The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar and Another

M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. 2. As common question of law and facts arise in both these appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013 3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter refer red to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal. 4. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lod ged against the accused at police station, Kotwali, District Dat ia for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No. 552/2012. It was alleged that at about 8:00 p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012 when after distributing the milk, Cheeni @ Devasik Yadav came in front of his house situated at RajghatViram, at the same time, Dhruv Gurjar (accused) being armed with 12 bore gun, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 other persons came there and asked him to take out his nephew, and they will THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR kill him as on account of enmity of scuffle took place between his nephew Anand and the accused persons. When complainant told them that my nephew is not here at the same time all of them started to abuse the complainant with filthy language and when he asked them not to do so, at the same time, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3-4 other persons spoken that “kill this bastard”, at the same time, Dhruv Gurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets struck on three places of his body, i.e., on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear, due to which, he sustained injuries and blood started oozi ng from it. According to the complainant, Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Si ngh were present on the spot, who had witnessed the incident. On hearing the noise of fire, when other people of vicinity reached there, then, all of these persons fled away from the spot of the incident. 4.1 On the basis of a report, a DehatiNalishi bearing No. 0/12 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. As t he complainant sustained injuries, his MLC was performed. On the basis of the contents of the said report, a Crime bearing No. 552/ 2012 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and the criminal investigation was triggered. Thereafter, the investigation team reached the spot and prepared the spot map and articles were seized. 4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. That on 21.03.2013, the police arrested the accused. 4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572 of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant. 5. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the Hi gh Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705. 6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the 439 offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013 7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 1936/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter refer red to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/ 13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal. 8. The facts leading to this appeal are, that on 21.12.2012 one truck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed the complainant – Malkhan Singh Yadav, who is also a truck driver that his truck was having some problem and he is near Sitapur village. The complainant reached there and found that his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck. It is alleged that when they were busy in repairing the truck, four persons at around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and they had beaten all of them with legs and fists and snatched cash of Rs.7,300/- and two Nokia mobiles having Sim Nos. 9411955930 & 7599256400 from the complainant – Malkhan Singh Yadav, Rs.19,000/- from Mangal and Rs.16,500/- from Janki Kushwah and a Spice mobile having Sim No. 8756194727. That the complainant is driving on that route since last 7 to 8 years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village. According to the complainant, all the four persons were known to him and one of them, namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having ‘Addhi’ in his hand, the second one was Ravi Sharma, who was having gun in his hand, and the ot her two were Babloo Sharma and Bhurerai. All the accused persons a fter robbing the complainant, Mangal and Janki Kushwah, went towards Sitapur village. 8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat Police Station, District Datia and lodged the first information report, which was registered as Crime No. 159 of 2012 against the accused under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act. Thereafter, the investigation was started and the police reached the spot THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] of the incident and prepared spot map and also recorded the statement of witnesses. Thereafter, they sent the complainant and two other persons to the District Hospital, Datia for medical examination, where the Medical Officer found simple injuries on various body parts of them. 8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the accused persons and in the village but could not found them and ultimately prepared the ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him on 1 6.04.2013. Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013, the accused persons approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing of FIR N o. 159/2012, registered against them at Police Station Goraghat, Di strict Datia for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act. 9. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the Hi gh Court has considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra). 10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V .P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya Prad esh has preferred the present appeal. 11. So far as the criminal appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the accused were facing the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. It was alleged against the acc used that at the time of commission of the offence, the accused Dhruv Gurjar fired from his fire arm on the original complainant with an intention to kill him, and the original complainant sustained serious injuries and the pellets struck on three places of his body, i.e., on the forehead, left shoulder and left ear. That incident took place on 17.12.2012 and the investigati ng officer commenced the investigation, recorded the stat ement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. on 18.12 .2012. The 441 investigating officer also seized the articles. The Investigat ing officer also collected the medical evidence. It appears that one of the co- accused, namely, Rohit Gurjar was arrested on 21.03.2013. Nothing in on record to show, whether in fact the respondent no.1 herein, the main accused – original accused no.1 was arrested or not. It appears t hat during the investigation, immediately, the original accused no.1 – Dhruv Gurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by filing an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. Immediately on the fourth day of filing of the application, by the impugned judgment and order dated 8.4.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that there is a settlement arrived at between the complainant and the accused. While quashing the FIR, the High Court has relied u pon the decision of this Court in the case of Shjji (supra) , specially the observations recorded by this Court “that where there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility, the criminal case registered against the accused persons, though it may not be compoundable, can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C”. 12. Now so far as the criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/ 2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V .P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. The incident was a lleged to happen on 21.12.2012. Immediately, the investigating officer started the investigation. All the accused were absconding. T hat when the investigation was in progress, the original accused approached the High Court by way of an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on 12.03.2013 and prayed for quashing of the FIR. That on 14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before h im on 16.04.2013. That, by the impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that the original complainant and the accused has entered into a compromise. Hence, the present appeals. 13. Shri Varun K. Chopra, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh has vehemently submitted that in both these cases, the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the respective FIRs which were for the offences under Sections 30 7, 294 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively. 13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs mechanically and solely on the basis of the settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused, without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offe nces alleged against the accused persons. 13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the pow ers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the respective FIRs, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences al leged were against the society at large and not restricted to the persona l disputes between the two individuals. 13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective FIRs. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel t hat the High Court ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the complainant has compromised/entered into a settlement with the accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording c onviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that in a given case despite the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/materi al. It is submitted that in the present cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It is submitted that therefor e in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly e rred in considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the ca se of Shiji (supra) . 13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-State that as such in the appeal ari sing out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the accused were absconding f rom 443 the day of the commission of the offence and, in fact, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him. It is submitted that in between the day of the alleged commission of the off ence and filing of the application before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and while they were absconding, the accused managed to get the affidavits of the complainant and other witnesses, which were dated 9.2.2013. It is submitted that all these aforesaid circumstances and t he conduct on the part of the accused were required to be considered by th e High Court while quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more particularly when the offenc es alleged were against the society at large, namely, robbery and under the Arms Act, and in fact non-compoundable. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant-State has placed re liance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2 014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471; ParbatbhaiAAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019. 13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on beha lf of the appellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has supported the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court. 14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused that in the facts and circumstances of the case and when the complainant and the accused entered into a compromise and settled the disputes amicably among themselves, and therefore when the High Court found that there is no chance of recording convicti on against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial w ould be an exercise of futility, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly quashed the respective FIRs. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the accused has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the case s of Jitendra Raghuvanshi vs. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC 58; Anita Maria Dias vs. State of Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar vs. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443 . 14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals. 15. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length. 16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the pr esent appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the offences under S ections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V .P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recording conviction agains t the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exerc ise in futility, the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs. 16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant f acts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriou sness of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the disti nction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C . to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to f ind out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circum spection and 445 courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanic ally. Even, the quashing of the respective FIRs by the High Court i n the present cases for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of t he IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions. 16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this Court has observed and held as under: “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guid eline engrafted in such power viz.: ( i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes wh ere the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of case s, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its vi ew, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppres sion and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victi m and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the m atter between themselves. However, this power is to be exerc ised sparingly and with caution. 447 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, t he guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under speci al statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the off ences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havin g overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particul arly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5 . While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to grea t oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the ch ances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal pro ceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement bet ween the parties is going to result in harmony between them which ma y improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accep ting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. I t is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to sta rt or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as i n such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before th e High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not b e a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the off ender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is 449 proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 16.4 In the case of ParbatbhaiAahir (supra) , again this Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of decisions of t his Court on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions: “(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. (2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Cour t to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. (4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a w ide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. (5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the fa cts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate. (6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the H igh Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of th e THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim hav e settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. (7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. (8) Criminal cases involving offences which aris e from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or s imilar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropr iate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. (9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (10) There is yet an exception to the principle s et out in Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 16.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Ar ms Act (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013), by no stretc h of imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that w here the accused are facing trial under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well 451 as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, as the offences are definitely against the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence. 16.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compou ndable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the societ y, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case of Kalyan Singh (supra) . 17. Now so far as the decisions of this Court upon which the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has placed reliance, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, none of the decisions shall be of any assistance to the accused in the present case. In all the aforesaid cases, the dispute was a matrimonial dispute, and/o r the dispute predominantly of a civil dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrong is basically private or personal. 18. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of t his Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective FIRs by observing that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the aforesai d ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misap plied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecut ion still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the ot her witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particula rly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/ or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court obse rved that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be a futile exercis e that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also furthe r observed THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.] ‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to that this Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under: “18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the fact s and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fi t case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.” 18.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society a t large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/ matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 of the Arms Act etc. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the H igh Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the respect ive FIRs, by observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of 453 recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an ex ercise in futility. The High Court has mechanically considered the afo resaid decision of this Court in the case of S hiji (supra), without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. 18.2 Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the cas e of the appeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the High Court has erred in quashing the FIR. It is required to be noted that the FIR was lodged on 21.12.2012 for the offence alleged to happen on 21.12.2012. All the accused were absconding.After a period of approximately three months, they approached the High Court by way of filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on 12.03.2013. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on 14.03.2013. In the meantime, the accused managed to get the affidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dated 09.02.2013, and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, i.e., within a period of three days from the date of filing the petition. The High Court has also not considered the antecedents of the accus ed. It has come on record that the accused persons were facing number of trials for the serious offences. The aforesaid would be relevant factors, while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C and while considering the application for quashing the FIR/complaint/cr iminal proceedings. In fact, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have been more vigilant and ought to have considered relevant facts and circumstances under which the accused got the settlement entered into. The High Court has not at all considered the afores aid relevant circumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, both th ese appeals succeed, and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgme nts and orders passed by the High Court are hereby set a side, and the respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the respective accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law. Divya Pandey Appeals allowed. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. DHRUV GURJAR [M. R. SHAH, J.]