The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas @ Ratan Rabidas & Anr.

INDU MALHOTRA, J. 1. The issue which has arisen for consideration in the present Criminal Appeals is whether the Gauhati High Court was justif ied in issuing directions that road traffic offences shall be dealt with only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“M.V. Act”), and in holding that in cases of road traffic or motor vehi cle offences, prosecution under the provisions of Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”) is without sanction of law, and recourse to the provisions of the IPC would be unsustainable in law? 2. The Gauhati High Court, Agartala bench vide the impugned judgment dated 22.12.2008 held that: i. Sections 183 and 184 of the M.V. Act, which relate to driving of motor vehicles at excessive speeds and dangerously, and other offences under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act are compoundable before the Police, or in court, and that no further proceeding shall be taken against the accused after he has pleaded guilty. On this premise, it was held “ that the provisions of Cr.P.C must succumb to the statutory provisions to the M.V.Act, and any investigation, inquiry or trial contrary to the same, would be illegal and unsustainable in law ”. [Para 14 of the impugned judgment]. STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RA TAN RABIDAS & ANR. ii. The IPC and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C”) are placed in Entry No. 1 and 2 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The M.V. Act,1988 falls under Entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List. Hence, the status of the M.V. Act is at par with the IPC and Cr.P.C, and it cannot be presumed that M.V. Act is either a subordinate legislation, or inferior to the IPC and Cr.P.C in status. [Para 21 of the impugned judgment] iii. Section 5 of the IPC removes any kind of ambiguity about the conviction and punishment of offenders under a special enactment, which covers the field. Section 208 of the M.V. Act has laid down a special procedure for disposal of road traffic offences. Hence, recourse to the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IPC. Section 5 of the IPC recognizes the supremacy of the special laws, which cannot be diluted under the garb of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. [Paras 24- 26 of the impugned judgment] iv. The prosecution of road traffic offences under the IPC is not permitted, since it has no sanction of law. The only exception to this rule would be where the offence cannot be adequately punished under the M.V. Act. [Para 24-26 of the impugned judgment] v. Since road traffic offences can be regulated and adequately dealt with under the provisions of MV Act, resort to the provisions of the IPC, which is a general law should be avoided. [Para 28 of the impugned judgment] vi. Sections 183 to 188 of the MV Act, which relate to punishment for driving at excessive speed or dangerously or in a drunken condition, etc., are silent about the outcome of the accidents. These penal provisions do not prescribe any separate punishment for causing hurt to people or for damaging any property. However, this does not mean that the Legislature was 777 not aware or totally oblivious to the consequences of dangerous driving while enacting the M.V. Act. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment] vii. If a person cannot be convicted for causing hurt to any person while driving a motor vehicle in a rash and dangerous manner under the MV Act, then the said offender cannot also be convicted under the IPC, since the IPC does not expressly take within its purview road traffic offences. [Para 30 of the impugned judgment] viii. To permit the prosecution of offenders under t he provisions of any other penal law other than the M.V. Act in cases of motor vehicle offences would amount to overriding the M.V . Act, which is a special enactment framed by Parliament for motor vehicle offences. By invoking provisions of the IPC for motor vehicle offences, the basic character and structure of the M.V. Act would get distorted, and would not help in curbing the rising rate of motor vehicle accidents. [Para 33 of the impugned judgment] ix. Prosecution of offenders in cases of road traffi c accidents must be carried out under the M.V. Act as a general rule subject to one exception i.e to try offenders in cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under S. 304 IPC, because sentence of imprisonment of 6 months provided under the M.V. Act appears to be inadequate, going by the rising rate of violent road accidents. The prosecution of offenders under the provisions of the IPC is violative of settled principles of law and contrary to the legislative intent of the M.V. Act. [Para 37 and 37.1 of the impugned judgment] x. The High Court directed the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, and to issue appropriate directions to all subordinate officers to ordinarily register cases against offenders of motor vehicle accidents only under the provisions of the M.V. Act subject to the exception under S. 304 IPC. STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] 3. The present Special Leave Petitions have been filed b y the States of Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh before this Court, where in vide Orders dated 12.05.2009 and 31.07.2009, the operation o f the impugned judgment was stayed. This Court vide Order dated 26.04.2010 granted special leave to appeal, and directed that the stay of the impugned judgment would continue to operate during the pendency of the appeals. 4. Despite service of notice, none appeared for the Respondents. Since there is no contest to the adjudication on the merits of the case, we are not touching upon that part of the judgment. 5. The M.V. Act is a beneficial legislation, the primary objective being to provide a statutory scheme for compensation of victims of motor vehicle accidents; or, their family members who are rendered helpl ess and disadvantaged by the untimely death or injuries caused to a member of the family, if the claim is found to be genuine. 1 The Act provides a summary procedure for claiming compensation for the loss s ustained in an accident, which is otherwise applicable to su its and other proceedings while prosecuting a claim before a civil court. 2 5.1 The M.V. Act repealed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The need was felt to take into account changes in road transport technology, pattern of passenger and freight movements, development of the road network in the country and particularly improved techniques in motor vehicle management. In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty and Ors .3, this Court made suggestions for raising the limit of compensation p ayable in motor vehicle accidents wherein death and permanent disabl ement had occurred, even in the event of there being no fault on t he part of the person driving the offending vehicle, and also in hit and run accidents. The said suggestions were taken into consideration by the Legislature and incorporated in the M.V. Act, 1988. 1 The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C. Padma and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 713; Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 2 Vimla Devi and Ors. vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 186 3 (1987) 4 SCC 284: AIR 1987 SC 2158 779 5.2 Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, 1988 deals with “Offences, Penalties and Procedure”. It deals with offences re lating to contraventions of the provisions of the M.V. Act, or any rule, regulation or notification made thereunder. It primarily deals with offences relating to licenses, driving of vehicles by unauthorized persons, control of traffic, maintenance of motor vehicles, using a vehicle in an unsafe condition, or without registration or permit, driving beyond speed limits, dr iving dangerously or driving by a drunken person, or by a person under the influence of drugs, etc. 5.3 The relevant provisions of the M.V . Act,1988 (as they stood at the time of commission of the offence in questio n) which are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below: 183. Driving at excessive speed, etc . – (1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle in contravention of the speed limits refe rred to in section 112 shall be punishable with fine whi ch may extend to four hundred rupees, or, if having been p reviously convicted of an offence under this sub-section is a gain convicted of an offence under this sub-section, wit h fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (2) Whoever causes any person who is employed by him or is subject to his control in driving to drive a moto r vehicle in contravention of the speed limits referred to in section 112 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to t hree hundred rupees, or, if having been previously convi cted of an offence under this sub-section, is again convict ed of an offence under this subsection, with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. (3) No person shall be convicted of an offence puni shable under subsection (1) solely on the evidence of one witness to the effect that in the opinion of the witness su ch person was driving at a speed which was unlawful, unless t hat opinion is shown to be based on an estimate obtained by the use of some mechanical device. (4) The publication of a time table under which, or the giving of any direction that any journey or part of journey is to be completed within a specified time shall, if in the opinion of the Court it is not practicable in the circumstances of the case STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] for that journey or part of a journey to be completed in the specified time without contravening the speed limits re ferred to in section 112 be prima facie evidence that the person who published the time table or gave the direction has committed an offence punishable under sub-section ( 2). 184. Driving dangerously — Whoever drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case in cluding the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually i s at the time or which might reasonably be expected to be in the place, shall be punishable for the first offence wi th imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and f or any second or subsequent offence if committed within t hree years of the commission of a previous similar offen ce with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years , or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or wi th both. 185. Driving by a drunken person or by a person under the influence of drugs . - Whoever, while driving, or attempting to drive, a motor vehicle,— (a) has, in his blood, alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. of blood detected in a test by a breath analyser, or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an exte nt as to be incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle. shall be punishable for the first offence with impr isonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine w hich may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both; and for a second or subsequent offence with imprisonment for term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may ext end to three thousand rupees, or with both Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, the dru g or drugs specified by the Central Government in this b ehalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be d eemed to 781 render a person incapable of exercising proper contro l over a motor vehicle. 187. Punishment for offences relating to accident . – Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of clause ( c) of sub-section (1) of section 132 or of section 133 or section 134 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may ex tend to five hundred rupees, or with both or, if having been previously convicted of an offence under this sectio n, he is again convicted of an offence under this section, w ith imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or wit h both. 208. Summary disposal of cases - (1) The Court taking cognizance of any offence (other than an offence whic h the Central Government may by rules specify in this beh alf) under this Act,— (i) may, if the offence is an offence punishable wit h imprisonment under this Act; and (ii) shall, in any other case, state upon the summon s to be served on the accused person that he— (a) may appear by pleader or in person; or (b) may, by a specified date prior to the hearing of the charge, plead guilty to the charge and remit to the Court, by money order, such sum (not exceeding the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offence) as the Court may specify, and the plea of guilt indicated in the money order coupon itself: Provided that the Court shall, in the case of any o f the offences referred to in sub-section (2), state upon the summons that the accused person, if he pleads guilt y, shall so plead in the manner specified in clause (b) and shall forward his driving licence to the Court with his l etter containing such plea. STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] (2) Where the offence dealt with in accordance with sub- section (1)is an offence specified by the Central Gove rnment by rules for the purposes of this sub-section, the Court shall , if the accused person pleads guilty to the charge and forward his driving licence to the Court with the letter containing his plea, make an endorsement of such conviction on his driving licence. (3) Where an accused person pleads guilty and remit s the sum specified and has complied with the provisions o f sub- section (1), or as the case may be, sub-sections (1) and (2), no further proceedings in respect of the offence sh all be taken against him nor shall he be liable, notwithst anding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence by re ason of his having pleaded guilty. 209. Restriction on conviction . - No person prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 183 or section 184 shall be convicted unless— (a) he was warned at the time the offence was committed that the question of prosecuting him would be taken into consideration, or (b) within fourteen days from the commission of the offence, a notice specifying the nature of the offence and the time and place where it is alleged to have been committed was served on or sent by registered post to him or the person registered as the owner of the vehicle at the time of the commission of the offence, or (c) within twenty-eight days of the commission of th e offence, a summons for the offence was served on him: Provided that nothing, in this section shall apply w here the Court is satisfied that— (a) the failure to serve the notice or summons refer red to in this sub-section was due to the fact that neither the name and address of the accused nor the name 783 and address of the registered owner of the vehicle could with reasonable diligence have been ascertained in time, or (b) such failure was brought about by the conduct of the accused.” 5.4 Section 183 provides for the offence of driving a vehicle at excessive speed in contravention of the speed limits referred in Section 112 of the M.V. Act; while Section 184 M.V . Act deals with the offence of driving dangerously. In order to constitute an offence under Section 184, the following ingredients are required to be proved:- (a) the accused should be driving a motor vehicle; (b) the vehicle should be driven at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public having reg ard to all the circumstances of a case, including the nature, c ondition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the volume of traffic at the time of the accident or which might reasonably be expec ted to be in the place. Section 183 and 184 must be read with Section 209 of M.V. Act, which provides that a warning, notice or summons, is mandato rily required to be given for an offence punishable under Section 183 or 184. 5.5 Section 185 of the M.V. Act pertains to the offe nces of driving after consuming alcohol, or driving under the influence of drugs. Any person who while driving or attempting to drive, (a) ha s alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. present in his blood, detected by a breath analyser; or (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an e xtent that he is incapable of exercising proper control over the ve hicle, shall be guilty of an offence under Section 185 of the M.V. Act. 5.6 Section 187 pertains to offences arising from accidents. The offence is for breach of duty and failure to comply with the provisions of Section 132(1)(c) or Section 133 or Section 134 of the M.V. Act. Clause (c) of Section 132 (1) was omitted by S. 40 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 (w.e.f. 14-11-1994); Secti on 133 relates to the duty of the owner to give information regarding the name and address of, and the licence held by, the driver or conductor, who is accused of any offence under this Act on the demand of any poli ce officer; while Section 134 relates to the duty of the driver in case of an accident and injury to a person, to take all reasonable steps to secure STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] medical attention for the injured person, by conveying him to the nearest medical practitioner or hospital, and providing necessary information to the police and insurer of the vehicle about the accident. 5.7 The offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act provide a summary procedure for disposal of cases, which are compoundabl e in nature under Section 208 (3) of the M.V. Act. Section 208(3) provides that if an accused pleads guilty and deposits the fine imposed, then “ no further proceeding in respect of offence shall be taken a gainst him nor shall he be liable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, to be disqualified for holdi ng or obtaining a licence by reason of his having pleaded guilty ”. 5.8 The IPC, on the other hand, is punitive and deterrent in nature. The principal aim and object is to punish offenders for offences committed under the IPC. The relevant provisions of the IP C which are necessary to advert to are extracted herein below: 5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act .- Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the prov isions of any special or local law. 279. Rash driving or riding on a public way .- Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a ma nner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a t erm which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder . Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for lif e, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fi ne, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intenti on of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is lik ely to cause death; 785 or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to caus e death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cau se such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 304A . Causing death by negligence - Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished w ith imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or person al safety of others. - Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punis hed with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. 338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. - Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligen tly as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of o thers, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 5.9 Section 279 IPC falls under Chapter XIV – “ Offences affecting Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decen cy And Morals ”, and provides for offences relating to rash and negligent driving which endanger human life. Section 279 IPC makes rash driving, or riding on a public road, punishable if such rash driving or riding endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. It is the rash or negligent manner of driving or riding which endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person, which constitutes an offence under Section 279 IPC. 5.10 Sections 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 IPC fall under Chapter XVI – “ Offences Affecting the Human Body ” which makes STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] provision for offences relating to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing death by negligence by doing any rash or negligent act, and causing hurt or grievous hurt, by endangering the life or p ersonal safety of others. 5.11 Where the rash or negligent driving results in hurt or grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under Secti on 337 or 338 IPC is committed. 5.12 Where the rash or negligent driving, results in the death of a person, without the knowledge that the said act will ca use death, Section 304A IPC would be applicable. In other words, Section 304A applies to cases where there is no intention to cause dea th, and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. Negligence and rashness are essential elements of Section 304A. 4 The three ingredients of Section 304-A, which are required to be proved are: (1) the death of a human being; (2) the acc used caused the death; and (3) the death was caused by the doin g of a rash or negligent act, though it did not amount to culpable homicide of e ither description. 5 The requirement of culpable rashness under S.304A IPC is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. 6 Criminal or culpable rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton, and the further knowledge that it may cause injury, but done without any inte ntion to cause injury or knowledge that the act would probably cause. 7 5.13 When a person drives a vehicle so recklessly, rashly or negligently that it causes the death of a person, and of whic h he had knowledge as a reasonable man, that such act was dangerous e nough to cause death, he may be attributed with the knowle dge of the consequence, and may held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which is punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. 4 Naresh Giri v. State of M.P . (2008) 1 SCC 791; Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 5 Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 6 N.K.V Bros (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal & Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 457 7 Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 84 787 5.14 Sections 279, 304-A, 337 and 338 IPC may be invoked only if the act of the accused is a negligent or rash act. It i s manifest from the scheme of Sections 279, 304-A, 336, 337 and 338 IPC that these offences are punishable because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein, irrespective of the knowledge or int ention of the offender. With respect to Section 304 Part II IPC, the prosecution has to prove that the death of the person was caused by the act of the accused, and that he had knowledge that such act was likely to cause dea th. 8 To constitute an offence under this Section, the kno wledge of the offender as required under Section 300 IPC is to be proved and established. 6. In our view there is no conflict between the provisions of the IPC and the MV Act. Both the statutes operate in entirely dif ferent spheres. The offences provided under both the statutes are separate and distinct from each other. The penal consequences provided under both the statutes are also independent and distinct from each other. The ingredients of offences under the both statutes, as discussed earlier, are different, and an offender can be tried and punished independently under both statutes. The principle that the special law should prevail over the general law, has no application in cases of prosecution of offenders in road accidents under the IPC and M.V. Act. 7. It is pertinent to mention that there is no provision under t he M.V. Act which separately deals with offences causi ng death, or grievous hurt, or hurt by a motor vehicle in cases of motor vehi cle accidents. Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act is silent about the act of rash and negligent driving resulting in death, or hurt, or grievous hu rt, to persons nor does it prescribe any separate punishment for the same; whereas Sections 279, 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC have been specifically framed to deal with such offences. 8. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides, “Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished und er either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 8 Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2 012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] It is well settled that an act or an omission can constitu te an offence under the IPC and at the same time, be an offence under any other law. The finding of the High Court that the pr osecution of offenders under two statutes i.e. the M.V. Act and the IPC, is unsustainable and contrary to law, is therefore, set aside. A similar issue arose in the case of T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari 9, wherein the appellant was prosecuted both under Section 177 of the IPC, and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court held as follows: “6. We proceed to consider the next question arising i n this case viz. whether the appellant can be prosecuted both under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 52 of th e 1922 Act [Income Tax Act, 1922] at the same time. I t was argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of t he provisions of Section 26 of the General clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) the appellant can be prosecuted either und er Section 52 of the 1922 Act or under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and not under both the sections a t the same time. We are unable to accept this argument as correct . Section 26 of the General clauses Act states: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or m ore enactments.— Where an act or omission constitutes a n offence under two or more enactments, then the offe nder shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twic e for the same offence. In other words, the section p rovides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shal l not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence . We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.” [emphasis supplied] 9 (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 : (1969) 72 ITR 787 789 Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan 10 , the accused was prosecuted under Sections 26 and 30 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 as well as Sections 188, 272, 273 and 328 of the IPC for transportation and sale of prohibited gutka/pan masala . The High Court held that Section 55 of the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 being a specific provision made in a special enactment, Section 188 of the IPC was inapplicable. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court, and held that : “8 . There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an of fender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. W here an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and puni shed under either or both enactments but shall not be li able to be punished twice for the same offence. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. The High Court ough t to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clause s Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more enactments -Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender sha ll be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 9. In Hat Singh’s case this Court discussed the doc trine of double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act to observe that prosecution under two different Act s is permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the prosecution of the Respondent therein for offences u nder the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 and Indian Penal Code, this Court in State (NCT of D elhi) STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] 10 Criminal Appeal No. 1195-1207 of 2018, Decided on September 20, 2018 v. Sanjay held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the offences committed b y persons are penal and cognizable offences. A perusa l of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that t here is no bar for prosecution under the IPC merely because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties. We, t herefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the first point.” [emphasis supplied] 9. The legislative intent of the MV Act, and in particular Chapter XIII of the MV Act, was not to override or supersede the provisions of the IPC in so far as convictions of offenders in m otor vehicle accidents are concerned. Offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act, cannot abrogate the applicability of the provisions under Sections 297, 304, 304A, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The offences do not overlap, and therefore, the maxim of “ generalia specialibus nonderogant ” is inapplicable, and could not have been invoked. The offences prescribed under the IPC are independent of the offences prescribed under the M.V. Act. It cannot be said that prosecution of road traffic/motor vehicle offenders under the IPC would offend Section 5 of the IP C, as held by the High Court, in so far as punishment for off ences under the M.V. Act is concerned. 10. Considering the matter from a different perspective, offences under Chapter XIII of the MV Act are compoundable in nature in view of Section 208(3) of the MV Act, whereas offences under Section 279, 304 Part II and 304A IPC are not. If the IPC gives way to the MV Act, and the provisions of CrPC succumb to the provisions of the MV Act as held by the H igh Court, then even cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing death, or grievous hurt, or simple hurt by rash and negligent driving, would become compoundable. Such an interpretation would have the consequence of letting an offender get away with a fine by pl eading guilty, without having to face any prosecution for the offence committed. 11. This Court has time and again emphasised on the need to strictly punish offenders responsible for causing motor vehicle accidents. With rapidly increasing motorisation, India is facing an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities. The financial loss, emotiona l and social trauma caused to a family on losing a bread winner, or any other member of the family, or incapacitation of the vict im cannot be quantified. 791 12. The principle of proportionality between the cr ime and punishment has to be borne in mind. The principle of just p unishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offenc e. 11 The maximum imprisonment for a first time offence under Chapter XIII of the M.V. Act, is up to only six months; whereas the maximum imprisonment for a first time offence under the IPC in relation to road traffic offences can go upto 10 years under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The sentence imposed by the courts should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and should have a deterring effect on wrong-doers. 12 The punishment of offenders of motor vehicle accidents under the IPC is stricter and proportionate to the offence committed, as compared with the M.V. Act. 13. We thus hold that a prosecution, if otherwise maintainabl e, would lie both under the IPC and the MV Act, since both the statu tes operate with full vigour, in their own independent spheres. Even assuming that some of the provisions of the MV Act and IPC are overlapping, it cannot be said that the offences under both the statutes are incompatible. 14. The High Court has given a contradictory finding by holding on the one hand that the provisions of the Cr.P.C must succumb t o the provisions of the M.V. Act, as executive authorities cannot t ake away a beneficial provision under a special law enacted by Parlia ment (para 14 of the impugned judgment), while on the other hand, it has opin ed that the M.V. Act is not a complete code in itself, a nd there is no complete bar to investigate road traffic offences under the provisions of Cr.P.C. (para 23 of the impugned judgment). 15. In our considered view the position of law is well-settled. This Court has consistently held that the M.V. Act,1988 is a complete code in itself in so far as motor vehicles are concerned. 13 However, there is no bar under the M.V. Act or otherwise, to try and prosecute offences under the IPC for an offence relating to motor vehicle acc idents. On this ground as well, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 11 Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608 12 State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Arego udar (2002) 3 SCC 738 13 National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesa ria, (2008) 3 SCC 464 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 99 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 945; Gottumukka la Appala Narasimha Raju v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 446 : (2 008) 2 SCC (L&S) 662 STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] 14 (2000) 5 SCC 82 16. The object behind punishing persons found guilty of causing motor vehicle accidents has been succinctly stated by this Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana 14 in the following words: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on Section 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under Section 304-A IPC, that road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent a nd the toll is galloping day by day in India, and that no solution i s in sight nor suggested by any quarter to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that “more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so t he Indian highways are among the top killers of the cou ntry”, the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today. So V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision [Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 17] thus: (SCC p. 720, para 3) “Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, t he law under Section 304-A IPC and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequ ency of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of speed ing menaces.” 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna [(1987) 1 SCC 538 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 198] this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under Sec tion 304-A IPC to remain in force although the High Cour t too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accide nts in India and the devastating consequences visiting the vict ims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the natu re of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting t he 793 benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. W hile considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed f or the offence of causing death by rash or negligent drivi ng of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accele rator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any acci dent occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might no t be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the cour t. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that i f he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human be ing due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the co urts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, fo r lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous dri ving of automobiles . “ [emphasis supplied] In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka 15 , the Court opined that there is a constant concern of the Court on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences in cases of motor vehicle accidents. In that case, the appellant was found guilty for t he offences punishable under Sections 337, 338, 279 and 304-A IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months along with fin e. The Court held that: “32. We may note with profit that an appropriate punishme nt works as an eye-opener for the persons who are not care ful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they w ould be shown indulgence or lives of others are like ‘flies to the wanton boys’. They totally forget that the lives of many are STA TE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH v. RAMCHANDRA RABIDAS @ RATAN RABIDAS & ANR. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.] 15 (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 in their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human bein g is given an indecent burial by their rash and negli gent act. 33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment . It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imp osed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for j ustice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightl y ignored .” [emphasis supplied] 17. In view of the above discussion, we set aside the direc tions issued by the Gauhati High Court to the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to issue appropriate instructions to their subordinate offic ers to prosecute offenders in motor vehicle accidents only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and not the IPC. 18. The Criminals Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid term s. The interim order passed on 26.04.2010 is made absolute. All pending Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of. Ordered accordingly. Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.