Pratap Mehta v. Sunil Gupta & Ors.
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been filed
against the common judgment dated 17.07.2018 of the High Court of
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Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal NO.365/2018 and other connected LPAs.
Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the appellant aggrieved by common
judgment dated 06.07.2018 of learned Single Judge i n Writ
Petition(C)No.2142 of 2016 (State Bar Council of M.P. vs. Bar Council
of India & Ors.) and Writ Petition (C) No.2215 of 2016 (Sunil Gupta vs.
Bar Council of India & Ors.). Learned Single Judge vide its judgment
dated 06.07.2018 disposed of the writ petitions with certain directions.
2. The brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for decidi ng
these appeals are:
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh held the elections for its
constituent members in the month of May-June, 2014. After declaration
of the result notice dated 09.06.2014 was issued for holding the firs t
meeting of newly elected members on 29.06.2014. Agenda for the
meeting to be held on 29.06.2014 was to conduct the elections for the
various offices and the Committees of the State Bar Council of Madhya
Pradesh including the office of its representative member in the Bar
Council of India. In these appeals we are concerned only with one
Agenda item which is to the following effect:
“ Part-B
Serial No.1: Discussion, consideration and decision
regarding the election of the representative member of the
Bar Council for the Bar Council of India.”
3. Pursuant to notice dated 09.06.2014, a meeting was held on
29.06.2014, which was presided over by the Advocate General of the
State of Madhya Pradesh and was attended by all the 25 m embers of
the State Bar Council of M.P. In the meeting, one Shri Ra meshwar
Neekhra was elected as Chairman.
4. The case of the respondents, who were writ petitioners before
the High Court was that in the said meeting, election for other office
bearers including election for representative member of the State Bar
Council to Bar Council of India was held in which Shri Sunil Gupta was
unanimously elected. Shri Sunil Gupta, also started working as member
representative in the Bar Council of India. On 29.06.2014, 9 members
of the State Bar Council wrote a letter to its Secretary requesting him to
organise a meeting for conducting elections to the various offices and
Committees of the State Bar Council. It was further alleged in the letter
that after the election of Chairman on 29.06.2014, the meeting has been
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
adjourned and the members without any further notice to the members
who had thereafter left the place of meeting, reconvened the meeting
and elected Shri Sunil Gupta as representative of the Ba r Council of
India. A letter dated 13.07.2014 was also sent to the above effect by 13
members.
5. On 13.07.2014 another letter was sent to the Secretary by 13
members requesting to consider a no- confidence motion under Rule
122A of the State Bar Council of M.P. Rules against Shri R ameshwar
Neekhra, the Chairman. Taking cognizance of the let ters dated
29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 sent by various members to the Secretary,
notice dated 16.07.2014/19.07.2014 was issued to the members of State
Bar Council informing them of a special meeting scheduled to be held on
02.08.2014 for deciding the issues brought forth in the said letters. The
special meeting was convened on 02.08.2014. The prop osed no-
confidence motion against Chairman was withdrawn, Chairman relying
on the various letters sent by the members declared all the elections held
on 29.06.2014 except his own, as void. All the office bearers and members
who were elected on 29.06.2014 submitted their resignations from their
respective posts except Shri Sunil Gupta who refuse d to resign as
representative to the Bar Council of India. On 02.08.2014, election of
several officer bearers including representative to the Bar Council of
India was conducted in which Shri Pratap Mehta was declared elected
as representative of the State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India.
6. Aggrieved by the Resolution dated 02.08.2014 electing Shri
Pratap Mehta, Election Petition No.01/2014 was filed by Shri Sunil
Gupta before the Bar Council of India. During pendency of the aforesaid
Election Petition, State Bar Council passed Resolution on 07.02.2015,
with a majority of 17 votes, withdrawing its earlier Resol ution dated
02.08.2014, thereby re-affirming that Shri Sunil Gupta is its representative
member in the Bar Council of India. Shri Sunil Gupta filed an application
on 11.02.2015 before the Bar Council of India for seeking leave to
withdraw his Election Petition No.01/2014. However, instead of
permitting for withdrawal, Chairman of the Bar Council of India passed
an order dated 16.11.2015 observing that Pratap Mehta has prima facie
case, hence, he permitted Pratap Mehta to join as representative of the
State Bar Council in the Bar Council of India pending the final report of
the sub-committee which was constituted for enquiring into the elections
of Shri Sunil Gupta and Shri Pratap Mehta. The sub-committee submitted
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its report in which report sub-committee found that election of Shri Sunil
Gupta cannot be held to be valid as representative of State Bar Council
in the Bar Council of India rather it is Shri Pratap Meht a who was
elected on 02.08.2014 in continuation of the meeting held on 29.06.2014
which meeting was held to dispose of and transact the un-transac ted
business which was fixed for 29.06.2014. The Bar Council of India passed
an order dated 05.12.2015, dismissing the Election Petition filed by Shri
Sunil Gupta. Bar Council of India held that there is no infirmity in the
election of Shri Pratap Mehta as representative to the Bar Council of
India.
7. The State Bar Council of M.P. withdrew Writ Petition ( C)
No.No.973 of 2016 challenging order dated 16.11.2015 and Writ
Petition(C) No.2142 of 2016 was filed by the State Bar Council of M.P.
challenging order dated 05.12.2015 of the Bar Council of India. Another
Writ Petition (C)No.2215 of 2016 was filed by Shri S unil Gupta
challenging order dated 05.12.2015 passed by the Bar Council of India.
Both the writ petitions were heard by the learned Single Judge and have
been decided by a common judgment dated 06.07.2018. Learned Single
Judge held that election of Shri Sunil Gupta as representative in the Bar
Council of India dated 29.06.2014 is not valid. Learned Single Judge
also held that election dated 02.08.2014 electing Shri Pratap Mehta as
representative in the Bar Council of India is also not valid it having been
held contrary to the Bar Council of India Rules.
8. The learned Single Judge vide its judgment dated 06.07.2018
allowed few of the prayers made by writ petitioners, howe ver, certain
other prayers were refused. Allowing the petition, learned Single Judge
held that election of representative in Bar Council of India fr om the
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh held on 29.06.2014 as well as
02.08.2014 were both invalid. In the circumstances, learned Single Judge
took the view that the State Bar Council cannot be without any
representative in the Bar Council of India, hence he directed for holding
of fresh elections by the State Bar Council to elect its representative in
the Bar Council of India. Paragraph 45 of the judgment conta ins the
operative portion of the judgment, which is to the following effect:-
“45. The prayers in the writ petitions, so far as t hey seek
implementation of the Petitioner s Resolutions dated 29.06.2014
and 07.02.2015 electing the Respondent No. 3 as a member
representative of Petitioner/SBCMP in the Respondent No.1/
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
BCI, are rejected. However, the prayer quashing the Respondent
No. 1 s Impugned Order dated 05.12.2015 is allowed a nd
accordingly the Impugned Order dated 05.12.2015 is quashed
and set aside. The Petitioner in W.P.(C) No.2142/2016, i.e., the
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh is directed to hold within
a period of 4 weeks, fresh elections for electing its representative
member in the Respondent No.1/BCI by following the procedure
as prescribed in the BCI Rules. Upon the Petitioner
communicating the result of the election to be held in terms of
the aforesaid directions to the Respondent No. 1/BCI, the said
Respondent No. 1 would take consequential steps to include the
name of the person elected by the Petitioner/SBCMP as its
representative member in the Respondent No. 1/BCI.”
9. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 06.07.2018, Shri Pratap
Mehta and Bar Council of India filed letters patent appeals before the
Division Bench of the High Court. All the appeals were dismissed by
the Division Bench vide its judgment dated 17.07.2018. Shri Pratap
Mehta aggrieved by said judgment has filed Civil Appeal Nos. 8172-
8173 of 2018 whereas Bar Council of India has filed Civil Appeal Nos.
8174-8177 of 2018. All the appeals have been heard together.
10. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel has appeared for
Shri Pratap Mehta whereas Shri S.N. Bhat has appeared for Bar Council
of India. Shri Vikas Upadhyay, learned counsel has appeared for State
Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh. Shri Nitin Gaur, learned counsel has
appeared on behalf of Shri Sunil Gupta.
11. Shri Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants submits that High Court committed an error in exceeding its
jurisdiction under Article 226 by entering into the issues of the facts by
re-appreciating evidence. It is submitted that High Court under Article
226 could not have re-appreciated evidence and come to a differ ent
conclusion to one which was arrived at by Bar Council of India, the
adjudicating authority, regarding election of State Bar Council for electing
a representative to the Bar Council of India. It is su bmitted that both
learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court committed an error in holding that there was no agenda for holding
election of the State Bar Council representative for Bar Council of India
for the meeting dated 02.08.2014. It is submitted that for t he meeting
dated 02.08.2014, letters of the members of the State Bar Council dated
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29.06.2014 as well as 13.07.2014 itself contain items, which were to be
considered in the meeting to be scheduled, hence agenda of the meeting
was very much clear and High Court erred in setting aside the election
dated 02.08.2014 on an erroneous ground. The meeting dated 02.08.2014
being an adjourned meeting of 29.06.2014, no separate agenda was
required to be issued for the meeting dated 02.08.2014.
12. Shri Vikas Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for State
Bar Council submits that the meeting dated 02.08.2014 was not an
adjourned meeting of meeting dated 29.06.2014. He submits that special
meeting was convened by the Secretary of the State Bar C ouncil to
take a decision on the letter dated 29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 given by
members of the State Bar Council. The question as to whe ther the
election of representative to the Bar Council of India was validly held on
29.06.2014, was a disputed question, which was required to be decided
before holding any fresh election, hence no fresh election coul d have
been held on 02.08.2014. He further submits that the Bar Council of
India Rules framed under the Advocates Act, 1961 are statutory rules,
which govern election of the member of the State Bar Counci l to the
Bar Council of India, which election is to be held in accordance with the
Statutory Rules. The election dated 02.08.2014 for electing a member
of the State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India having not been held
in accordance with Part II of Bar Council of India Rules h as rightly
been invalidated by the High Court. It is submitted that election dated
02.08.2014 is in breach of Rules 2, 3 and 7. He further submits tha t
State Bar Council having already elected Shri Sunil Gupta as its member
in the Bar Council of India on 29.06.2014, the said election could not
have been set aside except in accordance with the p rocedure as
prescribed in Rule 9 of the Bar Council of India Rules. There was no
challenge to the election dated 29.06.2014 of Shri Sunil Gupta as pe r
Rule 9, hence it was not within the jurisdiction of State Bar Council to
elect another representative in place of Shri Sunil Gupta . He submits
that in the Election Petition No.1 of 2014 filed by Shri Sunil Gupta in
spite of there being application by Shri Sunil Gupta to withdraw the election
petition in view of the resolution of the State Bar Council dated 07.02.2015,
the Bar Council of India erroneously proceeded to decide the elect ion
petition on 05.12.2015. He further submits that in pursuance of judgment
of learned Single Judge as confirmed by Division Bench on 17.07.2018,
the State Bar Council has fixed 12.08.2018 for holding election of the
State Bar Council’s representative in the Bar Council of I ndia, which
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
election has been held on 12.08.2018 and the result of the elec tion in
pursuance of order of this Court dated 03.10.2018 has been submitted
before this Court in the sealed envelope on the date fixed for hearing.
13. Learned counsel for the Bar Council of India supported the
decision of the Bar Council of India dated 05.12.2015. It is submitted
that in the meeting dated 29.06.2014, no election was held except the
election of Chairman. After election of Chairman, the meet ing was
adjourned, which is recorded in the meeting itself. The lett er dated
29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 submitted by members of the State Bar Council
were for fixing a meeting to hold rest of the elections and that meeting
having been fixed for 02.08.2014, no fresh agenda was required to be
issued and there was no illegality in the meeting dated 02.08.2014. It is
further submitted that on 02.08.2014, apart from el ecting the
representative to the Bar Council of India, rest of the ele ctions were
conducted and no one has any objections regarding elections held on
02.08.2014 except Shri Sunil Gupta, who did not submit his resignation
on that day whereas all other office bearers and members ele cted on
29.06.2014 has submitted their resignations. He submits that High Court
committed an error in holding that election dated 02.08.2014 in so far as
it relates to representative of State Bar Council in the Ba r Council of
India is not correct.
14. We have considered the respective submissions of the parties
and have perused the records.
15. The entire dispute in the present appeals centres rou nd the
election dated 02.08.2014 in so far as it relates to election of Shri Pratap
Mehta as State Bar Council representative in the Bar Council of India.
The learned Single Judge having held that election of Shri Sunil Gupta on
29.06.2014 as State Bar Council representative in the Bar Counci l of
India was not valid and the said decision having not been cha llenged
either by the State Bar Council or by Shri Sunil Gupta, the said issue has
become final between the parties. The High Court having held that
election dated 02.08.2014 is not valid in so far as it relates to election of
representative of State Bar Council in the Bar Council of India is
concerned, the only issue to be answered is as to whether the said election
is valid or not?
16. The Advocates Act, 1961, Section 4 provides for the Bar
Council of India. According to Section 4(1)(c) in the Bar Coun cil of
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India, one member has to be elected by each State Bar Counc il from
amongst its members. Section 4(1)(c) is as follows:-
“4. Bar Council of India.-(1) There shall be a Bar Council for
the territories to which this Act extends to be known as the Bar
Council of India which shall consist of the following members,
namely:-
(a)... ... ...
(b) ... ... ...
(c) one member elected by each State Bar Council from
amongst its members.”
17. Under Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961, Bar Council
of India is empowered to make rules for discharging its function s. In
exercise of power under Section 49 and all other enabling powers under
the Advocates Act, 1961, the Bar Council of India has framed the Bar
Council of India Rules. Chapter I of Part II of the Rules refers to Section
15, Sections 4 and 10B of the Advocates Act, 1961. Chapter I Part II of
the Rules, thus, are to give effect to provisions of Section 4 of the Act,
which provides for constitution of Bar Council of India in which one of
its members to be elected by each State Bar Council fr om amongst its
members. Rule 2, Rule 3 and rule 7 of Chapter I of Part II of the Rules
are as follows:-
“2. (1) The notice and agenda for the first meeting of the
State Council held after the election of its members on the expiry
of the term of its members elected at the previous election under
Section 8 of the Act may include the election of a member of the
State Council to the Council under Section (1) (c) of the Act.
(2) Every such election shall be held not later than 30 days
after the first meeting of the State Council after election under
Section 8 of the Act.
3. The election of a member of the Council shall be
conducted by the Secretary of the State Council who shall act
as the Returning Officer.
7. Every notice by the Secretary of the State Council fixing
a date for the election of a member to the Council under these
rules shall be sent not less than 15 clear days before th e date
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
fixed for the election. A copy of the said notice shall be se nt
simultaneously to the Secretary of the Council.”
18. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid Rules indicate that fo r
holding election of a member of Bar Council of India to be e lected by
State Bar Council, notice and agenda has to be issued by the Secretary
of the State Bar Council, which is a statutory requirement. There is no
issue between the parties regarding the fact that agenda dated 09.06.2014
was issued for the meeting of the members of the State Bar Council on
29.06.2014 including the agenda for electing a member from the State
Bar Council to the Bar Council of India as noticed above. Minutes of the
meeting dated 29.06.2014 has been brought on the record in Civil Appeal
Nos. 8174-8177 of 2018 as Annexure A4. A perusal of the proceeding
indicates that all 25 elected members and learned Advocate General,
who is Ex-officio member was present and meeting started at 11.00 am
and by 12.00 noon, the election of the Chairman was completed. The
Minutes record that for greeting the newly elected Chairman a nd to
see-off learned Advocate General, the proceeding of the meeting were
stayed/adjourned and thereafter again the meeting started in presence
of members for election of rest of the office bearers and m embers of
the Committees. It is useful to refer to the above portion of the proceeding
(English translation of the proceeding brought on record), which is to the
following effect:-
“The meeting of the Council started at 11:00 am at morning and
till 12:00 noon the election for the post Chairman was completed
and in wishing the newly elected Chairman and for giv ing
respectful departure to the Hon’ble Advocate, the working of
the meeting was stayed. Thereafter, again the meeting of general
assembly was started before the present members and the
remaining office bearers and member of the Council w ere
elected.”
19. The proceeding dated 29.06.2014 also contain a resolution as
Resolution No. 7 Part B, by which Shri Sunil Gupta’s name was proposed
and unanimously approved as representative of the State Bar Council to
the Bar Council of India. On 29.06.2014 itself, 9 members submitted a
letter addressed to Chairman of the State Bar Council that no information
of holding of adjourned meeting after 2.00 pm was received by them,
hence adjourned meeting be called for completing the rest of the elections.
To the same effect is another letter dated 13.07.2014 by 13 members of
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the Bar Council of State, which was received on 15.07.2014 by the
State Bar Council. Another letter dated 13.07.2014 signed by 13 members
of the State Bar Council was submitted to the State Bar Council of M.P.
requesting for convening a meeting under Rule 122A for considering no
confidence motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Council – Shri
Rameshwar Nikhra. The Officiating Secretary of the State Bar Council
issued a notice dated 16.07.2014 to all the members of the State B ar
Council referring to the letters received from members where ele ction
proceeding of Vice-Chairman, Treasurer and representative to the Bar
Council of India are being disputed and no confidence motion has been
presented against the Chairman. The officiating Secretary has convened
a special meeting dated 02.08.2014 for disposal of aforesaid le tters
received from the members of the State Bar Council. It is useful to
extract the entire notice dated 16.07.2014 issued by officiating Secretary,
which is to the following effect:-
“No. – SBC/MP/Important Meeting/General Body/4277/2014,
Date 16/07/2014
To,
All Hon’ble Members
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,
Sir/Ma’m„
The Special Meeting of the General Body of the State B ar
Council of Madhya Pradesh is scheduled for 2nd August, 2014,
Day-Saturday, in the Meeting Room of the Council’s Office at
11: O’clock in the Morning, in which the letter dated 29/06/2014
signed by 9 Hon’bie Members of the Council, two letters dated
13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11 Hon’ble Member
and Two letters signed by 2 Hon’ble Members received by e -
mail dated 15/07/2014 and one letter signed by 1 Hon’ble Member
received on 16/07/2014, vide which because of the election
process of the Vice Chairman of the Council, Treasurer, various
committees including the representative to the Bar Council of
India being disputed, a proposal for no confidence against t he
Chairman of the Council has been submitted under Ru1e 122-A
of the Council. In the special meeting both the aforesaid letters are
to be decided. You all are requested to be present in the Meeting.
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
For the convenience of the Hon’ble Members Rule 122-A of the
Council is as under:-
“122-A The Chairman, Vice Chairman or the Treasurer of the
Council could be removed by a vote of no confidence passed by
majority of the members present and voting in a meeting of the
council especially called for the purpose provided that at least 7
members of the Council have signed the requisition for holding
such a special meeting, and such meeting shall be called within a
period of 21 days from the date of receipt of the requisition by
the Secretary”.
Sd/-
(MUKESH M1SHRA)
Officiating Secretary
ENCLOSED- The letters dated 29/06/2014, 14/07/2014, 15/07/
2014 and 16/07/2017 received from the Hon’ble members.”
20. Another notice referred to as Amended notice of letter dated
16.07.2014 convening a special meeting was issued on 19.07.2014, which
is to the following effect:-
No. - SBC/MP/Important Meeting/General Body/4311/2014,
Date 19/07/2014
Amended letter for date 16/07/2014 of Special Meeting
To,
All Hon’bie Members
State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh,
Sir/Ma’ m,
The Special Meeting of the General Body of the State B ar
Council of Madhya Pradesh is scheduled for 2 nd August, 2014,
Day-Saturday, in the Meeting Room of the Council’s Office at
11: O’clock in the Morning, in which the letter dated 29/06/2014
signed by 9 Hon’ble Members of the Council, two letters dated
13/07/2017 received on 14/07/2014 signed by 11 Hon’ bie
Members and Two letters signed by 2 Hon’ble Members received
by e-mail dated 15/07/2014 and two letters signed by 1 Hon’ble
Member received on 16/07/2014, in which vide one letter the
prayer has been made to call for the meeting for election of the
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Vice-Chairman of Council, Treasurer, election of va rious
committees along with the representative to the Bar Council of
India and vide the second letter the no-confidence motion has
been presented against the Chairman of the Council under Rule
122-A of the Rules of the Council. In the special meeting both
aforesaid letters are to be decided. You all are requested to b e
present in the meeting. [Enclosure-Page 1 to 7]
For the convenience of the Hon’ble Members Rule 122-A of the
Council is as under:-
“122-A The Chairman, Vice Chairman or the Treasurer of the
Council could be removed by a vote of no confidence passed by
majority of the members present and voting in a meeting of the
council especially called for the purpose provided that at least 7
members of the Council have signed the requisition for holding
such a special meeting, and such meeting shall be called within a
period of 21 days from the date of receipt of the requisition by
the Secretary”.
Sd/-
(MUKESH M1SHRA)
Officiating Secretary
NOTE- The letters received from the Hon’bie Members in
relation to the Special Meeting has already been sent alongwith
the letter dated 16/07/2014.”
21. The notice dated 16.07.2014 as well as dated 19.07.2014
clearly indicate that special meeting was convened for taking a decision
on the letters received from members of the Council. The notice dated
19.07.2014 categorically mentions “in the special meeting both
aforesaid letters are to be decided” . The letters dated 29.06.2014
and 13.07.2014 has been referred in the notice where following two
subjects were mentioned:-
(a) Request for convening a meeting for conducting elections of the
rest of the office bearers and members;
(b) Under Rule 122-A, considering the motion of no confidence given
by 13 members of the Bar Council against the Chairma n,
Rameshwar Nikhra.
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
22. The notice dated 16.07.2014 clearly indicate that it did not
contain any agenda for the meeting. The notice convening the meeting
only referred to consideration of letters received from the members,
which was specifically mentioned as noticed above. The subject
mentioned in both the notices was to the following effect:-
(i) Notice dated 16.07.2014 “in the special meeting both
the aforesaid letters are to be decided”;
(ii) Amended notice dated 19.07.2014 “in the special
meeting both aforesaid letters are to be decided”.
23. Shackleton on the Law and Practices of Meetings, Fourteenth
Edition, while dealing with the subject “notice” states following:-
“The purpose to be stated
A notice, to be valid, must clearly state the business to be
transacted at the meeting and give all material information to
enable it to be fully understood.”
24. It is clear from the aforesaid that notices dated 16.07.2014
and 19.07.2014 were issued not for convening any adjourned meeting
rather special meeting was convened to consider two set of letters given
by members of the Council requesting for convening a meeting for holding
elections of office bearers and the members of different C ommittees
including representative to Bar Council of India and for considering no
confidence motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Counci l. In
the notice dated 16.07.2014 as well as notice dated 19.07.2014, the subject
of special meeting was thus for disposal of letters r eceived by the
members of the Council. It is to be noted that the minut es of the
proceeding dated 29.06.2014 has recorded and signed by Chairman
containing the election of not only the Chairman rather election of other
office bearers and different representatives, which is cl ear from the
proceedings brought on the record by Bar Council of India itself as
Annexure A4. It is a well established principle that m inutes of the
proceeding signed by the Chairman are prima facie e vidence of
proceeding and decisions recorded therein are deemed to be valid until
contrary is proved. Shackleton , while dealing with minutes as evidence
in Chapter 8 states following:-
“8. MINUTES AS EVIDENCE
8-07 In general, minutes form evidence of the matters to which
they refer, which can be relied on in civil proceedings:
1085
‘In an action against one or several members of the Gos port
and Forton Water Works Company for the value of lead pipes
supplied by the plaintiffs to the company, after the defendant
had been proved to be a partner in the company the entries in
a book contain-ing a record of the proceedings of the society
produced at its meetings, and open, to the inspection of ail
members, were admissible in evidence against the defendant;
the minutes showed that the order had been authorised by the
society:”
When minutes are signed by the chairman of the meeting, or the
next succeeding meeting, they are prima facie evidence of the
proceedings, and decisions recorded therein are deemed to be
valid until the contrary is proved. In practice, certified copies of
minutes are frequently provided to third parties as evidence of
the matters decided upon at the Meeting.
The chairman of a meeting has authority to determine all
incidental questions which arise at the meeting, and an entry by
him in the minute book of the result of a poll, or of his decision on
such questions, is prima facie evidence of that result, and the
onus of displacing that evidence is thrown on those who impeach
the entry:”
25. Thus, the letters issued by the members on 29.06.2014 and
13.07.2014 raised a dispute containing allegations disputing minutes of
the proceeding of the meeting dated 29.06.2014. Thus, it was a disputed
matter as to what actually happened on 29.06.2014, i.e. as to whether
the election of other office bearers and representatives w ere validly
completed on 29.06.2014 or after the election of the Chairman, the
meeting was adjourned. This dispute was to be resolved in the spe cial
meeting dated 02.08.2014, which was clearly indicated by notice dated
16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 as indicated above. The issue of agenda
alongwith the notice is requirement of a valid meeting and it is only in
context of adjourned meeting that no fresh agenda need to be issued.
The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 having not contained any
agenda and the meeting also not being described as adjourned meeting,
issuance of agenda for the meeting was necessary. Issuan ce of an
agenda, if any election was to be conducted on 02.08.2014 was necessary.
26. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the view of the High
Court - both of learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench that
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
no election could have been conducted on 02.08.2014 fo r electing
member to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council. Further,
the election of the member to the Bar Council of India is s tatutorily
regulated by Bar Council of India Rules and Rule 7 require notice by the
Secretary of the State Council fixing a date for the election of the member
to the Council. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 cannot be
read as notice as required under Rule 7 for holding election of a member
to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council, hence, the conduct
of election of a member as a representative from State Ba r Council to
Bar Council of India in the meeting dated 02.08.2014 cannot be said to
be in conformity with Rule 7 of Bar Council of India Rules. The High
Court was, thus, clearly right in its view that election of S hri Pratap
Mehta on 02.08.2014 as member of the Bar Council of India was not a
valid election. The learned Single Judge having already taken a view
that election dated 29.06.2014 electing Shri Sunil Gupta as the
representative to the Bar Council of India was not a valid election, which
issue was not, however, agitated either by the State Council or by Shri
Sunil Gupta, there is no need to ponder over the above election. Both
the elections dated 29.06.2014 and 02.08.2014 to elect a member in the
Bar Council of India having been held to be invalid, the High Court was
right in issuing directions for conducting a fresh election to elect a member
in the Bar Council of India, which was necessary and just.
27. Now, we come to the submission of Shri Vikas Singh that
High Court committed error in re-appreciating the evidence on re cord
and coming to a different conclusion to one which was recorded by the
Bar Council of India. Shri Vikas Singh has relied on the judgment of this
Court in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another,
AIR 1954 SC 215; Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and
others, AIR 1964 SC 477.
28. In Waryam Singh (supra) , the landlord has filed a petition
for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent by the tenant. The
Rent Controller rejected the application of the landlord aga inst which
landlord has moved to the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pra desh.
Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227, which allowed the
application for ejectment of tenant, which has been noted in Para 10 of
the judgment, which is to the following effect:-
“10. The respondents moved the Judicial Commissioner,
Himachal Pradesh, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
1087
of India for setting aside the order of the District Judge. The
learned Judicial Commissioner held that in view of the admitted
failure to pay the rent as provided by the rent deed or at the first
hearing of the court under the proviso to Section 13 (2) (i) the
courts below had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order
for ejectment against the tenants who had not done what was
incumbent on them to do under the law and that such a situation
called for interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner
in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their
authority. He, accordingly, set aside the orders of the courts below
and allowed the application for ejectment but gave the appellants
three months’ time for vacating the premises. The appellants
have now come up before this court on appeal by special leave
obtained from this court.”
29. The tenant challenged the orders under Articles 226 and 227
in this Court and one of the submissions raised was that Judicial
Commissioner acted wholly without jurisdiction in as much as the order
of the Rent Controller exercising powers under the Act was not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, the said submission
is noted in Para 11, which is to the following effect:-
“11. Learned advocate appearing in support of this appeal
urges that the learned Judicial Commissioner acted wholly without
jurisdiction inasmuch as (1) the Rent Controller or the District
Judge exercising powers under the Act was not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, Article 227 confers
no power on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner over the
Rent Controller or the District Judge, and (2) that Article 227
read with Article 241 confers no power of judicial
superintendence on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner.”
30. This Court repelled the submission of the tenant and held that
the High Court has judicial superintendence over tribunals and authorities.
In Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14, following has been laid down:-
“13. Re. 2.—The material part of Article 227 substantially
reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of
India Act,1915, except that the power of superintendece has
been extended by the Article also to Tribunals. That the Rent
Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under
the Act are Tribunals cannot and has not been controverted.
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of
superintendence conferred by the Article. Reference is made to
clause (2) of the article in support of the contention that this
article only confers on the High Court administrati ve
superintendence over the subordinate courts and tribunals. We
are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is
expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial
opinion in India was that Section 107 which was similar in terms
to Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of
judicial superintendence to the High Court apart fro m and
independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional
jurisdiction on the High Court.
In this connection it has to be remembered that Section 107 of
the Government of India Act, 1915, was reproduced in t he
Government of India Act, 1935, as Section 224. Section 224 of
the 1935 Act, however, introduced sub-section (2), which was
new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as
giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment
of any inferior court which was not otherwise subject to appeal
or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the
decisions of the different High Courts referred to above. Section
224 of the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certai n
modifications in Article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant
to note that sub-section (2) to Section 224 of the 1935 Act has
been omitted from Article 227.
This significant omission has been regarded by all High
Courts in India before whom this question has arisen as having
restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence
it had under Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and Section
107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. See the cases referred
to in Moti Lal v. The State through Shrimati Sagrawati1. O ur
attention has not been drawn to any case which has taken a
different view and, as at present advised, we see no reaso n to
take a different view.
14. This power of superintendence conferred by Article
227 is, as pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airw ays
Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee2, to be exercised most sparingly
and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordi nate
1089
courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting
mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner
in the case before us the lower courts in refusing to make an
order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts re alised
the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by Section
13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise
jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which
called for an interference by the Court of the Judi cial
Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so. In our
opinion there is no ground on which in an appeal by special leave
under Article 136 we should interfere. The appeal, therefore ,
must stand dismissed with costs.”
31. The above decision in no manner support the case of the
appellant rather it reiterates that the High Court under Articles 226 and
227 can interfere with an arbitrary order passed by an autho rity. The
next judgment relied by the appellant is Constitution Bench judgment of
this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra). This Court had elaborately
considered the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution in the aforesaid
case. This Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunal s. It was
further held that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 to issue a
writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court exercising
it is not entitled to act as an appellate court.
32. The findings of the fact reached by the inferior Court or
Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. There cannot be any dispute to the above
propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court. However,
in the same judgment, in paragraph 8, following was laid down by this
Court:-
“8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe
what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means.
What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it
must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is
apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear
that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal
is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory
provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in
disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be
so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that
no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the
said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may
also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not
be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the
Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there
can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari
is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, b e of
such a character as would satisfy the test that it is a n error of
law apparent on the face of the record……………………..”
33. Applying the above proposition in the present case, it was
clear that High Court had referred to statutory provisions of Bar Council
of India Rules and came to the conclusion that there was no notic e of
agenda for holding election of the State Bar Council member in the Bar
Council of India for meeting dated 02.08.2014. An obvious error of law
was committed by Bar Council of India in dismissing the election petition
of Shri Sunil Gupta. The High Court was right in exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction to set aside the erroneous order of the Bar Council of India.
The High Court was, thus, well within its jurisdiction in deciding the writ
petition and submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot
be accepted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the
writ petition.
34. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on K.
Narasimhiah Vs. H.C. Singri Gowda and others, AIR 1966 SCC
330. In the above case, this Court held that three days clear notice to
Councillors for holding a special general meeting is not mandatory. What
was held that period of notice in the facts of that case was not mandatory.
Present is not a case where any one has complained that ther e was no
notice for meeting to be held on 02.08.2014. In the above case also, the
notice was received by members, some of them have receiv ed three
days notice, some of them had received notice of less than three da ys.
In the above circumstances, this Court held that provision of three days
notice was only directory and not mandatory. The said judgment has no
application in the present case.
35. Another judgment relied by the appellant is P. Kasilingam
Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789. In the said
case, this Court was dealing with a question regarding effectiveness of
1091
resignation and consequence of withdrawal of resignation before the
effective date. The said case has no application in the pre sent case.
Last case relied by the appellant is V.S. Krishnan and others Vs.
Westfort Hi-tech Hospital Ltd. and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 363 .
In the above case, the Court held that when there are materials to show
that notices were sent, the burden is on the addresse e to rebut the
statutory presumption. In paragraph 29, following has been held:-
“29. Section 172 as well as Section 53 emphasised “giving
notice”. We have already adverted to how notice should be given
for AGM as per Section 172(2) and Sections 53(1) and (2) of
the Act. In view of the fact that the Company has placed materials
to substantiate that notices, in terms of the above provisio ns,
were given, as rightly pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for
the contesting respondents, statutory presumption under Section
53 will apply though the said act is rebuttable. In view of the fact
that there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden
is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption. The High
Court, on verification of those materials, has concluded that
“postal receipt with post office seal was produced to show that
notice was sent to all shareholders by certificate of pos ting in
the correct address as per the report”.”
36. In the present case, challenge to the proceeding dated
02.08.2014 was not on the ground of want of notice for the special
meeting, hence this case also does not help the appellant in the present
case.
37. Learned counsel appearing for the State Bar Council h as
produced the result of fresh election dated 12.08.2018 as conducted in
pursuance of the directions of the High Court, which election was also
permitted by this Court vide its order dated 09.08.2018 but with a condition
that the result thereof shall not be declared without the permission of the
Court.
38. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that
there are no merits in these appeals, which are hereby di smissed. In
view of the dismissal of the appeals, the election already conducted on
12.08.2018 be given effect to by all concerned. The appeals are dismissed
subject to above. Parties shall bear their own costs.
Devika Gujral Appe als dismissed.
PRATAP MEHTA v. SUNIL GUPTA & ORS.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]