G H P. Singaravelan & Ors. Etc. Etc v. the District Collector, Tiruppur and Dt & Ors. Etc. Etc.

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 5395-5399 OF 2016; CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 5605-5613 OF 2016; CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 5391-5393 OF 2016, AND CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 5367-5375 OF 2016 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals have been filed against the common final judgment and order dated 08.07.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras allowing writ appeals filed by the Respondents herein, being state authorities, and dismissing writ petitions filed by the Appellants herein, being drivers in various departm ents of the Government of Tamil Nadu, with respect to the Selection Grad e and Special Grade scales of pay applicable to them. 3. The Appellants, in a nutshell, are claiming the grant of Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay in the bracket of R s. 5000- 8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162, Finance (Pay Cell) Department dated 13.04.1998 (for short “G.O. Ms . No. 162”), which has been granted to around 3000 similarly placed employees. The Appellants place reliance on various decisions rendered by this Court and the High Court of Madras in several writ pet itions and appeals granting similar pay scales to the petitioners therein. Thus, it is argued that the impugned judgment of the High Court has erroneously differed from the consistent view taken in these decisions. 4. On the other hand, the Respondents argue in favour of the impugned judgment, claiming that the initial grant of the clai med pay scale to some drivers (out of which the entire cluster of litigations arose) was merely on account of an error on the part of officials i n some 415 government departments. Thus, it is submitted that the applicable scales of pay are Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectiv ely for the Selection Grade and Special Grade. 5. It has come to our attention that several Benches of this Court have dismissed SLPs against decisions of the High Court f ixing pay scales of the concerned drivers therein at Rs. 5000 -8000 for the Selection Grade and Rs. 5500-9000 for the Special Grade in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 162. We deem it fit to refer to the orders passe d by this Court in this respect: WA No. 67 of 2012 SLP (Civil) CC No. 14715 of 2012 Dismissed on 10.09.2012 WA No. 383 of 2009 SLP (Civil) No. 35969 of 2009 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WA No. 391 of 2009 SLP (Civil) No. 6522 of 2010 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WA No. 382 to 388 of 2009 SLP (Civil) No. 6523- 6530 of 2010 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WP No. 462 of 2012 WP No. 24912 of 2010 WA No. 383-391 of 2009 SLP (Civil) No. 22491 of 2012 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WP -29119- 2012 SLP (Civil) No. 33037 of 2013 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WA No. 791 and 792 of 2013 WP No. 2929 and 2930 of 2012 SLP (Civil) No. 33588 of 2013 Dismissed on 25.02.2015 WA No. 130, 131, 132 of 2011 SLP (Civil) CC No. 12886-12888 of 2013 Dismissed on 19.07.2013 WA No. 2243 of 2012 SLP (Civil) CC No. 6602 of 2013 Dismissed on 27.09.2013 WA No. 526 of 2013 SLP (Civil) CC No. 14007 of 2013 Dismissed on 21.08.2013 WA No. 24899 of 2014 SLP (Civil) No. 34265 of 2014 Dismissed on 06.02.2017 6. Be that as it may, it must be noted that all the above or ders of this Court were passed at the stage of admission its elf. Even the order dated 25.02.2015, passed by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with a batch of appeals having SLP (C) No. 35969/2009 as the lead matter, stated as follows: “UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following ORDER Dismissed.” 7. It is evident that all the above orders were non-sp eaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At t his juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or att ract the doctrine of merger. The following discussion on this proposi tion in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala , (2000) 6 SCC 359, is relevant in this regard: “( i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinat e forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is cap able of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii ) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The secon d stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii ) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv ) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non- speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exer cise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. 417 (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking orde r i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court with in the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judi cata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi ) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appella te jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the ord er may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii ) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition see king leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rul e (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.” (emphasis added) This view has also been adopted in a plethora of decisions of this Court, including the recent decision in Khoday Distilleries v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. , (2019) 4 SCC 376. 8. Applying these observations to the present case, it is clear that there has been no pronouncement by this Court constituting the law of the land as to the interpretation of G.O. Ms. No. 162. In such a situation, it is open for us to proceed to decide the instant appea ls uninfluenced by the prior orders of this Court dismissing SLPs against the grant of relief to drivers placed similarly as the Appellants her ein. 9. It is evident that the entire controversy in this case hinges on the interpretation of G.O. Ms. No. 162. Vide this order, the Tamil Nadu P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1998 (for short “the 1998 Rules” ) were notified, revising 25 standard pay scales on a pay scale- to-pay scale basis for State Government employees and teachers. While Sche dule I to the 1998 Rules indicated the revised pay scales, Schedule II specified the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales applica ble for each revised Ordinary Grade. Further, it was stated in paragrap h 4 of the G.O. that for posts with no promotional avenues, the Selection Gr ade and Special Grade scales as indicated in Schedule I I would be applicable. 10. It is not in dispute that drivers in various departments of the Government of Tamil Nadu were entitled to revised Ordinary Gr ade pay scales as per Schedule I. Further, since they did not have any promotional avenues, Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales under Schedule II would become applicable as and when they completed 10 and 20 years of service respectively. The dispute here lies with respect to the entries under Schedules I and II applicab le to the post of drivers. It is the submission of the Respondents that pr ior to the revision of pay scales under the 1998 Rules, drivers were enti tled to the pay scale of Rs. 975-1660 as determined by G.O. No. 818, Finance, dated 09.09.1989. Accordingly, the corresponding revised Ord inary Grade pay scale under Schedule I of the 1998 Rules would be as per Entry No. XX below: SCHEDULE -I LIST OF PAY SCALES Group (1) Existing Scale (2) Revised Scale (3) Rs. Rs. I 5500-200-6500 17400-500-21900 II 5100-150-5700 16400-450-20000 III 4500-150-5700 15000-400-18600 IV 4100-125-4850-150-5300 14300-400-18300 V 3950-125-4700-150-5000 12750-375-16500 VI 3700-125-4700-150-5000 12000-375-16500 VII 3000-100-3500-125-4500 10000-325-15200 VIII 2500-75-2800-100-4200 9100-275-14050 IX 2200-75-2800-100-4000 8000-275-13500 X 2000-60-2300-75-3200-100-3500 6500-200-11100 XI 2000-60-2300-75-3200 6500-200-10500 419 (emphasis added) 11. Relying on this, the Respondents submit that the drivers are entitled to a revised Ordinary Grade pay scale of Rs. 3200-4 900 only. As regards the Selection Grade and Special Grade pa y scales applicable, the Respondents claim that the Appellants are entitled to pay scales of Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively as per Serial No. 6 of Schedule II, which is corresponding to Entry No . XX of Schedule I. On the other hand, the Appellants claim that they are entitled to the revised Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scale s of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively as per Serial No. 8 of Schedule II. It would be useful to refer to Schedule II in this regard: SCHEDULE - II REVISED SELECTION GRADE AND SPECIAL GRADE SCALE OF PAY XI 2000 -60 -2300 -75 -3200 6500 -200 -10500 XII 1820-60-2300-75-3200 5900-200-9900 XIII 1640-60-2600-75-2900 5500-175-9000 XIV 1600-50-2300-60-2660 5300-150-8300 XV 1400-40-1600-50-2300-60-2600 5000-150-8000 XVI 1350-30-1440-40-1800-50-2200 4500-125-7000 XVII 1320-30-1560-40-2040 4300-100-6000 XVIII 1200-30-1560-40-2040 4000-100-6000 XIX 1100-25-1150-30-1660 3625-85-4900 XX 975-25-1150-30-1660 3200-85-4900 XXI 950-20-1150-25-1500 3050-75-3950-80-4590 XXII 825-15-900-20-1200 2750-70-3800-75-4400 XXIII 800-15-1010-20-1150 2650-65-3300-70-4000 XXIV 775-12-835-15-1030 2610-60-3150-65-3540 XXV 750-12-870-15-945 2550-55-2660-60-3200 Sl. Nos. (1) Ordinary Grade (2) Selection Grade (3) Special Grade (4) Rs. Rs. Rs. 1 2550-55-2660-60-3200 2650-65-3300-70-4000 2750-70 -3800-75-4400 2 2610-60-3150-65-3540 2750-70-3800-75-4400 3050-75 -3950-80-4590 3 2650-65-3300-70-4000 3050-75-3950-80-4590 3200-85 -4900 4 2750-70-3800-75-4400 3050-75-3950-80-4590 3200-85 -4900 5 3050-75-3950-80-4590 4000-100-6000 4300-100-6000 6 3200-85-4900 4000-100-6000 4300-100-6000 7 3625-85-4900 4300-100-6000 4500-125-7000 8 4000-100-6000 5000-150-8000 5500-175-9000 9 4300 -100 -6000 5000 -150 -8000 5500 -175 -9000 P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] (emphasis added) 12. Indeed, the genesis of the entire dispute lies in the fixat ion of Selection and Special Grade pay scales of certain drivers by cer tain local departments as per Serial No. 8 of Schedule II. Purs uant to this, the Joint Secretary to the Government, Finance Department, is sued Letter No. 96900/PC/98-2 dated 31.12.1998 to all Secretaries to the Government and Heads of Department, on the basis that such fixations were erroneous and needed to be reviewed, with a direction to effect recoveries wherever excess payments had been made. 13. In 2006, the Secretary, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (E) Department rejected the representation of the T amil Nadu Government Department Drivers’ Central Association seeking fixation of Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales at Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively, vide the proceedings in Lr. No. 13921/K/ 2005-1 dated 25.04.2006. This was challenged by the drivers’ association before the High Court in W.P. No. 34800 of 2006, which was allowed on the ground that the said proceedings did not r efer to G.O. Ms. No. 162. The association was directed to m ake a fresh representation before the Finance Department, to be decided in accordance with G.O. Ms. No. 162. 14. Such representation, however, was also rejected by the Finance Department vide letter No. 63685/CMPC/2006- 1, dated 01.10.2007, which states as follows: “3. Therefore, the Drivers are entitled for the Selection Grade / Special Grade scales of pay as ordered in Schedule-II of G .O. Ms. No. 162, Finance (PC) Department, dated 13-4-98, based on the ordinary grade scale of pay granted to the p osts of Drivers. As such all categories on par with Drivers in the Ordinary Grade of Rs.3200-4900 are entitled for the Selection Grade of 8 4000 -100 -6000 5000 -150 -8000 5500 -175 -9000 9 4300-100-6000 5000-150-8000 5500-175-9000 10 4500-125-7000 5300-150-8300 5900-200-9900 11 5000-150-8000 5500-175-9000 6500-200-10500 12 5300-150-8300 6500-200-10500 8000-275-13500 13 5500-175-9000 6500-200-10500 8000-275-13500 14 5900-200-9900 8000-275-13500 9100-275-14050 15 6500-200-10500 8000-275-13500 9100-275-14050 16 6500-200-11100 9100-275-14050 10000-325-15200 17 8000-275-13500 9100-275-14050 10000-325-15200 18 9100-275-14050 10000-325-15200 12000-375-16500 421 Rs.4000-6000 and Special Grade of Rs.4300-6000 respectively. The above Government Order has been issued based on th e recommendations of the Official Committee, 1998 and the Drivers are not denied the benefits ordered in the Government Order cited. Hence, your request has no merit to consider a s requested.” 15. A batch of writ petitions challenging the above order wa s subsequently filed before the High Court. These writ peti tions were allowed by the High Court vide judgment dated 30.09.2008 in W.P. No. 4288/2008 and connected matters thereto, with a direc tion for the fixation of pay scales in accordance with G.O. Ms. No. 162. Thi s was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2009 in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009. 16. Subsequently, several other writ petitions were filed by other similarly situated drivers seeking the benefit of the sa me higher pay scale. These petitions were also allowed on the basis of the previous decisions discussed above, with the notable exceptions of the judgment dated 18.11.2013 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in W.P. No. 1418/2001 and matters connected thereto, and th e impugned judgment herein. 17. Concluding that the drivers were not entitled to the higher claimed pay scales, these two judgments differed from the cons istent view taken in the preceding judgments and orders based on a sc rutiny of G.O. Ms. No. 162 and the prior history of pay scales pay able to the drivers. They justified differing from the decisions of t he Division Benches of the High Court on the premise that there was no s pecific direction by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 4288/2008 (supr a), or the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009, granting the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500- 9000 respectively. With respect to subsequent writ petiti ons granting these higher pay scales, it was noted that they had been dispose d of at the admission stage itself (in some cases even without not ice to the government) and could thus be disregarded. 18. Given this departure in the impugned judgment fro m the consistent view taken by prior coordinate Benches of the Hi gh Court, it is necessary to ascertain whether the High Court should have instead referred the matter to a larger Bench for consideration. This me rits a closer reading of the decisions of the Single Judge in W.P. No. 4288/ 2008 (supra) and of the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009. P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] As discussed above, the principal issue before the C ourts in these decisions was the validity of the order dated 01.10.2007 passed by the Finance Department rejecting the claim of the drivers’ assoc iation for Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively. 18.1 The Single Judge in W.P. No. 4288/2008 (supra) and the Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009 both set aside the orde r dated 01.10.2007 based on the fact that the claimed higher pay sc ales had already been granted and were still being received by certain other drivers in several government departments, as per G.O. M s. No. 162. Further, and more importantly, it was held that the letter dated 31.12.1998 wherein such higher pay scale fixations were deemed to be erroneous, would not have the effect of reducing the entitlemen t of drivers, as such a letter could not act as a substitute for modification of the G.O. itself. Thus, even though the Court did not give any express direction to grant the higher pay scales as per Serial No. 8 of Schedule II of the 1998 Rules, we find that the same was implicit in the Co urt’s directions for fixing the pay scales in terms of G .O. Ms. N o. 162. In other words, it cannot be said that the High Court in W.A. No s. 383- 391/2009 did not affirm the drivers’ claim that they were entitl ed to the higher Selection and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000- 8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively. 18.2 However, in the impugned judgment, the High Court only focused on the fact that the conclusion reached by the coordinate Bench in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009 was for appropriate fixation of pay sca les under G.O. Ms. No. 162 only, and there was no specific direction for grant of the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000- 8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively. On this basis, the High Cou rt proceeded to determine the question of pay scale entitlement and took a view diametrically opposite to that of the coordinate Bench i n W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009, finding that the Appellant-drivers were only entitled to the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively. In our considered opinion, such an approach is based on a narrow reading of the decision of the coordinate Bench in W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009, as it fails to appreciate the implicit direction in this order to grant the higher pay scales to th e drivers, as mentioned supra. Thus, it appears that the High Court differed f rom the view taken previously by a coordinate Bench based on a misreading of the same. In such a situation, once it was found by the H igh Court that it was in disagreement with the holding of its coordinate Bench in 423 W.A. Nos. 383-391/2009, it should not have proceeded to decide the matter by itself, and in the interest of judicial discipline, should instead have referred the matter to a larger Bench for its consi deration. 19. Be that as it may, in the interest of expeditious dispo sal of the matter, we do not deem it fit to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration at this stage. Thus, we shall proceed to decide it on merits accordingly. 20. In our considered opinion, apart from claiming parity with similarly placed individuals, the Appellants have been unable to justify how and why they are entitled to the Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 as specified in Serial No. 8 of Schedule II to the 1998 Rules, in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162. On the other hand, on perusing the series of revisions made to the p ay scales applicable to drivers employed with the State Govern ment, we find that the applicable pay scales for the Selection Grade a nd Special Grade would be as per Serial No. 6 of Schedule II to the 1998 Rules, i.e. Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively. 20.1 As the High Court has also noted in the impugned judgment, the pay scales of the Appellants can be traced back to G .O. Ms. No. 666, Finance dated 27.06.1989, by which the State Government issued the Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1989, implement ing the recommendations of the V th Tamil Nadu Pay Commission. Under these rules, the original and revised pay scales of 30 common categ ories of posts were specified. The scale of pay for drivers was mentioned at Serial No. 11 in the first part of the Schedule to these rule s, having been revised from Rs. 610-1075 to Rs. 950-1500. 20.2 The next revision came through G.O. Ms. No. 818, Finance, dated 09.09.1989, whereby drivers’ pay scale was increased to Rs. 975- 1660. Later, under G .O. Ms. No. 304, Finance dated 28.03.1990, Special Grade and Selection Grade scales of pay were introduced for p ersons who had completed 10 years and 20 years of service respectivel y. For the post of drivers carrying the Ordinary Grade pay sca le of Rs. 975- 1660, the Selection and Special Grade brackets were set as R s. 1200- 2040 and Rs. 1320-2040 respectively. 20.3 Finally, when the 1998 Rules were introduced through G .O. Ms. No. 162, the post-wise determination of pay scales was replaced by a pay scale-to-pay scale basis determination. As alr eady seen in Schedule I of the said rules, the pay scale of Rs. 975-1660 appl icable P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] to drivers was revised to Rs. 3200-4900. For this, the corresp onding Selection and Special Grades specified in Schedule II were Rs. 4000- 6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively. 21. Against this backdrop, we find substance in the submi ssion of the Respondents that the Appellants are not lawfully en titled to the claimed Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales of Rs. 5000- 8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162. 22. The only question to be settled, therefore, is whether the Appellants are entitled to claim parity with the drivers who have so far been granted benefits vide the orders of the High Court and this Court, as mentioned supra in paragraph 5. 23. In this respect, we find that the High Court in the impugned judgment was correct in concluding that the Appellants cannot clai m such relief on the strength of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, when once it has been found that they are not lawfully entit led to the same. It is well-settled by now that a person cannot invoke Article 14 to claim a benefit extended to someone similarly placed if he is not lawfully entitled to such benefit in the first place. Article 14 embodies the concept of positive equality alone, and not negative equality, that is to say, it cannot be relied upon to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity. In fact, this Court has opined that this principle extends to orders passed by judicial fora as well. Thus, the jurisdiction of a higher court cannot be invoked on the basis of a wrong order passed by a lower f orum. In this respect, it would be fruitful to refer to the following passa ge from the decision of this Court in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer , (2013) 14 SCC 81: “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mista ke, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an e arlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced b y a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illega lity and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial 425 forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/ decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherw ise it would make functioning of administration impossi ble. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745 : AIR 1995 SC 705], Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 164 : AIR 2005 SC 565] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. [(2006) 3 SCC 581 : AIR 2006 SC 898] and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [(2010) 11 SCC 455 : AIR 2010 SC 1937].)” This proposition was also recently affirmed by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati (Civil Appeal No. 7295/2019, judgment dated 16.09.2019). 24. Thus, it is evident that the Appellants cannot c laim the Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively, solely on the strength of earlier de cisions of the High Court, without showing how they, themselves, are entitled to such benefit in the first place. In such a situation, w e are of the considered view that the Appellants can only be granted the benefit of the Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay to which they are lawfully entitled in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162, i.e. Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively. 25. Therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The instant a ppeals are hereby dismissed, and the impugned judgment is confirmed. CIVIL APPEALS @ SLPs [Diary No. 42301/2017] 1. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 2. These appeals have been filed by the State of Tamil N adu, represented by its Principal Secretary, Finance (Pay Cel l) Department against the judgment and order dated 05.01.2015 of the High Court of Madras in W.P. No. 2363 of 2013, and the final judgment and order dated 11.09.2017 dismissing Review Application No. 153 o f 2016 against the same, with respect to the pay scale entitle ments of certain drivers employed by the High Court of Madras in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162. P. SINGARA VELAN v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUPPUR AND DT [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.] 3. These appeals arise out of virtually the same fa ctual background as those disposed of above. W.P. No. 2363 of 2013 was filed by the concerned drivers employed with the High Court of Madras, seeking quashing of paragraph 5 of Letter No. 63305/Pay Cell/2010-1 dated 08.11.2010 issued by the State Government, on which bas is the Government had denied them the benefit of Selection and Special Grade pay scales as per Serial No. 8 of Schedule II of the 1998 Rule s under G.O. Ms. No. 162. The petitioners therein also sought a direction t o the State Government for appropriate fixation of pay scales in the above terms. 4. The Division Bench allowed the writ petition on the gro und that the drivers were not entitled to any promotional avenues, and hence were entitled to the full benefits of the appropriate pay scale under Schedule II of the 1998 Rules. It was further found that the d rivers were entitled to benefits under Serial No. 8 of the said schedule, looking to the disposal of similar matters by the High Court and this Court. The review application filed against the same also came to be dismissed by the High Court. 5. As discussed supra, it has not been disputed before us tha t the drivers concerned were not entitled to any promotional avenue s. Thus, it is evident that the High Court rightly concluded that the drivers were entitled to the full benefits of the appropriate pay scale under Schedule II of the 1998 Rules. However, in light of our foregoing finding that persons employed in the post of drivers in various d epartments in the Government of Tamil Nadu are only entitled to Ordinary, Selection and Special Grade pay scales in terms of Serial No. 6 of S chedule II of the 1998 Rules, i.e. at Rs. 3200-4900, Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300- 6000 respectively, we have no hesitation to hold that the High Court erred in directing fixation of such pay scales to drivers employed at the High Court in terms of Serial No. 8 of the Sched ule II, fixing Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively. 6. The appeals are therefore allowed partly, to the exte nt that the State Government is directed to fix the pay scale benefits available to the Respondents in the instant appeals in terms of Serial No. 6 of Schedule II of the 1998 Rules under G.O. Ms. No. 162. Nidhi Jain Appeals disposed of.