Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State Rep. by Insp. of Police
T.S. THAKUR, CJI. I. A Bench comprising three-Judges of
this Court has referred to us the following short but interesting question: G
"Whether consecutive life sentences can be awarded to a
convict on being found guilty of a series of murders for which he
has been tried in a single trial?. "
2. The question arises in the following circumstances: H
36
3. The appellants were tried for several offences including an
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short, "the IPC") for several murders allegedly committed by them
in a single incident. They were found guilty and sentenced to suffer
varying sentences, including a sentence of imprisonment for life for each
one of the murders committed by them. What is important is that the
sentence of imprisonment for life for each one of the murders was directed
to run consecutively. The result was that the appellants were to undergo
consecutive life sentences ranging between two to eight such sentences
depending upon the number of murders committed by them. Criminal
appeals preferred against the conviction and the award of consecutive
life sentences having failed, the appellants have filed the present appeals
to assail the judgments and orders passed by the courts below.
4. When the appeals came up for hearing before a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, learned counsel for the appellant appears to have
confined his challenge to the val id ity of the direction issued by the Trial
Court and affirmed by the High C.Jurt that the sentences of imprisonment
for life awarded to each one of the appellants for several murders allegedly
committed by them would run consecutively and not concurrently. It
was argued that in terms ofScction 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 (for short, "the Cr.P.C.''1 the sentence oflife imprisonment awarded
to the appellants for different murders alleged to have been committed
by them could run concurrently a~1d not consecutively as ordered by the
Trial Court and the High Court. Reliance in support of that submission
was placed upon a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
O.M Cherian @ Thanka. ~han vs. State of Kera/a & Ors., (2015) 2
SCC 501 and a three-Judg· ·Bench decision of this Court in Duryodhan
Rout vs. State of Orissa (,'O 15) 2 SCC 783.
5. On behalf of the respondent - State of Tamil Nadu, reliance
appears to have been placul upon two other decisions of this Court in
Kamalanantha and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 5 SCC 194
and Sanaullah Khan vs. State of Bihm; (2013) 3 SCC 52 to argue that
it was legally permissible to award more than one life sentence to a
convict for different murders committed by him with a direction that the
sentences so awarded shall run consecutively. The Bench hearing the
appeal noticing a conflict in the views taken by this Court on the question
whether consecutive life sentences were legally permissible, directed
the matter to be placed before a larger bench comprising Five Judges to
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF 37
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!]
resolve the conflict by an authoritative pronouncement. That is precisely A
how these appeals have been placed before us for an authoritative
pronouncement.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length. Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with sentences in cases of
conviction of several offences at one trial-,runs as under : 8
"31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several
offences at one trial.
(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or
more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions
of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
sentence him for su.ch offences, to the several
punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is
competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting
of imprisonment to commence the one after the
expiration of the other in such order as the Court may
direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments
shall run concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be
necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate
punishment for the several offences being in excess of
the punishment which it is competent to inflict on
conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for
trial before a higher Court: Provided that-
( a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to
imprisonment for longer period than fourteen years;
(b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the
amount of punishment which the Court is competent to
inflict for a single offence.
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person,
the aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed G
against him under this section shall be deemed to be a
single sentence. "
7.Acareful reading of the above would show that the provision is
attracted only in cases where two essentials are satisfied viz. (I) a person
38
is convicted at one trial and (2) the trial is for two or more offences. It is
only when both these conditions are satisfied that the Court can sentence
the offender to several punishments prescribed for the offences committed
by him provided the Court is otherwise competent to impose such
punishments. What is significant is that such punishments as the Court
may decide to award for several offences committed by the convict
when comprising imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration
of the other in such order as the Court may direct unless the Court in its
discretion orders that such punishment shall run concurrently. Sub-section
(2) of Section 31 on a plain reading makes it unnecessary for the Court
to send the offender for trial before a higher Court only because the
aggregate punishment for several offences happens to be in excess of
the punishment which such Court is competent to award provided always
that in no case can the person so sentenced be imprisoned for a period
longer than 14 years and the aggregate punishment does not exceed
twice the punishment which the court is competent to inflict for a single
offence. Interpreting Section 31(1), a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in O.M Cherian s case (supra) declared that if two life sentences are
imposed on a convict the Court must necessarily direct those sentences
to run concurrently. The Court said:
"Section 31 (1) Cr PC enjoins a further direction by the
court to specify the order in which one particular
sentence shall commence after the expiration of the
other. Difficulties arise when the courts impose sentence
of imprisonment for l!fe and also sentences of
imprisonment for fixed term. Jn such cases, if the court
does not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently,
then the sentences will run consecutively by operation
of Section 31 (1) CrPC. There is no question of the
convict first undergoing the sentence of imprisonment
for life and thereafter undergoing the rest of the
sentences of imprison111ent for fixed 'term and any such
direction would be unworkable. Since sentence of
i111prisonment for life means jail till the end of normal
life of the convict, the sentence of i111prisonment of fixed
term has to necessarily run concurrently with life
imprisonment. In such case, it lvill be in order if the
Sessions Judges exercise their discretion in issuing
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!]
direction for concurrent running of sentences. Likewise
if two life sentences are imposed on the convict,
necessarily, the court has to direct those sentences to
run concurrently. "
8. To the same effect is the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this
Court in Dwyodhan Routs case (supra) in which this Court took the
view that since life imprisonment means imprisonment of full span oflife
there was no question of awarding consecutive sentences in case of
conviction for several offences at one trial. Relying upon the proviso to
sub-Section (2) of Section 31, this Court held that where a person is
convicted for several offences including one for which life sentences
can be awarded the proviso to Section 31 (2) shall forbid running of such
sentences consecutively.
9. It would appear from the above two pronouncements that the
logic behind life sentences not running consecutively lies in the fact that
imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life
of the convict. If that proposition is sound, the logic underlying the ratio
of the decisions of this Court in O.M Cherian and Dwyodhan Rout
cases (supra) would also be equally sound. What then needs to be
examined is whether imprisonment for life does indeed imply imprisonment
till the end of the normal life of the convict as observed in O.M Cherian
and Dwyodhan Routs cases (supra). That question, in our considered
opinion, is no longer res integra, the same having been examined and
answered in the affirmative by a long line of decisions handed down by
this Court. We may gainfully refer to some of those decisions at this
stage.
I 0. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, (1961)
3 SCR 440 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment was bound to serve the remainder of his
life in prison unless the sentence is commuted or remitted by the
appropriate authority. Such a sentence could not be equated with a fixed
term.
11. In Dalabir Singh vs. State of Punjab, ( 1979) 3 SCC 745 a
three-Judge Bench of this Court observed:
" .... life imprisonment strictly means imprisonment for
the whole of the mans life, but in practice amounts to
incarceration for a period between JO and 14 years
39
40
which may, at the option of the convicting court, be
subject to the condition that the sentence of
imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts where there
are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and
the community cannot run the risk of the convict being
at large."
12. Again in State of Punjab vs. Joginder Singh (1992) 2 SCC
661, this Court held that ifthe sentence is' imprisonment for life' the
convict has to pass the remainder of his life under imprisonment unless
of course he is granted remission by a competent authority in exercise
of the powers vested in it under Sections 432 and 433 of the Cr.P.C.
13. In Maru Ram vs. Union of India and Ors. (1981) I SCC
107 also this Court following Godse 5· case (supra) held that imprisonment
for life lasts until last breath of the prisoner and whatever the length of
remissions earned the prisoner could claim release only ifthe remaining
sentences is remitted by the Government. The Court observed:
"We follow Godse's case to hold that imprisonment for
life lasts until the last breath and whatever the length
of remission earned the prisoner can claim release only
if the remaining sentence . is remitted by the
Government. "
14. In Ashok Kumar@ Golu vs. Union of India (1991) 3
SCC 498, this Court had yet another occasion to examine the true meaning
and purport of expression "imprisonment for life" and declared that
when read in the light of Section 45 of the !PC the said expression
would ordinarily mean the full and complete span oflife. The following
passage in this regard is apposite:
"12. xxx.
The expression 'imprisonment for life' must be read in
the context of Section 45, /PC. Under that provision
G the word 'life' denotes the life of a human being unless
the contrary appears from the context. We have seen
that the punishments are set out in Section 53,
imprisonment for life being one of them. Read in the
light of Section 45 it would ordinarily mean
imprisonment for the full or complete span of life. . .... "
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!]
15. To the same effect is the decision of this Cou11 in the case of
Laxman Naskar VS. Union of India. (2000) 2 sec 595 where this
Court held that life sentence is nothing less than lifelong imprisonment
although by earning remission, the life convict could pray for pre-mature
release before completing 20 years of imprisonment including remissions
earned.
I 6. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in
Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458, Shri Bhagwan
vs. $tate qf Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296 and Swamy Shraddananda
vs. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 which too reiterate the
legal position settled by the earlier mentioned decisions of this Court. A
recent Constitution Bench decision of this Co.urt in Union of India vs.
Sriharan, 2015 (13) SCALE 165 also had another occasion to review
the case law on the subject. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in
Sambhaji Krishna, Ratan Singh, Maru Ram and Ranjit Singh :S cases
(supra) this Court observed:
"It is quite apparent that this Court by stating as above
has affirmed the legal position that the life imprisonment
only means the entirety of the life unless it is curtailed
by remissions validly granted under the Code of
Criminal Procedure by the Appropriate Government or
Under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution by the
Executive Head viz., the President or the Governor of
the State, respectively. "
17. The legal position is, thus, fairly well ~ettled that imprisonment
for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless
of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the
competent authority. That being so, the provisions of Section 31 under
Cr.P.C. must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenet
that a life sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in
prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment
for life twice over would be anomalous and irrational for it will disregard
the fact that humans like all other living beings have but one life to live.
So understood Section 31 (I) would permit consecutive running of
sentences only if such sentences do not happen to be life sentences.
That is, in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious impossibility
of a prisoner serving two consecutive I ife sentences.
41
42
18. A somewhat similar question fell for consideration before a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ranjit SinRh vs. U11io11 Terri101y
of Chandigarh, ( 1991) 4 SCC 304. The prisoner was in that case
convicted for murder and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. He
was released on parole while undergoing the life sentence when he
committed a second offence of murder for which also he was convicted
and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. In an appeal filed against
the second conviction and sentence, this Court by an order dated 30'h
September, 1983 directed that the imprisonment for life awarded to him
should not run concurrently with his earlier sentence of life imprisonment.
The Court directed that in the event of remission or commutation of the
earlier sentence awarded to the prisoner, the second imprisonment for
life awarded for the second murder committed by him shall commence.
Aggrieved by the said direction which made the second life sentence
awarded to him consecutive, the prisoner filed a writ petition under Article
32 of the Constitution primarily on the ground that this Court's order
dated 301h September, 1983 was contrary to Section 427 (2) of the Cr.P.C.,
according to which any person already undergoing sentence of
imprisonment for life if sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the
subsequent sentence so awarded to him shall run concurrently with such
previous sentence. Relying upon God~e ~·and Maru Rams cases (supra),
this Court held that imprisonment for life is a sentence for remainder of
the life of the offender. There was, therefore, no question of a subsequent
sentence of imprisonment for life running consecutively as per the general
rule contained in sub-section (I) of Section 427. This Court observed:
"8.xxxxxxxxx
As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by
Shri La/it, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life
being understood to mean as a sentence to serve the
remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted
by the appropriate authority and a person having only
one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction
of imprisonme111 for a term or imprisonment for life can
only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and
certainly not added to it since extending the life span
of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond
human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated
in sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]
enunciated in sub-section {l) thereof is that without the
court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run
concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in
which no direction of the court is needed to make the
subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous
sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has
been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based
on sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of
the court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature
of an exception to the general rule enacted irrsub
section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent
conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence
unless the court directs it to run concurrently. The
meaning and purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section (2)
is, therefore, clear. "
19. Having said that, this Court declared that once the subsequent
imprisonment for life awarded to the prisoner is superimposed over the
earlier life sentence, the grant of any remission or commutation qua the
earlier sentence of life imprisonment will not ipso facto benefit the
prisoner qua the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment. Such
subsequent sentence would continue and shall remain unaffected by the
remission or commutation of the earlier sentence. This Court said:
"xxxxxxxxx
In other words, the operation of the superimposed
subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be
wiped out merely because in respect of· the
corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any
remission or commutation has been granted by the
appropriate authority. The consequence is that the
petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any
remission or commutation in respect of his earlier
sentence because of the superimposed.subsequent life
sentence unless the same corresponding benefit in
respect of the subsequent sentence is also granted to
the petitioner. It is in this manner that the direction is
given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to
run concurrently. "
43
44
20. Ranjit Singh '.I· case (supra) was no doubt dealing with a fact
situation different from the one with which we are dealing in the present
case, inasmuch as Ranjit Singh s case (supra) was covered by Section
427 of the Cr.P.C. as the prisoner in that case was already undergoing a
sentence of life imprisonment when he committed a second offence of
murder that led to his conviction and award of a second sentence of life
imprisonment. In the cases at hand, the appellants were not convicts
undergoing life sentence at the time of commission of multiple murders
by them. Their cases, therefore, fall more appropriately under Section
31 of the Code which deals with conviction of several offences at one
trial. Section 31 (I) deals with and empowers the Court to award, subject
to the provisions of Section 71 of the !PC, several punishments prescribed
for such offences and mandates that such punishments when consisting
of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in
such order as the Court may direct unless the Court directs such
punishments shall run concurrently. The power to award suitable
sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and
cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can
also be stipulated by the Court awarding such sentences. So also the
Court is competent in its discre~ion to direct that punishment awarded
shall run concurrently not consecutively. The question, however, is
whether the provision admits of more than one life sentences running
consecutively. That question can be answered on a logical basis only if
one accepts the truism that humans have one life and the sentence of
life imprisonment once awarded would require the prisoner to spend the
remainder of his life in jail unless the sentence is commuted or remitted
by the competent authority. That, in our opinion, happens to be the logic
behind Section 427 (2) of the Cr.P.C. mandating that if a prisoner already
undergoing life sentence is sentenced to another imprisonment for life
for a subsequent offence committed by him, the two sentences so
awarded shall run concurrently and not consecutively. Section 427 (2)
in that way carves out an exception to the -general rule recognised in
Section 427 (I) that sentences awarded upon conviction for a subsequent
offence shall run consecutively. The Parliament, it manifests from the
provisions of Section 427 (2), was fully cognizant of the anomaly that
would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is
directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception
to the general rule to clearly recognise that in the case of life sentences
for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]
cannot be directed to run consecutively. The provisions of Section 427
(2) apart, in Ranjit Singh s case (supra), this Court has in terms held
that since life sentence implies imprisonment for the remainder of the
life of the convict, consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded as
humans have only one life. That logic, in our view, must extend to Section
31 of the Cr.P.C. also no matter Section 31 does nqt in terms make a
provision analogous to Section 427 (2) of the Code. The provision must,
in our opinion, be so interpreted as to prevent any anomaly or irrationality.
So interpreted Section 3 1 ( 1) must mean that sentences awarded by the
Court for several offences committed by the prisoner shall run
consecutively (unless the Court directs otherwise) except where such
sentences include imprisonment for life which can and must run
concurrently. We are also inclined to hold that if more than one life
sentences are awarded to the prisoner, the same would get super imposed
over each other. This will imply that in case the prisoner is granted the
benefit of any remission or commutation qua one such sentence, the
benefit of such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.
21. We may now turn to the conflict noticed in the reference
order between the decisions of this Court in Cherian and Duryodhan s
cases (supra) on the one hand and Kamalanatha and SanaullahKhan s
cases (supra) on the other.
22. In 0.M Cherian~· case (supra) the prisoner was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment for offences punishable under Sections
498 A and 306 of the IPC. The Courts below had in that case awarded
to the convicts imprisonment for two years under Section 498 A of the
IPC and seven years under Section 306 ofJPC and directed the same to
run consecutively. Aggrieved by the said direction, the prisoners appealed
to this Court to contend that the sentences awarded to them ought to run
concurrently and not consecutively. The appeal was referred to a larger
bench of Three Judges of this Court in the light of the decision in Mohd.
Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti vs. Assistant Collector of
Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad and Anr. (1988) 4 SCC 183.
Before the larger bench, the prisoners relied upon Mohd Akhtar
Hussain s case (supra) and Mano} @ Panu vs. State of Haryana
(2014) 2 sec 153 to contend that since the prisoners were found guilty
of more than two offences committed in the course of one incident, such
sentences ought to run concurrently. This Court upon a review of the
case law on the subject held that Section 3 I of the Cr.P.C. vested the
45
46
court with the power to order in its discretion thatthe sentences awarded
shall run concurrently in case of conviction of two or more offences.
This Court declared that it was difficult to lay down a straightjacket rule
for the exercise of such discretion by the courts. Whether a sentence
should run concurrently or consecutively wou Id depend upon the nature
of the offence and the facts and circumstances of the case. All that
could be said was that the discretion has to be exercised along judicial
lines and not mechanically. Having said that, the Court observed that if
two life sentences are imposed on a convict the court has to direct the
same to run concurrently. That is because sentence of imprisonment for
life means imprisonment till the normal life of a convict.
23. As noticed above, Cherian s case (supra) did not involve
awarding of two or more life sentences to the prisoner. It was a case of
two term sentences being awarded for two different offences committed
in the course of -the same transaction and tried together at one trial.
Even so, this Court held that life sentences cannot be made to run
consecutively plainly because a single life sentence ensures that the
remainder of the life of the prisoner is spent by him in jail. Such being
the case, the question of a second such sentence being undergone
consecutively did not arise.
24. In Duryodhan Routs case (supra) the prisoner was convicted
for offences punishable under Sections 302, 376 (2)(t) and 201 of the
IPC and sentenced to death for the offence of murder and rigorous
imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(t).
Imprisonment for a period of one year was additionally awarded under
Section 201 of !PC with a direction that the sentences would run
consecutively. In appeal, the High Court altered the sentence of death
to imprisonment for life while leaving the remaining sentences untouched.
The petitioner then approached this Court to argue that the sentences
ought to run concurrently and not consecutively as directed by the Courts
below. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayaks case
(supra) and several other subsequent decisions on the subject this Court
held that the sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for
the remainder of the life of the prisoner. The Court further held that
Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. would not permit consecutive running of life
sentence and the term sentence since the aggregate punishment of the
petitioner would go beyond the outer limit of 14 years stipulated in the
proviso to Section 31(2) of the Cr.P.C. The Court observed:
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]
"Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of
conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to
Sub-Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo
whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a
period of longer than 14 years. Jn view of the fact that
life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and
complete span of life, the question of consec·utive
sentences in case of conviction for several offences at
one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is
sentenced of conviction of several offences, includii1g
one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31 (2)
shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can
be imposed. "
25. While we have no doubt about the correctness of the
proposition that two life sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively,
we do not think that the reason for saying so lies in the proviso to Section
31 (2). Section 31 (2) of the Cr.P.C. deals with situations where the Court
awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate
of the punishment for the several offences for which the prisoner is
being sentenced upon conviction. A careful reading of sub-Section (2)
would show that the same is concerned only with situations where the
Courts awarding the sentence and directing the same to run consecutively
is riot competent to award the aggregate of the punishment upon
conviction for a single offence. The proviso further stipulates that in
cases falling under sub-section (2), the sentence shall in no case go
beyond 14 years and the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice
the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to award. Now
in cases tried by the Sessions Court, there is no limitation as to the Court's
power to award any punishment sanctioned by law including the capital
punishment. Sub-section (2) will, therefore, have no application to a case
tried by the Sessions Court nor would Sub-section (2) step in to forbid a
direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court
of Session.
26. To the extent Dwyodhan Rout case (supra) relies upon proviso
to Sub-section (2) to support the conclusion that a direction for consecutive
running of sentences is impermissible, it does not state the law correctly,
even when the conclusion that life imprisonment means for the full span
of one's life and consecutive life sentences cannot be awarded is
47
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 5 S.C.R.
otherwise sound and acceptable.
27. In Kamalanantha VS. Stale of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 5 sec
I 94, the prisoners were convicted amongst others for offences under
Sections 376, 302, 354 of the IPC and sentenced to under rigorous
imprisonment for life foroffences under Sections 376 and 302 and various
terms of imprisonment for other offences with the direction that the
sentences awarded shall run consecutively. One of the issues that was
raised in support of the appeal was that the Courts below were not
justified in awarding consecutive life sentences. That contention was
rejected by a two-Judge Bench of this Cou1i in the following words:
"The contention of Mr. Jethmalani that the term
"imprisonment" enjoined in Section 31 Crl'C does not
include imprisonment for life is unacceptable. The term
"imprisonment" is not defined under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Section 31 of the Code falls under
Chapter 111 of the Code which deals with power of
courts. Section 28 of the Code empowers the High Court
to pass any sentence authorised by law. Similarly, the
Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions .Judge may pass
any sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of
death which shall be subject lo confirmation by the High
Court. In our opinion the term ""i111prison111e11t" would
include the .\·entence of imprisonment for I ife. "
28. The above view runs contrmy to the ratio ofthis Court's decision
in Cherian s case (supra) and Duryodhan Rout~· case (supra). That
apart the view taken in Kamalanantha s case has not noticed the basic
premise that a life sentence once awarded would imply that a prisoner
shall spend the remainder of his Ii fc in prison. Once that happens there
is no question of his undergoing another life sentence. To the extent the
decision in Ka111ala11a11tha s case takes the view that the Court can for
each offence award suitable punishment which may include multiple
sentences of imprisonment for life for multiple offences punishable with
death, there is and can be no quarrel with the stated proposition. The
Court can and indeed ought to exercise its powers of awarding the
sentence sanctioned by law which may include a life sentence. But if
the decision in Kamalanantha purports to hold that sentence of
imprisonment for life can also be directed to run consecutively, the same
does not appear to be sound for the reasons we have already indicated
MUTHURAMALINGAM & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY INSP. OF 49
POLICE [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]
earlier. We need to remember that award of multiple sentences of A
imprisonment for Ii fe so that such sentences are super imposed over one
another is entirely different from directing such sentence to run
consecutively.
29. Sanaullah Khan vs. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC52 simply
follows the view taken in Kamalanantha 's case and, therefore, does B
not add any new dimension to call for any further deliberation on the
subject.
30. We are not unmindful of the fact that this Court has in several
other cases directed sentences of imprisonment for life to run
consecutively having regard to the gruesome and brutal nature of the
offence committed by the prisoner. For instance, this Court has in
Ravindra Trimbak Chouthmal vs. State of Maharashtra ( 1996) 4 SCC
148, while commuting death sentence penalty to one of imprisonment
for life directed that the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment
under Section 207 IPC shall start running after life imprisonment has run
its due course. So also in Ronny vs. State of Maharashtra ( 1998) 3
SCC 625 this Court has wlille altering the death sentence to that of
imprisonment for life directed that while the sentence for all other offences
shall run concurrently, the sentence under Section 376 (2)(g) shall run
consecutively after running of sentences for other offences. To the
extent these decisions may be understood to hold that life sentence can
also run conse~utively do not lay down the correct law and shall stand
overruled.
31. In conclusion our answer to the question is in the negative.
We hold that while multiple sentences for imprisonment for I ife can be
awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with
imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be directed
to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed
over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the
competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the
sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other.
32. We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension of this
case argued before us namely whether the Court can direct life sentence
and term sentences to run consecutively. That aspect was argued keeping
in view the fact that the appellants have been sentenced to imprisonment
for different terms apart from being awarded imprisonment for I ife. The
50
Trial Court's direction affirmed by the High Court is thatthe said term
sentences shall run consecutively. It was contended on behalf of the
appellants that even this part of the direction is not legally sound, for
once the prisoner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, the
term sentence awarded to him must run concurrently. We do not, however,
think so. The power of the Court to direct the order in which sentences
will run is unquestionable in view of the language employed in Section
31 of the Cr.P.C. The Court can, therefore, legitimately direct that the
. prisoner shall first undergo the term sentence before the commencement
of his life sentence. Such a direction shall be perfectly legitimate and in
tune with Section 31. The converse however may not be true for ifthe
Court directs the life sentence to start first it would necessarily imply
that the tem1 sentence would run concurrently. That is because once the
prisoner spends his life in jail, there is no question of his undergoing any
further sentence. Whether or not the direction of the Court below calls
for any modification or alteration is a matter with which we are not
concerned. The Regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to
deal with that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said
in the foregoing paragraphs.
33. The reference is accordingly answered.
E Devika Gujral Reference answered.