Jai Krishan (d) Tr. Lrs. v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J 1. Leave
gran~d. G
2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and
'order dated 16th July, 2005 passed by the High Court of
Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) at Nainital in first Appeal No. 56
of 2001 (Old No.325/1995). By the impugned judgment, the
Division Bench of the High Court partly allowed the appeal n
.
A preferred by the State of U.P., set aside part of the judgment
and award dated 23rd March, 1995 passed by the Reference
Court.
3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 was issued on 14th September, 1977 for the purpose of
acquiring land measuring 36 acres situated at Glenmire Estate,
cosycot and cosynook in Mussoorie. The acquisition was so
made for the purpose of extension of Lal Bahadur Shastri
C National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. Thereafter
follow up Notification under Section 6 of the LA.Act was issued
on 30th January, 1978 which was also published. The
possession of the land was taken over on 3rd July, 1986. The
Special Land Acquisition Officer, after hearing the parties
D passed the award on 27th November, 1984 determining the
amount of compensation at Rs.4,89,615.75.
4. Col. Jai Krishan (since deceased) represented by Lrs.
(appellant herein) and Mahesh Chandra- respondent no.8, got
E filed reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act. The said
reference No. L.A.154 of 1985 heard by the Additional District
Judge, Dehradun. The aforesaid claimants alleged before the
Reference Court that considering the fact that Mussoorie is a
famous tourist place, its land is of immense potential value, the
market value of the land in question is Rs.25 lakh per acre. As
F such they claimed compensation for 36 acres of acquired land.
They further claimed that the value of the constructed building
cannot be assessed less than Rs. 100/- per sq. feet and,
therefore, considering the plinth area of 3786 sq. feet of
Glenmire building, 2528 sq. ft. of Cosynook building and other
G construction, the valuation should be Rs.6,31,400/- and after
deducting the amount on account of depreciation factor the
value of building is Rs. 4,73,550/-. There were 6990 trees on (
the aforesaid 36 acres of land. The claimants also submitted
before the reference court that considering the fact that value
H of the trees which has been assessed @ Rs.15/- per tree,
JAi KRISHAN (D) TR. LRS. v. STATE OF 1003
UTTARAKHAND [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
should have been at least Rs.50/- per tree. In reply, the stand A
of the State of U .P. was that the claimants have already claimed
Rs.7,50,000/- as compensation for the acquired land and as
such they are not entitled to claim any amount more than that.
It was further pleaded that the land being sloppy a_nd uneven
as such it cannot be assessed more than Rs.5,000/- per acre. B
The respondents based their claim on the basis of the rate
shown in exemplar sale deed dated 26th December, 1976.
5. The Reference Court after framing necessary issues,
taking into consideration the evidence and hearing the parties C
enhanced the amount of compensation of land from
Rs.1,80,000/- to Rs.19,76,000/- and that of trees from
Rs.1,05, 155.50 to Rs.4,00,000/-. Aggrieved by the order
passed by the Reference Court the State and Union of India
preferred the appeal.
6. The Division Bench of Uttarakhand High Court by the
impugned judgment dated 16th July, 2005 applied the principle
of Belting area on following presumption:
"No doubt that Mussoorie is an important tourist place E
and its land is of immense potential value but
simultaneously it is also true that the land in Mussoorie
is sloppy and hilly. As such for assessing a true market
value that flat rate, for entire land of 36 acres, cannot be
applied."
7. The claimants also claimed 12% additional
compensation u/s 23(1A) of the L.A. Act, which the Court below
had not granted. The claimants also claimed that they were
entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 7,01,875/- towards Fuel value/
Timber value of the tree standing on the acquired land as G
approved by the retired Forest Ranger. They also pleaded that
the compensation having been paid after more than one year
from the date on which possession was taken, they are entitled
for interest @ 15% per annum as provided under proviso to
Section 28 of the L.A. Act. Such claim was made by the H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A appellant and another by means of cross-objections. However,
the High Court without deliberating on such issues as raised
in the cross objections passed the impugned judgment. In the
circumstances, the appellant and another preferred Review
Petition No. 87 of 2005 before the High Court with a petition
B for condonation of delay.
8. The impugned judgment was delivered on 16th July,
2005 and a review petition was filed on 15th September, 2005
i.e. after 30 days delay. The appellant and another took specific
C plea that their lawyer used to come from Allahabad to Nainital
who when came to know about the judgment, applied for the
certified copy of it on 4th August, 2005 which was delivered
on 9th August, 2005. Thereafter sometime was taken to file the
review petition. The High Court dismissed the petition for
condonation of delay and review petition on the ground of non-
D prosecution. The restoration petition filed by the appellant was
also dismissed.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
High Court wrongly applied the principle of belting area. The
E 36 acres of land is adjacent to the Lal Bahadur Shastri National
Academy of Administration. Mussoorie and is located at tourist
spot. He further contended that the appellants were entitled for
12% additional compensation u/s 23(1A) in addition 15%
solatium u/s 28 of the L.A.Act in view of delayed payment of
F compensation after more than one year. The stand of the
learned counsel for the respondent-State is that the High Court
rightly applied the principle of belting area as the land is sloppy
and uneven.
10. As noticed above, the High Court noticed that
G Mussoorie is an important tourist place and it is the land of
immense potential value. But without any basis or pleadings,
the High Court presumed that total land in Mussoorie is sloppy
and hilly. The High Court though noticed the exemplar sale-deed
dated 31..3.1977 (paper no. 17-C) which shows the market
H value of the land at Rs. 54,896/- per acre and the said sale-
JAi KR I SHAN (D) TR. LRS. v. STATE OF 1005
UTIARAKHAND [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
deed pertains to the land nearer to the Lal Bahadur Sastri A
National Academy. But without any basis, the High Court
observed as under:
'We are of the view that the rate mentioned in this sale
deed cannot be applied as ·exemplar for entire land B
acquired. Value of the land cannot be said to be same
for all the 36 acres acquired as part of the land would be
nearer to it and part of it would be a far. "
The aforesaid observation made by the Division Bench of
the High Court is not based on any evidence but on C
presumption and surmises. It cannot be a ground that the
Mussoorie is a hilly place and therefore the principle of Belting
area is to be applied. It was not the case of the State of U.P.
that in all land acquisition proceedings in Mussoorie the
principle of Belting area is applied. In this background on mere D
presumption it was not open to the High Court to apply principle
of belting area for determination of compensation. The High
Court has also accepted that the market value of the land in
question is Rs. 54,896/- per acre as decided by the Reference
Court; therefore in absence of any pleading on the part of State E
of U.P. it was not open for the High Court to apply the principle
of belting area.
11. It has not been disputed that the site of new town of
the acquired land is almost at the same elevation as Mussoorie
as it has been developed as a Hill resort and has immense
potential value. It is adjacent to the Lal Bahadur Shastri National
Academy, which is the beneficiary of such acquisition.
12. For the reason aforesaid, the part of the impugned
judgment dated 16th July, 2005 passed by the High Court in G
so for as it relates to the valuation of land is set aside and the
award passed by the Revisional Court under Section 18 is
upheld.
13: The provisions of Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act
mandate as follows:
"23 Matters to be considered in determining '
compensation. - (1) In determining the amount of
compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this
Act, the Court shall take into consideration
first, the market value of the land at the date of the
publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section
(1 );
secondly, the damage sustained by the person
interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops
or trees which may be on the land at the time of the
Collector's taking possession thereof,·
thirdly, the damage (if any}, sustained by the person
interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession
of the land, by reason of severing such land from his
other land;
fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person
interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession
of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously
affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in
any other manner, or his earnings;
fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by
the Collector, the person interested is compelled to
change his residence or place of business, the
reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change;
and
sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from
diminution of the profits of the land between the time of
the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the
time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.
JAi KRISHAN (D) TR. LRS. v. STATE OF 1007
UTTARAKHAND [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
[(1 A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above A
provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount
calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on
such market value for the period commencing on and
from the date of the publication of the notification under
Section 4, sub-Section (1 ), in respect of such land to the B
date of award to the Collector or the date of taking
possession of the land, whichever is earlier."
Explanation- In computing the period referred to in this
sub-section, any period or periods during which the
proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up C
on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any
Court shall be excluded.]"
14: In Gurpreet Singh vs. Uni<;m of India, (2006) 8 SCC
457 this Court noticed the claim which envisages award of D
:::ompensation at different stages. In all the stages, it is
necessary to take note of the provisions of Sections 23(1) and
23(1-Af In Gurpreet Singh (supra) this Court held as under:
"32. In the scheme of the Act, it is seen that the award of E
compensation is at different stages. The first stage occurs
when the award is passed. Obviously, the award takes in
all the amounts contemplated by Section 23(1), Section
23(1-A), Section 23(2) and the interest contemplated by
Section 34 of the Act. The whole of that amount is paid
or deposited by the Collector in terms of Section 31 of F
the Act. At this stage, no shortfall in deposit is
contemplated, since the Collector has to pay or deposit
the amount awarded by him. If a shortfall is pointed out,
it may have to be made up at that stage and the principle
of appropriation may apply, though it is difficult to G
contemplate a partial deposit at that stage. On the
deposit by the Collector under Section 31 of the Act, the
first stage comes to an end subject to the right of the
claimant to notice of the deposit and withdrawal or
acceptance of the amount with or without protest. H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A 33. The second stage occurs on a reference under
Section 18 of the Act. When the Reference Court awards
enhanced compensation, it has necessarily to take note
of the enhanced amounts payable under Section 23(1),
Section 23(1-A), Section 23(2) and interest on the
s enhanced amount as provided in Section 28 of the Act
and costs in terms of Section 27. The Collector has the
duty to deposit these amounts pursuant to the deemed
decree thus passed. This has nothing to do with the
earlier deposit made or to be made under and after the
c award. If the deposit made, falls short of the enhancement
decreed, there can arise the question of appropriation at
that stage, in relation to the amount enhanced on the
reference. "
In view of the decision in Gurpreet Singh(Supra), we hold
D that the claimants are entitled to additional compensation @
12% per annum as provided u/s 23(1A) of the L.A. Act.
15. Section 28 of the L.A. Act deals with interest payable
on excess compensation which reads as under:
"28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess
compensation.- -If the sum which, in the opinion of the
Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector
did award as compensation, the award of the Court may
direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess
at the rate of 67 [nine per centum] per annum from the
date on which he took possession of the land to the date
of payment of such excess into Court:
[Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that
where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court
after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the
date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of
fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the
date of expiry of the said period of one year on the
JAi KRISHAN (D) TR. LRS. v. STATE OF 1009
UTIARAKHAND [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been A
paid into Court before the date of such expiry.]."
16. In Sunder vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 this
Court held that the interested pecsons are also interested on
amount of solatium. The Court further observed as under: B
"15. When the court is of the opinion that the Collector
should have awarded a larger sum as compensation the
court has to direct the Collector to pay interest on such
excess amount. The rate of interest is on a par with the
rate indicated in Section 34. This is so provided in C
Section 28 of the Act. xx xx xx"
In Gurpreet Singh (supra) the reasons in this regard was
explained as under:
"54. One other question also was sought to be raised and D
answered by this Bench though not referred to it.
Considering ·that the question arises in various cases
pending in courts all over the country, we permitted the
counsel to address us on that question. That question is
whether in the light of the decision in Sunder(supra) the E
awardeeldecree-holder would be entitled to claim interest
on solatium in execution though it is not specifically
granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution
court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim
for interest on solatium had been made and the same F
has been negatived either expressly or by necessary
implication by the judgment or decree of the Reference
Court or of the appellate court, the execution court will
have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on
solatium .based on Sunder(Supra) on the ground that the G
execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the
award of the Reference Court or that of the appellate court
does not specifically refer to the question of interest on
solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and
rejected either expressly or impliedly by the Reference H
Court or the appellate cow}, and merely interest on
compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the
execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder(supra) and
say that the compensation awarded includes solatium
and in such an event interest on the amount could be
directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We
also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed
' only in pending executions and not in closed executions
and the execution court will be entitled to permit its
recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder
(Supra)(19-9-2001) and not for any prior period. We also
clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation or fresh
appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have
indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our
power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of
India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this
question."
The aforesaid principle has also been followed by this
' Court in Chhanga Singh and Another vs. Union of India and
Another (2012) 5 SCC 763.
17. The Reference Court awarded enhanced
compensation but such amount was deposited in the Court
after the date of expiry of period of one year. In the
circumstances, we hold that the appellants are also entitled to
F interest @ 15% per annum under proviso to Section 28 of the
L.A. Act.
18. The High Court failed to notice that the provisions of
Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act are mandatory and the
claimants-appellants are entitled to 12% enhanced
G compensation for the period commencing from the date of
publication of Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The
High Court also failed to appreciate that the appellants are
entitled to interest @ 15% per annum as contemplated under
proviso to Section 28 of the_ L.A. Act as the compensation was
H paid after the expiry of period of one year.
JAi KRISHAN (D) TR. LRS. v. STATE OF 1011
UTIARAKHAND [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
19. The High Court instead of dismissing the review A
petition ought to have condoned the delay, reason of which was
sufficiently explained by appellant and ought to have allcwed
the revision application in favour of the appellant.
20. In view of the findings recorded above, we set aside 8 the part of the impugned judgment dated 16th July, 2005 so
far as it relates to payment of compensation for the land, uphold
the award passed by the Reference Court to the extent above
and direct the respondents to pay 12% enhanced
compensation in terms of Section 23(1A) and another 15%
interest in terms of proviso to Section 28 of the L.A. Act as C
ordered above within three months ..
21. The appeals are allowed with the aforesaid
observations and directions. There shall be no order as to
costs. D
pevika Gujral Appeals partly allowed.