Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-iv
R. F. NARIMAN, J.
1. The present appeal relating to assessment year 1995-96 is by
one Shri Shiv Raj Gupta, who was the Chairman and Managing Director
of M/s Central Distillery and Breweries Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
“CDBL”), which had a unit in Meerut manufacturing beer and India n
Made Foreign Liquor (hereinafter referred to as “IMFL”). The facts
leading to an appreciation of the issues raised in this appeal are as follows.
2. By a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to
as “MoU”) dated 13.04.1994, made between the appellant and three
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group companies of M/s Shaw Wallace Company Group (hereinaf ter
referred to as “SWC group”), the appellant, his wife, son, daughter-in-
law and two daughters were the registered holders of 1,86,109 e quity
shares of INR 10 each constituting 57.29% of the paid-up equity share
capital of CDBL listed in the Bombay and Delhi Stock Exchanges. The
break-up of the shares held by the family members of the appellant and
the appellant himself are as follows:
Name of the Shareholder Number of Shares held in CD BL
Shiv Raj Gupta ( Appellant ) 38,999
Jayant Gupta ( Appellant ’s Son) 44,658
Roopa Gupta ( Appellant ’s Daughter -in -law) 53,911
Pushpa Gupta ( Appellant ’s Wife) 3,303
Avanti Pandit ( Appellant ’s Daughter) 5,541
Arti Kirloskar ( Appellant ’s Daughter) 2,760
Total 1,86,109
3. The said MoU recites that the company employed in its factory
350 employees and around 25 staff and other officers in its other offices.
The MoU then refers to a direction of the Supreme Court, w hich was
made by an Order dated 11.03.1994, which made it clear that the
company’s manufacturing activity at the plant at Meerut was suspended
until a secondary effluent treatment plant is installed and made operative
by the company. This led to the sale of this controlling block of shares,
which was sold at the price of INR 30 per share (when the listed market
price of the share was only INR 3 per share). It is state d in the said
MoU that the entire sale consideration of Rs.55,83,270/- has since been
paid by the SWC group to Shri Gupta, as a result of which Shri Gupt a
has irrevocably handed over physical possession, management and control
of the said brewery and distillery of CDBL to a representa tive of the
SWC group on 10.02.1994. Among the things to be done under the MoU,
it was made clear that the nominees of the SWC group would be put in
the saddle i.e. be made directors on or before 13.04.1994, so that they
will constitute an absolute majority on the board of the company.
Importantly, both Shri Shiv Raj Gupta and his son Shri Jayant Gupta
(who, together with his wife, is the major shareholder of the family) will
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
resign as Chairman and Managing Director and as Joint M anaging
Director respectively of CDBL by 13.04.1994. Under Clause 7 of th e
said MoU, personal guarantees given by the appellant and hi s son to
UCO Bank, IFCI, ICICI and IREDA for loans amounting to INR 8.44
crores will be indemnified against all claims, actions, e tc. in respect
thereof.
4. By a Deed of Covenant dated 13.04.1994, the MoU signed on
the same day was reiterated, and it was then stated in recitals 3 and 4 as
follows:
“(3) Over the past years, Mr. Shivraj Gupta has acq uired
considerable knowledge, skill, expertise and specialization in liquor
business.
(4) In furtherance of the purchase of the said shares, SWC have
requested Mr. Shivraj Gupta to give a restrictive covenant to and
in favour of SWC for not carrying ondirectly or indirectly any
manufacturing or marketing activities, whatsoever, relating to Indian
Made ForeignLiquor (IMFL) or Beer for a period of 10 years
from the date hereof which Mr. Gupta has agreed to give for the
consideration of a non-competition fee of Rs. 6,60,00,00 (Rupees
Six crores and sixty lacs only) to be paid by SWC to Mr. Gupta.”
The Deed of Covenant is a short document containing two clauses,
which are set out as follows:
“1.In consideration of the sum of Rs. 6,00,00,000 (Rupees Six
crores only) paid by SWC to Mr. Gupta as anadvance against the
aforesaid non-competition fee of Rs.6,60,00,000 (the receipt
whereof, Mr. Gupta hereby admits and acknowledges), Mr. Gupta
hereby irrevocably agrees, covenants and undertakes that wit h
effect from the date of these presents, Mr. Gupta will not start or
engage himself directly or indirectly or provide any s ervice,
assistance or support of any nature, whatsoever, to or inrelation
to the manufacturing, dealing and supplying or marketing of Indian
Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and/orBeer. The balance amount
of Rs. 60,00,000 (Rupeessixty lacs only) will be paid by SWC to
Mr. Gupta on 31 st October, 1994.
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2.This covenant shall remain in full force and effect for aperiod
of 10 years from the date of these presents and this covenant will
be absolutely and irrevocably binding on Mr. Gupta.”
5. The bone of contention in this appeal is whether the said Deed
of Covenant can be said to contain a restrictive covenant as a result of
which payment is made to the appellant, or whether it is in fact part of a
sham transaction which, in the guise of being a separ ate Deed of
Covenant, is really in the nature of payment received by the appellant as
compensation for terminating his management of CDBL, in which case
it would be taxable under Section 28(ii)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Section 28(ii)(a) reads as follows:
“28. Profits and gains of business or profession.
The following income shall be chargeable to income-tax under
the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”, -
xxx xxxxxx
(ii) any compensation or other payment due to or received by,-
(a) any person, by whatever name called, managing the whole or
substantially the whole of the affairs of an Indian company, at or
in connection with the termination of his management or the
modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto;”
6. By an order dated 31.03.1998, the Assessing Officer held that
despite the fact that the appellant owned a concern, namely, one M/s
Maltings Ltd., which also manufactured IMFL, being a loss ma king
concern, no real competition could be envisaged between a giant, namely,
the SWC group and this loss making dwarf, as a result of w hich the
huge amount paid under the Deed of Covenant cannot be said to be an
amount paid in respect of a restrictive covenant as to non-competition.
It was further held that the son of the appellant was not paid any such
non-compete fee or amount despite the fact that he also resig ned from
his position as Joint Managing Director. It was also held that this was a
lump sum payment with no reason as to why such a huge am ount of
INR 6.6 crores was being paid. It was also found that there was no
penalty clause to enforce the performance of obligatio ns under the
aforesaid Deed of Covenant, as a result of which, applying the judgment
in McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. CTO (1985) 3 SCC 230 , the Deed of
Covenant was held to be a colourable device to evade tax that is payable
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
under Section 28(ii)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. As a result thereof,
this amount was then brought to tax under the aforesaid provision.
7. An appeal from the Assessing Officer to the lear ned
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) was dismissed. When it came
before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter re ferred to as
“Appellate Tribunal”) the learned Accountant Member differed with the
learned Judicial Member. The learned Accountant Member held that
the two deeds would have to be read separately and that revenue cannot
challenge the business perception of the assessee. Further , it was held
that there was no colourable device involved, and that, as a result, non-
compete fee payable under the Deed of Covenant was not taxable under
Section 28(ii)(a) or any other provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The learned Judicial Member on the other hand substantially a greed
with the Assessing Officer, as a result of which he decided in favour of
the revenue. A reference was then made to a third Member , who was
also a Judicial Member. The learned third Member emphasised the fact
that a share worth INR 3 was sold for INR 30 under the MoU as a
result of transfer of control of the CDBL. It cannot be sai d that these
shares have been undervalued, neither can it be said that there was any
collusion or other sham transaction, as a result of which the amount of
INR 6.6 crores has escaped income tax. He pointed out that by a letter
dated 02.04.1994, a “penalty clause” was provided for in that, out of the
amount received by the assessee an amount of INR 3 crore was to be
deposited with the SWC group for two years under a public deposit
scheme, it being made clear that in case there is any breach of the terms
of the MoU resulting in loss, the amount of such loss will be deducted
from this deposit. The result, therefore, was that the appeal stood allowed
by a majority of 2:1 in the Appellate Tribunal.
8. The revenue preferred an appeal under Section 260-A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 to the High Court. In its grounds of appeal, the
revenue framed the substantial questions of law that arose in the matter
as follows:
“A) Whether the ITAT has correctly interpreted theprovisions of
Section 28(ii) of the Income Tax Act,1961?
B) Whether the Ld. ITAT was correct in holding thatreceipt of
Rs.6.6 crores by the respondent/assesseeas non-competitive fee
was a capital receipt u/s 28(iv)income tax act and not a revenue
receipt as envisaged in Section 28(ii) of I.T. Act?
883
C) Whether the Ld. ITAT failed to distinguish betweennature of
capital and nature of benefit in commercial sense in re spect of
amount of Rs. 6.6 crores received in view of restrictive covenant
of deed dated 13.04.1994?
D) Whether Ld. Judicial Member of ITAT was correct in recording
his difference of opinion that receipt of Rs. 6.6 crores by
respondent/assessee was actually a colourable exercise to evade
tax and same was held to be taxable under Section 28(ii) of the
Income Tax Act?”
9. By the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi
High Court dated 22.12.2014, the Division Bench framed the following
substantial question of law:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of thecase, t he
amount of Rs. 6.6 crores received by theassessee from SWC is
on account of handing overmanagement and control of CDBL
(which wereearlier under the management and control of
theassessee) to SWC as terminal benefit and is taxableu/s 28(ii)
of the Income-tax Act or same is exempt as capital receipt being
non-competition fee by executing deed of covenant”
After going through the MoU and the Deed of Covenant, both
dated 13.04.1994, and copiously referring to the order of the Assessing
Officer dated 31.03.1998, the High Court agreed with the Assess ing
Officer and the first Judicial Member of the Appellate Tribunal, stating
that the Deed of Covenant could not be read as a separate do cument
and was not in its real avatar a non-compete fee at all. Howeve r, in its
ultimate conclusion, disagreeing with the learned Assessing Officer and
the minority judgment of the Tribunal, the High Court went on to state
that the said sum of INR 6.6 crores could not be brought to tax und er
Section 28(ii)(a), but would have to be treated as a taxable capital gain
in the hands of the appellant, being part of the full value o f the sale
consideration paid for transfer of shares.
10. Shri Arvind Datar and Shri Ajay Vohra, learned senior
advocates appearing on behalf of the appellant, have taken us thr ough
the orders of the Income Tax Authorities, the Appellate Tribunal and the
impugned judgment of the High Court. They raised as a preliminary
submission the fact that under Section 260-A, it is only the substantial
question of law that is framed that can be answered and no ot her. If
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
some other question is to be answered, the Court must first give notice
of the same to both sides, hear them, pronounce a reasoned order and
thereafter frame another substantial question of law, which it may then
answer. This procedure has not been followed in the present case as it is
clear that the substantial question of law framed did not contain within it
the question as to whether the assessee can be taxed outside the provisions
of Section 28(ii)(a). The entire judgment is, therefore, vitiated and must
be set aside on this ground alone. They relied on several judgments t o
buttress this contention. They then relied upon the judgment of the learned
Accountant Member and of the third Member in favour of the assessee
and the reasoning therein, which according to them is unexceptionable
and should have been followed by the High Court. They also cited
judgments to show that prior to 01.04.2003, i.e. before the introduction
of Section 28(va) by Finance Act 20 of 2002 with effect from the aforesaid
date, any sum received under an agreement for not carrying out an y
activity in relation to any business was taxed, for the first time, under
this provision and the provision not being retrospective would not apply
to the facts of the present case.
11. Shri Arijit Prasad, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf
of the revenue, read the order of the Assessing Officer and the order of
the first learned Judicial Member and adopted the reasoning contained
therein. According to him, the High Court judgment correctly appl ied
both McDowell (supra) and Vodafone International Holdings BV
v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613 to arrive at the result which it
arrived at as it was clear that the amount of INR 6.6 crores that was
received by the assessee was really in the nature of pa yment for the
sale of shares. He also argued as an alternative that in any event it
would fall under Section 28 (ii)(a) as was correctly held by the learned
Assessing Officer and the minority judgment of the Appellate Tribunal.
12. Having heard learned counsel for both parties, we are of the
view that the appeal needs to succeed first on the prelimina ry ground
raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Section 260-A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 reads as follows:
“260-A. Appeal to High Court.
(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed
in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal before the date of establishment
of the National Tax Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the
case involves a substantial question of law.
885
(2) The Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or
the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or an ass essee
aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file
an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section
shall be—
(a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on
which the order appealed against is received by the asses see or
the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner;
(b) [***]
(c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating therein
the substantial question of law involved.
(2A) The High Court may admit an appeal after the expiry of the
period of one hundred and twenty days referred to in clause ( a)
of sub-section (2), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause
for not filing the same within that period.
(3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question
of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated,
and the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed
to argue that the case does not involve such question :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.
(5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated
and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on which
such decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit.
(6) The High Court may determine any issue which—
(a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or
(b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by
reason of a decision on such question of law as is referre d to in
sub-section (1).
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals
under this section.”
This provision, being modelled on a similar provision that is contained
in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, makes it clear that the
High Court’s jurisdiction depends upon a substantial question of law being
involved in the appeal before it. First and foremost, it shall formulate that
question and on the question so formulated, the High Court may th en
pronounce judgement, either by answering the question in the affirmative
or negative or by stating that the case at hand does not involve any such
question. If the High Court wishes to hear the appeal on any ot her
substantial question of law not formulated by it, it may, for reasons to be
recorded, formulate and hear such questions if it is satisfied t hat the
case involves such question – See section 260-A (4). Under sub-section
(6), the High Court may also determine any issue which, though raised,
has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal or has been wrongly
determined by the Appellate Tribunal by reason of a d ecision on a
substantial question of law raised.
13. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait
(1997) 5 SCC 438, this Court referred to Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and then stated:
“10. We would only add that ( a) it is the duty cast upon the High
Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the
case even at the initial stage; and ( b) that in (exceptional) cases,
at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction
under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC in
formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should
be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper
opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without
formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal
is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on
court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question
of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite
side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters
within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry
to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many
cases and second appeals are entertained and/or dispos ed of,
without conforming to the above discipline.”
887
This statement of the law was followed in Dnyanoba Bhaurao
Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2 SCC 471 ( See
paragraph 10). A recent decision of this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v.
Gobinda Ghosh (2014) 11 SCC 605 has reiterated these principles in
paragraph 16 as follows:
“16. Section 100 of the Code lays down the provision with regard
to the second appeal which reads as under:
“100. Second appeal .—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in
force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree
passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if
the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a subst antial
question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal
shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the
appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question
of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and
the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to
argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such
question.”
From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is manif estly
clear that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an appellate
decree only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law. It further mandates th at the
memorandum of appeal precisely states the substantial question
of law involved in the appeal. If such an appeal is filed, the High
Court while admitting or entertaining the appeal must record its
satisfaction and formulate the substantial question of law involved
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
in the appeal. The appeal shall then be heard on the questions so
formulated and the respondent shall be allowed to argue only on
those substantial questions of law. However, proviso to this section
empowers the court to hear on any substantial question of law not
formulated after recording reasons”
14. It can be seen that the substantial question of law tha t was
raised by the High Court did not contain any question as to whether the
non-compete fee could be taxed under any provision other than Section
28(ii)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Without giving an opportunity to
the parties followed by reasons for framing any other substantial question
of law as to the taxability of such amount as a capital rec eipt in the
hands of the assessee, the High Court answered the substantial question
of law raised as follows:
“63. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we deem it appropriate
and proper to treat Rs. 6.60 crores as consideration paid for sale
of shares, rather than a payment under Section 28(ii)(a) of the
Act.
xxx xxxxxx
65. The substantial question of law is accordingly answered in
favour of the appellant-Revenue and against the responde nt-
assessee but holding that Rs.6.60 crores was taxable as capita l
gains in the hands of the respondent-assessee being a part of the
full value sale consideration paid for transfer of shar es. The
appellant-Revenue will be entitled to costs as per the Delhi High
Court Rules.”
Clearly, without any recorded reasons and without framing any
substantial question of law on whether the said amount could be taxed
under any other provision of the Income Tax Act, the High Court went
ahead and held that the amount of INR 6.6 crores received by the
assessee was received as part of the full value of sale consideration
paid for transfer of shares – and not for handing over management and
control of CDBL and is consequently not taxable under Section 28(ii)(a)
of the Income Tax Act. Nor is it exempt as a capital receipt being non-
compete fee, as it is taxable as a capital gain in the hands of the
respondent-assessee as part of the full value of sale consideration paid
for transfer of shares. This finding would clearly be in the teeth of Section
260-A (4), requiring the judgment to be set aside on this score.
889
15. Coming to the merits, the High Court found:
“22. …No doubt, market price of each share was only Rs.3/- per
share and the purchase price under the MOU was Rs.30/-, but
the total consideration received was merely about Rs.56 lacs .
What was allegedly paid as non-compete fee was ten times more,
i.e. Rs.6.60 crores. The figure per se does not appear to be a
realistic payment made on account of non-compete fee, dehors
and without reference to sale of shares, loss of management and
control of CDBL. The assessee had attributed an astronomica l
sum as payment toward non-compete fee, unconnected with the
sale of shares and hence not taxable. Noticeably, the price received
for sale of shares, it is accepted was taxable as capital gain. The
contention that quoted price of each share was mere Rs. 3 only ,
viz . price as declared of Rs. 30/- is fallacious and off beam. The
argument of the assessee suffers from a basic and fundamental
flaw which is conspicuous and evident.”
This finding flies in the face of settled law. A catena of judgments
has held that commercial expediency has to be adjudged from the point
of view of the assessee and that the Income Tax Departme nt cannot
enter into the thicket of reasonableness of amounts paid by the assessee.
This Court in CIT v. Walchand & Co. (1967) 3 SCR 214 stated as
follows:
“It is open to the Tribunal to come to a conclusion either that the
alleged payment is not real or that it is not incurred by the assessee
in the character of a trader or that it is not laid out wholly and
exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee and to
disallow it. But it is not the function of the Tribunal to determine
the remuneration which in their view should be paid to in employee
of the assessee. When a claim for allowance under Se ction
10(2)( xv ) of the Income Tax Act is made, the Income Tax
Authorities have to decide whether the expenditure claimed as an
allowance was incurred voluntarily and on grounds of commercial
expediency. In applying the test of commercial expediency f or
determining whether the expenditure was wholly and exclusively
laid out for the purpose of the business, reasonableness of the
expenditure has to be adjudged from the point of view of the
businessman and not of the Revenue.” [at page 217]
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
The aforesaid judgment was followed by this Court in J.K.
Woollen Manufacturers v. CIT (1969) 1 SCR 525 where the Court
held:
“As pointed out by this Court in CIT v. Walchand& Co. Private
Ltd. [(1967) 65 ITR 381 : (AIR 1967 SC 1435)] in applying the
test of commercial expediency for determining whethe r an
expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose
of the business, reasonableness of the expenditure has to be
adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not of
the Income Tax Department. It is, of course, open to the Appellate
Tribunal to come to a conclusion either that the alleged payment
is not real or that it is not incurred by the assessee in the character
of a trader or it is not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose
of the business of the assessee and to disallow it. But it is not the
function of the Tribunal to determine the remuneration which in
their view should be paid to an employee of the assessee.” [at
page 529-530]
This Court in CIT v. Panipat Woollen & General Mills Co.
Ltd. (1976) 2 SCC 5 stated as follows:
“6. Before coming to the facts it may be necessary to menti on
that there can be no dispute with respect to the two import ant
propositions:
“( 1) that in order to fall within Section 10(2)( xv ) of the Act the
deduction claimed must amount to an expenditure which was laid
out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the
business, profession or vocation. This will naturally depend upon
the facts of each case,
(2) that in order to determine the question of reasonableness of
the expenditure, the test of commercial expediency w ould have
to be adjudged from the point of view of the businessman and not
of the Income tax Department.”
Further, this Court in Shahzada Nand & Sons v. CIT (1977) 3
SCC 432 reiterated this principle as follows:
“4. …But it is well settled that these factors are to be considered
from the point of view of a normal, prudent businessman. The
reasonableness of the payment with reference to these fac tors
has to be judged not on any subjective standard of the assessing
891
authority but from the point of view of commercial expediency…
…What is the requirement of commercial expediency must be
judged not in the light of the 19th Century laissez-faire doctrine
which regarded man as an economic being concerned only to
protect and advance his self-interest but in the context of current
socio-economic thinking which places the general interest of the
community above the personal interest of the individual and believes
that a business or undertaking is the product of the combined
efforts of the employer and the employees and where there is
sufficiently large profit, after providing for the salary or
remuneration of the employer and the employees and other prior
charges such as interest on capital, depreciation, reserves etc., a
part of it should in all fairness go to the employees.”
Also, this Court in S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT (2007) 1 SCC 781
held as follows:
“36. We agree with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in
CIT v. Dalmia Cement (B) Ltd. [(2002) 254 ITR 377 (Del)] that
once it is established that there was nexus between the expenditure
and the purpose of the business (which need not necessarily be
the business of the assessee itself), the Revenue cannot justifiably
claim to put itself in the armchair of the businessman o r in the
position of the Board of Directors and assume the role to decide
how much is reasonable expenditure having regard to the
circumstances of the case. No businessman can be compelled to
maximise its profit. The Income Tax Authorities mus t put
themselves in the shoes of the assessee and see how a prudent
businessman would act. The authorities must not look at the matter
from their own viewpoint but that of a prudent businessman. As
already stated above, we have to see the transfer of the borrowed
funds to a sister concern from the point of view of commercial
expediency and not from the point of view whether the amount
was advanced for earning profits.”
The same principle has also been cited with approval by a recent
judgment of this Court in Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2015) 16 SCC
359 where the Court held as follows:
“11. Insofar as loans to the sister concern/subsidiary company
are concerned, the law in this behalf is recapitulated by this Court
in S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT [ S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT , (2007) 1
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
SCC 781]. After taking note of and discussing on the scope of
commercial expediency, the Court summed up the legal position
in the following manner: (SCC pp. 787-88, paras 27-31)
xxx xxxxxx
31. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the expression
‘for the purpose of business’ is wider in scope than the expression
‘for the purpose of earning profits’ vide CIT v. Malayalam
Plantation Ltd. [ CIT v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd. , (1964) 53
ITR 140 (SC)] , CIT v. Birla Cotton Spg. &Wvg. Mills Ltd.
[CIT v. Birla Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. , (1971) 3 SCC
344] , etc.”
12. In the process, the Court also agreed that the view taken by
the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Dalmia Cement (B.) Ltd. [ CIT v.
Dalmia Cement (B.) Ltd. , 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1447 : (2002)
254 ITR 377] wherein the High Court had held that (SCC OnLine
Del para 8) once it is established that there is nexus between the
expenditure and the purpose of business (which need not
necessarily be the business of the assessee itself), the Revenue
cannot justifiably claim to put itself in the arm-ch air of the
businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and
assume the role to decide how much is reasonable expenditure
having regard to the circumstances of the case. It further he ld
that no businessman can be compelled to maximise his profit and
that the Income Tax Authorities must put themselves in the shoes
of the assessee and see how a prudent businessman would act.
The authorities must not look at the matter from their own viewpoint
but that of a prudent businessman.”
16. The High Court’s next finding based on the judgment in
Vodafone (supra) is as follows:
“56. In view of the aforesaid discussion and our findings on the
true and real nature of the transaction camouflaged as ‘non-
compete fee‘, we have no hesitation and reservation that the
respondent-assessee had indulged in abusive tax avoidance.”
17. We may only reiterate as correctly found by the majori ty
judgments of the Appellate Tribunal, that:
(i) A share of the face value of INR 10 and market value of
INR 3 was sold for INR 30 as a result of control premium
having to be paid.
893
(ii) It is important to note that each member of the famil y was
paid for his/her shares in the company, the lion’s share being
paid to the assessee’s son and wife as they held the most
number of shares within the said family.
(iii) The non-compete fee of INR 6.6 crores was paid only to the
assessee. This was for the reason stated in the Deed of
Covenant, namely, that Shri Shiv Raj Gupta had acquired
considerable knowledge, skill, expertise and specialisation in
the liquor business. There is no doubt that on facts he has
been Chairman and Managing Director of CDBL for a period
of about 35 years; that he also owned a concern, namely
M/s Maltings Ltd., which manufactured and sold IMFL and
beer and that he was the President of All India Distiller ies
Association and H.P. Distilleries Association.
(iv) It is further recorded in the judgment of the Accounting
Member that the amount of INR 6.6 crores was arrived at
as a result of negotiations between the SWC group and the
appellant.
(v) That the restrictive covenant for a period of 10 years resulted
in the payment of INR 66 lakhs per year so that the appellant
“…will not start or engage himself, directly or indirectly, or
provide any service, assistance or support of any nature,
whatsoever, to or in relation to the manufacturing, dealing
and supplying or marketing of IMFL and/or Beer.” Given
the personal expertise of the assessee, the perception of the
SWC group was that Shri Gupta could either start a rival
business or engage himself in a rival business, which would
include manufacturing and marketing of IMFL and Beer at
which he was an old hand, having experience of 35 years.
(vi) As was correctly held by the second Judicial Member, it
was also clear that the withholding of INR 3 crores out of
INR 6.6 crores for a period of two years by way of a public
deposit with the SWC group for the purpose of deduction of
any loss on account of any breach of the MoU, was akin to
a penalty clause, making it clear thereby that there was no
colourable device involved in having two separate agreements
for two entirely separate and distinct purposes.
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
18. The reasons given by the learned Assessing Officer and t he
minority judgment of the Appellate Tribunal are all reaso ns which
transgress the lines drawn by the judgments cited, which state that the
revenue has no business to second guess commercial or business
expediency of what parties at arms-length decide for each other . For
example, stating that there was no rationale behind the payment of INR
6.6 crores and that the assessee was not a probable or perceptible threat
or competitor to the SWC group is the perception of the Assessing Officer,
which cannot take the place of business reality from the point of view of
the assessee, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove. The fact that
M/s Maltings Ltd. had incurred a loss in the previous year is again neither
here nor there. It may in future be a direct threat to the SWC group and
may turn around and make profits in future years. Besides, M/s Maltings
Ltd. is only one concern of the assessee – it is the assessee’s expertise
in this field on all counts that was the threat perception of the SWC
group which cannot be second guessed by the revenue. Equally the fact
that there was no penalty clause for violation of the Deed of Covenant,
has been found by us to be incorrect given the letter dated 02.04.1994.
The fact that the respondent-assessee in his letter dated 26.03.1 998 in
reply to the show cause notice had stated that the SWC group had gained
substantial commercial advantage by the purchase of shares in CDBL
as the turnover increased from INR 9.79 crores in the accounting period
ending 31.03.1991 to INR 45.17 crores in the accounting period ending
31.03.1997 is again neither here nor there. As a matter of fact, the SWC
group, due to its own advertisement and marketing efforts, may well
have reached this figure after a period of six years (the date 30.09.1995
is wrongly recorded by the High Court in paragraph 19 – the correct
date as per the letter dated 26.03.1998 is 31.03.1991, as has been pointed
out by us hereinabove).
19. It only remains for us to point out the judgment in Guffic
Chem (P) Ltd. v. CIT (2011) 4 SCC 254. In this case, the question set
out by the Court is as follows:
“Whether a payment under an agreement not to compete (negative
covenant agreement) is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt is
the question which arises for determination in this case?”
Here, the Court was dealing with an amount of INR 50 lakhs
received by the appellant-assessee from Ranbaxy as a no n-compete
895
fee under an agreement dated 31.03.1997. This Court in negating t he
application of Section 28(ii)(a) to such receipt, held as follows:
“Decision
4. The position in law is clear and well settled. There is a dichotomy
between receipt of compensation by an assessee for the l oss of
agency and receipt of compensation attributable to the negative/
restrictive covenant. The compensation received for the lo ss of
agency is a revenue receipt whereas the compensation attributable
to a negative/restrictive covenant is a capital receipt.
5. The above dichotomy is clearly spelt out in the judgment of this
Court in Gillanders case [(1964) 53 ITR 283 (SC)] , in which the
facts were as follows: the assessee in that case carried on business
in diverse fields besides acting as managing agents, shippin g
agents, purchasing agents and secretaries. The assessee also acted
as importers and distributors on behalf of foreign principals and
bought and sold on its own account. Under an agreement which
was terminable at will the assessee acted as a sole agent of
explosives manufactured by Imperial Chemical Industries (Export)
Ltd. That agency was terminated and by way of compensation
Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. paid for firs t three
years after the termination of the agency two-fifth s of the
commission accrued on its sales in the territory of the agency of
the appellant and in addition in the third year full commission was
paid for the sales in that year. Imperial Chemical Industries (Export)
Ltd. took a formal undertaking from the assessee to refrain from
selling or accepting any agency for explosives.
6. Two questions arose for determination in Gillanders case
[(1964) 53 ITR 283 (SC)] , namely, whether the amounts received
by the appellant for loss of agency was in normal course of business
and therefore whether they constituted revenue receipt? The
second question which arose before this Court was whether the
amount received by the assessee (compensation) on the condition
not to carry on a competitive business was in the nature of capital
receipt? It was held that the compensation received by the assessee
for loss of agency was a revenue receipt whereas compens ation
received for refraining from carrying on competitive business was
a capital receipt.
SHIV RAJ GUPTA v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
DELHI-IV [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
7. This dichotomy has not been appreciated by the High Court in
its impugned judgment. The High Court has misinterpreted the
judgment of this Court in Gillanders case [(1964) 53 ITR 283
(SC)] . In the present case, the Department has not impugned the
genuineness of the transaction. In the present case, we are of the
view that the High Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent
findings of fact recorded by CIT (A) and the Tribunal.
8. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. The payment received
as non-competition fee under a negative covenant was always
treated as a capital receipt till Assessment Year 2003-2004. It is
only vide the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1-4- 2003
that the said capital receipt is now made taxable [see Section
28( v-a )]. The Finance Act, 2002 itself indicates that during the
relevant assessment year compensation received by the assessee
under non-competition agreement was a capital receipt, not taxable
under the 1961 Act. It became taxable only with effect from 1-4-
2003. It is well settled that a liability cannot be created
retrospectively. In the present case, compensation received under
the non-competition agreement became taxable as a capital receipt
and not as a revenue receipt by specific legislative mandate vide
Section 28( v-a ) and that too with effect from 1-4-2003. Hence,
the said Section 28( v-a ) is amendatory and not clarificatory.
9. Lastly, in CIT v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji [(1959) 35 ITR
148 (SC)] it was held by this Court that if a contract is entered
into in the ordinary course of business, any compensation received
for its termination (loss of agency) would be a revenue receipt. In
the present case, both CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal, c ame to
the conclusion that the agreement entered into by the assess ee
with Ranbaxy led to loss of source of business; that payment was
received under the negative covenant and therefore the receipt
of Rs. 50 lakhs by the assessee from Ranbaxy was in the nature
of capital receipt. In fact, in order to put an end to the litigation,
Parliament stepped in to specifically tax such receipts under the
non-competition agreement with effect from 1-4-2003.”
20. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we allow the
appeal and set aside the impugned judgment for all the reasons given by
us above. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of in terms of
the judgment.
Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.