Jagjeet Singh Lyallpuri (dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. v. M/S Unitop Apartments & Builders Ltd.
A. S. BOPANNA,J.
1. The appellants are before this Court assailing the order dated
31.07.2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab and H aryana at
Chandigarh in FAO No. 5704 of 2012 (O&M). Through the said order,
the High Court has remanded the matter to the sole Arbitrator Mr. Justice
Kuldip Singh, retired Judge, Supreme Court of India for pr oviding
opportunity of leading evidence to both the parties a nd also grant
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and thereafter decide each
and every claim and counter claim separately on merits. The said order
is passed in an appeal filed by the respondent herein under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act 1996’ for short). The
appellant herein who was the respondent in the said appeal is therefore
before this Court claiming to be aggrieved by the said order.
2. The brief facts leading to the present situation is t hat the
appellants herein are joint owners of the land measuring 14 Kanals and
3 Marlas (8560 Sq. yards) situate at village Sunet, Tehsil an d District
Ludhiana, State of Punjab. The respondent company t hrough its
representatives claiming to be well-versed with cons truction and
development of properties approached the appellants for joint venture in
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD.
constructing a residential-cum-commercial complex on the subject land.
Accordingly, an agreement dated 14.12.1996 was entered into and among
other terms agreed therein, the respondent had undertaken to complete
the construction of the building consisting of at least six fl oors within
three years from the date of obtaining the sanctioned plan fr om the
Ludhiana Municipal Corporation. The project was required to be funded
by the respondent and a sum of Rs. 45,00,000/- (Rupees Forty-Fi ve
Lakhs only) was to be deposited with the appellant as a guar antee for
completion of the project. In that view, the appellants were expected to
retain the same if the building is not completed within the period of three
years. The sale proceeds from the constructed building was to be shared
in the ratio of 48:52 % between the appellants and the respondent.
3. Pursuant to such agreement the respondent secured the sanction
of the building plan from the Municipal Corporation on 04.07.1997. The
period of three years was to be computed from that point as per the
agreement. Hence the construction ought to have been completed by
03.07.2000. According to the appellant, the respondent though commenced
the construction during August, 1997, the activity was undertaken until
31.03.1999 and the project was abandoned by them thereafter. Sin ce
the construction was not completed by 03.07.2000 and no further progress
was made despite the appellant having waited beyond the said period,
the appellants got issued a legal notice dated 01.11.2001 and terminated
the agreement dated 14.12.1996. The respondent though issued reply
dated 28.11.2001 did not proceed further to make progr ess in the
construction.
4. The appellants further claim that in such circumstan ce the
appellant and the respondent entered into a compromise and a cancellation
agreement dated 26.10.2004 was executed due to which an amount of
Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Lakhs only) from the amount which was
received as security deposit was returned. Notwithstanding the same,
since there was change of guard in the composition of the management,
the respondent filed an application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996
seeking to restrain the appellants from damaging or demoli shing the
construction which had been raised by the respondents. Immediate ly
thereafter a notice dated 23.11.2004 was issued by th e respondent
invoking the arbitration clause for referring the matter to arbitration.
The Arbitration Case No. 124 of 2006 under Section 11 of the Act, 1996
filed by the respondent was allowed on 03.07.2009 and Mr. Justice Kuldip
439
Singh, retired Judge, Supreme Court of India was appointed as the sole
arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties.
5. In that view the parties appeared before the learned Arbitrator
and filed their respective claim, counter-claim and objection thereto. The
evidence by way of affidavit and the documents of respective parties
was also filed, where after the learned Arbitrator on hearing the learned
counsel for the parties passed the award dated 13.01.2010 through which
both the claim as well as the counter claim was dismissed. The respondent
herein claiming to be aggrieved by the same filed a petition under Section
34 of the Act, 1996 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Ludhiana
which was registered in Arbitration Case No. 3 dated 29.01.2010. The
learned Additional District Judge through the order dated 13.09.2012
affirmed the award by dismissing the petition. It is in that view the
respondent herein filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996
before the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has
arrived at the conclusion that the parties have not been granted
appropriate opportunity by the learned arbitrator to tender evidence by
examining witness and to cross-examine the witnesses, whose affidavits
were filed. It is further held by the High Court that the learned Arbitrator
has not considered the aspect relating to the extent to which the
construction was put up and the amount that was expende d by the
respondent herein and no determination, in that regard has been made.
The said observation was made after holding, though the time was not
the essence of the contract but yet the long delay would not be justified.
It was held, even in that circumstance the other as pects required
consideration. In that background the matter was remanded to the learned
Arbitrator for fresh consideration.
6. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the appellant while
assailing such conclusion by the High Court has taken us through the
appeal papers and has referred to the agreement dated 14.12.1996 and
the clauses governing the parties. It is contended that when a dispute is
referred to the learned Arbitrator, Section 19 of the Act, 1996 provides
that the Arbitrator can determine the rules of procedure. In that regard
it is pointed out that in the hearing held on 28.11.2009 the l earned
Arbitrator has in the course of the proceedings finalised the procedure
and recorded the same in the order. It is pointed out that the respondent
was represented by a senior advocate in the arbitration p roceedings
wherein it has been agreed that the parties would rely upon the affidavits
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]
and documents that were filed and the procedure of cross-examination
could be dispensed. In that background the learned arbitrator has referred
to the materials on record in the background of the claim put forth and
the affidavits filed in support thereof while arriving at the conclusion.
Hence, he contends that the procedural lapse as attempted t o be made
out at this stage is not justified.
7. It is further contended by Mr. Shyam Divan that in a proceedings
where the consideration ought to be limited to the extent provided under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and when the learned Additional Dis trict
Judge has in that light examined and confirmed the award, the
consideration ought not to have been expanded by the learned Si ngle
Judge in a proceedings under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 wherein also
the scope is limited. On the factual aspect it is co ntended that despite
the terms agreed in the agreement dated 14.12.1996, no progress was
made in the construction even until the point when the proceedings were
initiated before the learned Arbitrator after it was abandoned in March
1999. In that circumstance when the learned Arbitrator has ta ken into
consideration these aspects and arrived at the conclusion , the learned
single judge could not have interfered with the award. The learned senior
counsel in that regard has taken us through the award to point out that a
detailed consideration has been made by the learned Arbitra tor on all
aspects including the fact that the cancellation of the agre ement was
agreed between the parties. On the contention urged relating t o the
construction incurring an amount of Rs.1,22,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore
Twenty-Two Lakhs only) said to have been made by the respondent
also a consideration has been made. In that circumstance when the
contention was adverted to and a view was taken by the learned
Arbitrator based on a finding of fact, the learned Single Judge was not
justified in commenting that the said aspect had not been adverted to by
the learned Arbitrator. It is therefore contended that the award is liable
to be sustained and the order passed by the learned Single Judge be set
aside.
8. Mr. Shibo Shankar Misra, learned counsel for the respondent
in his attempt to sustain the order passed by the lear ned Single Judge
contends that the respondent had raised twelve claims before the learned
Arbitrator and each claim should have been decided separately. It is his
case that the learned Arbitrator has proceeded to reject the claim only
on the conclusion that time is the essence of the contract . Though the
441
terms as contained in the agreement dated 14.12.1996 is not disputed,
the learned counsel contends that the delay caused resulting in no n-
completion of the project is solely attributable to the appellant. The
appellants had not parted with the title documents relating to the land in
question due to which the respondent was not in a position to raise the
funds from the bank by creating mortgage. Apart from the sec urity
amount the respondent has suffered loss to the extent of Rs. 1,22,00,000/
- (Rupees One Crore Twenty-Two Lakhs only) being th e cost of
construction which was put up. Specific claim was raised under different
heads before the learned Arbitrator. Despite such contentions and claims
being put forth the learned Arbitrator has not considered the same. In
that regard it is contended that clause 11 of the agreement which provides
relating to the expenditure incurred has not been properly appreciated.
The learned counsel contended that the learned Additional District Judge
in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 has also not adverted
to these aspects of the matter. However, the learned Single Judge taking
note of these aspects and also keeping in view the decision in the case
of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. SAW Pipes L imited
2003 (5) SCC 705 has arrived at the conclusion that an award of the
present nature cannot be sustained and has accordingly remanded the
matter to the learned Arbitrator to provide opportunity to the parties and
take a fresh decision. It is contended that in such circumst ance when
both parties would have an opportunity, the appellant herein cannot make
out any grievance. He therefore contends that the above a ppeal be
dismissed.
9. In the light of the contentions put forth we have perused the
appeal papers and made reference to the material on record. With regard
to the agreement dated 14.12.1996 and the clauses contained therein to
regulate the parties there is no serious dispute between the parties. The
very fact that a contention has been raised by the respondent seeking to
attribute the delay and the non-completion of the project to the appellant
by contending that the non-furnishing of the title documents had prevented
the respondent from raising loan would by itself indicate that no progress
was made except putting up the initial construction and the project was
not completed within the period of three years or thereafter, though the
building plan was sanctioned on 04.07.1997. In that light the appellant
had issued a notice dated 01.11.2001 and terminated the agreement,
which had resulted in a dispute between the parties. In that background
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]
the matter was placed before the learned Arbitrator who had been
appointed in a proceeding under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. A perusal
of the award dated 30.01.2010 available at Annexure P-12 to the appeal
papers would indicate that a detailed consideration has been m ade by
the learned Arbitrator on all aspects of the matter. I n that background
when the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was filed before the
learned Additional District Judge, the learned Additional District Judge
in fact has also adverted to all aspects of the matter and since no ground
for interference as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was
made out, the learned Additional District Judge through his order dated
13.09.2012 has upheld the award.
10. In that backdrop when the learned Arbitrator and the learned
Additional District Judge have arrived at a concurrent opi nion, it is
necessary for us to take note as to whether the learned Single Judge in
an appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 could have adverted
into the merits of the contention beyond the scope available under Section
34 (2) of the Act, 1996 so as to set aside the award and rema nd the
matter. In that regard whether the contentions which were put forth to
assail the award by picking holes in the procedure adopted by the learned
Arbitrator is to be accepted or not also requires examination, keeping in
view the scope of Section 34 (2) of the Act, 1996 and determine as to
whether such ground is made out.
11. Since the learned Single Judge has presently accepted t he
contention raised on behalf of the respondent herein that the procedure
followed by the learned Arbitrator is contrary to law and has prejudiced
the respondent herein since the witnesses were not cross- examined,
this aspect of the matter is required to be noticed at the outset. As rightly
pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the rules of
procedure to be followed by an Arbitral Tribunal is flexible and can be
agreed upon by the parties as provided under Section 19 of th e Act,
1996 which reads as hereunder;
19. Determination of rules of procedure – (1) The arbitral
tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).
(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to a gree on the
procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its
proceedings.
443
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), the arbitral
tribunal may, subject to this Part, conduct the proceedings in the
manner it considers appropriate.
(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (3) includes
the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, mate riality
and weight of any evidence.
12. Further, keeping in view that the contention put forth before
the High Court by the respondent herein to assail the award was in the
manner as noticed above with regard to the appropriate proc edure not
being followed and there being denial of opportunity and in that view the
respondent not being able to put forth the case appropriately before the
learned Arbitrator, the effect of the same is required to b e examined.
When a challenge is raised on that ground, in our opinion it would at best
fall under Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) which reads as follows;
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award – (1)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only
by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with
sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if —
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that —
(i) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(ii) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbi tral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or”
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, in order to consider whether the challenge is sustainable
on the ground available in law, at the outset it is necessary to examine
whether the procedural lapse if any is committed by the learned Arbitrator
in unilaterally denying the opportunity to the parties so as to make the
award invalid and to set aside the same exercising the pow er under
Section 34 or in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. In th is
regard as noticed, Section 19 of the Act, 1996 provides that the Arbitral
Tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the India n
Evidence Act. Further, it provides that the parties are free to agree on
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]
the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal. In this back drop
it is noticed that in the case on hand, in the proceedings dated 28.11.2009
(Annexure P-15) before the learned Arbitrator, the procedure to be
followed has been discussed and recorded, which reads as hereunder;
“The parties and their learned counsel have been heard. Whatever
further pleadings, documents and list of witnesses were to be
filed by the parties in terms of the proceedings dated 10.10.2009,
have been done. The evidence of the claimant as well as of t he
respondents was to be recorded today. Mr. Ram Lal, whom the
respondents want to cross-examine, is present befor e the
Arbitrator. The learned counsel for the parties have, howe ver,
agreed and consented before me they do not wish to cro ss-
examine any of the witnesses whose affidavits have been filed by
the parties concerned. In view of the consent of the learne d
counsel of the parties and parties themselves who are pr esent, I
close the evidence. The parties will rely on the affidavits already
filed and the documents and other pleadings already placed on
the record.”
(emphasis supplied)
That apart by the very proceedings dated 28.11.2009 the points
on which arguments would be addressed were also treated as the issues
for consideration and has been formulated and recorded in the or der
sheet.
13. From a perusal of the proceedings dated 28.11.2009 it would
be clear that both contentions raised by the learned counsel fo r the
respondent herein and which were accepted by the learned Single Judge
to ultimately remand the matter, would not be justified. F irstly, in the
presence of the parties and their learned counsel it has b een recorded
that they do not wish to cross-examine any of the witnesses w hose
affidavits have been filed by the parties concerned and one of the witness
who was present was discharged without being cross examined and no
grievance was made either by the parties or their learned counse l who
were present. It is in that view the evidence was take n as closed on
28.11.2009 and the issues for consideration was settled for argume nts
on the same day. In that circumstance having consented to t he said
procedure, it would not be open for the respondent herein to approbate
and reprobate so as to raise a different contention at this point. Having
445
accepted the said procedure the respondent is estopped fr om raising
such contention before the learned Single Judge that th e arbitrator
misconducted himself by not permitting the parties to cross-examine the
witness and also that the learned Arbitrator being more than 70 years of
age and suffering from knee problem has pressurized the respondent to
speed up the matter and the evidence was closed. It is rather intriguing
for us to note that such contention has not only been permi tted to be
raised, but also accepted by the learned Single Judge to re mand the
matter, which is wholly unjustified.
14. We are of such opinion for the reason that the procedure to be
followed in arbitration proceedings was settled by a separate order dated
28.11.2009 during the course of the proceedings before the lear ned
Arbitrator. Thereafter the award was passed only on 13.01.2010. Though
the respondent was represented by their learned counsel and the o rder
dated 28.11.2009 was passed while recording the proceedings of th at
day, neither any application had been filed before the learned Arbitrator
to recall the said order and provide opportunity to tender evid ence or
cross examine, nor was a challenge raised by initiat ing any other
proceedings, before the award was passed. It is only subsequent to the
award being passed such contention is being raised as an afterthought,
which in such event cannot be accepted. That apart, the agr eement
being entered into on 14.12.1996 and the work not having progresse d
subsequent to March,1999 was not seriously in dispute and in t hat
circumstance based on the affidavit, the admitted documents have been
taken note by the learned Arbitrator due to which t he non-cross-
examination in any event has not prejudiced the respondent herein. One
aspect of the matter no doubt was with regard to the claim that was put
forth by the appellant herein that a cancellation a greement dated
26.10.2004 was entered into and the security deposit of Rs. 40 Lak hs
and the advance of Rs. 23 Lakhs has been re-paid to Mr. S. Su rinder
Singh which was disputed by the respondent. On that aspect the learned
Arbitrator in any event has concluded that the said payment if any cannot
be considered as a payment made to the respondent company but has
been received by Mr. Surinder Singh who had made gain unto himself.
In such event since the respondent has not filed the affidavit of Mr.
Surinder Singh disputing the same, it is an inter-se matter to claim from
Mr. Surinder Singh and therefore, the non-cross-examination on th at
aspect also has not resulted in any prejudice. Be that as it may, as already
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]
taken note, the procedure to be followed in the arbitral proceedings has
been agreed to by the parties. Hence the respondent cannot be heard to
complain as and when it suits them.
15. Further, since through the very order dated 28.11.2009 the
issues for consideration on which the arguments would be address ed
was settled and the matter was proceeded on that understanding without
raising any objection, the grievance put forth by the resp ondent and
accepted by the learned Single Judge that the learned Arbitrator has not
answered each of the claims separately in the award, cannot also be
accepted. A perusal of the award would indicate that the learned
Arbitrator has adverted to all aspects in a sequential m anner and has
recorded his conclusion in answer to the contentions that were put forth.
16. One other aspect which has been recorded by the learned
Single Judge as the reason for which the matter requires reconsideration
by the learned Arbitrator is that the claim put forth by t he respondent
that the sum of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- spent by them has not been considered
by the learned Arbitrator. In that regard the learned Single Judge has
held that though the respondent herein would not be entitled to continue
the project due to lapse of time the learned Arbitrator has not considered
the right of the parties relating to the extent of the cost incurred for the
existing construction and the manner in which it is to be dealt with. On
this aspect, a perusal of the award passed by the lear ned Arbitrator
would indicate that after having arrived at the conclusio n that the
respondent has committed the breach, the learned Arbitrator ha s also
adverted to the said contention relating to the cost incurred for the extent
of construction made, as claimed and has rejected t he same. The
consideration as made is as hereunder;
“I may examine, at this stage the claimant’s contentio n that
construction worth about Rs. 1 crore 20 lacs has been done on
the project. The claimant has primarily relied on the balance sheet
of the Company for the relevant year in support of this argument.
The balance sheet is Annexure-K at page 118-126 of the statement
of Claim. In the schedule forming part of the accounts for the
year ending 31 st March, 1999, the balance sheet shows an
expenditure of about 1 crore 20 lacs on the project in process .
This includes Rs. 44 lacs as advance given to the respondent s
(land owners) as guarantee money. Expenditure incurred has been
shown under various headings such as advertisement and publicity,
447
salary, entertainment, iron and steel, cement, GC sheets, stand ,
bricks, marble, crusher, electrical, GI pipes, gate, prof essional
charges, telephone expenses, electricity expenses, labou r and
construction charges. An amount of Rs. 56,58,530/- has been
shown under the heading purchase. It is not indicted so as to what
was purchased. All the items required for the construction of the
project have been shown separately but it is not clear o n what
purchase/purchase this amount was spent. No explana tion is
forthcoming from the claimant in this respect. Mr. Mahajan while
controverting the argument of Mr. Lekhi has stated that Loca l
Commissioner’s report Annexure-W makes it clear tha t the
amount which may have been spent on the construction was much
less. Be that as it may there is no expert evidence on the r ecord
to show as to how much money was spent on the construction.
The claimant company did receive some money as advance against
flats and offices to be constructed. It is in the evidence tha t Rs.
23 lacs was received by the Company in this respect. The balance
sheet as on 31 st March, 1999 at page 121 shows that the Company
received Rs. 19,79,488/- as advance against flats and offices. In
the absence of reliable evidence on the record, it is not possible to
accept the argument of the learned counsel for the claimant. ”
17. In that circumstance when the learned Arbitrator has noticed
the contention and recorded a finding of fact it cannot be accepted that
the learned Arbitrator has not adverted to the same so as t o require
reconsideration. To be fair to the learned Arbitrator, it has in fact been
noticed by the learned Arbitrator relating to the change of Directors and
shareholders of the company in 2007 as against the shareholder s who
existed as on 30.09.2005 and also that the erstwhil e Directors/
shareholders who had personal knowledge have not been examined by
filing their affidavits and even though an application dated 12.09.2009
for summoning them as witnesses was filed, the same was not pressed
and the evidence was closed on 28.11.2009 with the consent of the
parties. The learned Arbitrator has in fact recorded that none of them
have come forward to render assistance in the proceedings . In such
circumstance when the respondent herein, who were themselves the
claimants before the learned Arbitrator have not conducted the m atter
in an appropriate manner by securing affidavit evidence of the erstwhile
directors/shareholders, they cannot at this stage turn around and contend
that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself. In any event the
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]
challenge to the award does not fall under any of the clauses of Section
34 of Act, 1996. In such circumstance the reliance placed by the learned
Single Judge on a decision in the case of ONGC (supra) is highly
misplaced. Therefore, the order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the learned
Single Judges is not sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside.
18. During the course of hearing we had also made an endeavour
to see that the parties amicably settle the matter by enabling the
respondent herein to receive some amount towards the expended portion,
also by not ignoring the loss suffered by the appellants due to de lay.
From the photographs produced before us we have noticed that except
raising some columns, there is no major construction that is put up. In so
far as the expense as claimed by the respondent, as indicate d by the
learned Arbitrator as extracted above, there is no conclus ive evidence
to that effect. Though such columns are raised, admittedly construction
activity has not taken place beyond March, 1999 and already two decades
have elapsed. In view of the breach and the respondent herein failing in
the present lis there would be no absolute right in their favour since the
inevitable loss suffered by the appellants by not being able to enjoy the
property for the last more than two decades also cannot be lost sight.
The appellant herein who is the owner of the property will have to enter
into a fresh contract and the need and manner of development may not
be the same at this point and in such event the appellant herein also
would be put to some loss to undertake the demolition process themselves
or there would be reduction that would be made by t he alternate
developers who would undertake the project. Further, the actual quantum
in any event cannot be determined and also when a breach has be en
committed through the predecessor directors/shareho lders of the
respondent company and when the present directors/shareholders have
entered the scene in the midst of the breach they would have to bear the
loss, if any, to that extent. Therefore, without reference t o the actual
loss suffered by the parties, while putting an end to the litigation between
the parties, in the peculiar circumstance and in the inte rest of justice,
notwithstanding the fact that we have held the order of the learned Single
Judge as not sustainable, in exercise of our power under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India the appellant is directed to pay the s um of
Rs. 45,00,000/- (Rupees Forty-Five Lakhs only) to the r espondent
whereupon they would be entitled to assume possession of the subject
land and proceed to enjoy the same in accordance with law.
449
19. In the result the appeal is disposed of with the following order:
(i) The order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana in FAO No. 5704 of 2012 (O&M) is set aside. Consequently,
the award dated 13.01.2010 passed by the learned Arbitrator is restored.
(ii) The appellant is directed to pay the sum of Rs. 45,00,000 /-
(Rupees Forty-Five Lakhs only) in full quit of all claims, to the respondent
within three months.
(iii) Immediately on payment of the said amount the appellant
shall be entitled to resume possession of the subject land in the status as
it exists and enjoy the same in accordance with law.
(iv) Parties to bear their own costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal disposed of.
JAGJEET SINGH LYALLPURI (DEAD) v. M/S UNITOP
APARTMENTS & BUILDERS LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA,J.]