National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mannat Johal & Ors. Etc. Etc.

DINESH MAHESHWARI, J. 1. The application for substitution of legal representatives in the petition filed on behalf of the claimants is allowed; the named legal representative shall stand substituted in the both the petiti ons. Delay condoned in the petition filed on behalf of the claimants. 1.1. Leave granted in the both the petitions. 2. These cross-appeals relating to the vehicular ac cident compensation claims, respectively by the insurer of the offending vehicle NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL and by the claimants, are directed against the common judgment and order dated 06.07.2018, as passed in FAO No. 1136 of 2000 (O & M) and connected matters, whereby the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has allowed the appeal for enhancement of compensation filed by the claimants and has modified the common award dated 27.01.2000 as made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh in MACT Case Nos. 80 of 1996 and 84 of 1996 that were filed respectively by the parents and by the wife and children of the deceased Shri Rajpal Singh Johal. 3. In the impugned judgment and order dated 06.07.2018, the High Court has made upward revision of the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and, in place of the amount of Rs. 37,71,000/- together with interest @ 12% p.a. as awarded by the Tribunal, the Hi gh Court has awarded a sum of Rs. 48,00,000/- together with interest @ 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of realisation. The High Court has allowed this enhancement essentially with reference to the principles enunciated by this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.: 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) and in Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.: 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC). 4. In these appeals, on one hand, the insurer of the offending vehicle has questioned the quantum of compensation so awarded, basically on the ground that while making assessment of pecuniary loss, the ex gratia amount received by the claimants from the employer of the deceased deserves to be deducted while, on the other hand, the claimants have questioned the reduction of the rate of interest by the High Court. 4.1. Therefore, the basic question for consideration in these appeals is as to whether the amount of compensation as awarded by t he High Court is that of just compensation or the same calls for any modification? 5. The background aspects of the matter, so far relevant for the question at hand, may be noticed, in brief, as follows: 5.1. The vehicular accident in question occurred on 30.12.1995, at about 1 p.m., near the police out post Bagari (Assam), when the deceased Shri Rajpal Singh Johal was driving a car, taking his wife and children along, from Kaziranga to Guwahati. The offending vehicle, being an oil tanker bearing registration No. AS-01-9526, rammed into the car driven by the deceased while coming from the opposite direction. The 689 deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained in this accident while his wife was also injured and their two children suffered severe shock. 5.2. On account of demise of the victim Shri Rajpal Singh Johal due to the injuries sustained in the accident afore said, two claim applications came to be made before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh: one on 14.05.1996 by the parents of deceased, being MACT Case No. 80 of 1996; and another on 22.05.1996 by the wife and minor children of the deceased, being MACT Case No. 84 of 1996. The sum and substance of the allegations in claim applications had been that the deceased met with his untimely end for the accident in questi on that occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the oil tanker in question. It was asserted that the deceased was 38 years of age; was wor king as General Manager (Marketing) with Punjab Wireless System Limited, Mohali; was drawing gross annual salary of Rs. 3,21,801.60 with perks just prior to the accident; and he was due to be promoted as the Associate Vice President in January 1996 whereby, his annual salary would have been enhanced to Rs. 3,50,000/-. While asserting their dependency on the deceased, the claimants i.e., the parents, wife and chi ldren of the deceased claimed compensation against the driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle. The cause of action being the same, these two claim petitions were consolidated, and were tried and decided together by way of the common award dated 27.01.2000. 5.3. Before the Tribunal, driver of the offending vehicle remained ex parte while its owner denied any negligence on part of the driver and rather alleged that the accident occured due to rash and negligent driving by the deceased. On the other hand, insurer of the offending vehicle denied the factum of the accident and also alleged that the driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving license. 5.4. On the pleadings, the Tribunal framed as many as 9 issues . After taking evidence, the Tribunal proceeded to determine the relevant issues in its impugned award dated 27.01.2000. The Tribunal decided the basic issues relating to the factum of accident and the responsibility for the same against the non-applicants while holding that the accident in question occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending oil tanker. The Tribunal also held that the wife and children of the deceased were dependent on him and further that the parents were m arginally dependent on him. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] 5.5. On the question of quantification of compensation, the Tribunal took note of the evidence led by the claimants as regards emoluments of the deceased as on 01.12.1995; the fact that his colleagues were promoted as Associate Vice President in the year 1995; that he too had the prospects of such promotion; and that emoluments of the Associate Vice President were revised with effect from the month of December 1996. Therefore, the Tribunal considered it just and reasonable to a ssess the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,51,000/- p.a., as p er the revised emoluments for the post of Associate Vice President in th e employer company. Then, the Tribunal proceeded to deduct one-third tow ards personal expenses of the deceased and in this manner, took the annual loss of dependency at Rs. 2,34,000/- and, after applying the multiplier of 16, assessed the pecuniary loss of the claimants at Rs. 37,44,000/-. The Tribunal further awarded Rs. 25,000/- towards transportation of dead- body and Rs. 2,000/- towards other expenses and thus, finally awarded a sum of Rs. 37,71,000/- to the claimants. The Tribunal also allo wed interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of filing of claim application No. 80 of 1996. The Tribunal allowed a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- each to the mother and father of the deceased while observing that t hey were in the age group of 78 years and were only marginally dependent on the deceased; and apportioned the remaining amount amongst the wife and children of the deceased. 5.6. Against the award so made by the Tribunal, the claimants in MACT Case No. 84 of 1996 preferred an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, seeking enhancement of the a mount of compensation, while the insurance company preferred two sepa rate appeals questioning the findings in the award and seeking reduction of the amount of compensation. 5.7. The High Court, in its impugned judgment dated 06.07.2018, in the first place rejected the contentions urged on behalf of the insurer as regards the factum and cause of accident and affirmed t he findings of the Tribunal. As regards quantum of compensation, the High Court proceeded to make enhancement over the amount award ed by the Tribunal with reference to the decisions in Pranay Sethi and Sarla Verma (supra). The High Court did not accept the basis of assessment of loss of income with reference to the likely enhanced emoluments of deceased on his expected promotion and subsequent revision o f pay- scale in the year 1996. The High Court, therefore, took the base annual 691 emoluments at Rs. 3,21,801.60 and, while deducting Rs. 20,000/- towards income-tax, rounded off the figure to Rs. 3,00,000/-. The High Court , thereafter, provided for enhancement of 40% towards future prospects and then, looking to five number of dependents, deducted one-fourth towards personal expenses of the deceased. In this manner, t he High Court arrived at the multiplicand of Rs. 3,15,000/- and, while applying the multiplier of 15 in view of the age of the deceased at 38 years, worked out the pecuniary loss at Rs. 47,25,000/-. The High Court further awarded Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate. Accordingly, the High Court assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/- and rounded it up to Rs. 48,00,000/-. The High Court, however, allowed interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a., while holding that the respondents related with the offending vehicle were liable to make payment of compensation. As regards apportionment, the High Court allowed a sum of Rs. 26,00,000/- to the wife of the deceased; Rs. 8,00,000/- to the son of the deceased; Rs. 10,00,000/- to the daughter of the deceased; and Rs. 2,00,000/- each to the mother and father of the deceased. 6. Assailing the impugned judgment of the High Court, learned counsel for the insurer has strenuously argued that the High Court has erred in not considering and applying the principles enunciated in Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma & Ors.: 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC) and in not deducting the ex gratia amount received by the claimants from the employer of the deceased. Learned counsel has also attempted to argue that the High Court has taken into consideration certain payments like conveyance allowance, performance linked special pay and company lease accommodation while making the calculation of total annual gross salary, though such allowances ought to have be en deducted. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants would submit that a clear case for enhancement over the modified award of the High Court is made out, particularly when the High Court reduced the annual income figure of the deceased from Rs. 3,51,000/- to Rs. 3,21,801.60 and further slashed it to Rs. 3,00,000/- and then, reduced the rate of interest at 7.5% p.a. as against the rate allowed by the Tribunal at 12% p.a. According to the learned counsel, the rate of interest as allowed by the Tribunal was in conformity with the lending rates at the time of accident in the year 1995 and should not have been reduced. The learned counsel has also argued that a few components of allowances and benefits NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] as taken into consideration for assessment of the annual inco me had been the part of composite pay packet of the deceased and the claimants were also the beneficiaries of such allowances while being dependent on the deceased. The learned counsel for the claimant has also countered the submissions as regards the ex gratia payment made by the employer with the contentions that such an amount is not required to be deducted from the total compensation, while relying on the decision in Sebastiani Lakra & Ors. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. : 2019 ACJ 34 (SC). 7. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view th at the modified award made by the High Court in this case remains that of just compensation and no case for interference is made out in either of these appeals. 8. It remains trite, and need not be over-emphasised, that while dealing with the question of quantification in a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the Act of 1988’), the endeavor has to be to ensure awarding of just compensation to the claimant/s. In Shashi Sharma (supra), this Court reiterated on the basics regarding meaning of the expression “just” in the context of the Act of 1988 in the following:- “17. ........ the term “compensation” has not been defined in the 1988 Act. By interpretative process, it has been underst ood to mean to recompense the claimants for the possibl e loss suffered or likely to be suffered due to sudden and u ntimely death of their family member as a result of motor ac cident. Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be just and adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should be passed on to the claimants in the matter of awar d of compensation. Section 168 of the 1988 Act makes the first principle explicit. Sub-section (1) of that provision makes it clear that the amount of compensation must be just. The word “just” means—fair, adequate, and reasonable. It has been derived from the Latin word “justus”, connoting rig ht and fair. In para 7 of State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, it has bee n held that the expression “just” denotes that the amount must 693 be equitable, fair, reasonable and not arbitrary. I n para 16 of Sarla Verma v. DTC, this Court has observed that the compensation “is not intended to be a bonanza, larges se or source of profit”. That, however, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as to what amount would be a just compensation.” 9. In a case like the present one, relating to the death o f the vehicular accident victim, any process of awarding “just” compensation involves assessment of such amount of pecuniary loss which could be reasonably taken as the loss of dependency suffered by the c laimants due to the demise of the victim. In other words, such a proc ess, by its very nature, involves the assessment of monetary contribution that the claimants were likely to receive from the deceased had he not met with the untimely end due to the accident. For the purpose of such an assessment, while some of the basic facts, like the age, job and income of the deceased and the number of dependents with extent of t heir dependency, could be reasonably ascertained from the eviden ce on record, yet, several uncertain factors also, per force, come into play, like the future prospects of the deceased coupled w ith various imponderables related with a human life. As the process, by i ts very nature, involves a substantial deal of guess-work, this C ourt, over the years, has evolved and applied several principles so as to ensure that as far as possible, the methods for assessment remain uniform, curb ing against disparity in the amount of compensation to be awarded in similarly circumstanced cases. It is not necessary for the presen t purpose to traverse through the large number of past decisions, particularly for the reason that the basic parameters stand explained and standardised with the larger Bench decision in Pranay Sethi (supra), wherein this Court has partly modulated the parameters enunciated in the two-Judge Bench decision in Sarla Verma (supra), and has laid down the principles as follows:- “59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addi tion should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary sh ould be read as actual salary less tax. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] 59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income shou ld be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was betwe en the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased w as between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established in come means the income minus the tax component. 59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore. 59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with para 42 of that judgment. 59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. 59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses sh ould be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 9.1. For completion of the principles above-quoted, appropriate would it to be to take note of paragraphs 30 to 32 as also paragraph 42 in Sarla Verma (supra ) which read as under:- “30 . Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general prac tice is to apply standardised deductions. Having conside red several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction toward s personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one- third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of depe ndent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) whe re the number of dependent family members exceeds six. 695 31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different p rinciple. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a b achelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short tim e, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and sibl ings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and wil l not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone w ill be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be consi dered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father. 32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contrib ution to the family. However, where the family of the bac helor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his person al and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contri bution to the family will be taken as two-third. ***** ***** ***** 42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the Table, which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M- 15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.” 10.Applying the principles aforesaid to the present case, we find that the award made by the Tribunal suffered from a few fundame ntal NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] errors and shortcomings as regards the assessment of multiplicand. The Tribunal, instead of taking the last drawn emoluments of the deceased, chose to proceed on his enhanced projected emolumen ts after the expected promotion and pay revision. However, thereafter, the Tribunal did not provide for any further future prospects. The Tribunal also did not make any deduction towards the tax component. Moreover, the Tribunal deducted one-third towards personal expenses of the deceased though he had had five dependents. Then, the Tribunal a pplied the multiplier of 16. Apparently, the assessment made by the Tribunal could not have been countenanced, for being not in conformity with the principles in Pranay Sethi ( supra ). 11. The High Court, on the other hand, took the figure of the last drawn emoluments of the deceased and made the deduction towards income-tax. Thereafter, the High Court provided for future prospects at 40% and made the deduction of one-fourth towards personal expenses. In this manner, the High Court arrived at the figure of multiplicand at Rs. 3,15,000/-. On this multiplicand, the High Court applied the multiplier of 15 in view of the age of deceased at 38 years and hence, worked out the pecuniary loss at Rs. 47,25,000/-. As noticed, the High Court further awarded Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses, and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate; and finally assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/-, rounded up to Rs . 48,00,000/-. 11.1. The assessment so made by the High Court stands more or less in conformity with the principles enunciated in Pranay Sethi(supra ). The only doubtful area is that the High Court provided for enhancement towards future prospects only at 40% on the last drawn emoluments of the deceased and not at 50% though he was shown to be in a settl ed employment with future chances of promotion as also pay revi sion. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, we are not considering any modification in the amount awarded by the High Court for a variety of factors, as indicated infra . 12. Taking up the question of ex gratia payment received by the claimants from the employer of the deceased, it is noticed that an amount of Rs. 3,21,801/- was paid by the employer to the claimants, being one year’s gross salary of the deceased. While relying on the dec ision in Shashi Sharma, it is contended on behalf of the insurer that the ex 697 gratia amount so received by the claimants is required to be deducted. Noticeable it is that in Shashi Sharma’s case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with the payment received by the legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Rule 5 of the Haryana Comp assionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Emplo yees Rules, 2006 (‘Rules of 2006’) whereunder, on the death of a government employee, the family would continue to receive as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last dra wn by the deceased employee for periods specified in the Rules and after the said period, the family would be entitled to receive family pension. The family would also be entitled to retain the government accommodati on for a period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000/- as ex gratia 1. 12.1. The aforesaid decision in Shashi Sharma has been explained and distinguished by another three-Judge Bench of t his Court in Sebastiani Lakra ( supra ) in the following:- “10. In Shashi Sharma’s case, 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC), this court was dealing with the payments made to the legal heir s 1 Rule 5 of the Rules of 2006 taken into consideration in Shashi Sharma’s case had been as under: “5. Criteria for financial assistance .—(1) On the death of any government employee, the family of the employee would continue to receive as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the normal course without raising a specific claim— (a) for a period of fifteen years from the date of death of the employee, if the employee at the time of his death had not attained the age of thirty-five years; (b) for a period of twelve years or till the date the employee would have retired from government service on attaining the age of superann uation, whichever is less, if the employee at the time of his death had attained the age of thirty-five years but had not attained the age of forty-eight years; (c) for a period of seven years or till the date the employee would have retired from government service on attaining the age of superann uation, whichever is less, if the employee had attained the age of forty-eight years. (2) The family shall be eligible to receive family pension as per the normal rules only after the period during which he receives the financial assistance as above is completed. (3) The family of a deceased government employee wh o was in occupation of a government residence would continue to retain the r esidence on payment of normal rent/licence fee for a period of one year from the date of death of the employee. (4) Within fifteen days from the date of death of a government employee, an ex gratia assistance of twenty-five thousand rupees shall be provided to the family of the deceased employee to meet the immediate needs on the loss of the bread earner. (5) House rent allowance shall not be a part of all owance for the purposes of calculation of assistance.” NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] of the deceased in terms of rule 5(1) of the Haryan a Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of Decea sed Government Employees Rules, 2006 (for short ‘the sa id Rules’). Under rule 5 of the said Rules on the dea th of a government employee, the family would continue to re ceive as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased empl oyee for periods set out in the Rules and after the said period t he family was entitled to receive family pension. The family was also entitled to retain the Government accommodation for a period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000 as ex gratia. In this case, the three-Judge Bench advert ed to the principles laid down in Helen C. Rebello’s case 1999 ACJ 10 (SC), followed in Patricia Jean Mahajan’s case 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC), and came to the conclusion that the deci sion in Vimal Kanwar’s case 2013 ACJ 1441 (SC), did not tak e a view contrary to Helen C. Rebello or Patricia Jean Mahajan cases (supra). The following observations are relev ant: “(12) The principle expounded in this decision in Hele n C. Rebello’s case that the application of general principle s under the common law to estimate damages cannot be invoked for computing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. Further, the ‘pecuniary advantage’ fr om whatever source must correlate to the injury or dea th caused on account of motor accident. The view so taken is the correct analysis and interpretation of the r elevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and m ust apply proprio vigore to the corresponding provision s of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This principle has been re- stated in the subsequent decision of the two-Judge Benc h in Patricia Jean Mahajan’s case, 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC), to reject the argument of the insurance company to ded uct the amount receivable by the dependants of the deceas ed by way of ‘social security compensation’ and ‘life insurance policy’.” However, while dealing with the scheme the court hel d that applying a harmonious approach and to determine a j ust 699 compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act it woul d be appropriate to exclude the amount received under the said Rules under the head of ‘pay and other allowances’ last drawn by the employee. We may note that on principle thi s court has not disagreed with the proposition laid down in Helen C. Rebello or in Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra), but wh ile arriving at a just compensation, it had ordered the deductio n of the salary received under the statutory Rules.” 12.2. In the present case too, it has not been shown if the ex gratia amount received by the claimants had been under any Ru les of service and would be of continuous assistance, as had been the case in Shashi Sharma ( supra ) as per the Rules of 2006 considered therein. In an overall analysis and with reference to the decision in Sebastiani Lakra ( supra ), we are clearly of the view that the decision in Shashi Sharma would not apply to the facts of the present case and no deduction in the amount awarded by the High Court appears necessary. 12.3. Apart from the above, as noticed, the High Court has even otherwise provided for enhancement towards future prospects only at 40% though the deceased was in a settled job and was not self-employed or on fixed salary. If at all an assertion is made that the assistance received by the claimants or a part of allowances received by the deceased need to be taken into consideration for making certain deduction s, the enhancement by way of future prospects at 50% would be eff ectively setting off any such proposed deduction. In other words, in the ultimate analysis, the amount of pecuniary loss as assessed by t he High Court remains reasonable and cannot be said to be either exorbitant or too low so as to call for any interference. 13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. T he Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. MANNAT JOHAL [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] 14.The upshot of the discussion aforesaid is that in our view, the amount ultimately receivable by the claimants in terms of the judgment of the High Court remains that of just compensation and no ca se for interference is made out. 15. Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed. Divya Pandey Appeals dismissed.