Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State of Ker,ala & Ors.
·
.DIPAK MISRA, CJI 1. In this public interest litigation preferred
under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia the petitioners have prayed
C for issue of appropriate writ or direction commanding the Government
of Kerala, Dcwaswom Board of Travancore, Chief Thanthri of
Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta and
their officers to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group
of 10 to 50 at the Lord Ayappa Temple at Sabarimala (Kcrala) which
has been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage; to
D declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 (for Signature Not Verified Digitally
signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV short, "the 1965 Rules") framed
in exercise of powers conferred by Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places
of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, "the
E 1965 Act") as unconstitutional being violative ofArticles 14, 15, 25 and
~I A(e) of the Constitution of India and further to pass directions for
safety of women pilgrims. That apart, a prayer has also been made for
laying guidelines in matters of general inequality related to religious
practices in places of worship.
2. The preamble to 1965 Act lays down that the Act has been
enacted to make better provisions for entry of all classes and sections of
Hindu into places of public worship. Section 2 is the dictionary clause. It
reads as follows:-
"Section 2 . .Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context
oth crwisc rcq uircs, -
(a) "Hindu" includes a person professing the Buddhist, Sikh or
Jaina religion;
(b) "place of public worship" means a place, by whatever name
known or to whomsoever belonging, which is dedicated to, or
H fo~ the benefit of. or is used generally by, Hindus or any section
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 623
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK.MISRA, CJl]
or class thereof, for the pcrfonnancc of any religious service or A
for offering prayers therein, and includes all ands and subsidiary
shrines, mutts, devasthanams, namaskara mandapams and
nalambalams appurtenant or attached to any such place, and
also any sacred tanks, wells, springs and water courses the
waters of which arc worshipped, or arc used for bathing or for B
worship, but does not include a "sreekoil"; .
(c) "section or class" includes any division, sub-division, caste,
sub-caste, sect or denomination whatsoever."
3. Section 3 that provides for places of public worship to be open
to all sections &nd classes of Hindus reads thus:- c
"Section 3. Places of public worship to be open to all.
section and classes of Hindus:- Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in
foi:ce or any custom or usage or ai1y instrument having effect by
.virtue of any such law or any decree or order of court, every D
place of public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to
any section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and
classes of Hindus; and no Hindu of whatsoever section or class
shall, in any manner, be prevented, obstructed or discouraged
from entering such place of public worship, or from worshipping
or offering prayers thereat, or performing any religious service E
therein, in the like manner and to the like extent as any other
Hindu of whatsoever section or class may enter, worship, pray
or perform:
Provided that in the case of a public of public worship which is a
temple founded for the benefit ofany religious denomination or F
section thereof, the provisions of this section, shall be subject to
the right of that religious denomination or section as the ca.se
may be, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion."
4. Section 4 deals with the power to make regulations. The said
provision being significant is reproduced below:- G
"Section 4. Power. to make regulations for the maintenance
of order and decorum and the due performance of rites
and ceremonies in places of public worship:- ( 1) The trustee
or any other person in charge of any place or public worship
shall have power, subject to the control of the competent authority H
..... ,
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 14 S.C.R.
A and any rules which may be made by that authority. to make
regulations for the maintenance of order and the decorum in the
place of public worship and the due observance of the religious
rites and ceremonies performed therein:
Provided that no regulation made under this sub-section shall
B discriminate in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on
the ground that he belongs to a particular or class. (2) The
competent authority referred to in sub-section ( 1) shall be,-
(i) in relation to a place of public worship situated in any area to
which Part I of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious
C Institutions Act, 1950 (Travancore-Cochin Act XV of 1930),
extends. the Travancorc Dcvaswom Board;
(ii) in relation to a place ofpuhlic worship situated in any area to
which Part II of the said Act extends, the Cochin Devaswom
Board; and
(iii) in relation to a place of public worship situated in any other
area in the State ofKerala, the Government."
5. The State of Kerala in exercise of power under Section 4
framed the 1965 Rules. Rule 3 of the 1965 Rules is extracted hereunder:-
"Ruic 3. The classes of persons mentioned here under shall not
be entitled to offer worship in any place of public worship or
bath in or use the water of any sacred tank, well, spring or water
course appurtenant to a place of public worship whether situate
within or outside precincts thereof, or any sacred place including
a hill or hill lock, or a road, street or pathways which is requisite
for obtaining access to the place of public worship-
( a) Persons who are not Hindus.
(b) Women at such time during which they are not by custom
and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.
G ( c) Persons under pollution arising out of birth or death in their
families.
( d) Drunken or disorderly persons.
( e) Persons suffering from any loathsome or contagious disease.
(f) Persons of unsound mind except when taken for worship
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 625
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
under proper control and with the permission of the executive A
authority of the place of public worship concerned.
(g) Professional beggars when their entry is solely for the purpose
ofbcgging."
[Emphasis supplied] B
6. It is contended in the Writ Petition that the Division Bench of
the High Court of Kcrala in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary,
Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthpuram and Ors.1 has
upheld the practice of banning the entry of women above the age of 10
and below the age of 50 to trek the holy hills ofSabarimala in connection
with the pilgrimage to the Sabarimala temple and from offering worship C
·at Sabarimala Shrine during any period of the year. It is worthy to note
here that a public interest litigation was entertained by the High Court on
the basis of a petition sent by one S. Mahendran which was· converted
into a Writ Petition and treated as a public interest litigati.on. It complained
that the young women are not allowed to offer prayers at the Sabarimala D
Shrine which was contrary to the customs and usage followed in the
temple. The Chief Secretary of the State of Kerala filed a counter
affidavit before the High Court. The High Court has summarized the
said affidavit which is to the following effect:-
"l 0. The Chief Secretary of Kerala filed a counter-affidavit on E
behalf of 3rd respondent. In that affidavit it is stated that the
Tavancore Devaswom Board has to manage and arrange for
the conduct of daily worship and ceremonies and festivals in
every temple according to its usage as per the provision contained
in Section 31 of the Travancorc-Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act. The Board is entrusted with administration as
well as making of rules. Regarding the entry in temples, necessary
provision has been made in the Travancore-Cochin Temple
(Removal ofDisabilities) Act and by Act 7of1965. Every Hindu
shall be entitled to enter a temple and offer worship there by
virtus of Section 3 of that Act. The Travancore Dcvaswom
Board had framed ru Jes before the enactment of Act 7 /1965
under Section 9 of the Temple Entry Act. Rule 6(c) framed
thereunder relates to entry of women. The restriction is for entry
of women at such times during which they are not by custom
1 AIR 1993 Kerala 42
626
and usage al lowed to enter temples. The Board issues
notifications evety year informing the public about the prohibition
regarding entty of women of the age group of 10 to 50 in the
Sabarimala temple and Pathinattampadi during Mandalam,
Makaravi.lakku festival and Vishu: Third respondent further
contends that the complaint voiced by the petitioner is not one
maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia and
seeks dismissal of the petition."
7. The High Court posed the following questions:-
"(l) Whether woman of the age group 10 to 50 can be permitted
c to enter the Sabarimala temple at any period of the year or during
any of the festivals or poojas conducted in the temple.
(2) Whether the denial ofentty of that class of woman amounts
to discrimination and violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the
Constitution of India, and
D (3) Whether directions can be issued by this Court to the
Devaswom Board and the Government ofKerala to restrict the
entty of such woman to the temple?"
8. We need not refer to the reasoning and the analysis made by
the High Court, for what we are going to say at a later stage. After
devoting some space, the High Court held thus:-
"40. The deity in Sabarimala temple is in the form of a Yogi or a
Bramchari according to the Thanthri of the temple. He stated
that there are Sasta temples at Achankovil, Aryankavu
and Kulathupuzha, but the deities there are in different fonns.
Puthumana Narayanan Namboodiri, a Thanthrimukhya ·
recognised by the Travancore Devaswom Board, while examined
as C. W. 1 stated that God in Sabarimala is in the fonn of a
Naisthik Bramchari. That, according to him, is the reason why
young women are not permitted to offer prayers in the temple.
41. Since the deity is in the form of a Naisthik Brahmachari, it is
therefore believed that young women should not offer worship
in the temple so that even the slightest deviation from celibacy
and austerity observed by the deity is not caused by the presence
of such women."
And again:-
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 627
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
"43 .... We are therefore of the opinion that the usage of woman. A
of the age group I 0 to 5.0 not being permitted to enter the temple
and its precincts had been made applicable throughout the year
and there is no reason why they should be permitted to offer
worship during specified days when they are not in a position to
observe penance for 41 days due to physiological reasons. In B
· short, woman after menarche up to menopause are not entitled
to enter the temple and offer prayers there at any time of the
year."
9. The conclusions summed up by the High Court read as follows:
"44. Our conclusions are as follows :
( 1) The restriction imposed on women aged above l 0 and below
50 from trekking the holy hills ofSabarimala and offering worship
at Sabarimala Shrine is in accordance with the usage prevalent
from time immemorial.
(2) Such restriction imposed by the Devaswom Board is not D
violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution oflndia.
(3) Such restriction is also not violative of the provisions of Hindu
Place of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 since
there is no restriction between one section and another section
or between one class and another class among the Hindus in the E
matter of entry to a temple whereas the prohibition is only in
respect of women of a particular age group and not women as a
class."
10. It issued the following directions:-
"45. In the light of the aforesaid conclusions we direct the first
respondent, the Travancore Devaswom Board, not to permit
women above the age of 10 and below the age of 50 to trek the
holy hills ofSabarimala in connection with the pilgrimage to the
Sabarimala temple and from offering worship at Sabarimala
Shrine during any period of the year. We also direct the 3rd .
respondent, Government of Kerala, to render all necessary
assistance inclusive of police and to see that the direction which
wd have issued io the Devaswom Board is implemented and
coftiplied with."
628
I I. When this matter was listed, we requested Mr. Raju
Ramachandran and Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel to assist
the Com1 as amici curiae.
12. We have heard Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. K.
Ramamoorthy, learned amici curiae, Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned counsel
for the petitioners. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the
State of Kerala, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan and .Ms.
Indira Jaising, learned senior counsel and Mr. V.K. Biju, learned counsel
for the respondents /intcrvcnors. Be it clarified, the matter was heard
solely for the purpose of considering whether the matter should be
referred to a larger Bench or not. After the matter was reserved, learned
counsel for the parties have filed their written notes of submissions.
13. Before we refer to the legal issues, it is interesting to note that
an affidavit was filed by the first respondent - State of Kerala through
Joint Secretary, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram on
13.11.2007 asserting, inter alia, that the Government is not against any
sort of discrimination towards women. An additional affidavit was filed
on 05.02.2016 stating that an erroneous stand was taken in the earlier
affidavit dated 13.11.2007. The subsequent affidavit states that the said
affidavit could not have gone contrary to the High Court judgment and a
stand in variance to the stand taken before the High Court cou Id not
E have been taken. In the earlier affidavit, the State had supported the
petitioners but in the additional affidavit, it has been asserted:-
. F
"12. It is submitted that lakhs of women devotees visit Sabarimal a
every year. However the restriction of women between the age
of I 0 and 50 has been prevailing in Sabrarimala from time
immemorial. This is in keeping with the unique "pratishta sangalp"
or idol concept of the temple. The same is an essential and integral
part of the right of practice or religion of a devotee and comes
under protective guarantee of the Constitution under article
25 and 26which has been held to contain a guarantee for rituals,
observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are an
essential or integral part of religion. It is then immune from
challenge under Article 14. This Hon'ble Court in Ritu Prasad
Sharma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461 held that religious
customs which are protected under Articles 25 and 26 are
immune from challenge under other provisions of Part III of the
Constitution."
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 629
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
14. It is further asserted in the latter affidavit that: A
"14. It is submitted that the Petitioners have challenged the
constitutionality of Rule 3(b) of the Kera la Hindu Places of Public
Worship (Authorisaton ofEntry) Rules, 1965 which provides that
women at such time during which they are not by custom and
usage allowed to enter a place of public worship shall be included B
in the class of persons who shall not be entitled to offer worship
in any place of worship. It is submitted that said Rule only reflects
the guarantee under Articles 25 and 26(b) where rituals,
ceremonies and modes of worship which are exclusively matters
of religion are excluded from the legislation under Article
25(2)(b)."
15. After referring to Rule 3, the asseveration of the State is:
"It is clear that it is only custo1ns and usages of temples and
rnlcs required to maintain order, decorum and safety of the temp le
which are protected by these rules and such exclusions are not D
on the basis of caste, birth, pedigree or sex but based on the
beliefs, customs and usages of the temple. As far as Sabarimala
is eoncemed, restriction of entry to persons who are not Hindus
is not applicable and devotees of all religions worship at
Sabarimala."
16. Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that there is no religious custom or usage in the Hindu religion specially
in Pampa river region to disallow women during menstrnal period.
According to him, banning entry of women would be against the basic
tenets of Hindu religion. It is his assertion in the written note that
Sabarimala Temple is not a separate religious denomination because (i) F
the religious practices perfonned in Sabarimala Temple at the time of
'Puja' and other religious ceremonies are not distinct and arc akin to any
other practice perfonned in any Hindu Temple; (ii) that it does not have
its separate administration but is regulated by statutory Board constituted
under Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950; (iii) G
that it is getting State funding out of Consolidated Fund under Article
290-A of the Constitution; (iv) that there is no particular follower of
this temple except general Hindu followers visiting anytemple; and (v)
that mere attraction of some people for some temple docs not make it a
separate and distinct religious denomination. Learned counsel referring
630
to the decision in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Shri Lakhshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutti would contend that what is protected under Article 26(b) is only
the 'essential part' ofreligion. Relying on Durgah Committee,Ajmer
v. Syed Uussain AIP, it is urged by him that clauses ( e) and (d) of Article
26 do not create any new right in favour ofreligious denomination but
only safeguards their rights. Learned counsel contends that in the matters
of managing religious affairs. all practices arc not always sacrosanct.
for there may be many ill practices like superstitions which in due course
of time may be merely ac;cretions to the basic theme of that religious
denomination. Itis put forth by him that entry to the temple is not essential
to religion and there is difference between "regulation of entry" and
"complete prohibition of entry". Placing reliance on Sri Venkatramana
Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.4, learned counsel submits
that the religious denomination cannot completely exclude the members
ofany community and may only restrict their entry in certain rituals. He
further contends that the relevant Rule cannot be interpreted to mean
that it bars entry of women as such an interpretation would invite violation
of principles underlying gender equality. Mr. Gupta contends that the
expression 'at any stage of time' occurring in Ruic 3(b) has to be read
narrowly which can be found in customs or usage like during late night if
by any custom or usage women arc not allowed to enter temple, the said
custom or usage shall continue but it docs not permit complete prohibition
of entry of women.
17. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned senior counsel submits that entry
into temple is a matter of religion as has been spelt out in Sri
Venkatramana Devaru (supra) case and the tight of ently is claimed
for worship for the purposes of "darshan" and hence, is a part of the
fundamental right under Article 25 .She has commended us to the
authority in Sastri Yagnapurushadji and Ors. v. Muldas Bhudardas
Vaishya and Anr. 5 Learned senior counsel would urge that Section 4 of
the 1965 Act provides that no regulation has to be made to discriminate
in any manner whatsoever against any Hindu on the ground that he
belongs to a particular section or class and. therefore, Rule 3(b) cannot
withstand scrutiny. Learned senior counsel has pointed out that
'1954 SCR 1005
'(1962) 1 SCR 383
'(1958) SCR 895
5 1966 3 SCR 242 : AIR 1966 SC 1119
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 631
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
Notifications which stipulate a ban of women from the age of 10 to 50 A
from entering the temple is contrary to the 1965 Act as well as the
Constitution. According to her, the same is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26. It is her
contention that Sabarimala is not a denominational temple but a temple
for all Hindus and, therefore; Article 26(b) is not attracted. The said B
temple permits all categories of Hindus to enter the temple regardless of
the denomination. It is her stand that Rule 3 is also utra vires the 1965
Act inasmuch Section 4 of the 1965 Act restricts the authorities from
making any rule that discriminates against any Hindu on the ground that
he belongs to a section or class and the rule coupled with notifications
singles out women as a separate class of Hindu whose entry into the C
places of public worship can be restricted based on custom. According
to the learned senior counsel, the right to manage the affairs in the matter
of religion does not encompass the right to ban entry inside a temple.
She has placed reliance on Sastri Yagnapurushadji (supra), Sri Adi
Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi v. State of D
U.P.6 and A.S. Naryana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P.7• She would
emphasise on harmonious interpretation of constitutional provisions, that
is, Articles 14, 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Learned senior counsel
placing reliance upon Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nata Sangam and
Ors. v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. 8 submits that
constitutional legitimacy supersedes all religious beliefs and, therefore,
prohibition on entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years plays
foul of the constitutional principle. She would also submit that it is not a
custom as is conceived of by the authorities and even if it is accepted as
such, it is wholly unconstitutional as it creates an invidious discrimination
perpetrating sexual differences.
18. Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned arnicus curiae in his written
note of submission has put forth that the judgment of the High Court of
Kerala is founded on the religious practice and after detailed enquiry the
view having taken by the High Court that the restriction.imposed by the
Devaswom Board is not violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the
Constitution, the same should not set at naught in this petition for public G
interest litigation. His further argument is that the devotees of Lord
Ayyappa could also be brought within the ambit of religious denomination
1• 1997 (4) sec 606
1 1996 (9) sec 548
'AIR 2016 SC 209 H
A who have been following the religious practice which has been essential
part ofreligion. His stand is that this Court had no occasion to consider
the important question, that is,·what is religious practice on the basis of
religious belief which w~uld apply not only to Ayyappa temple but would
also apply to all the prominent temples all over India and, therefore, the
B matter has to be decided by a Constitution Bench. According to the
learned senior counse 1, none of the cases cited at the Bar would govern
the issue raised here, that is, protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution is not limited to the matters of doctrine or belief but also
extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore, contains a
guarantee for rituals and observations, ceremonies and modes of worship
C which arc integral parts of religion. The concept "essential part ofreligious
practice'' has to be decided by the Court with reference to the practices
which arc regarded by the large sections of the community for several
centuries. It is propounded by him that a religious practice based on
religious faith adhered to and followed by millions of Hindus for over a
millennium in consonance with natural rights of men and women is not D violative o fFundamen ta! Rights without appreciating the scope of these
rights.
19. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned amicus curiae, in his turn,
contends that Sabarimala Sree Dharma Sastha Temple is a public temple,
members of the public arc admitted: and its use as a place of public
E worship and entry thereto is not to any particular denomination or part
thereof. The temple is managed andiadministered by a statutory body,
i.e .. the Travancore Devaswom Board. As entry to a public temple is a
legal right but not a permissible tight and, therefore, the temple authorities
have no authority to curtail the said right. In this context, he has drawn
F inspiration from the authorities namely. Deoki Nandan v.
Murlidhar 9, Sri Radhakanta Deb v. Commissioner of Hindu
Religious Endowments, Orissa 10 and Nar Hari v. Badri Nath
Temple Committee 11 • It is his proponement that the right of a woman
t.o visit and enter the temple as a devotee of the deity, as a believer in
Hindu faith is an essential facet of her right and restriction of the present
G nature creates a dent in that right which is protected under Article 25 of
the Constitution. Article 25(1) cstabli:;hes a non-discriminatory right and
it is available to men and women prof :ssing the same faith, for it engulfs
"(1956) SCR 756
"'(1981) 2 sec 226
H 11 (1952)SCR849
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 633
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
the concept of intra-faith parity. The distinction between entry into temples A
and right to conduct the worship of the deity as per ritualistic process of
worship by an "Acharya" has been recognized to keep the constitutional
norm at its pedestal. In this regard, he has commended few passages
from Nar Hari (supra) and Shastri Yagnapurudasji (supra).
· 20. Mr. Ramachandran would further contend that Article 25(2)(b) B
expressly states that intent of the Founding Fathers clearly prohibits
exclusionary practices. As per Sri Vcnkatramana Devaru
(supra). Article 25(2)(b) is not a mere enabling provision that creates
substantive right being a constitutional command but lays down if any
exception gets space, it has to be extremely narrow and within such
exception the exclusion of women as a class from the age of 10 to 50 is
neither permissible nor acceptable. The exclusionary practice cannot be
justified on the grounds of health, public order or morality because morality,
as envisaged in Article 25 or Article 26, is not an individualized or
sectionalized perception subj cct to varying practices and ideals of every
religion. The concept of morality has to be based on the constitutional
text and especially should be inconsonance with Articles 14, 15, 17. 21,.
38 and 51 A of the Constitution. The word "morality" has to be interpreted
as constitutional morality but not the speeches from the pulpit by some.
It must have constitutjpnal legitimacy. In this regard, learned senior
counsel has drawn our~ attention to Adi Saiva Sivaehariyargal Nala
Sangam and others v, State of T.N.'2, Manoj Narula v. Union of E
India 13, National Legal Services Authority v. Union oflndia 14, State
of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab .Jamat and others 1 ~.
21. Mr. Ramachandran further contends that the stand of the State
of Kerala and the Devaswom Board is that the practice is based on
religious custom and the same is essential to religious practice. It is
fundamentally fallacious as such a religious practice cannot be essential
to the religion and it has been only imposed by subordinate legislation.
The custom that has been conceived of is not a part of the essential
religious practice and t
1
1e said practice has to be appreciated keeping in
view the religious rights as enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the G
Constitution. The submi ;sion of the State is that there is no total prohibition
is fallacious because a significant section of adult women is excluded
12 (2016) 2 sec ns
"(20i4)9sec1
" (2014) s sec 438
1' (2oos1 8 sec 534 H
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 14 S.C.R.
and the singular ground for exclusion is sex and the biological feature of
menstruation. To put it differently, the discrimination is not singularly on
the ground of sex but also sex and the biological factor which is a
characteristic of the particular sex. In such a situation, contends Mr.
Ramachandran, "impact test'' has to be applied to declare the rule and
the notification to be unconstitutional. For the said purpose, he has
commended us to the authority in Bennet Coleman & Co. and others
v. Union of India and others16• Learned senior counsel would contend
that Ruic 3(b) is ultra vircs of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1965 Act because
Section 3 makes it clear that Rules made under it cannot be discriminatory
against any section or class. Therefore, when it protects customs and
usage and takes shelter under the same, which may prohibit entry, then
i't is not in accord with Section 3 of the 1965 Act which expressly
overriiles custom and usage. The 1965 Act provides that rules have to
be made for due observance of religious rites and ceremonies. The
inclusion of words "custom and usage" transgress the very purpose of
the Act and also the basic intent of the legislation apart from the
constitutional provisions. His further submission is that the State has a
duty to ensure ilie enjoyment of fundamental rights. By inserting Rule
3(b) which goes against the inclusionary mandate of Section 3 of the
I 965 Act, the State has failed in its duty to protect the fundamental
rights. He has, in this regard, relied upon the decisions in S. Rangarajan
v. P. Jagjivan Ram and others 17, Ram Jethmalani and others v.
Union of .India and others18, M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of
India and others 19.
22. Learned senior counsel has seriously criticized the stand of
the Devaswom Board and the State that the decisions rendered by the
Kera la High Court operates as res judicata, for the High Court was not
dealing with the validity of the Rules or invoking rights of individuals
under Article 25. It is his further stand that when there is violation of a·
fundamental right, the Court in a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution can proceed to re-examine the earlier decision as has been
held in Sanjay Singh and another v. U.P. Public Service
G Commission, Allahabad and another20 . In the present case, it is the
1' (I 972) 2 SCC 788
11 (1989)2 sec 574
1' (2011i s sec 1
1'I (2006) s sec 212
H 20 12007) 3 sec no
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, C.ll]
judgment by the High Court and the said judgment cannot debar the
jurisdiction o{this Court to adjudge the constitutionality of the statutory
provisions or the Rules or the notification because the principle of res
judicata will not remotely apply to such a case. Additionally, he submits
that a statute which may be upheld as constitutional at one poillt of time
can become unconstitutional at a later point of time as has been held
in Satyawati Sharma v .. Union of lndia and another 21 anli in A tam
Prakash v. State of Haryana and othcrs 22 •
23. lt is submitted by Mr . .laideep Gupta, learned senior counsel
that Artide 25 and 26 of the Constitution guarantee every pcrsoli and
community, the right and freedom to profess practice and pmpagate
religion and manage its own affairs in matters of religion. It is settled
that a religion not only lays down a code of ethical rules but may also
prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship.
These, whc11 they constitute an integral/essential part of the religion is
protected uadcr Article 25 and Article 26 of the ConstitJJtion. It is further
urged hy him 1hat the administration of the temple vests with the
Travancorc Dcvaswom Board under the provisions of the Act and there
is a statutory duty cast on the Dcvaswom Board to arrange worship in
temples in accorc.Jancc with the usage. Therefore, in matters ofrcligion,
it is the opinion of the priests that is final. It is also the contention that
under.ceremonial law pe1~taining to temples, who are entitled to enter
into them for won:hip, where they arc entitled to stand and worship and
how worship is to be conducted are all matters of religion protected both
under Article 25 and Article 26(b ).
24. Mr. K. Parasaran and Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior
counsel appearing for Dcvaswom Board submit that the
petition mider Article 32 of the Constitution is not maintainable as no
right affecting public at large is involved in the case. The religious
questions posed in this Writ Petition can be determined finally only by
the "Thanthri" concerned and not by other Thanthries who have no
authority over the Sabarimala Temple; that worshippers visit the temple
after observing penance for 41 days and usually ladies between the age
of lO and 50 will not be physically capable of observing "vratham" for
41 days on physiological grounds; that the rule that during these seasons
no women aged more than 10 and less than 50 shall enter the temple is ·
21 (2008l s sec 287
22 ( t 986) 2 sec 249
635
A scrupulously followed and the Board, being a statuto1y authority, cannot
forget the mandate laid down under Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the
Constitution while administering the Temples under their control; that
the Board cannot conceive of any religious practice under the Hindu
Religion which deprives a worshipper of his right to enter the Temple
and worship therein according to his belief; that notifications arc issued
by the Board during Mandalam, Makaravilakku and Vishu preventing
women of the age group between 10 to 50 from entering the Temple
taking into account the religious sentiments and practices followed in the
temple. Article 25confcrs freedom of conscience and freedom to profess,
practice and propagate religion subject to public order, morality and health
and all other provisions of Part III. But every religious denomination or
any section thereof shall have the right to manage their religious affairs
subject to public order, morality and health. Every religious denomination
is conferred such freedom under Article 26 of the Constitution and they
shall have the right - (a) to established and maintain institutions for
D religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters
of religion, and (c) to administer such property in accordance with law.
It i1> contended that Ayyappa devotees form a denomination by
themselves and have every ri~ht to regulate and manage its own affairs
in matters ofreligion. Reliance has been placed on Raja Bira Kishore
Deb v. State of Orissa 23 • teamed senior counsel have also drawn
immense inspiration from theYudgment of the High Court to highlight the
stand that it is the right of a rdigious denomination to administer property
and it is fundamental under the Constitution. Passages have been
reproduced from Shri Lakhshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt (supra). In essence, th~ submission is that the practice which is in
vogue in the temple is an essential part of religion which the Constitution
protects. Learned senior counsel have commended us to a decision in S.P.
Mittal v. Union of India and others24 • According to them, whether
any practice is an integral part of the religion or not has to be decided on
the basis of evidence. Rely'ng upon the authority in Tilkayat Shri
Gvindlalji Maharaj v. State ofRajasthan and others25 it is contended
G that that the question will alv ays have to be decided by the Court and in
doing so the Court may have :o enquire whether the practice in question
is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an
2·' AIR 1964 SC 150
'·1 (1983J 1 sec s1
"(1964).2SCR561: AIR 1963~=1638
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. v. STATE 637
OF KERALA & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
integral or essential part of the religion and finding on the question on A
such an issue will al~·ays depend upon the evidence adduced before it
as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion.
Reference has been made to Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of
Bombay and Others 26 to state that the said authority has in unmistakable
terms held that in regard to affairs in matters of religion the right of B
management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right
which no legislature can take away. Various paragraphs from the judgment
of the.Kcrala High Court have been referred to bolster the stand that
such restriction imposed by the Davaswom Board is not violative of
Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Such restriction is also not
violative of the provisions ofthel965 Act since there is no restriction
between one section and another section or between one class among
. the Hindus in the matter of entry to the temple whereas the prohibition is
only in respect of women of a particular age group and not women as a
class. They have referred to the additional affidavit filed by the Dcvaswom
Board that Ayyappans belong to a different denomination and it is
elaborately set forth bow the temple has come into existence. That apart,
it is seriously canvassed that once a decision has been rendered by the
High Court, it would operate as res judicata and that will bind all persons
including the petitioners herein. The question as to whether a set of
persons constitute a religious denomination is a mixed question of fact
and law and should be decided by a competent civil court after
examination of documentary and other evidence. In this regard, reliance
has been placed on the authority in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State
of Tamil Nadu and othcrs 27• Various other aspects have also been
highlighted but it is not necessary to note the same at present.
25. Having noted the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and that of the State, we feel certain significant issues arise for
consideration. Be it noted, learned ~ounsel for the parties have formulated
certain issues as we had reserved the order on a singularaspect, that is,
whether the matter should be referred to the Constitutiort Bench or not.
We need not reproduce the questions framed by them.
26. According to us, the following questions arise for consideration:
!. Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a
biological factor exclusive to the female gender amounts to
"AIR I 954 SC 388: 1954 SCR I 55
·" (2014) s sec 75
A "discrimination" and thereby violates the very core of Articles
14, 15and17 and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles
25 and 26 of the Constitution?
2. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an
"essential religious practice" underArticle 25 and whether a
B religious institution can assert a claim in that regard under the
umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the matters of
religion?
3. Whether Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and,
if so, is it permissible on the part of a 'religious denomination'
c managed by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-
A of the Constitution of India out of Consolidated Fund ofKerala
and Tamil Nadu can indulge in such practices violating
constitutional principles/ morality embedded in Articles 14, 15{3),
39(a) and 51-A( e)?
4. Whether Ruic 3 of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Rules permits 'religious denomination'
to ban entry of women between the age of 10 to 50 years? And
if so, would it not play foul of Articles 14 and 15(3) of the
Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?
5. Whether Rule 3(b) ofKerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Rules, I 965 is ultra vires the Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act,
1965 and, if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative
of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution?
27. Let the papers be placed before the learned Chief Justice for
constitution of the appropriate larger Bench.
Ankit Gyan Matter referred for constitution oflarger Bench.
ENDOF2017
*****