Adjudicating Officer, Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Bhavesh Pabari
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Two primary questions, in a way interconnected, have been
referred by the Referral judgment and order dated 14 th March, 2016
passed in Siddharth Chaturvedi Vs. Securities and Exchange Board
of India 1. The correctness of the view expressed on the said t wo
questions by a numerical smaller bench of this Court in Securities and
Exchange Board of India through its Chairman vs. Roofit Industries
Limited 2 would coincidentally arise. The questions referred can b e
enumerated and summarized as follows:
(i) Whether the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of
Section 15-J of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act , 1992
(hereinafter referred to as “SEBI Act”) are exhaustive t o govern the
discretion in the Adjudicating Officer to decide on the quantum of penalty
or the said conditions are merely illustrative?
(ii) Whether the power and discretion vested by Section 15-J of
the SEBI Act to decide on the quantum of penalty, regardle ss of the
manner in which the first question is answered, stands eclipsed b y the
penalty provisions contained in Section 15-A to Section 15-HA of the
SEBI Act?
3. The SEBI Act, as the object of its enactment would indic ate,
was enacted “ to provide for the establishment of a Board to protect
the interests of investors in securities and to pro mote the
development of, and to regulate, the securities marke t and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto .”
4. For the purposes of the present reference, we may proceed t o
consider the provisions contained in Chapter VI-A of the SEBI Act.
Sections 15-A to 15-HA are the penalty provisions whereas Section 15-
I deals with the power of adjudication and Section 15-J enumerates the
“factors to be taken into account by the Adjudicating Officer”
while adjudging the quantum of penalty.
5. Section 15-A, illustratively, as existing prior to its amendment
by Act No.59 of 2002, as amended by Act No.59 of 2002 and thereafter
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI
1 (2016) 12 SCC 119
2 (2016) 12 SCC 125
as amended by Act No.27 of 2014 and Section 15-J are required to be
specifically noticed at this stage.
Section 15A as existing prior to Amendment Act No.59 of 2002
“15A. Penalty for failure to furnish information, return, etc.
- If any person, who is required under this Act or any rules or
regulations made thereunder, -
(a) to furnish any document, return or report to the Board,
fails to furnish the same, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding
one lakh and fifty thousand rupees for each such failure;
(b) to file any return or furnish any information, books or
other documents within the time specified therefor in the
regulations, fails to file return or furnish the same within the time
specified therefor in the regulations, he shall be liable to a penalty
not exceeding five thousand rupees for every day, during which
such failure continues;
(c) to maintain books of account or records, fails to maintain
the same, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding ten thousand
rupees for every day during which the failure continues.”
Section 15A as amended by Act No.59 of 2002
“15A. Penalty for failure to furnish information, return, etc.
- If any person, who is required under this Act or any rules or
regulations made thereunder, -
(a) to furnish any document, return or report to the Board,
fails to furnish the same, he shall be liable to a penalty of one lakh
rupees for each day during which such failure continues or one
crore rupees, whichever is less;
(b) to file any return or furnish any information, books or
other documents within the time specified therefor in the
regulations, fails to file return or furnish the same within the time
specified therefor in the regulations, he shall be liable to a penalty
of one lakh rupees for each day during which such failure continues
or one crore rupees, whichever is less;
(c) to maintain books of account or records, fails to maintain
the same, he shall be liable to a penalty of one lakh ru pees for
905
each day during which such failure continues or one crore rupees,
whichever is less.”
Section 15A as amended by Amendment Act No.27 of 2014
“15-A. Penalty for failure to furnish information, return, etc.
- If any person, who is required under this Act or any rules or
regulations made thereunder,-
(a) to furnish any document, return or report to the Board
fails to furnish the same, he shall be liable to a penalty which shall
not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to one
lakh rupees for each day during which such failure continues
subject to a maximum of one crore rupees;
(b) to file any return or furnish any information, books or
other documents within the time specified therefor in the
regulations, fails to file return or furnish the same within the time
specified therefor in the regulations, he shall be liable to a penalty
which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend
to one lakh rupees for each day during which such failure continues
subject to a maximum of one crore rupees;
(c) to maintain books of account or records, fails to maintain
the same, he shall be liable to a penalty which shall not be less
than one lakh rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees for
each day during which such failure continues subject to a maximum
of one crore rupees.
Section 15 J
“15-J. Factors to be taken into account by the adjudicating officer.-
While adjudging the quantum of penalty under section 15-I, the
adjudicating officer shall have due regard to the following factors,
namely:-
(a) the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage,
wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default;
(b) the amount of loss caused to an investor or group of
investors as a result of the default;
(c) the repetitive nature of the default.
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
Explanation - for the removal of doubts, it is clarified t hat the
power of an adjudicating officer to adjudge the quantum of penalty
under sections 15-A to 15-E, clauses (b) and (c) of section 15-F,
15-G, 15-H and 15-HA shall be and shall always be deemed to
have been exercised under the provisions of this section.”
[Explanation added by Act No. 7 of 2017]
6. Insofar as the second question is concerned, if the pena lty
provisions are to be understood as not admitting of any excep tion or
discretion and the penalty as prescribed in Section 15-A to Section 15-
HA of the SEBI Act is to be mandatorily imposed in case of default/
failure, Section 15-J of the SEBI Act would stand obliterated and eclipsed.
Hence, the question referred. Sections 15-A(a) to 15-HA have to b e
read along with Section 15-J in a manner to avoid any inconsistency or
repugnancy. We must avoid conflict and head-on-clash and construe the
said provisions harmoniously. Provision of one section cannot be used to
nullify and obtrude another unless it is impossible to reconcile the two
provisions. The explanation to Section 15-J of the SEBI Act adde d by
Act No.7 of 2017, quoted above, has clarified and v ested in the
Adjudicating Officer a discretion under Section 15-J on the quantum of
penalty to be imposed while adjudicating defaults under Sections 15-A
to 15-HA. Explanation to Section 15-J was introduced/added in 2017 for
the removal of doubts created as a result of pronou ncement in
M/s. Roofit Industries Ltd. case (supra) . We are in agreement with
the reasoning given in reference order dated 14 th March, 2016 that
M/s Roofit Industries Ltd. had erroneously and wrongly held that Section
15-J would not be applicable after Section 15-A(a) was amended with
effect from 29 th October, 2002 till 7 th September, 2014 when Section 15-
A(a) of the SEBI Act was again amended. It is beyond any doubt that
the second referred question stands fully answered by clarification through
the medium of enacting the Explanation to Section 15-J vide Act No.7 to
2017, which also states that the Adjudicating Officer shall always have
deemed to have exercised and applied the provision. We, therefore, deem
it appropriate to hold that the provisions of Section 15-J were never
eclipsed and had continued to apply in terms thereof to the de faults
under Section 15-A(a) of the SEBI Act.
7. Reference Order in Siddharth Chaturvedi & Ors. (supra)
on the said aspect has observed that Section 15-A(a) could apply even
to technical defaults of small amounts and, therefore, presc ription of
907
minimum mandatory penalty of Rs.1 lakh per day subject to maximum
of Rs.1 crore, would make the Section completely disproportionate and
arbitrary so as to invade and violate fundamental rights. Insertion of the
Explanation would reflect that the legislative intent, in spite of the use of
the expression “whichever is less” in Section 15-A(a) as it existed during
the period 29 th October 2002 till 7 th September 2014, was not to curtail
the discretion of the Adjudicating Officer by prescribing a minimum
mandatory penalty of not less than Rs. 1 lakh per day till compliance
was made, notwithstanding the fact that the default was technical, no
loss was caused to the investor(s) and no disproportionate gain or unfair
advantage was made. The legislative intent is also clear as Section 15A(a)
was amended by the Amendment Act No.27 of 2014 to state that th e
penalty could extend to Rs. 1 lakh for each day during which the failure
continues subject to a maximum penalty of Rs. 1 crore. This amendment
in 2014 was not retrospective and therefore, clarificatory and removal
of doubt Explanation to Section 15-J was added by the Act No. 7 of
2017. Normally the expression “whichever is less” would connote absence
of discretion by prescribing the minimum mandatory penalty, but in the
context of Section 15A(a) as it was between 29 th October,2002 till 7 th
September, 2014, read along with Explanation to Section 15-J added by
Act No.7 of 2017, we would hold the legislative intent was not to prescribe
minimum mandatory penalty of Rs.1 lakh per day during which the default
and failure had continued. We would prefer read and interpret Section
15-A(a) as it was between 25 th October, 2002 and 7 th September, 2014
in line with the Amendment Act 27 of 2014 as giving discretion to the
Adjudicating Officer to impose minimum penalty of Rs.1 lakh subject to
maximum penalty of Rs.1 crore, keeping in view the period of default as
well as aggravating and mitigating circumstances including those specified
in Section 15-J of the SEBI Act.
8. This will require us to consider the first question referred.
Having dealt with the submissions advanced by the rival parties, (both
parties have actually canvassed for a wider and mor e expansive
interpretation of Section 15-J), we are inclined to take the view that the
provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J are illust rative in
nature and have to be taken into account whenever such circumstances
exist. But this is not to say that there can be no other circumstance(s)
beyond those enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J that
the Adjudicating Officer is precluded in law from considerin g while
deciding on the quantum of penalty to be imposed.
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
9. A narrow view would be in direct conflict with the provisions of
Section 15-I(2) of the SEBI Act which vests jurisdi ction in the
Adjudicating Officer, who is empowered on completion of the inquiry to
impose “ such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with th e
provisions of any of those sections .”
10. The above apart, the circumstances enumerated in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J of the SEBI Act may have no relevance
and may never arise in case of contraventions contemplated by certain
provisions of the SEBI Act, for instance Section 15-A, 15-B or 15-C of
the SEBI Act. Failure to furnish information, return, etc.; failure to enter
into agreement with clients; and failure to redress investors’ grievances
cannot give rise to the circumstances set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of Section 15-J.
11. Therefore, to understand the conditions stipulated in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J to be exhaustive and admitting of no
exception or vesting any discretion in the Adjudicating Officer would be
virtually to admit/concede that in adjudications involving penalties under
Sections 15-A, 15-B and 15-C, Section 15-J will have no app lication.
Such a result could not have been intended by the legisla ture. We,
therefore, hold and take the view that conditions stipulated in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J are not exhaustive and in the given facts
of a case, there can be circumstances beyond those enumera ted by
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J which can be taken note of by
the Adjudicating Officer while determining the quantum of penalty.
12. At this stage, we must also deal with and reject the argument
raised by some of the private appellants that the conditions stipulated in
clauses (a) to (c) of Section 15-J are mandatory conditions which must
be read into Sections 15-A to 15-HA in the sense that unless the conditions
specified in clauses (a) to (c) are satisfied, penalt y cannot be imposed
by the Adjudicating Officer under the substantive provisions of Sections
15-A to 15-HA of the SEBI Act. The argument is too far-fetched to be
accepted. Section 15-J of the SEBI Act enumerates b y way of
illustration(s) the factors which the Adjudicating Officer should take into
consideration for determining the quantum of penalty imposable . The
imposition of penalty depends upon satisfaction of th e substantive
provisions as contained in Sections 15-A to Section 15-HA of the SEBI
Act.
909
13. There is a distinction between a continuing offence and a
repeat offence. The continuing offence is a one which is of a continuous
nature as distinguished from one which is committed once and for all.
The term “continuing offence” was explained and elucidated by giving
several illustrations in State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Ors. 3.
In case of continuing offence, the liability continues until the rule or its
requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occa sion when
disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is an offence
committed. Continuing offence constitutes a fresh offence ev ery time
or occasion it occurs. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh 4,
continuing offence or default in service law was explained as a single
wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. A recurring or successive
wrong, on the other hand, are those which occur periodically with each
wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of acti on. We have
made reference to this legal position in view of clause (c) of Section 15-
J of the SEBI Act which refers to repetitive nature of default and not a
continuing default. The word “repetitive” as used therein would refer to
a recurring or successive default. This factum has to be taken into
consideration while deciding upon the quantum of penalty. This dictum,
however, does not mean that factum of continuing default is not a relevant
factor, as we have held that clauses (a) to (c) in Secti on 15-J of the
SEBI Act are merely illustrative and are not the only grounds /factors
which can be taken into consideration while determining the quantum of
penalty.
14. We now proceed to consider each of the case as, in our
considered view, such exercise would be appropriate to finally terminate/
decide the appeals under consideration.
C.A. No. 9797 of 2014 (Bhavesh Pabari Vs. The Adjudicating
Officer, SEBI)
C.A. No. 9798 of 2014 (M/s. Shree Radhe Vs. The Adjudicating
Officer, SEBI)
C.A. No. 9799 of 2014 (Hemant Sheth Vs. The Adjudicating
Officer, SEBI)
15. These appeals arise from a common order dated 1 0 th
September, 2013 passed by the Securities Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai,
3 (1972) 2 SCC 890
4 (2008) 8 SCC 648
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
(“Appellate Tribunal” for short), on appeals preferred by Mr. Bhavesh
Pabari, M/s Shree Radhe, and Mr. Hemant Sheth impugnin g three
separate orders all dated 30 th December, 2011 passed by the Adjudicating
Officer under Section 15-I of the SEBI Act.
16. Impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal confirms
penalty of Rs.20,00,000 (Rupees twenty lakhs only) each as imposed on
the appellants by the Adjudicating Officer under Section 15-HA of the
Act for violation of Regulation Nos.4(2)(a), (b) and (g) of t he SEBI
(Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practic es relating to
Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (“PFUTP Regulations” for short).
17. Factual findings, as observed by the Adjudicating Officer and
accepted by the Appellate Tribunal as un-controvertible, are mentioned
below:
(i) Bhavesh Pabari in his name and as sole proprietor of M /s.
Shree Radhe, Hemant Sheth and one Neeraj Sanghvi had
indulged in synchronized/structured and reversed trade in
the scrips of M/s. Gulshan Polyols Ltd. (erstwhile Gulshan
Sugar and Chemicals Ltd.) (“GPL” for short) from 10 th
April, 2006 to 8 th September, 2006.
(ii) Connection/complicity between Bhavesh Pabari/M/ s. Shree
Radhe, Hemant Sheth and one Neeraj Sanghvi was
established and was not disputed. Hemant Sheth and
Bhavesh Pabari/M/s. Shree Radhe had a common
introducer in the “Know Your Customer” documentation.
(iii) Scrips of GPL opened at Rs.44.75 on 12 th January, 2006,
touched a peak high of Rs.103.40 on 30 th August, 2006 and
closed at Rs. 31.70 on 29 th December, 2006. The share
price of the scrips during the period 1 st December, 2005 to
11 January, 2006 was in the range of Rs.31.50 to Rs. 49.90
with an average daily volume of 8,255 shares.
(iv) The three appellants along with Neeraj Sanghvi, during the
period 10th April, 2006 to 8 th September, 2006 had traded
with each other in 18,48,081 shares of the GPL which had
accounted for around 16.29% of the total traded volume in
this period.
911
(v) About 45% of the total shares, i.e., 8,34,453 shares were
executed via structured orders, i.e., buy and sell orders
which were placed within a gap of one minute. Out of this,
trade in 5,97,835 shares (32% of the total shares traded)
were through synchronized orders as the rate and quantity
of the buy and sell order were identical.
(vi) On 64 trading dates between 10 th April, 2006 to 8 th
September, 2006, a reverse trading pattern was espied in
15,18,204 shares, which had accounted for 13.38% of the
total market value and was more than 20% of the market
volume in the aforesaid period.
(vii) On 24 days between the period from 10 April, 2006 to 8 th
September, 2006, the quantity traded in the GPL scrips
between the connected persons was more than 50% of the
market volume.
(viii) On 1 st August, 2006, the connected transactions were
83.79% of the market volume.
(ix) Bhavesh Pabari had indulged in self trade in 60,203 GPL
shares (5.1% of the total traded quantity from 18 th April,
2006 to 25 th August, 2006).
(x) Bhavesh Pabari had executed reversal trades with M/s.
Shree Radhe and Hemant Sheth for 7,73,810 shares during
the period 18 th April, 2006 to 25 th August, 2006 which was
66% of the total traded quantity.
(xi) Bhavesh Pabari had entered into 96 buy trades in 1,22,324
shares which were found to be synchronized by price and
time and 69 buy trades in 1,43,170 shares synchronized by
price, time and quantity with his sole proprietorship M/s.
Shree Radhe in the period 18 th April, 2006 to 25 th August,
2006.
(xii) Bhavesh Pabari had entered into 282 sell trades in 2,16,578
shares which were synchronized by price and time, and 32
sell trades for 43,626 shares which was found to be
synchronized by price, time and quantity with M/s Shree
Radhe during the period 18 th April, 2006 to 25th August,
2006.
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
(xiii) Bhavesh Pabari had entered into 28 buy trades for 55,915
shares synchronized by price and time and 21 buy trades
for 39,350 shares synchronized by price, time and quantity
with Hemant Sheth in the period 18 th April, 2006 to 25 th
August, 2006.
(xiv) Bhavesh Pabari had entered into 22 sell trades for 41,500
shares which were found to be synchronized by price and
time and 16 sell trades for 40,422 shares which were
synchronized by price, time and quantity with Hemant Sheth
in the period 18 th April, 2006 to 25 th August, 2006.
(xv) Similarly, there were 13 buy and sell trades with Nee raj
Sanghvi.
18. The sole contention of the learned counsels appearing on behalf
of Bhavesh Pabari and M/s Shree Radhe is that penalties of Rs.20,00,000
(Rupees twenty lakhs only) each should not have been se parately
imposed on Bhavesh Pabari and M/s Shree Radhe, of which he was the
sole proprietor.
19. This contention superficially seems attractive, but on an in-
depth reflection should be rejected as Bhavesh Pabari had indulge d in
trading in its personal name and as also the sole proprietor of M/s. Shree
Radhe. This is clear from inter se transactions and transact ions with
connected persons. Thus, Bhavesh Pabari had transacted in two different
capacities, i.e., in his personal name and as sole proprietor of M/s. Shree
Radhe. It is in this background that total penalty of Rs.40 lakhs (Rupees
forty lakhs only) under Section 15-HA of the SEBI Act had been imposed
for violation of Regulations 4(2)(a), (b) and (g) of the PFUTP Regulations
as the transactions were in two different names, though belonging to the
same individual.
20. Accordingly, C.A. No.9798/2014 preferred by M/s Shre e
Radhe and C.A. No.9797/2014 preferred by Bhavesh Pabari hold no
merit and are dismissed affirming the order passed by t he Appellate
Tribunal and confirming the penalty of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty
lakhs only) each imposed under Section 15-HA of the Act. C.A. No.
9799/2014 by Hemant Sheth must also fail. In the given facts , we are
not inclined to show indulgence and leniency to the three appellants, as
the facts found are highly ignominious and scandalous.
913
C.A. No. 11311 of 2013 (A.O., Securities and Exchange Board
of India vs. Bhavesh Pabari)
C.A. No. 1824 of 2014 (Securities & Exchange Board of India
Vs. M/s. Shree Radhe)
21. SEBI has filed cross appeals aggrieved by the or der of
Appellate Tribunal dated 10 th September, 2013 deleting the penalty of
Rs.10,00,000 (Rupees ten lakhs only) each imposed on Bhavesh Pabari
and M/s Shree Radhe under Section 15-A(a) of the SEBI Act for violating
Section 11-C(3) and 11-C(5) of SEBI Act.
22. The relevant portion of the impugned order passed by the
Appellate Tribunal reads:
“Additional challenge in Appeal No. 71 of 2012 and 72 of
2012, relates to imposition of Rs.10 lac penalty upon each appellant
for violating Section 11C (3) and 11C (5) of SEBI Act. Grievance
of appellants is that failure to furnish requisite information w as
due to circumstances beyond control viz. grandmother of Bhavesh
Pabari (Appellant in Appeal No. 71 of 2012) who is proprietor of
M/s. Shree Radhe (Appellant in Appeal No. 72 of 2012) had
expired during the relevant period and, therefore, he was in
disturbed mind at the material time. Though, explanation given
does not inspire confidence in the facts of present case, where
penalty of Rs. 20 lac has already been upheld, in our opinion, it
would be just and proper to delete penalty of Rs. 10 lac imposed
upon both appellants”.
23. Submission of the SEBI that the impugned order did not record
any reason for deleting the said penalty, in spite of obs erving that the
explanation given by Bhavesh Pabari did not inspire confidence, would
be a just and fair criticism and a good challenge. We clearly have
reservations on the ground stated or rather lack of reasoning g iven by
the Appellate Tribunal, especially in the light of the language of Sections
15-A(a) and Section 15-J of the Act. However, during the hearing, the
learned counsel appearing for Bhavesh Pabari had drawn our attention
to his reply dated 28 th September, 2009 stating that Bhavesh Pabari’s
grandmother had expired and, therefore, he had requested for time to
make an appearance. It was stated at the Bar that gran dmother of
Bhavesh Pabari had expired on 19 th September, 2009, and this aspect
was highlighted and made known to the authorities. Furthermore, Bhavesh
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
Pabari/ M/s. Shree Radhe had submitted part information vide letter
dated 2 nd November, 2009. These aspects and explanations have not
been considered by the Appellate Tribunal.
24. Adjudicating Officer, while imposing penalty had referred to
the letter dated 6 th May, 2009 by which Bhavesh Pabari and M/s. Shree
Radhe were required to furnish information of details regarding trading
in the GPL scrips, connection/relation with the GPL, its p romoters/
directors, connection/relation between Hemant Sheth, etc. but the said
notice was not complied with. Thereafter, reminders dated 2 1 st July,
2009 and 14 th August, 2009 were issued, but again of no avail. This was
followed by summons dated 4 th September, 2009, 23 rd September 2009,
20 th October, 2009 and 5 th November, 2009.
25. Given the aforesaid facts, we should have remitted the matter
to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh adjudication and examination but
would refrain from doing so in view of the time gap, the quantum of fine
imposed, and, as we have upheld the total penalty of Rs.40,00,000/-
(Rupees forty lakhs only) imposed on the appellant under Sec tion 15-
HA of the SEBI Act. We would rather close the proce edings.
Accordingly, appeals preferred by SEBI, i.e., C.A. No.11311 of 2 013
and C.A. No.1824 of 2014 are also disposed of.
C.A. No.14728/2015 (Ankur Chaturvedi vs. Securities and
Exchange Board of India);
C.A. No.14729/2019 (Jay Kishore Chaturvedi vs. Securities and
Exchange Board of India); and
C.A. No.14730/2015 (Siddharth Chaturvedi vs. Securities and
Exchange Board of India); and
26. The above-captionedappellants are Promotors-cum- Directors
of M/s. Brij Laxmi Leasing and Finance Co. Ltd., a company whos e
shares were listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange.
27. It is accepted and admitted that the appellants Ankur
Chaturvedi, Sidharth Chaturvedi and Jay Kishore Chaturvedi having
purchased shares of M/s. Brij Laxmi Leasing and Finance Co. Ltd. on
2, 3 and 6 occasions respectively, were required but had failed to make
necessary disclosures to the stock exchange as stipulated and statutorily
mandated by Regulations 13(4) and 13(4A) read with Regulation 13(5)
of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Probation of In sider
Trading) Regulations, 1992 (“PIT Regulations” for short).
915
28. For the said violations, penalty of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five
lakhs only) in the case of Ankur Chaturvedi and Sidharth Chaturved i
and Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs only) in the case of Jay Kishore
Chaturvedi were imposed under Section 15-A(b) of the SEBI Act. Ankur
Chaturvedi had also suffered penalty of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs
only) under Section 15-HB of the SEBI Act as he had sold 45,032 shares
after acquiring 45,000 shares on 29 th January, 2013, which was in violation
of Clause 4.2 of the Model Code of Conduct for Prevention of Insider
Trading for Listed Companies as set out in Schedule I, Part A of the PIT
Regulations.
29. The aforesaid penalties were affirmed in the impugned order
passed by the Appellate Tribunal, rejecting the contention that the penalty
so imposed was harsh and deserved substantial reduction as there was
no intention on the part of the appellants to suppress purchase or sale or
that non-disclosure had not caused profits to appellants or otherwise a
loss to the investors and that the failure to make disclosure was an
inadvertent error without mala fide intention.
30. The Appellate Tribunal, considering the factual matrix, h as
held that the maximum penalty stipulated in the PIT Regulati ons was
Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) for each day during which the
failure continued or Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only), whichever
was less. The penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Authority took into
consideration the mitigating factors and cannot be said to be excessively
harsh or unreasonable.
31. In view of the factual background and the reasoning given by
the Appellate Tribunal, we do not find any good ground and reason to
interfere with the quantum of penalty confirmed by the impugned order
passed by the Appellate Tribunal.
C.A. No.33/2017 (Akshat Tandon and Others vs. Securities and
Exchange Board of India); and
C.A. No.9563/2018, (Badri Vishal Tandon vs. Securities and
Exchange Board of India).
32. We have jointly dealt with these two appeals as they bot h
relate to shares of M/s Bhawani Paper Mills Ltd. (“the Target Company”
in short).
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
33. In the first appeal, Akshat Tandon and 14 others are aggrieved
by the order dated 5 th October, 2016 passed by the Appellate Tribunal
wherein their appeal against order dated 31 st July, 2014 passed by the
Adjudicating Officer imposing penalty between Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees
three lakhs only) to Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees six lakhs only) for each of the
15 violations of Regulation Nos. 3(3) and 3(4) of the Securit ies and
Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover)
Regulations, 1997 (“SAST Regulations” for short) was upheld.
34. The appellants were promotors of the target company a nd
together were holding 54% of the paid-up shares of the target company,
which were acquired on various dates. The acquisition was in excess of
the limits prescribed under Regulations 3(3) and 3(4) of SAST Regulations.
Failure to notify/submit report to the concerned authorities within the
stipulated time in terms of Regulations 3(3) and 3(4) is accep ted. The
case of the appellants is predicated on the principle of proportionality,
for it is asserted that the quantum of penalty imposed is exce ssive and
unreasonably harsh. Similar contentions were raised before the Appellate
Tribunal with the submission that the target company had incurred huge
losses and that it was a sick company. Furthermore, there was an absence
of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage to the appellants or otherwise
a loss to the investors. Contentions were rejected on the ground that the
penalty imposed was reasonable and not harsh. To justify the quantum,
reference was made to Sections 15-A(a) and (b) of the SEBI Act, which
stipulate that the penalty could be Rs.1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only)
for each day during which the violation continued and could be as high
as Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only) for each violation.
35. This court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 15-
Z of the SEBI Act, cannot go into the proportionality and quantum of the
penalty imposed, unless the same is distinctly disproportiona te to the
nature of the violation which makes it offensive, tyrannous or intolerable.
Penalty by the very nature of the provision is penal. We ca n interfere
only where the quantum is wholly arbitrary and hars h which no
reasonable man would award. In the instant case, the factual findings
are not denied and, thus, we are not inclined to intermeddle with the
quantum of penalty. The penalty imposed is just, fair and reas onable
and, thus, upheld.
36. The appellants have also contended that in the absence of any
prescribed limitation period, SEBI should have issued show cause notice
917
within a reasonable time and there being a delay of about 8 ye ars in
issuance of show cause notice in 2014, the proceedings should have
been dropped. This contention was not raised before the Adjudi cating
Officer in the written submissions or the reply furnished. It is not clear
whether this contention was argued before the Appellate Tribunal. There
are judgments which hold that when the period of limitation is not
prescribed, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time.
What would be reasonable time, would depend upon the fa cts and
circumstances of the case, nature of the default/statute, prejudice caused,
whether the third-party rights had been created etc. T he show cause
notice in the present case had specifically referred to t he respective
dates of default and the date of compliance, which was made between
30 th August, 2011 to 29 th November, 2011 (delay was between 927 days
to 1897 days). Only upon compliance being made that the defaults had
come to notice. In the aforesaid background, and so noticing the quantum
of fine/penalty imposed, we do not find good ground and reason to
interfere.
37. Now coming to the second appeal, Badri Vishal Tandon has
impugned the order dated 20 th June, 2018 passed by the Appellate Tribunal
affirming the order dated 29 th December, 2017 passed by the Adjudicating
Officer, whereby he has been saddled with penalty of Rs. 1 ,50,000/-
(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) for violation of Regulation 7(1A)
read with Regulation 7(2) of the SAST Regulations. The appell ant as
Karta of Ram Mohandas Tandon (HUF) was allotted 22,50,000 shares
of the target company by way of preferential allotment, which constituted
6.46% of its total share capital. The shares were allotted pursuant to the
approval given by the Board of Directors vide letter dated 2 5 th June,
2011. The letter of allotment was received by him on 27 th June, 2011,
and 22,50,000 shares of the Target Company were transferred to his
demat account on 12 th August, 2011.
38. The Appellate Tribunal has affirmed the factual findings that
there was a delay in disclosure, which was required to be made within
two days of the receipt of intimation of allotment of s hares, as per
Regulations 7(1A) and 7(2) of the SAST Regulations. The intimation/
letter from the Target Company about the said acquisition was received
by the Bombay Stock Exchange only on 11 th July, 2011.
39. Maximum penalty imposable on Badri Vishal Tandon was upto
Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only). In this backdrop, we do not
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
find any reason to interfere with the quantum of penalty of Rs.1,50,000/
- (Rupees one lakh and fifty thousand only) as imposed in exercis e of
jurisdiction under Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act.
C.A. No.1009/2017 (Magnum Equity Broking Ltd. Vs.
Securities and Exchange Board of India).
40. The appellant has assailed the order of the Adjudicating Officer
dated 18 th July, 2014, which was affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal vide
order dated 28 th November, 2016, whereby penalty of Rs.3,00,000/-
(Rupees three lakhs only) was imposed on the appellant for violation of
Clause A(2) of the Code of Conduct for Stock Brokers. The said penalty
was imposed pursuant to investigation into trading in scrips of M/s Aarey
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“ADPL” in short) and M/s Winsome
Textile Industries Ltd. (“WTIL” in short) during the period 1 st January,
2009 to 31 st August, 2009.
41. The brief facts are that the appellant was a stock broke r and
member of the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited. The appellant h ad
executed synchronized trades in the aforesaid scrips on behal f of its
clients - Mr. Ronak Choski, Mr. Shailesh Patel, Ms. Nitaben Patel and
Ms. Kapilaben Patel, acting both as a stock broker as w ell as party
stock broker. Total volume of symphonized trade in the scrip of WTIL
was 68,02,131 shares, which were executed on one day. Total vol ume
of 88,89,052 shares in the case of scrip of ADPL were transacted over
a period of five days. The appellate order succinctly refers to the figures
and details of such transactions, for example, on 19 th February, 2009, the
appellant’s clients had executed 18 trades in the scrip of WTIL, which
constituted 68% of the total number of shares traded on that date and
38% of the trades executed on that date. For 7 out of 18 synchronized
trades, the buy and sell orders were perfectly matching i n price and
quantity. Similarly, on 20 th March, 2009, there were 73 synchronized
trades in the scrip of ADPL amounting to 43.8% of the shares traded
and 63.4% of the trades executed. The appellate order observes t hat
such synchronized trades create an artificial volume, leading to ratcheting
up in the trading of the scrip and cause price fluctuat ions, thereby
misleading the potential investors. Such transactions create a deceptive
appearance as to the quantum of trading in the scrip which c ould be
understood as a viable investment opportunity when it is not. This hurts
and damages sanctity of the securities market. Reference was specifically
made to the factum that the synchronized trade on different dates was
919
amounting to 3.4%, 7.17%, 20.4% and 15.12% of the total market volume
on 25 th March, 2009, 23 rd March, 2009, 26 th March, 2009 and 27 th March,
2009 respectively.
42. The appellant does not controvert the transactions/trades. The
case of the appellant is that the trades were executed wi thin a normal
price range and did not lead to an artificial price moveme nt. Reliance
was placed on SEBI’s circular dated 14 th September, 1999 that cross
deals executed between two clients of the same broker can be conducted
through the screen mechanism of the stock exchange. Submission was
that the synchronized trade was not a result of any illi cit scheme.
However, Appellate Tribunal had rejected the conten tions as the
transactions/trades made by the appellants were bet ween family
members restricted to two scrips of WTIL and ADPL spread over a
period of 6 days and had referred to the factual matrix of the case .
43. Reference to the Securities and Exchange Board of India
vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. 5 which refers to an earlier decision in the
Securities and Exchange Board of India vs. Kishore R. Ajmera 6 is
misconceived, for the said decisions do not hold that a broker cannot be
proceeded against for violation of Regulation 7 of the SEBI (Stock
Brokers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations, 1992 (“Stock Broker
Regulations” for short) for violation of Clause A(2) of t he Code of
Conduct for Stock Brokers. The decisions hold that a broker would not
be liable merely because he had facilitated the transactions, in the absence
of any material to suggest negligence and connivance on the part of the
broker. Thus, the matter would be different as observed in the concurring
judgment of Banumathi, J. in Rakhi Trading Pvt. Ltd. (Supra ), where
there was evidence to show involvement and meeting of minds of the
share broker with the client to indulge in egregious and foul transactions,
in which circumstances the stock broker would be held liable. While
proximity of time in an isolated case may not be conclusive, but huge
volume of trading between same set/group of brokers can in a given
case reasonably point to some kind of a fraudulent and manipula tive
exercise with prior meeting of minds. Further, there is a difference
between synchronized trading involving bulk quantities and negotiated
trades as a result of consensual bargaining involving synchronization of
buy and sell orders resulting in matching thereof as per pe rmissible
5 (2018) 13 SCC 753 (paragraph 40)
6 (2016) 6 SCC 368
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
parameters which are programmed accordingly. Test of preponderance
of probability applies for the adjudication and determination of civil liability
for violation of the SEBI Act or the provisions of the Regulations framed
thereunder (see para 65 to 69 in Rakhi Trading Pvt. Ltd. ). Keeping the
aforesaid parameters in mind, the adjudicating authority had imposed
penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs only) under Section 15-HB
of the SEBI Act, which has been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal being
commensurate with the violation.
44. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any infirmity wit h
the concurrent findings or with the quantum of penalty imposed and the
same is upheld.
C.A. No.2641/2017 (M/s Quantum Global Securities & Leasing
Company Ltd. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India).
45. In the present appeal, the appellant is the registered stock
broker and had indulged, as per the findings recorded in the adjudication
order dated 22 nd July, 2014 and upheld by the Appellate Tribunal vide
order dated 18 th January, 2017, in synchronized trades, circular trades
and reversal trades in the scrips of M/s Gangotri Textiles Ltd. during the
period 7 th April, 2006 to 31 st May, 2006. Accordingly, the appellant had
violated Sections 12A (a), (b), (c) of the SEBI Act and Regulations 3(a),
(b), (c), (d), 4(1), 4(2)(a), (e) and (g) of the PFUTP Regula tions and
Regulation 7 read with Clauses A(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Code of
Conduct for Stock Brokers specified under Schedule II of the Stock
Broker Regulations. Consequently, penalty of Rs.60,00,000/- (Rupees
sixty Lakhs only) was imposed under Section 15-HA for violation of the
provisions of the SEBI Act and the PFUTP Regulations and the penalty
of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) was imposed under Section
15-HB of the SEBI Act for the violation of the provisions of the Code of
Conduct for Stock Brokers.
46. The appellant did not dispute the factual findings of having
indulged in synchronized trade, circular trade and reversal trade in the
scrips of M/s. Gangotri Textiles Ltd. They pleaded lenienc y claiming
that they had no mala fide intention and their annual turnover for several
years was around Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only). Lastly, their
contribution towards Last Traded Price (LTP) variation was no minal.
The contentions have to be rejected as the appellant was a part of the
larger game plan along with other entities who had i ndulged in
921
synchronized, circular and reversal trading leading to a total cumulative
positive and negative LTP contribution of Rs.999.25 and Rs.1007.25
respectively. It is to be further noted that the penalty imposable under
15-HA of the SEBI Act could be upto Rs.25,00,00,000/- (Rupees twenty-
five crores only) or three times the amount of profit made o ut of such
practices whichever was higher. Thus, the penalty of Rs.60,00,000/-
(Rupees sixty lakhs only) was not unreasonable and excessive. Similarly,
penalty of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) for failing to adhere
to the standards required to be maintained by the stock brokers w hich
could be as high as Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only) was no t
excessive, unreasonable or harsh. Penalty was also imposed on other s
who had participated in the nefarious plan. Findings are corre ct and
unchallengeable. We do not find any good ground and reason to interfere
with the quantum of penalty.
C.A. No.6160/2018 (Durga Prasad Yadav & Anr. vs. Securities
and Exchange Board of India).
47. Durga Prasad Yadav and Jai Hind Kumar have filed the present
appeal having suffered penalty of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one cror e
only) under Section 15-A(a) of the SEBI Act for violation of Section 11-
C(3) of the SEBI Act vide adjudication order dated 20 th January, 2016
which stands affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 15 th
January, 2018.
48. The appellants were required to furnish particulars about the
plans/schemes offered to the public, funds mobilized, Memorandum of
Association, details of Directors, etc. in order to examine the matter
under Section 11-AA of the SEBI Act and the SEBI (Co llective
Investment Schemes), Regulations, 1999 (“CIS Regulations” for short).
For this purpose, various letters dated 22 nd November, 2012, 11 th January,
2013, 7 th November, 2013 and 20 th February, 2014 were written by SEBI
to the two appellant Directors, two other Directors and M /s Skylark
Land Developers & Infrastructure India Pvt. Ltd. for fu rnishing of
information /documents/reports. Since there was an inordinate delay,
default and failure in furnishing information and responding to these letters,
fresh summons were issued on 30 th July, 2014 under Section 11-C(3) of
the SEBI Act requiring them to furnish the details to which again there
was no response. Consequently, second summons dated 12 th September,
2014 were issued for furnishing information by 22 nd September, 2014, to
which yet again there was no response. Thereafter, show cause not ice
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]
on 30 th June, 2015 was issued to which a part reply was given by the
appellants on 23 rd September, 2015. An email dated 30 th November, 2015
was also sent by SEBI asking them to reply before 10 th December, 2015,
with an opportunity to appear on 15 th December, 2015. This was also
communicated by forwarding the notice through Speed Post AD, which
was returned undelivered in case of Durga Prasad. T hus, several
opportunities were given to ensure compliance by the appellants.
Afterwards, on 15 th December, 2015 Subodh Kumar Gupta, authorized
representative of the appellants and others had appeared and sought
adjournment for 22 nd December, 2015, on which date a reply was filed.
Subsequently, an additional reply dated 30 th December, 2015 was
furnished. Appellants in the aforesaid replies had stated that their offices
were sealed and, therefore, the required details and informat ion could
not be furnished. Further, SEBI had not provided th em necessary
documents including the copy of complaint, affidavit, evidence against
them and the investigation report.
49. We would now refer to the background of the case and why
notices/summons were issued. The aforesaid notices and summons were
issued pursuant to orders passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
in the year 2010 in Public Interest Litigation against various companies
including M/s Skylark Land Developer and Infrastructure India Pvt. Ltd.
for cheating thousands of investors in fraudulent schemes by promising
high returns. Pursuant to orders passed by the High Court, dif ferent
authorities including SEBI were given liberty to take appropriate action
in accordance with law. Central Bureau of Investigation was also directed
to conduct investigation. Therefore, SEBI had issued not ice to the
aforesaid company, the two appellants and two other Directors to provide
information of documents for alleged violation of Section 11-C of the
SEBI Act.
50. During the course of hearing by SEBI, most details as provided
by the appellants were general in nature. We would observe that in case
there was no violation pertaining to mobilization of funds from the public
under various schemes/arrangements, this could have been so stated in
clear and categoric terms. Moreover, the contention that t he offices
were sealed which rendered them incapable to furnish information has
been rejected for two good reasons. First, this stand is belated and held
to be an afterthought when it could have been raised at the first instance
when the reply dated 5 th December, 2012 was furnished, given that the
923
records were seized by the police on 5 th May, 2011. Second, assertion
was contradicted by their own conduct when during the proceeding s
they had submitted a few documents, which were incomplete and not as
desired. They did not make any distinction as to the documents within
their possession and as to those with the police. Appellate Tribunal had
in these circumstances affirmed the finding that there wa s a lack of
good faith and failure in complying with the aforesaid notice s/letters/
summons/emails. Adjudicating Officer had, therefore, rightly recorded
that non-compliance of summons had hampered the further course of
investigation. The failure was without any justification. Agreeing with
the said findings, the Appellate Tribunal has observed that details were
withheld with a view to delay the investigation being conducted by SEBI
to the detriment of investors from whom funds were collected by the
appellants in contravention of CIS Regulations.
51. We do not find any fault with the reasoning given. We are of
the opinion that the fault squarely lied with the appellants and, thus, penalty
of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only) for violation of Section 11-
C(3) under Section 15-A(a) of the SEBI Act does not ca ll for any
interference.
52. The reference made vide order dated 14 th March, 2016 and
the above captioned Civil Appeals are, accordingly, disposed of. In the
facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals disposed of.
ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD
OF INDIA v. BHAVESH PABARI [SANJIV KHANNA, J. ]