C.V. Francis v. Union of India & Ors.
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. The Petitioner, who has
appeared in person, was employed as a Manager by the
Respondent, Bokaro Steel Limited, which subsequently became
a unit of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) from 20.2.1998. On the
same date a Voluntary Retirement Scheme was introduced and G
the Petitioner also applied on 7.4.1998 to avail the benefits of ·
the Scheme. The Petitioner claims to have applied for leave
from 30.4.1998 to 31.5.1998 which was purported to have been
sanctioned.
2. However, without waiting for acceptance of his H
C.V. FRANCIS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 57
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
4. The said Order was challenged by the Petitioner in the A
Kerala High Court by way of Writ Petition No. 26659 of 2009,
which was, however, rejected on the ground that the Kerala
High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Thereafter, the Petitioner approached the Jharkhand High
Court by way of Writ Petition (S) No. 4057 of 2004. B
5. The Writ Petition having been dismissed by the learned
Single Judge, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the
Division Bench in which Petitioner's counsel strongly urged that
his application for voluntary retirement be accepted. He also c added a new dimension to his submissions that since there
was no response from the side of the Respondent, his
application for voluntary retirement must be deemed to have
been accepted. Accordingly, the subsequent proceedings
taken by way of disciplinary proceedings and the order of
D termination of services passed therein, must be held to be
entirely invalid.
6. In support of his submissions, the Petitioner relied
heavily on the decision of this Court in Tek Chand Vs. Dile
Ram [(2001) 3 SCC 290]. Although, the said decision was E
rendered in the context of an election, incidentally the question
of voluntary retirement also came up for consideration. The
learned Judges held that there were three categories of rules
relating to seeking of voluntary retirement after notice. In the
first category, voluntary retirement automatically comes into F
force on expiry of notice period. In the second category also,
retirement comes into force unless an order is passed during
notice period withholding permission to retire and in the third
category voluntary retirement does not come into force unless
permission to this effect is granted by the competent authority. G
-"' In such a case, refusal of permission can be communicated
even after the expiry of the notice period.
7. The Petitioner then referred to Rule 48-A of the Central
Civil Services Pension Rules, dealing with retirement on
completion of 20 years' qualifying service. The Petitioner H
A pointed that under Sub-rule (1) at any time after the Government
servant has completed twenty years' qualifying service, he may,
by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the
Appointing Authority, retire from service. He also pointed that
under Sub-rule (2), the notice of voluntary retirement given under
B sub-rule (1) would have to be accepted by the Appointing
Authority. However, under the proviso thereto, it is further
provided that where the Appointing Authority does not refuse
to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the
period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall become
c effective from the date of expiry of the said period.
8. Drawing an analogy with the facts of his own case, the
Petitioner contended that even in his case, upon expiry of the
period of notice given by him to retire voluntarily in terms of the
Voluntary Retirement Scheme, the retirement became
D ineffective on expiry of the said period of the notice.
• Accordingly, the subsequent letter addressed to him by the
Respondent company to rejoin his duty was of little
consequence and any action taken thereupon would be void.
According to Petitioner, the termination of his services was in
E violation of the well-settled principles relating to acceptance of
voluntary retirement laid down in Tek Chand's case (supra).
9. Appearing for the Respondent Company, Mr. Dhruv
Mehta, learned Senior Advocate, strongly opposed the
F Petitioner's case on behalf of the Respondent Company
primarily on the ground that in a scheme for voluntary retirement
floated by a company, it is entirely the company's discretion to
accept and allow an employee's application for voluntary
retirement. The concept of deemed acceptance also was not
G available in the instant case, since the scheme did not contain
such a provision.
10. Mr. Mehta highlighted the conduct of the Petitioner after
applying for voluntary retirement. Mr. Mehta pointed out that
without waiting for his prayer for voluntary retirement to be
H accepted, the Petitioner joined an American Company even
C.V. FRANCIS v. UNION OF !NOIA & ORS. 59
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
before the expiry of the notice period. In fact, it was quite A
evident from the tenor of his letters seeking leave, that the
Petitioner never intended to rejoin his duty in the Respondent
company. On the question of deemed acceptance of an
employee's application for voluntary retirement, Mr. Mehta
referred to the decision of this Court in Padubidri Damodar B
Shenoy Vs. Indian Airlines Limited and Another [(2009) 10
SCC 514], wherein, although, the Petitioner upon completing
of 20 years' of qualifying service had applied for voluntary
retirement, he was informed that such retirement would not be
automatic on expiry of period of notice, but it would become c
effective only after the approval of the competent authority. In
the said case, this Court also observed that the employee had
never acted as if his services had been discontinued on the
expiry of the three months' notice period, inasmuch as, he
continued to attend his duties. Thus, the application for voluntary 0 retirement made by the Petitioner therein, never really came into
effect.
11. Mr. Mehta submitted that the facts of the present case
were somewhat similar to the facts of the above case, where,
although an application had been made for voluntary retirement, E
the same was not accepted and the services of the Petitioner
therein did not stand terminated even after the expiry of the
period of notice. Mr. Mehta urged that on the same reasoning,
the decision in Tek Chand's case (supra) would have no
application to the facts of this case. F
12. Having considered the submissions made on behalf
of the parties, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment
and Order of learned Single Judge, as upheld by the Division
Bench of the High Court, rejecting the Petitioner's prayer
challenging the termination of his services. It may be noted that G
notice was issued on the Special Leave Petition on 11.11.2011
only to consider whether the order of dismissal passed against
the Petitioner could be converted into an order of compulsory
retirement. We have considered the matter from that angle and
A do not find any justification to modify the Order of either the
learned Single Judge or the Division Bench. As has been
emphasised by the Division Bench of the High Court, it is
obvious that the Petitioner having obtained employment in the
United States of America, had no intention of rejoining his
B duties with the Respondent company. Instead of waiting for the
notice period, the Petitioner moved to the United States, having
obtained employment there and his letters praying for leave
were of no consequence. Furthermore, instead of attending the
disciplinary enquiry commenced against him, the Petitioner
c repeatedly requested the Respondent company to accept his
application for voluntary retirement.
13. It is well-established that a Voluntary Retirement
Scheme introduced by a company, does not entitle an
employee as a matter of right to the benefits of the Scheme.
D Whether an employee should be allowed to retire in terms of
the Scheme is a decision which can only be taken by the
employer company, except in cases where the Scheme itself
provides for retirement to take effect when the notice period
comes to an end. A Voluntary Retirement Scheme introduced
E by a company is essentially a part of the company's desire to
weed out the deadwood.
14. The Petitioner's contention that his application for
voluntary retirement came into effect on the expiry of the period
F of notice given by him must fail, since there was no such
stipulation in the scheme that even without acceptance of his
application it would be deemed that the Petitioner's voluntary
retirement application had been accepted. Once that is not
accepted, the entire case of the Petitioner falls to the ground.
The decision in Tek Chand's case (supra) will not, therefore,
G have any application to the facts of this case, particularly when
the Petitioner's application for voluntary retirement had not been
accepted and he had been asked to rejoin his services. The
Petitioner was fully aware of this position as he continued to
apply for leave after the notice period was over.
C.V. FRANCIS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 61
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15. We are not, therefore, inclined to interfere with the A
orders impugned in the Special Leave Petition which is,
accordingly, dismissed.
16. Having regard to the facts of the case, there will be
no order as to costs. B
K.K.T. SLP dismissed.