Baljeet Singh (dead) Through Lrs. and Others Etc. Etc. v. State of U.P. and Others
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the
special leave petitions is condoned.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common impugned
judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad in First Appeal No. 919/1993 and other allied first appeals,
the respective original claimants – land owners have preferred the present
special leave petitions.
3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that there is an inordinate
delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively (approximately 21 years)
in preferring the special leave petitions before this Court challenging the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court. There
is a further delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the
special leave petitions.
3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are
vehemently opposed by the respondents herein. Therefore, this Court is
first required to consider and decide the application/applications submitted
by the petitioners/applicants praying to condone the huge delay of 7534,
7542 and 7886 days respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.
4. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the lands of the
respective petitioners have been compulsorily acquir ed under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and therefore, they are entitled
to the fair compensation for the lands acquired. It is submitted that the
dispute is with respect to the lands acquired of village Guls itapur and
Tilpta which are only 4 kms. away from village Kasna. It is submitted
that the location wise the lands of village Gulsitapur an d Tilpta were
better located and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – Dadri
Road. It is submitted that village Kasna is 4 kms. behind village Gulsitapur.
It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village Kas na, Section 4
notification was issued on 1.3.1989 and the compensation was awarded
@ Rs.65/- per square yard, which has been confirmed by this Court
vide order dated 05.12.2016. It is submitted that therefore the respective
petitioners are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands acquired of
village Gulsitapur and Tilpta at par with the land owners of village Kasna,
BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
i.e., at Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submitted t hat therefore the
agriculturists/farmers are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands
acquired. It is submitted that for the lands compulsorily acqui red, the
delay should not defeat the valuable rights of the petitioners to get fair
compensation. It is submitted that the petitioners may not be awarded
the interest and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act
for the period of delay.
4.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
of this Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal v.
Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127;
and K. Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy Collector (Land
Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840 , it is prayed to
condone the delay and consider the special leave petitions on
merits.
5. All these applications are vehemently opposed by the learned
Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar Pradesh State
Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and on b ehalf of
respondent no.4 – Greater Noida Industrial Development Aut hority.
Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of respondent nos. 3 and 4 opposing
the present applications for condonation of delay.
5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delay
of approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave
petitions. It is submitted that at no point of time earli er the
respective petitioners made any grievance with respect t o
inadequacy of the compensation as awarded by the High Court.
5.2 It is further submittedby the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that as such no sufficient cause has
been shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21
years. It is submitted that merely because in view of the
subsequent decision in the case of lands acquired of another
village, relying upon which the petitioners have preferred the
present petitions, huge delay of approximately 21 years may
not be condoned.
5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing f or
the respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed upon
653
the decisions of the High Court and this Court is with respect
to entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too in
respect of the land which was acquired after about four years
of acquisition of the petitioners’ land. It is submitted that
therefore the lands acquired of village Kasna are n ot
comparable at all with respect to the lands acquired of village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta.
5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned c ommon
judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 is concerned, as such, the
same has attained finality. It is submitted that not on ly the
petitioners accepted the compensation but after the sai d
judgment was delivered by the High Court no special leave
petition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.
It is submitted that therefore they have acquiesced with the
impugned common judgment and order of the High Court.
5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that any attempt by the present
petitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascading
effect where every one whose land has been acquired by the
said notification with respect to the land acquired at village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta would start demanding enhance d
compensation @ Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submitted
that similarly the other land owners whose land has been
acquired though at different villages between the years 1985-
1989, too start demanding the same rate of compensation.
5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that after the acquisition, the land is
developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid. They ar e
maintained. The developed land has been allotted decades
ago. It is submitted that the rate of allotment is based on the
cost of acquisition and the amounts spent on development,
laying out the infrastructure. It is submitted that if the cost of
acquisition is increased, then how this cost would now be
recovered from the allottees after decades of allotment. It is
submitted therefore that to entertain the present petitions now
after a period of approximately 21 years and to increase the
amount of compensation would have a cascading effect.
BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]
5.7 It is further submitted that it is disputed and denied that the
land in village Gulsitapur is superior to the land in village Kasna.
It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna is
located on the main road, which connects Greater Noida to
Sikanderabad, District Bulandshar, unlike the land of village
Gulsitapur which is in the interiors.
5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of th is
Court by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioners, referred to hereinabove, is concerned , it is
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisions
of this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case on
hand. It is submitted that in the present case there is a n
inordinate delay of approximately 21 years. It is submitted
that in the present case the petitioners have failed to make
out a sufficient cause to condone the huge delay of
approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave petitions.
It is submitted that in the relied upon cases this Court was
satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay. It is submitted that
in the relied upon cases the parity was claimed with respect
to the land acquired under the very notification and it was
pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some
of the land owners whose land was acquired under the same
notification could not prefer the appeals earlier and t hey
preferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity of
compensation at par with the lands acquired under the ve ry
notification. It is submitted that in the present cas e the
petitioners are claiming the parity in compensation with respect
to the land acquired of another village and that too the land in
the said village was acquired after a period of four years and
location wise etc.the lands are different. It is submitted that
therefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to t he
facts of the case on hand.
5.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present applications for condonation of delay and consequently
dismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties at length.
655
6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is an
inordinate delay of approximately 21 years in preferring the
special leave petitions before this Court challenging the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the High
Court which has been passed in the year 1996. It is required
to be noted that the notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act with respect to the land situated in village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta was issued in the year 1985; possession
was taken over in the month of January, 1987; the Land
Acquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988
awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.8-10 per square yard.
At the instance of the petitioners herein - the original land
owners, reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act was made to the reference Court. By judgment and
award dated 22.3.1993, the reference Court enhanced the
compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard. However, on
appeals and considering the material on record, by the
impugned common judgment and order, the High Court reduced
the amount of compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.
That thereafter, after a period of approximately 21 years, now
the petitioners have preferred the present petitions claiming
compensation at par with the compensation awarded for the
land owners of another village Kasna. It is required to b e
noted that so far as the land acquisition of village Kasna is
concerned, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of four
years and it appears that in between certain developments
have also taken place.
7. Having considered the averments made in the application /
applications for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as such
the petitioners have miserably failed to make out a case to condone the
huge delay of approximately 21 years. No sufficient cause ha s been
shown to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years. It is required
to be noted that as such in the application itself it is s ubmitted by the
petitioners that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court.
The only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years is
given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:
BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]
“That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble Court in
time was the fact that it was only in December, 2016, the claimants
pertaining to village Kasana got the enhanced compensation from
this Hon’ble Court to the tune of Rs.65/- per sq. yard . The
petitioners herein came to know about the said fact in the month
of January, 2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spelling
miseries over them. It took not only lots of courage in mustering
support from number of affected families but also it took time for
the petitioners to collectively file the instant special leave petition
claiming not only the enhanced compensation but also parity with
regard to the compensation awarded to their co-villagers at village
Kasana.”
7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there is
a reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhanced
compensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairl y
enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grant
interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court i.e .,
2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this
Court. Except the explanation in paragraph 3, repr oduced
hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining
the huge delay of approximately 21 years. Neither any poverty is
pleaded nor any financial difficulty is pleaded. Nothing is on record
that after the impugned common judgment and order is passed by
the High Court, the petitioners made any grievance/objection with
respect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the
High Court. On the contrary, all the petitioners have accepted
the compensation as per the judgment and award passed by the
reference Court determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.30/
- per square yard. It appears that with respect to some of the
land owners even the execution petitions are pending with respect
to recovery of the differential amount of compensation, determined
by the reference Court and the High Court as by the impugned
common judgment and order the High Court has reduced the
compensation from Rs.30-/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/- per sq. ya rd.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that after the impugned common
judgment and order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at
all is made by the petitioners with respect to inadequac y of the
657
compensation determined by the High Court. Thus, it can be said
that for a period of approximately 21 years no grievance was
made by the petitioners. Therefore, considering the terms of
doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain.
This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying
that in such a case the party who did not make any objection
acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other par ty and
therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.
8. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz .,
laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that
a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is
no limitation period prescribed by any statute rela ting to certain
proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches
and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants
who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation
for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where
the period of limitation is prescribed within which the ac tion is to be
brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed
period, the aggrieved party losesremedy and cannot enforce his legal
right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer
for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing
the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient
cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case
where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought
within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated
after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonati on of
delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and
justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. I t is not that in
each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the
delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the d elay. To
make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out
a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings
within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross
negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within
the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denie d
the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the
presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesce d with
BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]
the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound
public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time
then such right is non-existent.
9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of th is
Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal(supra); Dhiraj Singh
(supra); and K. Subbarayudu (supra) , relied upon by the learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, having
gone through the said decisions, we are of the opinion that none of the
said decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or
the said decisions shall be of any assistance to the petition ers. First of
all, in the relied upon cases, there was no such inordinate delay of
approximately 21 years. In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfied
on the sufficient cause for delay. In the relied upon cases, parity was
claimed with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and
it was pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some of the
land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification could
not prefer the appeals earlier and thereafter they prefe rred the appeals
subsequently and claimed parity of compensation at par wi th the land
acquired under the same notification. It is also required to be noted that
as such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt with and/
or considered the adverse impact/effect on the State/acqu iring body if
after inordinate delay/laches the State/acquiring body is directed to pay
the enhanced amount of compensation. In the present case, lands were
acquired as far back as in the year 1985 and the award by the Sp ecial
Land Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988. The reference
Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard,
which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugned common
judgment and order in the year 1996.It is required to be noted t hat the
lands were acquired for Industrial development purposes. That after the
acquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure and ame nities
are laid and the developed land has been allotted approximately before
30 years. It is the specific case on behalf of the respondent s that the
rate of allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amount
spent on development, laying out the infrastructure. Therefo re, if the
cost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring body is
directed to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it w ould be very
difficult to recover the difference of amount of compensation from the
allottees after decades of allotment. The acquiring body wi ll have to
659
make additional budgetary provision and as observed hereinabove it would
be very difficult for the acquiring body to recover the differ ence of
compensation from the allottees after so many years. All these aspects
and the cascading effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directed
to pay the additional compensation after number of years, have not been
considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied u pon by the
learned Advocate for the petitioners. Even if the petitioners are denied
the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period as
requested by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in that case also, to
direct the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount of
compensation after number of years (21 years) would be unreasonable
and would have a financial burden upon them and as observed hereinabove
it would be very difficult for the State/acquiring body to rec over the
same from the allottees. Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaid
decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the
same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, w e
refuse to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
respectively in filing the special leave petitions. Ac cordingly, the
applications for condonation of delay stand dismissed. Consequently, all
these special leave petitions are dismissed on the ground of limitation.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain SLPs dismissed.
BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]