Awadhesh Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr.
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 18.12.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad at Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 2517 of 2009 by
which the High Court has been pleased to allow the appeal preferred
by the original accused partly and has converted the conviction from
Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC, the original compl ainant
has preferred this appeal.
3. Brief facts of the case of the prosecution was t hat the
complainant Awadesh Kumar lodged an FIR at Police Station Kh iri,
District Lakhimpur Kheri on 11.07.2006 at 18:45 hours alleging therein
that on 11.07.2006 at about 5:30 p.m. his mother Smt. Lajjawati w as
making complaint to Ravinder Verma (original accuse d No. 1-
respondent No. 2 herein) regarding bad behaviour of his nephew Vishun
Kumar. At that time, Sudhir @ Ramaudh, Rakesh, Vishun Kumar were
also present there. When the mother of the complainant w as making
complaint, meanwhile all the above named four perso ns started
quarrelling with his mother.In the meanwhile, the b rother of the
complainant Anoop Kumar and his father Ram Lakhan also reach ed
there. Then all the four accused persons were asked by these persons
to go away from there. Feeling annoyed by this cond uct of the
complainant side, Vishnu Kumar, Rakesh Kumar and Su dhir @
Ramaudh exhorted Ravinder to fire at the deceased, Ravinder, with his
country-made pistol fired on the complainant’s mother. The complainant
along with other persons took his injured mother to police stat ion and
lodged the FIR.
4. That, initially the case was registered under Section 307, 504,
506/34 IPC, however, subsequently on the death of Smt. Lajjawa ti on
11.07.2006, the case was converted into one under Section 302 IPC.
AWADHESH KUMAR v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
After investigation, the Investigating Officer filed th e charge-sheet
against all the four named accused persons, including respondent No.
2 herein. All of them were tried by the learned Court of S essions for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The learned Trial Court
convicted respondent No. 2 herein (Ravinder) as the specific role of
fire on the deceased was attributed to him. The learned Trial Court
acquitted the other three accused persons. The Respondent No.2 herein
(original accused no.1) feeling dissatisfied with the order of conviction
passed by the learned Trial Court convicting him, preferred Criminal
Appeal before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order,
the High Court has modified the conviction from that of punish able
under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced him
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of 20,000/
-. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court modifying the conviction from Section 302 IPC to 304
Part I IPC, the original complainant has preferred the p resent appeal.
5. Learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant - or iginal
complainant has vehemently submitted that the High Court has
committed a grave error in modifying the conviction from that of Section
302 IPC to that of under Section 304 Part I IPC.
6. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the original complainant that, as such, the accused fired on
the deceased from a close range, due to which the deceased s ustained
serious injuries and ultimately died and, therefore, the case would fal l
under clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC. It is submitted that, therefore,
when the case falls under Clause fourthly to Section 300 IPC, th e act
of the accused would be culpable homicide amounting to murder.
Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original complainant has
submitted that the High Court has materially erred in holding that the
offence committed by the accused Ravinder would com e within
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC by observing that it was not a planned
crime and there was no prior intention and it took place in the heat of
passion on the spur of moment. It is submitted by the learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of the original complainant that Excepti on 4 to
Section 300 IPC would be attracted only when there is a fight or quarrel
which requires mutual provocation and blows by both sides in w hich
the offender does not take undue advantage. In support of his ab ove
submission, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original
complainant has heavily relied upon the decision of this Cour t in the
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case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shivshankar (2014) 10 SCC
366. It is submitted that, in the present case, there was no blow by the
complainant side of the deceased. The complainant s ide and the
deceased did not have any weapon. The accused came with a country-
made firearm after there was some altercation/exchange of words by
his cousin with the deceased. It is submitted that therefore the case
would not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. It is submit ted
that therefore the High Court has materially erred in conve rting the
conviction from the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC t o that
of Section 304 Part I IPC.
7. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused
No. 1 – respondent No. 2 herein has made strenuous efforts to support
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court ultimately
convicting the accused for the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC.
It is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing o n behalf of
respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 that the High Court has
rightly observed that it was not a planned crime and there was no prior
intention and it took place in the heat of passion on the spur of moment.
It is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing o n behalf of
respondent No. 2 that therefore the High Court has rightly observed
that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC would be attracted and, therefore,
the High Court has rightly converted the conviction from that of Section
302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC.
7.1 Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2
has taken us through the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court
while acquitting the other three accused and has submitted tha t while
acquitting the other three accused persons, the learned Trial Court has
clearly observed that there was no prior intention to commit the murder
with pre-planning and rather the incident took place all of a sudden,
when Lajjawati went to complain to Ravinder. It is submitte d that the
finding recorded by the learned Trial Court has gone unchallenged. It
is submitted that, therefore, the case would fall under Excepti on 4 to
Section 300 IPC and therefore also the High Court has rightly converted
the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that
of Section 304 Part I IPC.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties at length. We have also gone through and considered
the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court as well a s the High
Court.
AWADHESH KUMAR v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the learned Trial
Court convicted respondent No. 2 herein – original accused No. 1 for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. By th e impugned
judgment and order, the High Court converted the conviction for the
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part
I IPC on the grounds that:
(i) it was not a planned crime;
(ii) there was no prior intention; and
(iii) it took place in the heat of passion on the sp ur of
moment.
Therefore, as per the High Court, the case would fall under
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. However, considering the material /
evidence on record and considering the deposition of the original
complainant and considering the case of the prosecution proved, t he
incident in question that took place half an hour after there was abusive
language used by the cousin of original accused No. 1 – Ravinder with
the deceased. That, thereafter, respondent No. 2 her ein – original
accused No. 1 came with others with a country-made firearm a nd at
that time the deceased made a grievance with respect to th e abusive
language used by Vishun Kumar (cousin of original accused No. 1) and,
at that time, respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 started abusing.
At that time, the deceased and others told them not to use abusive
words in future and told them to go away. At that time, r espondent
No. 2 – original accused No. 1 told the deceased and others not t o
challenge him and he told that “Do you not know that I have been
convicted, now I do not have any kind of fear”. Thereafter, Rav inder
– respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 fired from the close range.
None of the persons from the complainant side, including the deceased,
was having any weapon. There was no further grave a nd sudden
provocation by the deceased which led to the accused to fire on the
deceased and, that too, from a very close range.
8.2 As observed by this Court in the case of Shivshankar (supra),
intention is a matter of inference and when death is a s a result of
intentional firing, intention to cause death is patent unless the case falls
under any of the exceptions. It is further observed and held that
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is attracted only when there is a fight
or quarrel which requires mutual provocation and blows by both side s
in which the offender does not take undue advantage.
191
8.3 In the case of Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of
Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 330, in paragraph 6, this Court has
observed and held as under:
“6............. It is true that some of the conditio ns for the
applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 exist here, but not all.
The quarrel had broken out suddenly, but there was no sudden
fight between the deceased and the appellant. ‘Fight’ postulates
a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged . The
deceased was unarmed. He did not cause any injury t o the
appellant or his companions. Furthermore, no less than three fatal
injuries were inflicted by the appellant with an axe, whic h is a
formidable weapon on the unarmed victim. Appellant is therefore,
not entitled to the benefit of Exception 4, either.”
8.4 The above observations fully support the view that the present
case falls under Section 302 IPC.
8.5 Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, t he
High Court has materially erred in applying Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC by holding that it was not a planned crime and there w as no prior
intention and it took place in the heat of passion on the spur of moment.
8.6 Considering the material/evidence on record disc ussed
hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the case falls under Clause
fourthly to Section 300 IPC and, therefore, the Trial Court was right in
convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302
IPC, more particularly, when the accused fired from a count ry-made
firearm on the deceased from a close range. By the accu sed firing
from a close range, the accused was supposed to know that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
9. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused relying
upon some of the observations made by the Trial Court while acquitting
the other three accused is concerned, it is required to be noted that
those observations were made by the learned Trial C ourt while
considering the common intention of the other accused and theref ore
benefit of such observations would not be available to original accused
No. 1 when it has come on record and it has been proved that it was
the original accused No. 1 who fired at the deceased and, that too, from
a very close range.
AWADHESH KUMAR v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[M. R. SHAH, J.]
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, t he
present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order pas sed
by the High Court modifying the conviction for the offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC to that of Section 304 Part I IPC is hereby
quashed and set aside. The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court
convicting the respondent No. 2 – original accused No. 1 for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC is hereby restored. Now, respondent
No. 2 – original accused No. 1 to surrender before the concerned Court
to undergo the sentence as imposed by the learned Trial C ourt, within
a period of three months from today.
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.