Suresh Kumar Through Gpa v. Anil Kakaria & Ors.
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. This appeal is filed by the
plaintiff against the judgment and order dated 02.05.2006 passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1522 of
2006 whereby the High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the
C ;tppellant herein and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21. I 0.2005
passed by the Additional District J udgc, Panchkula in C.A. No.20 of
2005.
2. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents arc the
defendants in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
3. The dispute in this appeal relates to plot No.28. measuring 114"
acre in Industrial Area Phase-I Urban Estate, Panchkula(hereinafter
referred to as ''the suit land").
4. Haryana Urban Development Authority (hereinafter referred
to as "HUDA") had allotted the suit land to one Shri Vcd Prakash
Kakaria in the year 1973. Thereatler Shri Ved Prakash Kakaria, on
24.04.1980, entered into an agreement with the appellant to sell the suit
land to him on certain terms and conditions.
5. On 05.02.1985. Shri Ved Prakash Kakaria expired. leaving
behind two sons and one daughter (respondentNos. 1 to 3) as his legal
heirs. Respondent Nos.I to 3 however, sold the suit land to respondent
No.4.
6. On I 0.10.1992. the appellant filed a suit against the respondents
for a declaration that the transfer made by respondent Nos. I to 3 in
favour of respondent No.4 is null and void and not binding on the appellant,
G that the respondents be restrained from interfering in appellant's
possession over the suit land as he claimed to be in possession of the suit
land, and lastly. for issuance of mandatory injunction against respondent
Nos. I to 3 directing them to transfer the suit land in favour of appellant.
SURESH KUMAR THROUGH GPA v. ANIL KAKARIA & ORS. 255
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE. J.]
7. The suit was essentially based on an agreement dated A
24.04.1980 and the Will alleged to have been executed by late Shri Ved
Prakash Kakaria in his favour for claiming the aforementioned reliefs
against the respondents.
8. The respondents filed their respective written statements and
denied the plaintiff's claim. The respondents denied the agreement dated B
24.04.1980 and also denied the execution of alleged Will said to have
been executed by Vcd Prakash Kakaria in favour of the plaintiff. The
respondents defended the sale of the suit land made by respondent Nos.I
to 3 in favour of respondent No.4 for valuable consideration and
contended that respondent No.4 was put in its actual possession and has
also set up their factory over the suit land and running the same. c
9. The Trial Court framed the issues and the parties adduced their
evidence. The Trial Court, by its judgment and decree d:ited 22.01.2005,
dismissed the suit. It was held that the appellant (plaintiff) failed to
prove the agreement dated 24.04.1980, that the Will was also not proved,
that respondent Nos. I to 3 being the owner of the suit land rightly sold D
the suit land to respondent No. 4 for consideration, and lastly, that
respondent No.4 was in possession of the suit land and has set up their
factory over the suit land.
I 0. Felt aggrieved, the appellant filed first appeal before the
Additional District Judge, Panchkula. By j udgment/decrce ,dated
21.10.2005, the First Appellate CoUit dismissed the appeal and upheld
the judgment/decree of the Trial Court. Felt aggrieved, the appellant
pursued the matter in second appeal before the High Court. The High
Court, by impugned judgment, dismissed the second appeal holding that
the concurrent findings of two Courts below are binding on the High
Court and that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of
law under Section l 00 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is against this
judgment of the High Court, the appellant (plaintiff) felt aggrieved and
filed this appeal by special leave before this Court.
11. Heard Mr. Jaidcep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Sanjay Kumar Viscn, learned counsel for the
respondents.
12. Having heard the learned counsel for the patties and on perusal
of the record of the case including written submissions, we find no merit
in the appeal.
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20t 7] i l S.C.R.
13. In our considered view, the three Courts below have nghtly
rendered the aforementioned findings in favour of the respondents and
we find no difiiculty in concurring with the findings which, in our view,
do not call for any interference by this Court.
14. In our considered opinion. the findings recorded by the three
Courts on facts, which are based on appreciation of evidence undertaken
by the three Courts, arc essentially in the nature of concurrent findings
of fact and. therefore, such findings arc binding on this Court. Indeed.
such findings were equally binding on the High Court while hearing the
second appeal and it was rightly held by the High Court also.
15. It is more so when these findings were neither found to be
perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such
findings nor these findings were found lo be against the evidence, nor
against the pleadings and lastly, nor against any provision oflaw.
16. Ewn apart from what is held above, we arc of the considered
opinion that the appellant's suit is wholly misconceived and was, therefore,
rightly dismissed by the three Courts below. We concur with the
reasoning of the Courts below and also add the following three reasons
in addition to what is held by the Courts below.
17. In the first place, the appellant had no title to the suit land. All
that he had claimed to possess in relation to the suit land was an agreement
dated 24.04.1980 to purchase the suit land from its owner (Shri Ved
Prakash Kakaria). The appellant, as mentioned above, failed to prove
the agreement. In this view of the matter. the appellant had no prima
facie case in his favour to file a suit nor he had even any locus to file the
suit in relation to the suit land once the agreement was held not proved.
18. Second, the proper remedy of the appellant in this case was to
file a civil suit against respondent Nos.I to 3 to claim specific
performance of the agreement in question in relation to the suit land and
such suit should have been filed immediately after execution of agreement
in the year 1980 or/and within three years from the date of execution. It
was. however. not done. The suit was, however. filed by the appellant
almost after 12 years from the dak of agreement and that too it was for
declaration and mandatory injunction but not for specific performance
of agreement. It was, in our opinion. a misconceived suit and was.
therefore, rightly dismissed.
SURESH KUMAR THROUGH GPA v. ANIL KAKARIA & ORS.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
19. Third, the suit was otherwise hopelessly barred by limitation
because, as mentioned above, the <late of agreement is 24.04.1980
whereas the suit was filed on l 0.10.1992. There is nothing to show that
the agreement was to be kept alive for such a long time. It is apart from
the fi1ct that the alleged agreement itself was not held proved and,
therefore, no suit for claiming any relief in relation to the suit land could
be filed by the appellant. Even the Will was rightly held not proved by
the Courts below and we arc inclined to uphold the finding on this issue
too. Indeed when the deceased has two sons and one daughter
(respondent Nos.1-3), why should he execute a Will in appellant's favour,
who was not related to him.
20. We are, therefore, of the view that keeping in view the
concurrent findings of three Courts below, which were rendered against
the appellant (plaintiff) coupled with our three reasonings mentioned
supra, the appeal has no merit.
21. ln viewofforegoing discussion, we find no merit in this appeal.
The appeal thus fails and is accordingly dismissed.
NiJhi Jain Appeal dismissed.
257