Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy & Ors.
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The present appeals emanate
from the judgment and order dated 2 nd August, 2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, striking
off paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition as also dismissing the
election petition, being Election Petition No.8 of 2014 filed by the appellant
challenging the election of respondent No.1.
2. The election in relation to Andhra Pradesh State Legislative
Assembly was held on 7 th May, 2014. The appellant and respondent
No.1 contested the election from the Punganur Assembly Constituency.
The respondent No.1 was declared as an elected candidate. By way of
an election petition, the appellant challenged the election of respondent
No.1 on the ground that respondent No.1 had grossly violated several
instructions issued by the Election Commission as also the provisions of
The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, “ the Act ”).
Respondent No.1, in turn, took out two applications seeking to strike out
paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the said election petition and to di smiss the
election petition in limine, both of which were ultimately allowed by the
High Court.
171
3. The background to the present conflict is set out as under:
a. On 12 th April, 2014, a notice of election was issued, inter alia
for a seat from the Punganur Assembly Constituency to the Andhra
Pradesh State Legislative Assembly;
b. Respondent No.1, a member of the Yuvajana Shramika Rythu
Congress Party (YSRCP) filed his initial nomination form for the
aforesaid elections on 12 th April, 2014 along with two affidavits
and again, second nomination form on 17 th April, 2014 with two
fresh affidavits. Appellant, a member of the Telugu Desham Party
(TDP), filed his nomination form on 17 th April, 2014.
c. After scrutiny of the nomination forms, on 21 st April, 2014, a
total of 8 (eight) candidates, including the appellant and respondent
No.1, were found eligible to contest the elections;
d. Appellant had filed objections on the same day i.e. 21 st April,
2014, objecting to the acceptance of nomination for ms of
respondent No.1 on the ground that he had failed to sign every
page of the affidavits in support of his nomination forms and had
also failed to fill up all the columns in his forms, contrary to the
rules prescribed in that regard. Respondent No.1 filed his counter
to the said objection petition;
e. The Returning Officer rejected the objection petition on the
ground that the said petition needed no consideration and was
hence over-ruled;
f. The elections were held on 7 th May, 2014, and results were
declared on 16 th May, 2014. Respondent No.1 was declared as
the elected candidate, having secured the highest number of valid
votes. Appellant finished second while the remaining 6 ( six)
candidates lost their deposits;
g. Appellant then challenged the election of respondent No.1 by
way of an election petition dated 25 th June, 2014, under Section
81 read with Sections 83, 100(1)(a) and (d)(i) of the Act befor e
the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. He also sought a
declaration that he was the duly elected member of the Sta te
Legislative Assembly of the 284-Punganur Assembly constituency;
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
h. Respondent No.1 then took out two applications in the said
petition viz. E.A. No. 329 of 2015 under Order VI Rule 16 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “ CPC ”) for striking out
the averments made in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the electi on
petition as being frivolous and vexatious, followed by E.A. No.
330 of 2015 under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking to dismiss
the election petition for failing to disclose a cause of action;
i.Appellant also took out miscellaneous applications for permission
to file rejoinder affidavit, expediting the election petition and for
taking note of suppression of material facts by respondent No.1;
j. The High Court vide its judgment dated 2 nd August, 2016,
(“ impugned judgment ”) allowed both the applications of
respondent No.1, eventually dismissing the election petition for
want of cause of action. The High Court broadly considered three
points. First, the sweep of the terms “material facts” and “cause
of action” in reference to an election petition; second, whet her
material facts and cause of action have been pleaded in the subject
election petition necessitating a trial; and, third, whether the election
petition as filed deserved to be rejected in limine without
conducting a trial. While dealing with the first point, the High
Court first discussed about the inter-play between Secti ons 81,
83, 100 and 101 of the 1951 Act. It held that the mandate of these
provisions is that the election petition must contain a conci se
statement of material facts on which the appellant relies and that
for the election petition to succeed, the appellant should establish
that the nomination of the returned candidate was improperly
accepted and further, due to such improper acceptance, the election
of the returned candidate has been materially affected. The High
Court relied upon the cases of Azhar Hussain vs. Rajiv Gandhi ,1
Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggarwal ,2 Pendyala Venkata Krishna
Rao Vs. Pothula Rama Rao ,3 Hari Shanker jain Vs. Sonia
Gandhi ,4 and Nandiesha Reddy Vs. Kavitha Mahesh 5 and
culled out the principles as follows:-
1 1986 (1) (Supp) SCC 315
2 (2009) 10 SCC 541
3 2005 (3) ALD 47
4 (2001) 8 SCC 233
5 (2011) 7 SCC 721
173
“15) So, on a compendious study of above precedenti al
jurisprudence we will understand:
(i) The phrase material facts employed in Section 8 3(1)(a)
of R.P.Act has not been defined and its meaning is a contextual
one in a given election petition.
(ii) Material facts or facta probanda are those basic,
elementary and prime facts which the election petitioner shall plead
and if traversed prove for the Court to afford a decree.
(iii) Whereas material particulars or facta probant ia are the
particulars in the form of evidence further vivify, refine and make
more clear the material facts.
(iv) Material facts are the entire bundle of fact s which
constitute a complete cause of action for the petitioner and total
defence for the respondent.”
Having said this, the Court then analysed the averments in the election
petition in the following words:-
“16) POINT No.2: I have carefully scrutinized the contents of
the election petition to know whether the 1 st respondent/election
petitioner had pleaded all the relevant material facts an d they
constitute cause of action to proceed with trial. It is observed that
in his pleadings he has reproduced the five objections taken b y
him before the 8 th respondent/Returning Officer at the time of
scrutiny of nomination and reiterated that the Returning Officer
has rejected his objections contrary to the Conduct of the Election
Rules and guiding principles. He has given the table showing the
votes polled to each contesting candidate and pleaded that he
stood second highest in the tally. As rightly contended by the
petitioner except fulminating that the Returning Officer has
unduly rejected his objections, the 1 st respondent has not
furnished the material facts in his pleadings as to how in
his perception and in the eye of law, the order of the
Returning Officer is impugnable. A mere scourging of t he
order of the Returning Officer howsoever fiercely, it mu st
be said, will not constitute material facts and give ri se to
cause of action unless the pleadings are balanced with the
factual and legal reasons projecting where and how the
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
impugned order suffered perversity and illegality. I n the
instant case, in my considered view, unfortunately the
pleadings are totally bereft of such material facts . On
completion of reading of pleadings one fails to underst and
how the order of the Returning Officer was at fault.
a) Paras-2, 9 to 11 are specifically attacked by the pet itioner on
the ground that pleadings in those paras are not supported by any
material facts and hence they are liable to be struck out. In para-
2 the 1 st respondent narrated the five objections taken by him. In
para-9 he expressed his grievance that 8 th respondent has not
considered his objection and his order is contrary to the judgment
of the Apex Court in Resurgence Indias case (10 supra). He further
mentioned in that para that as per the aforesaid judgment, filing of
an affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory.
In para-10 he pleaded that in the light of the Apex Courts judgment
8th respondent ought to have rejected the improper nomination of
the instant petitioner. He also pleaded that instant p etitioner
misrepresented the Election Commission as well as 8 th respondent
as he has not added Rs.21 lakhs to the gross total of his assets
and showed the gross total of his assets and showed the gross
total as Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. Whereas in
para-11 under the caption Grounds 1 st respondent reiterated that
8th respondent has made improper acceptance of nomination. The
cumulative effect of paras-2, 9 to 11 is nothing but again
lampooning the order of 8 th respondent as erroneous without
demonstrating as to how his order was factually and legally
perverse and wrong. Even the mentioning of the judgment
in Resurgence Indias case (10 supra) and the allega tion
that the petitioner suppressed Rs.21 lakhs from the total
assets, we will presently see, will not constitute any material
facts so as to strengthen the allegations in paras- 2, 9 to
11. ”
(emphasis supplied)
4. Relying on the decision in Pothula Rama Rao Vs. Pendyala
Venkata Krishna Rao and Ors. ,6 the High Court concluded that the
pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 were frivolous and vexatious and
6 (2007) 11 SCC 1
175
not containing any material facts and cause of action, for whi ch the
same were liable to be struck off. The High Court then proce eded to
examine the third point with an opening remark that the election petition
filed by the appellant was woefully silent about th e material facts
constituting cause of action. It then proceeded to consider the argument
of the appellant as to how the order of the Returning Officer was factually
and legally incorrect. It first considered objection Nos.1 and 3 taken by
the appellant that respondent No.1 had not signed at the bottom of each
and every page of the affidavit in Form No.26, which was violative of
Rule 35 of Civil Rule of Practice and that mere signing the last page of
affidavit was not enough. After adverting to Rule 35 of Civil Rule of
Practice, the High Court concluded that the said Rule was inapplicable
to the Form of affidavit filed before the statutory authority such as the
Returning Officer. It then referred to the Hand-book for the Returning
Officer-2014 issued by the Election Commission of India prescr ibing
form of affidavit to be submitted by the contesting c andidates. As per
the said instructions, the candidate is required to sign on the last page of
the affidavit. On this finding, the objection of the appellant was negatived.
While dealing with the objection No.2(a) taken by the appellant that in
Serial No.2 of Item No.4 in one of respondent No.1’s affidavits, t he
space under the heading of Total Income shown in IT returns relating to
wife of petitioner was left blank. Further, the candidate is not entitled to
file two affidavits in Form 26 in terms of Notification No.3/4/2012/SDR
dated 24 th August, 2012, issued by the Election Commission of India.
Furthermore, respondent No.1 did not disclose the crucial information
relating to criminal background if any, assets, liabilities and educational
qualifications etc., which rendered the nomination form invalid as per
Kisan Shankar Kathore Vs. Arun Dattatray 7. The High Court rejected
even this objection. While dealing with the instructions issued by the
Election Commission of India, the High Court opined that the candidates
were required to declare the information about the criminal background
if any, assets, liabilities, educational qualification etc. The amended Form
26 was a comprehensive form to include all the information that was
sought in the two separate affidavits. The revised form of Form 26 was
notified in the official gazette on 1 st August, 2012, whereafter, the Election
Commission of India made it clear by its Notification dated 24 th August,
2012, that the candidate shall file only one affidavit in the revised Form
7 (2014) 14 SCC 162
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
26. At the same time, the High Court held that the Notification did not
put any embargo on the candidate to file multiple nominatio n papers
contrary to Section 33(6) of the 1951 Act. On this basis, the decision in
Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra) was distinguished. While dealing with
objection Nos.2(b) and 4 raised by the appellant, that in Item No.6 the
respondent No.1 did not strike-out the inapplicable words in the Form
and thus suppressed crucial facts relating to his involvement in offence,
if any, the High Court noted that mere failure to strike out the inapplicable
words would not lead to an inference that there was suppression of any
material facts. For, the respondent No.1 had placed on record the same
facts against columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) being not appl icable. The
High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in t he case of
Krishnamoorthy Vs. Siva Kumar and others 8. In examining objection
No.2(c) regarding Item No.8(III) of Part-B of the affidavit unde r the
heading ‘Approximate Current Market Price’, which was left blank by
respondent No.1, the High Court accepted the plea of respondent No.1
that the said information was disclosed against the columns (a) and (b).
It held that the candidate is required to give the same particulars against
columns (a) and (b) and not against the heading. The decision of this
Court in the case of Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of
India 9was thus distinguished. While dealing with the fifth objection
regarding the proxy of the respondent No.1, namely, P. Dwarakanath
Reddy, regarding failure to put his signature on each and every page of
affidavit and Form 26 and later withdrawal of his nomination, the High
Court found that respondent No.1 has nothing to do with the nomination
of P. Dwarakanath Reddy. In other words, the High Court examined
each objection raised by the appellant before the Returning Officer and
reiterated in the election petition on its own merit to conclude as follows:-
“23) Thus, none of the objections raised by the 1 st respondent
before the 8 th respondent and repeated in his election petition merit
consideration. Apart from the above, the 1 st respondent in para-
10 of the election petition has taken a new ground to the effect
that the petitioner has concealed Rs.21 lakhs worth of movabl e
assets of his wife and showed his gross total value as
Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It must be held that
this objection also does not hold water. In Item No.VII the petitioner
8 (2015) 3 SCC 467
9 (2014) 14 SCC 189
177
has shown item wise moveable assets of his wife-G. Swarnalatha
and showed their gross total value as Rs.2,79,67,680/-. However,
the total value comes to Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It is only a mistake in
totaling the items of moveable properties. Since ther e is no
concealment of any item, the clerical error in totaling cannot be
taken as a felony.
24) Thus, on a conspectus, the election petition is liable t o
be dismissed in limine without necessity of conductin g trial
for two reasons – firstly, the petition is bereft of mat erial
facts and cause of action and secondly, the objections raised
before the 8 th respondent and repeated in the election
petition do not merit consideration, which can be and in
fact, have been, decided without necessity of conduc ting
trial. It is true that in Ashraf Kokkurs case (5 supra) cited by the
1st respondent the Apex Court held that when the facts disclose
material facts and cause of action though not complete cause of
action, the election petition need not be dismissed at the threshold.
However, in the instant case, as already observed s upra,
the election petition totally lacks material facts except
repetition of the objections raised before the 8 th respondent.
Therefore, election petition merits dismissal.
a) As already stated supra, the 1 st respondent has raised some
new objections with regard to alleged suppression of assets of the
petitioner and his wife in his counter for the first time b ut not
pressed the said objection. Hence, the said objection is not taken
into consideration. So, at the outset, the two petitions filed by the
petitioner deserve to be allowed and consequently the election
petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
This point is answered accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
On this basis, the High Court allowed EA No. 329 of 2015 filed b y
respondent No.1 for striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to
11 of the election petition being frivolous and vexatious and not containing
material facts and cause of action therein. The High Court also allowed
the second application filed by respondent No.1 being EA No.330 of
2015 and rejected the Election Petition No.8 of 2014 in limine .
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
5. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior
counsel appearing for the contesting respondent.
6. The principal contention of the appellant is that whilst dismissing
his election petition, the High Court has overlooked the cause of action
stated in the election petition, which arose from the fact that two different
sets of nomination forms and affidavits were filed by respondent No.1
containing several material deficiencies and discrepancies and which
was fatal. In other words, the nomination form of respondent No.1 was
wrongly accepted and it materially affected the election res ults of the
appellant. According to the appellant, the affidavits filed by respondent
No.1 in support of his nomination forms admittedly contained blank
columns and did not contain his signature on every page, which was not
only in contravention of several judgments of this Court, but also violated
Section 125A(i) of the Act and additionally, was also agains t several
circulars issued by the Election Commission. Respondent No.1 also filed
two affidavits along with each one of his nomination forms, in di rect
contravention of the mandate in the instructions issued by the Election
Commission permitting for only one affidavit to be filed. Further, perusal
of the said affidavits would reveal that respondent No.1 had suppressed
crucial information relating to movable and immovable assets owned by
him and his family members and in fact, filed a conflicting affidavit before
the Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly. In light of respondent
No.1’s suppression of significant information, the matter in issue required
a full-fledged trial and the High Court committed manife st error in
dismissing the election petition in limine . The High Court also erred in
striking off paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition on the ground
that the averments contained therein were vexatious and frivolous, without
giving any legal justification for the same. The High Court also took into
account pleadings made in the counter/reply submitted by res pondent
No.1 as opposed to only considering the averments made in the election
petition. Further, respondent No.1 had failed to specifically de ny the
allegations/averments in the election petition.
7. Mr. Siddharth Luthra relies upon the judgments of this Court in
Resurgence India (supra) , Krishna Murthy (supra) , Duni Chand Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors .10 , Kuldeep Singh Pathania Vs.
10 (2014) 16 SCC 152
179
Bikram Singh Jaryal 11 , D. Ramachandran Vs. RV Jankiraman &
Ors. 12 , Asharaf Kokkur Vs. KV Abdul Khader & Ors. 13 , Virender
Nath Gautam Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors. 14 , Kishan Shankar Kathore
(supra) , Harkirat Singh Vs. Amrinder Singh 15 , Mohd. Akbar Vs.
Ashok Sahu & Ors. 16 , RK Roja Vs. US Rayudu & Anr. 17 ,
Mairembam Prithviraj Vs. Pukhrem Sharathchandra Singh 18 and
Shri Balwant Singh Vs. Sri Laxmi Narain 19 .
8. Per contra , Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent no.1, submits that the findings of the Returning
Officer, as regards the objections taken by the appellant to respondent
No.1’s nomination form, were just and proper. He submits that e very
election petition is not required to go for trial, merely for performing a
formal exercise. The present case was purely based on docume nts on
record and there was no requirement of leading evidence in that regard.
Even before the High Court, only technical pleas were argued, none of
which were borne out by the record. As per Section 36(4) of t he Act,
respondent No.1’s nomination paper could be rejected merely on technical
pleas. Since it is well settled that an election petiti on was a statutory
proceeding and not an action at law or a suit in equity, the determination
of such petition had to be in consonance with Section 36(4) of the Act.
Further, the sine qua non for declaring an election void under Section
100(1)(d) of the Act was to plead and also establish that improper
acceptance of nomination had materially affected the re sults of the
election, which, in the present case, appellant had failed to assert. No
such pleading of material fact had been made by appellant. Similarly, the
election petition, as filed, failed to disclose even the material particulars
of facts to establish a cause of action warranting a trial. Finally, appellant
had introduced fresh allegations into his petition, including suppression
of assets and fraud, by way of counter affidavits to the application filed
by respondent No.1. This clearly went against the established law that
new facts could not be introduced in an election petition beyond a period
11 (2017) 5 SCC 345
12 (1999) 3 SCC 267
13 (2015) 1 SCC 129
14 (2007) 3 SCC 617
15 (2005) 13 SCC 511
16 (2015) 14 SCC 519
17 (2016) 14 SCC 725
18 (2017) 2 SCC 487
19 AIR 1960 SC 770
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of 45 days after declaration of the result of the impugned election. For,
the election petition had been filed in June 2014, whereas t he counter
affidavits were filed around a year later i.e. June 2015 and, therefore,
the averments contained therein could not be taken into consideration.
9. Mr. Ramachandran relied upon the following judgme nts:
Pothula Rama Rao (supra), Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. Vs. George
Fernandez & Ors. 20 , L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. Vs. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 21 , Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh
Aggarwal 22 , Mangani Lal Mandal Vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari 23 ,
Shambhu Prasad Sharma Vs. Charandas Mahant & Ors. 24 ,
Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra 25 , K.
Venkateswara Rao & Anr. Vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi & Ors. 26 ,
Harmohinder Singh Pradhan Vs. Ranjeet Singh Talwandi & Or s.
27 , Hari Shanker Jain Vs. Sonia Gandhi 28 and Tek Chank Vs. Dile
Ram 29 .
10. The central issue in these appeals is: whether the contents of
the subject election petition disclose cause of action warranting a trial?
The High Court by a composite judgment allowed the two applications
filed by respondent No.1 (returned candidate) praying for striking out
paragraphs 2 & 9 to11 of the election petition, being fri volous and
vexatious and not containing any material facts and not disclosing any
cause of action; and the second application for rejecting the election
petition in limine for non-disclosure of cause of action.
11. Ordinarily, an application for rejection of election petition in
limine , purportedly under Order VII Rule 11 for non-disclosure of cause
of action, ought to proceed at the threshold. For, it has to be considered
only on the basis of institutional defects in the election petition in reference
to the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. I ndeed, non-
disclosure of cause of action is covered by clause (a) therein. Concededly,
20 1969 (3) SCC 238
21 (1999) 1 SCC 666
22 (2009) 10 SCC 541
23 (2012) 3 SCC 314
24 (2012) 11 SCC 390
25 (1974) 2 SCC 133
26 (1969) 1 SCR 679; AIR 1969 SC 872
27 (2005) 5 SCC 46
28 (2001) 8 SCC 233
29 (2001) 3 SCC 290
181
Order VII of the CPC generally deals with the institution of a plaint. It
delineates the requirements regarding the particulars to be contained in
the plaint, relief to be specifically stated, for relief to be founded on
separate grounds, procedure on admitting plaint, and includes return of
plaint. The rejection of plaint follows the procedure on admitting plaint
or even before admitting the same, if the court on presentati on of the
plaint is of the view that the same does not fulfill the sta tutory and
institutional requirements referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. The
power bestowed in the court in terms of Rule 11 may also be exercised
by the court on a formal application moved by the defendant after being
served with the summons to appear before the Court. Be that as it may,
the application under Order VII Rule 11 deserves consideration at the
threshold.
12. On the other hand, the application for striking out pleadings in
terms of Order VI Rule 16 may be resorted to by the defendant (s)/
respondent(s) at any stage of the proceedings, as is predica ted in the
said provision. The pleading(s) can be struck off by the Court on grounds
specified in clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 16.
13. Indeed, if the defendant moves two separate applications a t
the same time, as in this case, it would be open to the cou rt in a given
case to consider both the applications together or independent of e ach
other. If the court decides to hear the application under Order VII Rule
11 in the first instance, the court would be obliged to consider the plaint
as filed as a whole. But if the court decides to proceed with the application
under Order VI Rule 16 for striking out the pleadings before consideration
of the application under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, on
allowing the former application after striking out the relevant pleadings
then the court must consider the remainder pleadings of the pl aint in
reference to the postulates of Order VII Rule 11, for determining whether
the plaint (after striking out pleadings) deserves to be rejected in limine .
14. In the present case, the High Court has presumably ado pted
the latter course. It first proceeded to examine the application for striking
out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition being
frivolous and vexatious and also because the same did not disclose any
cause of action. And having accepted that prayer, it proceeded to reject
the election petition on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
action. However, we find that the High Court has muddled the analysis
of the pleadings. It merely focused on the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9
to 11 of the election petition. It is one thing to strike o ut the stated
pleadings being frivolous and vexatious but then it does not follow that
the rest of the pleadings which would still remain, were not sufficient to
proceed with the trial or disclose any cause of action, wh atsoever, for
rejecting the plaint as a whole in limine or to hold that it did not warrant
a trial. No such finding can be discerned from the judgment under appeal.
Be that as it may, the High Court committed manifest error in striking
out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition, being
frivolous and vexatious by considering the factual matrix noted therein
as untenable on merit. For striking out the pleadings or for that matter,
rejecting the plaint (election petition), the High Court is not expected to
decide the merits of the controversy referred to in the election petition.
We shall elaborate on this aspect a little later.
15. Reverting to the contents of the election petition in paragraph
1, it is asserted that the election petition was to challenge the declaration
of election of respondent No.1 to the 284-Punganur Assembly
Constituency of Andhra Pradesh. The election petitioner has then given
the other factual details relating to the election process, which concluded
with the declaration of results on 16 th May, 2014. In paragraph 2, the
election petitioner (appellant herein) has asserted that he was challenging
the election on the ground of improper acceptance of nomination of
respondent No.1 by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8). It is pointed
out that the Returning Officer entertained two sets of nominations of
respondent No.1, despite the written objections taken by the appellant.
The nature of five objections taken by the appellant before the Returning
Officer have been mentioned, including the violation of Rule 35 of Civil
Rules of Practice and also Rule 4A of Election Rule, 1961 and non-
signing of each and every page at the bottom of the nominat ion form.
The five objections taken before the Returning Offic er have been
reproduced as follows:
“Objection No.1: The 1 st Respondent who filed nominations
has failed to sign on bottom of each and every page of the
affidavits in Form-26 as contemplated under Civil Rules of
Practice and also deliberately violated the conduct of Election
Rules.
183
Objection No.2: The 1 st respondent as a candidate failed to fill
up the affidavit at
a. The Column No.4 and Column No.2 under the head of total
Income shown in Income Tax returns.
b. The two sets of affidavits at Column No.6 have not properly
strike off which ever not applicable.
c. The Respondent No.1 in his two sets of affidavits kept blank
at Column No.8 (B) (III), where the words stand of
“Approximate Current market Price of …” at Part-B of (11)
abstract of the details given in (1) to (10) of Part-A . This is
mandatory as per the Conduct of Election Rules and also the
recent Apex Court judgment, circulated under Instruction No.18
to the Returning Officer.
Objection No.3: The Respondent No.1 has not singed on each
and every page in the affidavit of Form-26 as contemplated
under Civil Rules of Practice and also contemplated under Hand
Book of Returning Officers-2014 under Chapter 5.20.1.
Objection No.4: The Respondent No.1 in his affidavit at Column
No.6 has not properly struck off “which ever not applicable.
Objection No.5: The proxy of the 1 st respondent namely P.
Dwarakanath Reddy did not file his affidavit properly and also
not put his signatures and date on each and every page of
Form-26. Later he has withdrawn his nomination.”
16. In paragraph 3 of the election petition, it has been a sserted
that the appellant had raised objections before the Returning Officer on
21 st April, 2014. Further, respondent No.1 had given authorization to one
Shri V. Sreerami Reddy to answer the objections, who then filed a reply
to the objections taken by the appellant by merely denying and asserting
that the same were purely technical grounds and, therefore, to reject the
same. In paragraph 4 of the election petition, reference is made to the
proceedings before the Returning Officer as to how the objections were
rejected by him. It is then asserted that the rejection was for the reasons
best known to the Returning Officer and contrary to the mandatory
Conduct of Election Rules and governing provisions and instructions given
to the Returning Officer by way of Compendium Instructions, Volume-2
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
supplied to the Returning Officer(s) in light of the Supreme Court judgment
regarding the affidavits and blank columns. It is then stated t hat the
Returning Officer had also circulated “do’s and dont’s” along with the
check-list to every candidate contesting the election which clearly stated
that the candidates must strictly follow the procedure stipulated under
the Election Rules. The said instructions were supplied to the candidates
along with the set of nomination papers highlighting the decision of this
Court in Resurgence India (supra), regarding the consequence of keeping
the relevant columns in the nomination Form-26, blank. In paragraph 5
of the election petition, it is stated that the appellant ha d applied for a
certificate of its objection, authorization given to the th ird party and
counter, respectively. In paragraph 6, it is asserted that the appellant
secured second highest votes and respondent No.1 was declared elected
candidate. The tally of votes secured by the 8 candidates who contested
the election has been given in this paragraph. In paragraph 7, it is pointed
out that the Government of India issued a notification in its extraordinary
Gazette published on 1 st August, 2012 and amended Form-26 under Rule
4A of the Conduct of Election (Amendment) Rules, 2012. In the footnote
of the Gazette Notification, Note-1 to Note-4 have been given which
are relevant instructions for accepting a valid Form-26 give n to the
Returning Officer. Those notes have been reproduced as follows:
“Note: 1: Affidavit should be filed latest by 3.00 PM on the last
day of filing nomination.
Note: 2: Affidavit should be sworn before on Oath Commissioner
or Magistrate of the First Class or before a Notary Public.
Note: 3: All column should be filled up and no column to be left
blank. If there is no information to furnish in respect of any item,
either ‘Nil’ or ‘Not applicable’ as the case may be, sh ould be
mentioned.
Note: 4: The Affidavit should be either typed or written le gibly
and neatly.”
17. In paragraph 8 of the election petition, it is asserted that after
the aforementioned Government Notification, the Election Commission
of India issued proceedings bearing No.3/4/2012/SDR dated 24.8.2012,
Annexure-X directing all the State Election Commissions, political parties
185
and other organizations to follow the single affidavit strictly in accordance
with Form-26.
18. In paragraph 9 of the election petition, the appellant has asserted
that the objections taken by the appellant were not consid ered by the
Returning Officer, for which reason the decision of the Returning Officer
was contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of Resurgence
India (supra). Paragraph 27 of the said judgment has been highlighted
by the appellant. It is then asserted that the contents of p aragraph 27
were circulated along with the nomination papers by the Returning Officer
to every candidate. Thus, respondent No.1 was aware about the same.
Further, respondent No.1 did not sign each page of Form-26 in both the
sets of nomination papers filed before the Returning Office r. The two
sets of nomination papers were attested by the same Notary on the last
page of both the sets of nomination papers filed by respondent No.1, and
so the omission of signature and blank columns are “not in the nature of
technical mistakes at all”. This assertion is followed by the averments in
paragraph 10 that the Returning Officer ought to have reject ed the
nomination form of respondent No.1 at the threshold in light of the decision
of this Court. This is to assert that it was improper no mination of
respondent No.1, wrongly accepted by the Returning Officer as
contemplated under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the 1951 Act. It is then
stated that the Returning Officer was fully aware about the requirements
as per the decision of this Court, including the election material such as
Handbook for Returning Officer-2014, General Electi ons-2014,
Compendium Instructions, Volume-2 and Form-26 circulated by him. It
is then asserted that in spite of that the Returning Officer accepted the
nomination of respondent No.1, which enabled the respondent No.1 to
contest the election and eventually get elected. The declaration of election
of respondent No.1 by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8) was
thus a clear abuse of the process of law in light of the d ecision of this
Court. It is also asserted that respondent No.1 misr epresented the
Election Commission as well as the Returning Officer (respondent No.8)
by giving false information in a casual manner, at paragraph 7A regarding
the details of Immovable Assets in the two sets of affidavits in Form-26,
by showing the gross total value of Rs.2,79,67,680/ - instead of
Rs.3,00,67,680/- and deliberately did not count the column amount at
7(vii) of Rs.21,00,000/-.
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
19. In paragraph 11 of the election petition, it is stat ed that the
nomination forms (Form-26) filed by the appellant and respondent No.1
in two sets, may be treated as forming part of the election petition along
with the grounds of the election petition. Indeed, the opening par t of
paragraph 11 is not happily worded but it certainly conveys tha t the
nomination form of the respective candidates be treated as forming part
of the election petition and by reference thereto, the same would become
an integral part of the election petition. The grounds have been articulated
in paragraph 11 which reads thus:
“GROUNDS
a). Whether the 8 th Respondent has ignored the Constitutional
Spirit of Representation of the People Act (Act 43 of 1950) and
Act 43 of 1951 with allied Acts, Rules, Orders, Model Code of
Conduct for Guidance of Candidates supplied by the Election
Commission for the Election 284, Punganur Assembly
Constituency failing to conduct a fair scrutiny in accordance with
the law while conducting a fair scrutiny of the nomination of the
Respondent No.1 Form-26 in accordance with law?
b). Whether the 8 th Respondent acceptance of the improper
nomination of Forum-26 application as contemplated despite the
fatal omission of blank column under Section 100 (1) (d) (i) of
Representation of the People Act, 1951 of the two sets of affidavits
of the Respondent No.1 kept in blank at Column No.8 (B) (III),
where the words stand of “Approximate Current market Price of
…” at Part-B of (11) abstract of the details given in (1) to (10) of
Part-A?
c). Whether the Respondent No.1 election to 284, Pungan ur
Assembly Constituency can be set aside on the grounds that the
Respondent No.8/Returning Officer has accepted the imprope r
nomination Form vide Form-26 with omissions of not signing on
each and every page of the affidavit and not keep intact of filling
of the blanks contrary to the spirit of the Apex Court judgm ent
rendered in Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of India
& Anr., held in Writ Petition (Civil) No.121 of 2008 dt. 13.09.2013?
d). Whether the Respondent No.1 Affidavit with blank particulars
will render the affidavit nugatory and hit by Section 125 A(i) of
187
Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 directly and has to set aside
the election?”
20. On the basis of these pleadings, the appellant has prayed for
the following reliefs in the election petition:
“17. Under these circumstances it is prayed that this Hon’bl e
Court may be pleased to:
a) declare the election of Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy
(Respondent No.1) to the 284 Punganur Assembly Constituency
to be null and void and set-aside the same:
b) Further declare that the Petitioner has been duly elect ed as
Member of State Legislative Assembly of the 284 Pungan ur
Assembly Constituency under Section 84 of the Representation
of the People Act 1951.
c) Award the costs of the petition
d) And pass such other order or orders as it may deem fit and
proper in the circumstances of the case.”
21. It is well settled that the election petition will have to be read
as a whole and cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise to
rule that the same does not disclose a cause of action. Cause of a ction
embodies a bundle of facts which may be necessary for the plaintiffs to
prove in order to get a relief from the Court. The reliefs claimed by the
appellant are founded on grounds inter alia ascribable to Section
100(1)(d)(i). Further relief has been claimed to declare the appellant as
having been elected under Section 101 of the 1951 Act. The cause of
action for filing the election petition, therefore, w as perceptibly in
reference to the material facts depicting that the nomi nation form of
respondent No.1 was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer.
22. On reading the election petition as a whole, we have no
hesitation in taking a view that the High Court misdirected itself in
concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action
with or without paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed,
the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clear containing
all the necessary details and particulars as required by l aw. ‘Material
facts’ would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
grounds stated in the election petition in the context of relief to declare
the election to be void. It is well established that in an election petition,
whether a particular fact is material or not and as suc h required to be
pleaded, is a question which depends on the nature of the grounds relied
upon and the special circumstances of the case. Particular s, on the
other hand, are the details of the case set up by the party. The distinction
between “material facts” and “full particulars” has bee n delineated in
the case of Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba 30 . This judgment has
been adverted to in the reported decision relied by the parties. The Court
noted thus:
“10. We may take up the last facet first. As Chitty, J. ob served,
“There is some difficulty in affixing a precise meaning to” the
expression “discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence”.
He said: “In point of law … every cause of action is a reasonable
one.” (See Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. 31 ) A
reasonable cause of action is said to mean a cause of action with
some chances of success when only the allegations in the pleading
are considered. But so long as the claim discloses some cause
of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a
Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not like ly to
succeed is no ground for striking it out. The implicati ons
of the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the ground
that it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quite
often more known than clearly understood. It does
introduce another special demurrer in a new shape. T he
failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable caus e of
action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The
distinctions among the ideas of the “grounds” in Section 81(1); of
“material facts” in Section 83(1)(a) and of “full particula rs” in
Section 83(1)(b) are obvious. The provisions of Section 83(1)(a)
and (b) are in the familiar pattern of Order VI, Rules 2 and 4 and
Order 7, Rule 1(e) Code of Civil Procedure. There is a distinction
amongst the ‘grounds’ in Section 81(1); the ‘material facts ’ in
Section 83(1)(a) and “full particulars” in Section 83(1)(b).
11. Referring to the importance of pleadings a learned author says:
30 (1994) 2 SCC 392
31 (1887) 36 Ch D 489
189
“Pleadings do not only define the issues between the parties for
the final decision of the court at the trial, they manifest and exert
their importance throughout the whole process of the litiga tion.
… They show on their face whether a reasonable cause of action
or defence is disclosed. They provide a guide for the proper mode
of trial and particularly for the trial of preliminary issues of law or
fact. They demonstrate upon which party the burden of proof
lies, and who has the right to open the case. They act as a measure
for comparing the evidence of a party with the case which he has
pleaded. They determine the range of the admissible evidence
which the parties should be prepared to adduce at the trial. They
delimit the relief which the court can award. …”
[See: Jacob: “The Present Importance of Pleadings” ( 1960)
Current Legal Problems, at pp. 175-76].
12. Further, the distinction between “material facts” and “fu ll
particulars” is one of degree. The lines of distinction are not sharp.
“Material facts” are those which a party relies upon and which, if
he does not prove, he fails at the time.
13. In Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. 32 Scott L.J. said: “The word
‘material’ means necessary for the purpose of formul ating a
complete cause of action; and if any one ‘material’ statement is
omitted, the statement of claim is bad.” The purpose of “material
particulars” is in the context of the need to give the opp onent
sufficient details of the charge set up against him and to give him
a reasonable opportunity.
14. Halsbury refers to the function of particulars thus:
“The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding
principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly
the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises,
and incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variously
stated, namely either to limit the generality of the allegations in
the pleadings, or to define the issues which have to be tried and
for which discovery is required.”
(See: Pleadings Vol. 36, para 38)
32 (1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
15. In Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s “Precedents of Pleadings ”
1975 Edn. at p. 112 it is stated:
“The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding
principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly
the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises
and incidentally to save costs. The object of particulars is to ‘open
up’ the case of the opposite party and to compel him to reveal as
much as possible what is going to be proved at the trial, whereas,
as Cotton L.J. has said, ‘the old system of pleading at common
law was to conceal as much as possible what was going to b e
proved at the trial’.”
16. The distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’ which
together constitute the facts to be proved — or the facta probanda
— on the one hand and the evidence by which those facts are to
be proved — facta probantia — on the other must be kept clearly
distinguished. In Philipps v. Philipps 33 , Brett, L.J. said:
“I will not say that it is easy to express in words wh at are the
facts which must be stated and what matters need not be state d.
… The distinction is taken in the very rule itself, between t he
facts on which the party relies and the evidence to prove tho se
facts. Erle C.J. expressed it in this way. He said that th ere were
facts that might be called the allegata probanda, the facts which
ought to be proved, and they were different from the evidence
which was adduced to prove those facts. And it was upon the
expression of opinion of Erle C.J. that Rule 4 [now Rule 7(1)]
was drawn. The facts which ought to be stated are the mater ial
facts on which the party pleading relies.”
17. Lord Denman, C.J. in Willians v. Wilcox 34 said:
“It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is
relied it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the
subordinate facts which are the means of proving it, or the evidence
sustaining the allegations.”
18. An election petition can be rejected under Order VII
Rule 11(a) CPC if it does not disclose a cause of ac tion.
33 (1878) 4 QBD 127, 133
34 (1838) 8 Ad & EI 331
191
Pleadings could also be struck out under Order VI R ule
16, inter alia, if they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.
The latter two expressions meant cases where the pleadin gs
are obviously frivolous and vexatious or obviously
unsustainable. ”
(emphasis supplied)
23. In the case of Harkirat Singh (supra), this Court once again
reiterated thus:
“46. From the above provisions, it is clear that an election petition
must contain a concise statement of “material facts” on w hich
the petitioner relies. It should also contain “full particulars” of any
corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including a full statement
of names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrup t
practice and the date and place of commission of such practi ce.
Such election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified
in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) for the verifi cation of
pleadings. It should be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed
form in support of allegation of such practice and particul ars
thereof.
47. All material facts, therefore, in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, have to be set out in the election petition. If the material
facts are not stated in a petition, it is liable to be dismissed on that
ground as the case would be covered by clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of Section 83 of the Act read with clause (a) of Rule 11 of
Order 7 of the Code.
48. The expression “material facts” has neither been defined
in the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictio nary
meaning, “material” means “fundamental”, “vital”, “basic”,
“cardinal”, “central”, “crucial”, “decisive”, “esse ntial”,
“pivotal”, “indispensable”, “elementary” or “primar y”.
Burton’s Legal Thesaurus (3rd Edn.), p. 349.] The phrase
“material facts”, therefore, may be said to be those fa cts
upon which a party relies for its claim or defence. In oth er
words, “material facts” are facts upon which the plaintiff’ s
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
cause of action or the defendant’s defence depends. What
particulars could be said to be “material facts” would depend
upon the facts of each case and no rule of universa l
application can be laid down. It is, however, absol utely
essential that all basic and primary facts which mu st be
proved at the trial by the party to establish the existence of
a cause of action or defence are material facts and must b e
stated in the pleading by the party. ”
(emphasis supplied)
Again in paragraphs 51 & 52, this Court observed thus:
“51. A distinction between “material facts” and
“particulars”, however, must not be overlooked.
“Material facts” are primary or basic facts which must
be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support
of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of
action or defence. “Particulars”, on the other hand, are
details in support of material facts pleaded by the party .
They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving
distinctive touch to the basic contours of a pictur e
already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more
informative. “Particulars” thus ensure conduct of fair trial
and would not take the opposite party by surprise.
52. All “material facts” must be pleaded by the party in support
of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to
enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet
with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to
lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence,
will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the
other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of
evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.”
And again in paragraph 72, the Court noted thus:
“72. The Court, however, drew the distinction between “material
facts” and “particulars”. According to the Court, “material
facts” are facts, if established would give the petition er
the relief prayed for. The test is whether the Court could
have given a direct verdict in favour of the electi on
193
petitioner in case the returned candidate had not
appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis o f
the facts pleaded in the petition. ”
(emphasis supplied)
24. In Ashraf Kokkur (supra), this Court adverted to the exposition
in M. Kamalam Vs. V.A. Syed Mohammed , 35 and G.M. Siddeshwar
Vs. Prasanna Kumar 36 and in paragraph 21 noted that the pleadings
must be taken as a whole to ascertain whether the same constitute the
material facts involving triable issues. In paragraph 22, the Court observed
as follows:
“22. After all, the inquiry under Order 7 Rule 11( a) CPC is only
as to whether the facts as pleaded disclose a cause of action and
not complete cause of action. The limited inquiry is only to
see whether the petition should be thrown out at th e
threshold. In an election petition, the requirement under Section
83 of the RP Act is to provide a precise and concise statement of
material facts. The expression “material facts” plainly means
facts pertaining to the subject-matter and which are reli ed
on by the election petitioner. If the party does not prove
those facts, he fails at the trial. ”
(emphasis supplied)
25. The Court then went on to analyse the decision of a three-
Judge Bench in the case of V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. P.J. Francis 37 ,
wherein it has been observed that an election petition was not liable to
be dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of corrupt practice
alleged were not set out. Further, material facts are such primary facts
which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a
cause of action. It has also observed that so long as the claim discloses
some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be deci ded by a
Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no
ground for striking it out. Further, the implications of the liability of the
pleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable
cause of action are generally more known than clearly understood and
that the failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of action
35 (1978) 2 SCC 659
36 (2013) 4 SCC 776
37 (1999) 3 SCC 737
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
is distinct from the absence of full particulars. This decision also adverts
to the case of Ponnala Lakshmaiah Vs. Kommuri Pratap Reddy ,38
wherein the Court observed that the Courts need to be cautious in dealing
with request for dismissal of the petition at the threshold and exercise
their power of dismissal only in cases where on a plain read ing of the
petition no cause of action is disclosed.
26. The counsel for the contesting respondent has relied on the
decisions in Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Pothula Rama Rao
(supra), particularly paragraphs 8-10, 11 and 16 of the reported decision.
In that case, on facts, the Court found that necessary mater ial facts in
relation to the ground of improper acceptance of nomination form were
not pleaded by the election petitioner. In the present case, we have held
that there is discernible pleading as to what objections were taken before
the Returning Officer and as to why he was in error in not rejecting the
nomination of respondent No.1.
27. The counsel for the contesting respondent also relied on the
decision in Samant N. Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez 39 .No doubt
this decision predicates that election petition is a statutory proceedings
and not an action at law or suit in equity. There can be no debate with
regard to this proposition. At the same time, we cannot be oblivious
about the scope of the enquiry permissible at this stage by the election
court/tribunal while considering the application under Order V II Rule
11(a) of C.P.C.
28. In Kuldeep Singh Pathania (supra), the decision of the High
Court which is similar to one under consideration (namely the impugned
judgment) had accepted the explanation offered by the respondents and
meticulously dealt with it to conclude that the petition did not disclose
any cause of action since it lacked material facts. The High Court passed
that order purportedly in exercise of power under Order XI V Rule 2.
This Court pointed out the distinction between an order under Order VII
Rule 11 to reject the election petition in limine for non disclosure of
cause of action and an order under Order XIV Rule 2 for disposal of the
petition on a preliminary issue. In that case, the order p assed by the
High Court was relatable only to Order VII Rule 11. This Court adverted
to the decisions in Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Owners and Parties
38 (2012) 7 SCC 788
39 (1969) 3 SCC 238
195
Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors. 40 and Virendra Nath Gautam
Vs. Satpal Singh and Ors. ,41 and explicated that under Order VII
Rule 11(a), only the pleadings of the plaintiff-petitioner can be looked at
as a threshold issue. Whereas, entire pleadings of both sides can be
looked into for considering the preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule
2. Neither the written statement nor the averments or cas e pleaded by
the opposite party can be taken into account for answering the threshold
issue for rejection of election petition in terms of Order VII Rule 11 (a)
of the Act.
29. Whether the material facts as asserted by the appell ant can
stand the test of trial and whether the appellant would be able to bring
home the grounds for declaring the election of respondent No.1 to be
void, is not a matter to be debated at this stage. Suffice it to observe that
the averments in the concerned paragraphs of the election p etition, by
no standard can be said to be frivolous and vexatious as such. The High
Court committed manifest error in entering into the tenability of the facts
and grounds urged in support thereof by the appellant on me rit, as is
evident from the cogitation in paragraphs 16 to 22 of the impugned
judgment.
30. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this point . The
High Court has opined that the contents of paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the
election petition did not furnish “any” material facts but were only in the
nature of fulminating and lampooning order of the Returning Officer for
having unduly rejected the objections taken by the appellant whilst
accepting the nomination form submitted by respondent No.1. The High
Court broadly referred to the contents of the concerned paragra phs of
the election petition, but the analysis of the High Court in that behalf is
not correct. We have elaborately adverted to the contents of paragraphs
2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. We find force in the argument of the
appellant that the said paragraphs plainly disclose the facts, which are
material facts for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election of
respondent No.1 as being void, because of improper acceptance of his
nomination form by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8): To wit;
(i) The Returning Officer has improperly accepted the nomination
paper of the respondent No.1 despite the categorical objections
40 (2006) 3 SCC 100
41 (2007) 3 SCC 617
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
raised, being contrary to Rule 35 of Civil Rules of Practice,
Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and also
contrary to the judgment of this Court in Resurgence India
(supra).
(ii) Respondent No.1 failed to sign each and every page of t he
affidavit (Form No.26), which is in violation of Civil Rules of
Practice, Conduct of the Election Rules and Hand Book of
Returning Officer-2014 under Chapter 5.20.1.
(iii) Respondent No.1 failed to fill up the Column No.4 and Column
No.2 under the head of Total Income shown in Income Tax
Returns, of the said affidavit (Form No.26).
(iv) The Column No.6 of said two sets of affidavit has not been
properly struck off, whichever is not applicable.
(v) Column No.8(B)(III), where the words stand for “Approximate
Current Market Price of…” at Part-B of 11 abstracts of the
details given in (1) to (10) of Part A of the said affidav its,
which is mandatory as per Election Rules, judgments of this
Court and Circular and Instructions issued by the Returning
Officer.
(vi) Omission and blank Columns left in the said affidavits are not
at all a technical mistake. The respondent No.1 was very
much aware of the said rules and the law.
(vii) The Returning Officer did not follow the stated Rules a nd
law, and has favoured the respondent No.1 by accepting the
improper nomination/affidavit filed by him, enabling him to
contest the election, which is abuse of the processes of law
in light of the judgment of this Court (Resurgence India).
(viii)The Returning Officer (R-8) ought to have rejected t he
improper nomination of the respondent no.1 on 21.04.2014
itself at the threshold as contemplated under Secti on
100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of People Act.
(ix) The respondent No.1 misrepresented the Election Commission
as well as the Returning Officer (R-8) in a casual manner by
giving false information at Para 7A of details of Immovable
197
Assets in his two set of affidavits under Form-26 by showing
the gross total value of Rs.2,79,67,680 instead of 3,00,67,680
and deliberately did not count the Column amount at 7(vii) of
Rs.21,00,000/-.
(x) Form No.26 of two sets of nomination paper of Respondent
No.1 be read as Annexure-XIII for prosecution of the election
petition along with the grounds mentioned in the petition. In
the grounds at para 11 of the election petition, the appellant
has re-agitated these contentions.
31. Indubitably, the requirement of putting one’s signature on each
and every page on the affidavit has been restated i n the case of
Resurgence India (supra). It is held that when a candidate files an
affidavit with blank particulars it renders the affida vit itself nugatory.
Inasmuch as, the purpose of filing affidavit (form No.26) al ong with
nomination papers is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizens
under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India, who are entitled to
have the necessary information of the candidate at the time of his filing
of the nomination papers in order to make a choice of thei r voting. In
Paragraphs 25 and 26 of this judgment, the Court clarifi ed that the
observations made in paragraph 73 of the judgment in People’s Union
for Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India ,42 will not come in the way of
the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper if the said affidavit
is filed with blank columns. It further observed that the candidate must
take the minimum effort to explicitly remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable”
or “Not Known” in the columns and not to leave the particulars blank, if
he desires that his nomination paper be accepted by the Returning Officer
during the scrutiny of nomination in exercise of powers under Section 36
(6) of the 1951 Act being invalid nomination found and hit by Section
125-A (i) of the 1951 Act. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the Court
observed thus:
“27. If we accept the contention raised by the Union of India viz.
the candidate who has filed an affidavit with false information as
well as the candidate who has filed an affidavit with particula rs
left blank should be treated on a par, it will result in breach of
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of the
Constitution viz. “right to know”, which is inclusive of freedom of
42 (2003) 4 SCC 399
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
speech and expression as interpreted in Assn. for Democratic
Reforms .”
The conclusions and directions articulated in paragraph 29 of the decision,
read thus:
“29. What emerges from the above discussion can be
summarized in the form of the following directions:
29.1. The voter has the elementary right to know full particulars
of a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament/Assemblies
and such right to get information is universally recognized. Thus,
it is held that right to know about the candidate is a natural right
flowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
29.2. The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with t he
nomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the
citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The
citizens are supposed to have the necessary information at the
time of filing of nomination paper and for that purpos e, the
Returning Officer can very well compel a candidate to furnish
the relevant information.
29.3. Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render the
affidavit nugatory .
29.4. It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whether
the information required is fully furnished at the time of
filing of affidavit with the nomination paper since such
information is very vital for giving effect to the “rig ht to
know” of the citizens. If a candidate fails to fill the bl anks
even after the reminder by the Returning Officer, t he
nomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do comprehend
that the power of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination
paper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not be
laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced.
29.5. We clarify to the extent that para 73 of People’s Union
for Civil Liberties case will not come in the way of the
Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper when th e
affidavit is filed with blank particulars .
199
29.6. The candidate must take the minimum effort to
explicitly remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable” or “Not
known” in the columns and not to leave the particula rs
blank.
29.7. Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit by
Section 125-A(i) of the RP Act. However, as the nomination
paper itself is rejected by the Returning Officer, we find no
reason why the candidate must be again penalized for the
same act by prosecuting him/her .”
(emphasis supplied)
32. The purport of assertions made in the election petition was to
highlight this aspect in support of the ground for declaring the election of
respondent No.1 as being void on account of improper acceptance of
his nomination form by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8).
33. To put it differently, the approach of the High C ourt in
considering the two applications is, in our opinion, manifestly erroneous,
if not perverse. For, it has ventured into the arena of ana lysis of the
matter on merit. That is a prohibited area at this s tage. Since the
conclusion reached by the High Court that the pleadings in paragraphs 2
and 9 to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable,
it would necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, will have to
be examined as a whole without subtracting any portion therefrom. If so
read, it is not possible to take a view that the same does not disclose any
cause of action at all. On this finding, the application p referred by
respondent no.1 for rejection of election petition in limine under Order
VII Rule 11, cannot be countenanced and must also fail.
34. The only other plea of respondent No.1 that needs examination
is about the absence of averment in the election petition that because of
improper acceptance of nomination form of respondent No.1, it has
materially affected the election results of respondent No.1. Even this
contention should not detain us in light of the exposition in the r ecent
decision of this Court in M. Prithviraj (supra). For, the case of Durai
Muthuswami Vs. N. Nachiappan and Ors. ,43 noticed in this judgment,
it has been observed that in the case of election to a si ngle member
constituency, if there are more than 2 candidates and the nomination of
one of the defeated candidates had been improperly accepted, a question
43 (1973) 2 SCC 45
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
might arise as to whether the result of the election of the returned
candidate had been materially affected by such improper reception. That
would not be so in the case of challenge to the election of the “returned
candidate” himself on the ground of improper accepta nce of his
nomination. In paragraph 23 of the judgment in M. Prithviraj (supra),
after analysing the exposition in Durai Muthuswami (supra), the Court
observed thus:
“23. It is clear from the above judgment in Durai Muthuswami
that there is a difference between the improper accept ance of a
nomination of a returned candidate and the improper acceptance
of nomination of any other candidate. There is also a difference
between cases where there are only two candidates in the f ray
and a situation where there are more than two candi dates
contesting the election. If the nomination of a candidate other
than the returned candidate is found to have been improperly
accepted, it is essential that the election petitioner has to plead
and prove that the votes polled in favour of such candidate would
have been polled in his favour. On the other hand, if the
improper acceptance of nomination is of the returne d
candidate, there is no necessity of proof that the e lection
has been materially affected as the returned candidate would
not have been able to contest the election if his nominat ion
was not accepted. It is not necessary for the respondent to prove
that result of the election insofar as it concerns t he returned
candidate has been materially affected by the improper acceptance
of his nomination as there were only two candidates contesting
the election and if the appellant’s nomination is declared to have
been improperly accepted, his election would have to be set aside
without any further enquiry and the only candidate left in the fray
is entitled to be declared elected.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. The Court then noted that the decision in Durai Muthuswami
(supra), has been followed in Jagjit Singh Vs. Dharam Pal Singh and
Ors. 44 . This Court then adverted to its earlier decision in Vashist Narayan
Sharma Vs. Dev Chandra & Ors. 45 , paragraph 9 thereof. That has
been extracted in paragraph 25 of the judgment in M. Prithviraj (supra).
44 (1995) Supple (1) SCC 422
45 (1955) 1 SCR 509 = AIR 1954 SC 513
201
36. In Duni Chand (supra), this Court was called upon to consider
whether the nomination paper submitted by the appellant t herein was
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. It obse rved that if the
Returning Officer had rejected the nomination paper of the appellant
therein at the time of scrutiny, the order of rejection woul d have been
valid. As a result, the appellant could not have participated in the election
process and there would have been no occasion for him to be elected. It
would therefore, follow that improper acceptance of his nomination by
the Returning Officer has inevitably materially affected his result of the
election.
37. The respondent No.1 on the other hand, has relied on the
decision in Mangani Lal Mandal (supra). In this case, the election
was challenged by invoking the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) and
in that context the Court observed that it was essential for the ele ction
petitioner to plead material facts that the result of the election in so far
as it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected, by
such observance or non-observance. In the present case, the election is
challenged by invoking ground of improper acceptance of nomination of
the respondent No.1 – returned candidate under Section 100(1)(d)(i).
Even the other case i.e. Shambhu Prasad (supra), relied by respondent
No.1 will be of no avail. In that case, 22 candidates had filed their
nomination papers for election from the concerned constituency, out of
which only 17 candidates were left in the fray besides the e lection
petitioner, after withdrawal of nomination papers of 4 of such candidates.
The margin of victory between respondent No.1 and Karuna Shukla ,
who emerged as his nearest rival, was more than 20,000 votes. The
appellant in that case had polled 21,000 votes. He filed an el ection
petition before the High Court seeking a declaration about his having
been elected. Notably, the ground for declaring the election to be void
was not because of improper acceptance of nomination for m of the
returned candidate per se but because of improper acceptance of
nomination papers of other defeated candidates.
38. Our attention has also been invited by the learned counsel to
L.R. Shivaramagowda (supra), with particular emphasis on paragraph
10 and 11, wherein the Court observed that in order to declare an election
to be void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) it is absolutely necessary for the
election petitioner to plead that the result of the ele ction insofar as it
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
concerns the returned candidate has been materially affec ted. In the
present case, the election petition is in reference to the ground of improper
acceptance of nomination form of respondent No.1 – the r eturned
candidate under Section 100(1)(d)(i). Thus, if that plea is accepted and
the election of respondent No.1 is declared to be void, it would necessarily
follow that the election result of the returned candidate has been materially
affected.
39. The respondents had then contended that the election petitioner
cannot be permitted to bring or introduce a new ground or cause of
action beyond limitation period of 45 days of declaration of the result of
the election. We do not wish to dwell upon this issue. In our opinion, this
contention will have to be addressed by the High Court in the first instance.
The High Court, without recording any reason has disposed o f the
applications filed by the election petitioner (appellan t) as the election
petition itself was dismissed in limine . Since the election petition will
stand restored before the High Court, to subserve the ends o f justice,
the applications preferred by the election petitioner (appellant) will also
stand restored for being heard by the High Court on its own merit and to
decide it in accordance with law. As a result, it is not necessary for us to
dilate on the decision relied by the respondents in the case of
Harmohinder Singh (supra). We leave this contention open to be
decided by the High Court at the appropriate stage.
40. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the im pugned
judgment of the High Court in allowing both the applications fil ed by
respondent no.1 cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. For, we do not
find any merit in the plea of the respondent No.1 that paragraphs 2 & 9
to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious, which contention
erroneously commended to the High Court. On the other hand, we are
of the considered opinion that the subject election petition plainly discloses
cause of action for filing of the election petition to declare the election of
respondent No.1 to be void on the ground of improper acceptance of his
nomination.
41. We make it clear that we may not be understood to have
expressed any opinion on the merits of the other issues to be decided by
the High Court. In other words, our analysis is limited to the threshold
matter considered in this judgment about the striking off of the pleadings
and rejection of the election petition in limine .
203
42. In light of the above, we hold that E.A. No.329 of 2015 and
EA No.330 of 2015, both filed by respondent No.1 in the subject election
petition, deserve to be rejected. Further, the Election Peti tion No.8 of
2014 shall stand restored to the file of the High Court to i ts original
number for being proceeded further in accordance with law. Similarly,
the applications filed by the appellant shall stand restored (e xcept the
application for early hearing), to their original numbers to be decided by
the High Court in accordance with law.
43. As regards the application for early hearing of the el ection
petition filed by the appellant before the High Court, the same be treated
as disposed of in terms of this order. The imperativeness of expeditious
disposal of the election petition is underscored in Section 86(7) of the
1951 Act. As per the said provision, the trial of the election petition is
required to be disposed of preferably within six months from the date of
its presentation before the High Court. Besides, this Court in the case
of Mohd. Akbar (supra) has highlighted the necessity of discharging the
pious hope expressed by the Parliament. Therefore, we may only request
the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the election petition preferably
within three months from the production of a copy of this judgment by
either party before it.
44. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed in the above terms
with no order as to costs.
Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]