Nagaraj v. Union of India
Cited by 4 judgments in this corpus
- THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. v. DAVINDER SINGH & ORS. · 2024 INSC 562
- K PAVITHRA AND ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. · 2020 INSC 321
- B K PAVITRA AND ORS. v. THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS · 2019 INSC 671
- P.V. GEORGE AND ORS. v. STATE OF KERALA AND ORS. · 2007 INSC 73
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and ord er
dated 15.03.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench
at Dharwad in Criminal Revision Petition No.100297 of 2017 whereby
the High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition filed by the appellant
herein and affirmed the orders passed by the Courts below.
3. The appeal involves a short point as would be clear from a few
facts stated hereinbelow.
4. The appellant was a driver working in the Karnataka St ate
Road Transport Corporation. On 03.08.2006 at around 11.15 p.m., the
appellant while driving the bus hit it against the railway cr ossing gate
KM No. 350-5-6, which was set up on the railway line between Chalageri
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and Ranebennur Railway Stations. Due to the said hit, the railway crossing
gate was broken.
5. Section 160(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 provides that if any
person breaks any gate or chain or barrier set up on either side of a level
crossing which is closed to road traffic, he shall be p unished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years.
6. The appellant was, therefore, prosecuted for commission of
offence punishable under Section 160(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 by
the Principal Civil Judge and 1 st Additional JMFC, Ranebennur and
pursuant to which FIR No.385/2006) was lodged again st him on
04.08.2006 in RPF Police Station, Ranebennur.
7. By order dated 05.04.2011 passed by the 1 st Additional JMFC,
the appellant was found guilty for commission of the offence for which
he was charged and was accordingly sentenced to undergo si mple
imprisonment for a period of six months.
8. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed appeal be fore the
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Haveri. By order dated
04.03.2016, the Additional District and Sessions Judge dismissed t he
appeal filed by the appellant resulting in affirmation of his conviction and
sentence awarded by the JMFC by his order dated 05.04.2011.
9. The appellant carried the matter further in Revision in the High
Court of Karnataka at Dharwad Bench. By impugned order, the High
Court dismissed the revision and upheld the appellate o rder dated
04.03.2016 giving rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave by
the appellant in this Court.
10. Heard Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned couns el for the
respondent.
11. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant was three-
fold. In the first place, he contended that the appellant wa s wrongly
convicted for an offence punishable under Section 160(2) of the Railways
Act. According to him, there was no sufficient evidence to pro secute
the appellant much less to convict him for an offence punishable under
Section 160(2) of the Railways Act.
NAGARAJ v. UNION OF INDIA
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
12. In the second place, learned counsel contended that in any
event, when admittedly there was no injury caused to any human being
in the incident except causing some damage to the railway crossing
gate, the six months’ jail sentence to the appellant for commi ssion of
such offence was not justified. According to him, it was excessive and
disproportionate to its nature and the resultant loss caused. It was also
urged that the appellant out of six months’ jail sentence has already
undergone around one month’s jail sentence and, therefore, in the interest
of justice, his jail sentence is liable to be altered and reduced to what he
has already undergone.
13. In the alternative, learned counsel urged that the appellant at
the time of commission of offence was hardly 21 years of age and,
therefore, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances of the case
and the nature of offence, he be released under the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958.
14. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned order and contended that the appeal is liable to be dismissed
by affirming the impugned order.
15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part.
16. In our view, the first submission of learned counsel for the
appellant has no substance. It is for the reason that whe n the three
Courts below, i.e., the Court of Magistrate, Appellate Court and the
High Court in its revisionary jurisdiction, on appreciation of evidence,
have arrived at a conclusion that the appellant was found to have
committed the offence, such finding being concurrent finding of fact is
binding on this Court while hearing appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
17. Even otherwise, we have not been able to notice any kind of
perversity or illegality in the concurrent finding, which may call for any
interference in this appeal.
18. Coming now to the second submission, we find substance
therein. It is for the reasons that, first, the appellant has already undergone
one month’s jail sentence; second, the offence in question is ne ither
against the society nor it involves any moral turpitude and nor i t has
resulted in causing any harm or injury to any human being except causing
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some damage to the railway property, viz., one railway crossing gate;
and lastly, the offence is now 13 years old.
19. Keeping in view the aforementioned three reasons and in the
interest of justice, we are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
six months’ jail sentence awarded to the appellant by the thr ee Courts
below deserves to be altered to “what he has already undergone by the
appellant till date”.
20. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the third submission
urged by the learned counsel for the appellant deserves to be reje cted.
Even otherwise, we find no merit in it for the reason that the appellant
did not raise such plea before the three Courts below though it was
available to him at all stages of the proceedings.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and
is allowed in part. The conviction of the appellant is upheld but sentence
awarded to the appellant is reduced to “what he has already undergone”.
In other words, now the appellant is not required to undergo any further
jail sentence in this case except what he has already undergone.
22. The appellant is already on bail, his bail bond is discharged.
Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed partly.
NAGARAJ v. UNION OF INDIA
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]