National Insurance Company Limited v. Birender and Ors.
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. These civil appeals emanate from the common judgment and
order dated 8.8.2018 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh (for short, ‘the High Court’) in cross appeals being F.A.O.
Nos. 1341 of 2016 (O&M) and 4023 of 2016 (O&M), questioning the
correctness of the award dated 4.12.2015 passed by the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, Jind (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in M.A.C.T. Case No.
205 of 2014. The former appeal (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No……/2020
@ Diary No. 47693/2018) has been preferred by the insurance company
and the latter appeal (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No……./2020 @ D iary
No. 17683/2019) by the claimants-respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The parties
are referred to as per their status in the former appe al for the sake of
convenience.
4. The claim petition was filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
herein, who are the major sons of Smt. Sunheri Devi (decease d). The
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS.
deceased was on her way to attend the office of Tehsilda r, Uchana
(where she was working as a Peon) from Dharoli Khera villa ge on
20.10.2014 at about 9.00 a.m., travelling as a pillion rider on a motorcycle
bearing No. HR-32-G-8749. At that time, a dumper/tipp er bearing
registration No. HR-56-A-3260 coming from the opposite direction, being
driven in a rash and negligent manner, collided with the motorcyc le,
resulting in fatal injuries sustained to the deceas ed to which she
succumbed.
5. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 claimed an amount of
Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only) along with interest at the rate
of 12% per annum on the assertion that the deceased w as earning
Rs.28000/- per month (Rs. 21000/- as salary and Rs.7000/- as family
pension of her husband), she was hale and healthy and was the only
bread earner of her entire family and that they were largely depe ndant
upon her income and have also been deprived of her love and affection.
The appellant disputed the claim and pleaded that the accident did not
occur with the offending vehicle (the dumper/tipper) or due to fault of its
driver, and that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were major s and not
dependant upon the deceased and as such not entitle d for any
compensation. Further, the vehicle in question was bein g plied in
contravention of terms and conditions of the insurance policy a nd the
driver was not holding a valid and effective driving licence. Resultantly,
the insurance company-appellant was not liable to pay compensation.
6. After analysing the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that
the accident of the deceased occurred due to rash and negligent driving
of the offending vehicle. The Tribunal further noted that the driver and
the owner of offending vehicle have placed on record the driving licence
of the driver, valid insurance policy, public carrier p ermit and the
registration certificate of the offending vehicle and the appellant having
failed to lead any evidence to prove that the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy were violated, cannot be absolved of its liability. The
Tribunal also noted that though the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were major
and earning hands, the fact that they were legal heirs of th e deceased
and have been deprived of the pecuniary benefits through the deceased
cannot be denied.
7. Having decided the above issues in favour of the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2, the Tribunal while determining the quantum of compensation
took note of the gross monthly salary of the deceased as on September,
955
2014, which according to her service record was Rs.23,123/- and t he
net take home salary was Rs.16,918/-. The Tribunal did not consider the
family pension for computation, as the deceased was getting it in her
own right as widow and the same could not be reckoned. Her date of
birth was 1.4.1967 and date due for retirement was 31.3.2027, for which
multiplier of ‘13’ was applied. The deduction towards personal expenses
was kept at 50% as the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were major and earning
hands. Thus, the loss of dependency was determined at Rs.17,15,532/-.
In addition, an amount of Rs.25,000/- was awarded on account of funeral
expenses, etc. and the total compensation was compu ted at
Rs.17,40,532/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the
date of institution of petition. The driver, owner and insure r of the
offending vehicle were held jointly and severally liable.
8. Against the award passed by the Tribunal, cross appeals were
preferred being F.A.O. No. 1341 of 2016 (O&M) filed by the appellant
and F.A.O. No. 4023 of 2016 (O&M) filed by the respondent Nos. 1
and 2. The appellant (insurance company) primarily contended that the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are not entitled to compensation for loss of
dependency as they are major and earning and also because the family
of the deceased was entitled to receive financial assistanc e under the
Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of Deceased
Government Employees Rules, 2006 (in short, ‘the 2006 Rules’). The
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 contended that being major and also earning by
itself cannot be regarded as ineligibility to claim compensation. Further,
the Tribunal has wrongly assessed loss of dependency on take-home
salary instead of the drawing salary and without considering the family
pension received by the deceased had she been alive. Th ey further
claimed that the deduction of personal expenses should be one-t hird
(1/3 rd ) instead of 50%.
9. The High Court by considering the monthly salary for computing
compensation as Rs.23,123/-, benefits of future prosp ects at 30%,
applying a multiplier of ‘13’ and deduction for personal expenses at 50%
held that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to loss of dependency
qua loss of income at Rs.23,44,672/-. The High Court, in addition, while
considering the loss of dependency qua loss of pension by taking monthly
pension at Rs.7,000/-, applying a multiplier of ‘13’ and deduction for
personal expenses at 50%, held that Rs.5,46,000/- would be payable
towards this head. The compensation under conventional heads was
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
also increased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.30,000/-. Therefore, the total
compensation payable was determined as Rs.29,20,672/-. The High Court
further noted that financial assistance available to the fam ily of the
deceased, under the 2006 Rules would be Rs.33,29,712/- and deducted
50% of the said amount from compensation whilst relyi ng upon a
judgment of the same High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Ajmero and others 1. The High Court then deducted that amount of
Rs.16,64,856/- from the compensation amount of Rs.2 9,20,672/-
determined by it. Resultantly, the High Court reduced the compensation
awarded by the Tribunal to the extent of Rs.4,84,716/- and gave liberty
to the appellant to recover the excess amount, if already paid.
10. The former appeal is preferred by the appellant on the ground
that the High Court ought to have deducted the entire amount of financial
assistance under the 2006 Rules, instead of deducting only 50% thereof.
Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Reliance General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma and Ors.2. It is urged that claim
for loss of dependency is unavailable to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in
the facts of the present case, they being major sons of th e deceased
who were married and also gainfully employed. Reliance is place d on
Manjuri Bera (Smt) v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.3. It is
urged that the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 may be entitle d only to
compensation under conventional heads as held in National Insurance
Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors. 4.
11. The latter appeal has been preferred by the respondent N os.
1 and 2, primarily on the ground that the High Court erred in deducting
50% of the amount from compensation instead of one-third (1 /3 rd ).
Further, deduction of 50% amount of the financial assistance receivable
under the 2006 Rules on the assumption that the respondent Nos. 1 and
2 are eligible therefor is a manifest error. Reliance is also placed on the
decision of the High Court in Ajmero (supra). It is urged that the High
Court ought to have considered that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were
dependant on the deceased and that they have been deprived of her love
and affection and income and thus entitled to compensation as claimed
in the original application in that regard.
1 F.A.O. No. 2648 of 2016, decided on 31.07.2017
2 (2016) 9 SCC 627
3 (2007) 10 SCC 643
4 (2017) 16 SCC 680
957
12. We have heard Mr. Amit Kumar Singh, learned counsel for
the insurance company (appellant) and Ms. Abha R. Sharma, l earned
counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The principal issues which
arise for our consideration are as follows: -
(i) Whether the major sons of the deceased who are married
and gainfully employed or earning, can claim compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’)?
(ii) Whether such legal representatives are entitled o nly for
compensation under the conventional heads?
(iii) Whether the amount receivable by the legal representatives
of the deceased under the 2006 Rules is required to be
deducted as a whole or only portion thereof?
13. Reverting to the first issue - that needs to be answered on the
basis of the scheme of the Act. Section 166 of the Act p rovides for
filing of application for compensation by persons mentioned in clauses
(a) to (d) of sub-Section (1) thereof. Section 166 of the Act, as applicable
at the relevant time, reads thus: -
“Section 166. Application for compensation.- (1) An
application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature
specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made-
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or
any of the legal representatives of the deceased ; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all
or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as
the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the
deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation,
the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all
the legal representatives of the deceased and the l egal
representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as
respondents to the application.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the
option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the
Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form
and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no claim for compensation under
Section 140 is made in such application, the application shal l
contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before
the signature of the applicant.
(3) ***
(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of a ccidents
forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 15 8 as an
application for compensation under this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. The legal representatives of the deceased could move
application for compensation by virtue of clause (c) of Section 166(1).
The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on
the deceased, would be still covered by the express ion “legal
representative” of the deceased. This Court in Manjuri Bera (supra)
had expounded that liability to pay compensation under the Act does not
cease because of absence of dependency of the conce rned legal
representative. Notably, the expression “legal representa tive” has not
been defined in the Act. In Manjuri Bera (supra), the Court observed
thus:-
“9. In terms of clause ( c) of sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the
Act in case of death, all or any of the legal representatives of the
deceased become entitled to compensation and any such legal
representative can file a claim petition. The proviso to said sub-
section makes the position clear that where all the legal
representatives had not joined, then application can be made on
behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased by impleading
those legal representatives as respondents. Therefore, the H igh
Court was justified in its view that the appellant could maintain a
claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Act.
10. …..The Tribunal has a duty to make an award, determine the
amount of compensation which is just and proper and specify the
959
person or persons to whom such compensation would be paid.
The latter part relates to the entitlement of compensatio n by a
person who claims for the same.
11. According to Section 2(11) CPC, “legal representative” means
a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased perso n,
and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the
deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a represe ntative
character the person on whom the estate devolves on the de ath
of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar terms is the
definition of legal representative under the Arbitr ation and
Conciliation Act, 1996 i.e. under Section 2(1)( g).
12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of
BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [1989 Supp
(2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) CPC is
inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to
legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or
may not be legal heir competent to inherit the property of the
deceased can represent the estate of the deceased per son. It
includes heirs as well as persons who represent the est ate even
without title either as executors or administrators in possession of
the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by
the expression “legal representative”. As observed in Gujarat
SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal
representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person
due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a
wife, husband, parent and child.”
In paragraph 15 of the said decision, while adverting t o the
provisions of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed th at even if
there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal
representative, will be entitled to compensation. In the concurring
judgment of Justice S.H. Kapadia, as His Lordship then was, it is observed
that there is distinction between “right to apply for compensation” and
“entitlement to compensation”. The compensation constitutes pa rt of
the estate of the deceased. As a result, the legal represe ntative of the
deceased would inherit the estate. Indeed, in that case, the Court was
dealing with the case of a married daughter of the deceased and the
efficacy of Section 140 of the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying
the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of the
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of
the deceased and also earning.
15. It is thus settled by now that the legal representativ es of the
deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it
must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of
the deceased being legal representatives have a right t o apply for
compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider
the application irrespective of the fact whether the conc erned legal
representative was fully dependant on the deceased and not to limit the
claim towards conventional heads only. The evidence on record in the
present case would suggest that the claimants were working as
agricultural labourers on contract basis and were earning meagre income
between Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.1,50,000/- per annum. In that sense, they
were largely dependant on the earning of their mother and in fact, were
staying with her, who met with an accident at the young age of 48 years.
16. The next issue is about the deduction of the amount receivable
by the legal representatives of the deceased under the 2006 Rules from
the compensation amount determined by the Tribunal in terms of the
decision of three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shashi Sharma (supra).
This Court, after analysing the relevant rules, opined as follows: -
“23. Reverting back to Rule 5, sub-rule (1) provides for the period
during which the dependants of the deceased employee may
receive financial assistance equivalent to the pay and other
allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the
normal course without raising a specific claim. Sub-rule (2)
provides that the family shall be eligible to receive famil y
pension as per the normal Rules only after the period during
which they would receive the financial assistance in term s
of sub-rule (1). Sub-rule (3) guarantees the family of a deceased
government employee of a government residence in occupation
for a period of one year from the date of death of the employee,
upon payment of normal rent/licence fee. By virtue of sub-rul e
(4), an ex gratia assistance of Rs 25,000 is provided to the family
of the deceased employee to meet the immediate needs on t he
loss of the bread earner. Sub-rule (5) clarifies that house rent
allowance shall not be a part of allowance for the purpo ses of
calculation of assistance.
961
24. …..As regards the second part, it deals with income from
other source which any way is receivable by the dependants o f
the deceased government employee. That cannot be deducted
from the claim amount for determination of a just
compensation under the 1988 Act .
25. The claimants are legitimately entitled to claim for the loss of
“pay and wages” of the deceased government employee against
the tortfeasor or insurance company, as the case may be, covered
by the first part of Rule 5 under the 1988 Act. The claimants or
dependants of the deceased government employee (employed by
the State of Haryana), however, cannot set up a claim for the
same subject falling under the first part of Rule 5—”pay and
allowances”, which are receivable by them from employer (the
State) under Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules. In that, if the deceased
employee was to survive the motor accident injury, he would have
remained in employment and earned his regular pay a nd
allowances. Any other interpretation of the said Rules would
inevitably result in double payment towards the same head of loss
of “pay and wages” of the deceased government employe e
entailing in grant of bonanza, largesse or source of profit to the
dependants/claimants…..
26. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under
the 2006 Rules is absent. That, however, does not mean that the
Claims Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim
towards loss of pay and wages of the deceased has already been
or will be compensated by the employer in the form of ex gratia
financial assistance on compassionate grounds under Rule 5(1).
The Claims Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and determi ne
the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The
amount receivable by the dependants/claimants towards the head
of “pay and allowances” in the form of ex gratia fi nancial
assistance, therefore, cannot be paid for the second time to the
claimants. True it is, that the 2006 Rules would come into play if
the government employee dies in harness even due to natural
death. At the same time, the 2006 Rules do not expressly enable
the dependants of the deceased government employee to claim
similar amount from the tortfeasor or insurance company because
of the accidental death of the deceased government employee.
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
The harmonious approach for determining a just compensation
payable under the 1988 Act, therefore, is to exclude the amount
received or receivable by the dependants of the dec eased
government employee under the 2006 Rules towards the head
financial assistance equivalent to “pay and other allowances” that
was last drawn by the deceased government employee in the
normal course. This is not to say that the amount or pay ment
receivable by the dependants of the deceased govern ment
employee under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, is the total entitlem ent
under the head of “loss of income”. So far as the claim towar ds
loss of future escalation of income and other benefits is concerned,
if the deceased government employee had survived the accident
can still be pursued by them in their claim under the 1988 Act.
For, it is not covered by the 2006 Rules. Similarly, other benefits
extended to the dependants of the deceased government employee
in terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 including family
pension, life insurance, provident fund, etc., that must remai n
unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which, any
way would be paid to the dependants of the deceased government
employee, applying the principle expounded in Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC , (1999) 1 SCC 90 and United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan , (2002) 6
SCC 281 cases.
27. A priori, the appellants must succeed only to the extent o f
amount receivable by the dependants of the deceased government
employee in terms of Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules, towards financial
assistance equivalent to the loss of pay and wages of the deceased
employee for the period specified.”
(emphasis supplied)
The learned Judge of the High Court has, however, after adverting
to the decision of the same High Court in Ajmero (supra), went on to
observe that 50% of the amount receivable by the legal representatives
of the deceased towards financial assistance under the 2006 Rul es is
required to be deducted from the compensation amount. In the reli ed
upon decision, the same learned Judge had occasion to observe as follows:-
“… However, perusal of the judgment would reveal that
the Court has not adverted to the issue that had the Rule s
963
of 2006 extending assistance to family of a decease d
employee been not in existence, family would have be en
entitled to pension to the extent of 50% of the last drawn
pay. As per the settled position in law, the pensionary benefits
available to family of a deceased employee are not amenable for
deduction for computing loss of dependency. There is nothing on
record suggestive of the fact that in addition to compassionat e
assistance under the Rules, family of the deceased is being p aid
pension till the age of superannuation. Rather Rule 5(2) of the
2006 Rules specifically denies family pension as per n ormal
rules...” (emphasis supplied)
17. The view so taken by the High Court is not the correct reading
of the decision of three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shashi Sharma
(supra) for more than one reason. First, this Court was conscious of the
fact that under Rule 5(2) of the 2006 Rules, the family pension receivable
by the family would be payable, however, only after the period, during
which the financial assistance is received, is completed. In that context,
in paragraph 24 of the reported decision, the Court clearly noted that the
amount towards family pension cannot be deducted from the claim amount
for determination of a just compensation under the Act. Furthe r, the
High Court has erroneously assumed that the family of the dec eased
would be entitled for family pension amount immediately after the death
of the deceased employee. That is in the teeth of the sc heme of the
2006 Rules, in particular Rule 5(2) thereof. The said Rules provide for
financial assistance on compassionate grounds, as also, other benefits to
the family members of the deceased employee and as a package thereof,
Rule 5(2) stipulates that the family pension as per the normal rules would
be payable to the family members only after the period of delivery of
financial assistance is completed. The validity of this provision is not put
in issue. Suffice it to say that the view taken by the High Court in Ajmero
(supra) is a departure from the scheme envisaged by the 2006 Rules, in
particular, Rule 5(2). That cannot be countenanced.
18. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the High C ourt
committed manifest error in assuming that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
would be eligible to receive financial assistance under the 2006 Rules.
The eligibility to receive such financial assistance has been spelt out in
Rule 3 of the 2006 Rules read with the provision of Pension/Fa mily
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Pension Scheme, 1964. It appears that major sons and married daughters
are not included in the definition. However, we need not dilate on that
aspect in the present proceedings any further. It has come in the evidence
of Gobind Singh, Clerk in SDM Office (PW-1) that th e legal
representatives of the deceased have not submitted any request for getting
financial assistance till he had deposed. Indeed, respondent No. 1, who
had entered the witness box, did depose that they had applied for getting
salary of their deceased mother. The fact remains that there is no clear
evidence on record that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are held to be eligible
to get financial assistance or in fact, they are getting such financial
assistance under the 2006 Rules. The High Court, therefore, instead of
providing for deduction of the amount receivable by the legal
representatives of the deceased on this count (under the 2006 R ules),
from the compensation amount, should have independently determined
the compensation amount and ordered payment thereof subject to legal
representatives of the deceased filing affidavit/declara tion before the
executing Court that they have not received nor would they claim a ny
amount towards financial assistance under the 2006 Rules, so as t o
become entitled to withdraw the entire compensation amount.
19. Reverting to the determination of compensation amount, it is
noticed that the Tribunal proceeded to determine the compe nsation
amount on the basis of net-salary drawn by the deceased for the relevant
period as Rs.16,918/- per month, while taking note of the fact that he r
gross-salary was Rs.23,123/- per month (presumably below taxable
income). Concededly, any deduction from the gross-salary other tha n
tax amount cannot be reckoned. In that, the actual salary less tax amount
ought to have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal for determining
the compensation amount, in light of the dictum of the Constitution Bench
of this Court in paragraph 59.3 of Pranay Sethi (supra).
20. Similarly, the High Court despite having taken note of t he
submission made by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the deduction for
personal expenses of the deceased should be reckoned only as one-third
(1/3 rd ) amount for determining loss of dependency, maintained the
deduction of 50% towards that head as ordered by the Tribunal. This
Court in Pranay Sethi (supra), in paragraph 37, adverted to the dictum
of this Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. vs. Delhi Transport
Corporation & Anr.5 with approval, wherein it is held that if the dependant
5 (2009) 6 SCC 121 (para 30)
965
family members are 2 to 3, as in this case, the deduction towards personal
and living expenses of the deceased should be taken as one-third (1/3 rd ).
In other words, the deduction towards personal expenses to the extent
of 50% is excessive and not just and proper considering the fact that the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 alongwith their respective families were staying
with the deceased at the relevant time and were largely dependant on
her income.
21. Be that as it may, the Tribunal, for excluding the amount
received by the deceased as family pension due to demise of her husband,
had noted in paragraph 26, as under: -
“26. Learned counsel for the claimants further requested that about
to family pension being drawn by the deceased also be calculated
for the purpose of assessing the compensation. This conte ntion
and assertion of learned counsel for the claimants does not carry
any conviction with the Tribunal because the deceased was getting
family pension in her own right as the widow of the deceased and
cannot be termed as her income for the purpose of computing the
amount of compensation.”
The High Court, without reversing the said finding, proceeded to
include the amount of Rs.7,000/- per month received by the deceased as
pension amount after demise of her husband. We are in agreement with
the view taken by the Tribunal and for the same reason, have to reverse
the conclusion recorded by the High Court to include the said amount as
loss of dependency. That could not have been taken into account, as the
same was payable only to the deceased being widow and not her income
as such for the purpose of computing the amount of compensation.
22. Considering the above, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would be
entitled for compensation to be reckoned on the bas is of loss of
dependency, due to loss of gross salary (less tax amount, if any) of the
deceased and future prospects and deduction of only one-third (1/3 rd )
amount towards personal expenses of the deceased. As reg ards the
multiplier ‘13’ applied by the Tribunal and the High Court, th e same
needs no interference. As a result, on the facts and in the circumstances
of this case, the amount payable towards compensation will have to be
recalculated on the following basis: -
Loss of dependency due to loss of income calculated at
Rs.31,26,229.60/- [(Rs.23,123/- x 12 x 13) + (30% f uture
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v.
BIRENDER AND ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
prospects) – (1/3 rd deduction for personal expenses)]. In addition,
the claimants would be entitled for a sum of Rs.70,000/- towards
conventional heads in terms of dictum in paragraph 59.8 of Pranay
Sethi (supra). Thus, a total sum of Rs.31,96,230/- (Rupees thirty-
one lakhs ninety-six thousand two hundred thirty only), as rounded
off, is payable to the claimants.
However, this amount alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment, will be
payable subject to the outcome of the application made by the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 to the competent authority for grant of financial assistance
under the 2006 Rules. If that application is allowed and the a mount
becomes payable towards financial assistance under the said Rules to
the specified legal representatives of the deceased, commensurate amount
will have to be deducted from the compensation amount alongwith interest
component thereon. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2, therefore, can be
permitted to withdraw the compensation amount only upon filing of an
affidavit-cum-declaration before the executing Court that they have not
received nor would claim any amount towards financial assistance under
the 2006 Rules and if already received or to be received in future on that
account, the amount so received will be disclosed to the executing Court,
which will have to be deducted from the compensation amount determined
in terms of this order. The compensation amount, therefore, be paid to
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 subject to the above and upon giving an
undertaking before the executing Court to indemnify the insura nce
company (appellant) to that extent.
23. The appeals are partly allowed in the aforementioned terms
with no order as to costs. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall
stand disposed of.
Ankit Gyan Appeals partly allowed.