court counted the eleven years from the date of
recording of the evidence. However, on going through the
evidence, it is not at all clear as to whether the same is with
respect to the date of tendering evidence or with respect to the
date of the incident. In view of the mandatory presumption of
law under Section 3048 of IPC/1138 of the Evidence Act, it is
obligatory on the part of th·e prosecution to establish that the
death occurred within seven years of marriage. Section 3048
of IPC permits presumption of law only in a given set of facts
and not presumption of fact. Fact is to be proved and then only,
law will presume. In the instant case, prosecution has failed to
establish the crucial fact on the death occurring within seven
years of marriage.
11. Hence, we set aside the conviction of the appellant
under Section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). The
conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860) is confirmed. However, taking note of the late evening
age of the appellant, the substantive sentence is limited to the
period undergone by him during the investigation/trial.
12. The appeal is allowed as above.
8.8.B. Appeal partly allowed ..