The Director General (road Development) National Highways Authority of India v. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch & Ors.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 28178/2018, 1706/2019, Diary No. 19018 of 2018 and 1632 of 2019. With consent of counsel for the parties, they were tagged with the companion civil appeal s and heard finally. 2. On 06 June, 2013, when Ms. Vishakha Wadekar, was driving her car with her young daughter, Sanskruti Wadekar she had no inkling that danger lurked round the corner of the highway; over-mining at the height of 75 x 30 ft, in Gut No. 112, resulted in the destruction of a small hill by the side of the national highway. The resultant debris and a part of the hill collapsed and slid down to the road, claiming the lives of Ms. Vishakha and her daughter. The directions made by the Pune bench of the National Green Tribunal, on an application by a registered organization, (the respondent in the appeal, the Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, hereafter “Lokmanch”) are the subject matter of the appeals (CA 6932/ 2015 by NHAI; CA 5971/2019; CA 11803/2018 and CA 6862/2018) before this court. The other appeals by special lea ve question the judgments and orders of the Bombay High Court, which upheld the regulations framed pursuant to the order of the NGT. The Hig h Court negatived the challenge to those regulations in the writ petitions presented before it. 3. The facts in brief are that the National Highways Authority of India (hereafter “NHAI”) had entered into an agreement with M/s P.S. Toll Road (Pvt.) Ltd., a unit/undertaking of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. (which is arrayed as the ninth respondent; PS Toll Road (Pvt.) Ltd. hereafter referred to as “the concessionaire”) on 10.03.2010 for the maintenance and operation of the Pune-Satara section of National 1061 Highway No. 4, to an extent of 140 kms. The scope of the agree ment included construction of the project (i.e. the highway stretch) as well as its operation and maintenance for a period of 24 years. The agreement included stipulations mandating safety to the highway users (cl ause 18.1.1). The NHAI was duty bound to appoint experien ced safety consultants for carrying out safety audits of Project Highways (clause 18.1.2), the expenditure for which was to be borne by the concessionaire (clause 18.1.3). An elaborate highway monitoring mechanism was also contemplated by the agreement (clause 19.1) through which by t he seventh of each month, an independent engineer was to furnish a report after due inspection (of the operation and maintenance arrangements), containing defects or deficiencies (clauses 19.2). Ad ditionally, the independent engineer was to require the concessionaire to c arry out specified tests for confirming that the highway was operated in accordance with applicable standards (clause 19.3). Other stipulations included, inter alia, requirements that the concessionaire had to carry out remedial measures (Clause 19.4.1) within a period of 15 days after receipt of the report of the independent engineer. The conce ssionaire was put to terms in that if relevant repairs or remed ial measures were not undertaken, the NHAI could recover damages in terms of Cl ause 17.8. 1Another obligation cast on the concessionaire was to send a periodic report of various occurrences, including “unusual occurrences on the Project Highway” such as death or injury to any person (clause 19.6), any obstruction, or “flooding of Project Highway”. 4. In the meanwhile, the fifth respondent (who has filed CA 5971/ 2019 against the NGT’s order, hereafter referred to as “Rat hod”) on 03.01.2011 applied to the Government of Maharashtra for a licens e to 1 In terms of Clause 19.4.2, the measure of damages which NHAI could recover was calculable in terms of each days delay in complying with the remedial measures suggested by the engineer, based on the “higher (a) 0.5% of the Average Daily Fee and (b) 0.1% of the cost of such repair or repair estimated by the Independent Engineer” The same clause (17.8.1) stated that: “Notwithstanding anything contained in this agreement, should the actual traffic exceed the design capacity during any year or part thereof and the Concessionaire fails to repair or rectify any defect or deficiency set fort h in the Maintenance Requirements within the period specified therein, it shall be deemed to be in breach of this agreement and the Authority shall be entitled from such date to recover damages, to be calculated and paid for each day of the delay until the breach is cured, at the higher of (a) 5% (five percent) of Average daily fee and 1% (one percent) of the cost of such repair or rectification as estimated by the Independent Engineer, for the balance period of the concession. The recovery of such damages shall be without prejudice to the rights of the Authority under this agreement, including the right of termination thereof.” DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] extract minor minerals. This license was sought in respect of land bearing survey number 112A to look more to an extent of 5 acres and 93 cents. The license was granted by the appropriate authority of the government. By clause 1 of the terms of this license, the period of the l icense was two months; clause 5 stated that for extraction and minor minerals digging, work could not exceed more than 20 feet down side of the land surface. 5. Apparently soon after the license was taken over, c ertain demands were made regarding construction of a connecting road to the village. The materials on record by way of letters writte n to the local panchayat are to the effect that as a result of construction of the highway and due to the passage of time the existing road had been washed away. Consequently, the 2 km stretch from the left side of the new tunnel going up to the village was virtually non-existent. The panchayat r equested that the road should be strengthened and widened. 6. On 31.01.2011, the local authorities of the State government issued a show cause notice to Rathod alleging that debris were stored illegally on the site. It was alleged that this was contrary to Section 48 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (hereafter “land reve nue code”). Again, on 16.06.2011, the local panchayat issued a notice (which is on the record) stating that as a result of mineral extraction, the natural flow of rainwater was being obstructed. The notice also added that two heavy machines in non-performing condition were lying idle on the land and two JCB machines were also stationed there. Rathore evi dently received these notices; this is attested by his replies to the Tehsildar and other local authorities. After obtaining a report from the local officials, the Tehsildar, Bhor issued an order directing payment of ` 1,271,200 by Rathod for violation of the land revenue code on account of illega l extraction and use of minor minerals. 7. This activity of excavation and piling of debris, did not go unnoticed on the part of NHAI; it wrote to the Collector of Pune, pointing out that: “…large scale and indiscriminate excavation in the upper side hills of New Katraj Tunnel at both ends is in progress. Due to this excavation, drainage system above and near tunnel has been affected. This may lead to seepage of water inside tunnel roof thereby collapse of walls and ceiling of tunnel r esulting in collapse of tunnel and may lead to major mishap. The collapse in tunnel will block the entire traffic of NH4 from 1063 Mumbai/Pune to Bangalore and vice versa leading to chaotic situation.” The letter also mentioned specifically that Rathod had been notified; it sought action from the state government. 8. In the early hours of the morning of 6 th June, 2013, due to the monsoon, there was heavy rainfall at Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil, B hor and the surrounding areas. Water flowing through the hills at Mauje Shindewadi entered the road near the octroi post of the Pune Municipal Corporation, at Mauje Shindewadi Tehsil Bhor, District Pune, on NH-4, with great force. This created an obstacle in the form of a large sheet of water. Under these conditions, when the Alto car driven by V ishakha Wadekar and her daughter Sanskruti, was obstructed, they alighted to wade across to safety; however, the water gushed with grea t intensity and swept them away, resulting in their death. The resulting magisterial inquiry under Section 176, Code of Criminal Procedure resulted in a report dated 04.10.2013. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate who inquired into the incident appointed an expert, whose report was considered; he also visited the site and held several hearings. During the hear ings, pursuant to notices issued to various parties, the statements of Rathod, the local police authorities, eyewitnesses (Abhay Arvind Ranade, Vineet Vasant George and relatives of the deceased), the Project Director (General Manager) of NHAI, the team leader of the in dependent engineering firm associated with checking quality of maintenance of the highway, etc. were recorded. 9. Soon after the incident, the Lokmanch, through its president, filed an application under Section 14(1) read with Sections 16 and 18 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereafter “the NGT Act”), seeking mandatory injunction to restore natural contours at the foot base of the hill that had been destroyed by Rathod. Besides, general relief by way of directions to other respondents to take necessary ac tion for the protection of hills from destruction and for maintaining foot base design of the hills in the natural survey was sought. 10. The material produced before the NGT by the Sta te of Maharashtra in the form of an affidavit revealed th at large scale destruction of hills by individuals and concerns who had been given short term mining licenses, had occurred. According to the affidavit, there were 62 cases, and in many cases “hill-cutting” was resorte d to by DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] developers. The state had apparently imposed fines and penalt ies for these illegal activities. 11. The NGT, in its impugned order, commenting on the role of Rathod, held as follows, while justifying the imposition of liability upon that respondent: “It appears from the record that land Survey No. 112, is owne d by the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and their family mem bers. There are hills in the said land. They illegally cut hills withou t permission and extract minor mineral, which reduced heigh t of hill, circumference of the hill and or periphera l nature, surface of the hill in question. Acts of the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 made the area of hill fragile, susceptible to danger to the ecology and support of natural soil. In such a case, mere recovery of additional royalty would not be a proper remedial measure. At many places, the hill cutting is noticed prior to and after the pathetic incident and now inquiry is undertaken by the concerned revenue officials.” 12. Thereafter, the NGT based on its reasoning that the regulation of some activities, especially involving anything affecting hills has to be strictly regulated, directed as follows: “12. The question may arise as to what is the meaning of expression ‘Hill’. General perception is that it wo uld depend upon ocular assessment of the area, which is rounded land that is higher than the land surrounded by it, but is not expected to be as high as mountain. In other words, it is usually rounded natural elevation of land, lower than a mountain. There is no particular definition of the word ‘Hill’. The Oxford Dictionary gives meaning of word ‘Hill’ as follows: Hill - noun a naturally raised area of land, not as high or craggy as a mountain, a sloping stretch of road: they were climbing a steep hill in low gear, a heap or mound of something, a hill of sliding shingle. The wordbook has given meaning of expression ‘Hill’ as follows: 231 “Hill is an elevation of the earth’s surface that has a distinct summit. It has much less surface area than a 1065 mountain and is lower in elevation. Hills rise less than 305 metres above the surrounding area, whereas mountain s always exceed that height. However, a hill is not s imply Small Mountain. It is formed in a considerably diffe rent way. Hills may be classified according to the way they w ere formed and the kinds of materials they are made of. There are two types, constructional and destructional. Constructional hills are created by a built-up of rock debri s or sand deposited by glaciers and wind. Oval-shaped landforms called drumlins and sand dunes are samples of this type. Destructional hills are shaped by the deep erosi on of areas that were raised by disturbances in the ea rth’s crust. Such hills may consist of limestone overlying lay ers of more easily eroded rock.” 13. Draft Development Control Regulation Plan (DCR) of Pune is yet not approved by the PMC or Government. The cutting of hill by the Respondent Nos. 5 and 6, cre ated destruction to render a part of land useless, inclu ding development thereof for plantation of trees. It goes without saying that the destruction of hill could not have occurred without connivance or at least purposeful act or omission by the Project Proponent i.e. NHAI (Respondent No. 9). It i s in the affidavit of Mr. Rajeskumar Kundal, that agreem ent requires to take necessary steps for stoppage of il legal construction activity at Katraj hill top. However, a Notice dated 25th April, 2011, was issued to the Respondent No . 5 and copy of the same was marked to the Tehsildar, Bhor befor e occurrence of the incident. The Collector, Pune was reques ted to look into the matter. The authorities were thus, asked to take appropriate steps for stoppage of illegal activity in order to avoid major mishap and to ensure not to occur. They stated that one Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar, and her daughter died due to water flow, which gushed from the hill top and poured on the road. 14. We do not find any significant material to show tha t the Respondent No. 9 (NHAI) has taken reasonable steps to avoid the untoward incident. We do not find copies of the complaint made by NHAI to the authority. Assuming for a moment that DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] such communications were made at the fag end of April, 2011, yet, it was responsibility of NHAI to persuade said authority or the higher authority about inaction after 2011. The incident of raining in which Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar and her daughter had flown away, is said to have occurred on 10th July, 2013. Obviously, the Respondent No. 9, appears to have kept silen ce for about two (2) years, inspite of knowledge that the work of hill cutting was going on. In our opinion, NHAI (Respondent No. 9) perhaps was likely to be implied ly benefited due to the illegal act of hill cutting due to availabili ty of murum, stones and soil for the work for its proj ect. The contractor of NHAI was, therefore, interested in keeping the fingers crossed. 15. Considering probability and circumstances appearing on record, we have no hesitation in holding that there took place degradation of environment to large extent due to hill cuttin g at Katraj. We have further no hesitation in holding that the hill cutting occurred due to illegal acts of the Re spondent Nos. 5, 6 and with or due to act of omission of the Respondent No. 9. They are liable to pay compensation to the l egal representatives of the victims of incident in quest ion. They are also liable to pay restitution charges and pena lty for causing damage to the environment, in order to avoid such incident in future. 16. We deem it proper to give certain further directions to the concerned authority. In keeping with these findings, we direct: 17. a) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall pay amount of Rs. 50 Lakhs as joint penalty imposed on them for ca using environmental damage in the nearby area of Katraj, due to the hill-cutting. b) This amount shall be deposited with Collector (Pune) withi n six (6) weeks, else Collector can recover the amount as arrears of Land Revenue. This amount shall be deposited by Collector in special escrow account, and the amount be spent for environmental protection and conservation activities, including hill protection and conservation in the district. 1067 c) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall jointly and severally pay amount of Rs. 15 Lakhs towards compensation to the legal representatives of deceased Mrs. Vishakha Vadekar, an d her daughter if identity of legal representatives is prove d before the Collector. The above three (3) Respondents shal l immediately within four (4) weeks, deposit such amo unt in the office of Collector, Pune for payment to the le gal representatives of deceased in the incident. The Collector may issue a publication for locating legal representatives of above deceased women for payment of compensation and pay to them compensation after satisfaction of identity of the legal representatives by making due proportion as provide d under the relevant provisions of the Succession Act. d) The Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 9 shall also deposit amount of Rs. 10 Lakhs with the office of Collector for plantat ion of trees in order to restore damage caused to environm ent, though it may not be a sufficient remedy. e) The Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 shall gi ve instructions to the concerned revenue officials working wit hin all districts to have regular vigil within their areas t o verify whether fringes or nearby any hill or hill-top construction is/ are noticed and if found to be so, due inquiry may be ma de as to whether it is authorized or unauthorized. So also, instructions may be issued to the Municipal authori ties to ensure that no construction permission shall be given to any construction/development work, which is being proposed and is located at a distance may be of 100 ft. away from lowest slope i.e. incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as hill-tops, except for Bamboo cottages. f) In case of emergency or public purpose, the Hill cutting may be done by the concerned office of the Collecto r/ Commissioner by passing a reasoned order or if so requir ed by Law as provided under the Environment (Protection) A ct, 1986 and the Regulations thereunder.” Rathod, the NHAI and three other appellants (Patel India Pv t Ltd, Fern Constructions (India) Ltd and D.B. Realty Ltd.) have preferred appeals against the impugned order of the NGT; their grievance is from DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] the general directions issued in the impugned order, implicating buildings near hills. 13. In the second set of matters, i.e. the appeals by special leave, the facts are that acting on the directions of the NGT, the State of Maharashtra invoked its powers under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short “MRTP Act”) and directed, by a notification/circular dated 14.11.2017 that developme nt (relating to construction) was impermissible in an area abutting hills up to 100 feet. 14. By the impugned common judgment, the High Court held that there was no denial that the power to issue such directions or circulars existed by way of the amended Section 154 and that such power w as essential. The court further held that no individual or entity could claim any absolute right and contend that he could develop or construct anywhere and that the directions contained in the n otification supplemented bye-laws and building codes already in place in Mumbai and Pune. It was also observed that: “In Regulation 2 we have the definitions and as far as Part I I is concerned, that is general planning and building requirements. Regulation 11.1 says that no piece of land shall be used as site for construction of building if the sit e is hilly and having gradient more than 1:5. Thus, these stipulatio ns are already in place. What the National Green Tribu nal brought to the notice of the authorities is in-disc riminable cutting of hills in the Katraj Ghat. This unauthori zed construction by breaking of hills resulted in an accident. That is why the NGT directed that on hill tops and hill slopes and the portion at the foot of the hill and surrounding 100 feet, no construction activity should be permitted and no development permission be issued and such direction s be issued to the Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils. Bearing in mind that there are in place legal provi sions restricting the development activity on hill top and hi ll slope zones, all that the NGT and this Government Resolution directs is that in cases where there has already been a per mitted development activity within 100 feet of the hill, t hen, no permission for additional construction be granted n or any development be permitted by sanctioning additional Floor 1069 Space Index (FSI) or Transferable Development Rights (TDR) . In the event in sanctioned development plans if area of the above nature is in buildable zone, then, for carryi ng out development in such zone and while granting individ ual development permissions, an area of 100 feet surrou nding the hills should be demarcated as non-buildable. It can be used as open space, road etc. We are surprised that an order and direction of the NGT traceable to and in accordance with the planning law it challenged before us. Further, the directions of the State Government, which are but reiteration of the existing regulations, are under challenge. The imp ugned Government Resolution is in consonance with the provision s of the MRTP Act and the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 21 and 48 thereof. 24. We are not in agreement with Dr. Sathe, Mr. Godbole and Dr. Saraf that merely because such directions are iss ued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of se ction 154, the development Plan for the limits of the Mun icipal Corporations, namely Pune and Mumbai is altered or modified. We are also not impressed by their argument that b y such a Government Resolution, a modification is bro ught about in the Development Control Regulations and all this is without recourse to the specific powers conferred b y the MRTP Act. In other words, these are bypassed and by a Government Resolution, the above stand amended. In that regard our attention has been invited to the provisions in the MRTP Act enabling modifications or changes in the Development Plan and the procedure prescribed in that behalf . 25. We do not see any modification to the plan being brought about by the subject Government Resolution. If at a ll, the directions therein complement the provisions of the Development Control Regulations for the cities of the Mum bai and Pune or the concerned Municipal Corporation/Municipal Council areas. As it is, there was no permission to cons truct buildings other than a electric sub-stations, water works e tc. on hill tops. As far as these slopes are concerned, by their very nature, a hill slides down and if the slope is steep, the n, no construction activity can be carried out. There is no DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] guarantee or assurance that any construction activity in such areas would be able to withstand a landslide or acc idents, resulting from erosion of the hills on account of n atural reasons. It is experienced that human intervention is necessarily not responsible for a landslide, mudslide etc . On account of natural causes and calamities, such even ts can occur. Apart from that, the occurrence increases becaus e of human intervention including a construction activity car ried out at the foot of the hill or on top thereof. It is also possible if the hill is cut from its sides indiscriminately. It is also possible if there is damage to a hill while extracting minor mi nerals. The hill then becomes uneven. Then, it is not possible to prevent any calamity. Hence, in order to take care of the n atural calamities and which have occurred in various places in the State of Maharashtra recently and also on account o f unrestricted and unregulated breaking and cutting of the hills resulting in accidents endangering human life and safety that these supplemental directions have been issued. If t hey are for efficient administration of the Act and if they subserve larger public interest, then no fault can be found with the Government Resolution. Each of the operative direct ions, namely, serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of this Government Resolut ion subserve this object and purpose. If the Government Resolution has been issued after the attention of t he Government has been invited to an accident in Katraj G hat occurring due to unauthorized and illegal cutting o f hills, then, it is not as if the State Government has construed i t as a command or a binding order and issued the subject Government Resolution. The attention of the State Government being invited to such illegal and unauthorized so a lso uncontrolled, unregulated and unrestricted hill-cutti ng, that in order to prevent the same, the Government stepped in. It took recourse to its power conferred by section 154 of the MRTP Act in order to prevent future occurrences of this nature. If accidents and calamities can be prevented by tim ely intervention of the State Government in this manner, then, w e do not think that on the specious and unsubstantiated p leas of the petitioners, we should strike down the Gover nment Resolution.” 1071 15. The NHAI in its appeal contends that the NGT fell into error in issuing sweeping directions against it without considering that was no evidence to establish that it was in any way responsible for the degradation of the environment, which led to the tragedy. It is urged by Senior Counsel Mr P.S. Narasimha that the NGT’s findings are contrary to established facts and have also resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. He highlighted that there was no material on record to establish that the NHAI was in any way culpable or had failed to perform a public duty or neglected to avert a foreseeable calamity. Elaborating on this, it was u rged that the illegal mining activity was not carried on within the right-of-way or the carriageway of the highway. What occurred was the result of an act of God, i.e. extremely heavy rains, which resulted in flooding on the highway caused entirely on account of the debris collected which acted to obstruct the smooth flow of water. 16. It was highlighted that in any case, the NHAI could not be held responsible or made liable for the occurrence which led t o the tragedy. Mr Narasimha also argued that the NGT did not ret urn any finding that the construction of the highway was in any way contrary to environmental clearances or permissions secured by the NHAI. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal in so far as they pertained to the neglect or alleged omission of the NHAI, were contrary to law. He urged that the findings were illogical and irrational, and deserve to be set aside. 17. The NHAI also highlights that it wrote letters to th e local administration on 24.04.2011 and 15.07.2011, seeking its intervention on account of the illegal mining and activities and hill destruction, for which Rathod was responsible. However, the State government did not take any action. Likewise, Rathod did not take any remedial steps or cease the activity. The resultant tragedy entirely on account of the omissions of the state’s authorities to take action and the neglect and culpable negligence on the part of Rathod, was the cause of the tragedy and the events which led to the loss of two lives. It was also emphasized that the direction to pay compensation was contrary to legal princi ples and undermined the law. It was argued that neither the NHAI nor its concessionaire had any control over the activities of the sta te, which granted the mining licences. Rathod, the licensee, had continued illegal mining in the vicinity causing the accumulation of debris. This in turn, resulted in the obstruction of a culvert which resulted in collection of a DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] large volume of water. A huge sheet of water gushed out into the highway, sweeping away the car, tragically resulting in the death of two individuals. It was argued that in these circumstances, the NHAI could not be saddled with the responsibility of either paying damages to the dependents and legal representatives of the deceased nor could it be made liable to restore the environment through the payment of 50 lakhs or any part of it. 18. Rathod urges that the NGT’s findings against him are contrary to law. He argues that the NGT did not implead those who had standing, i.e. the legal representatives of the deceased; in fact, th ey had filed a civil suit, claiming compensation against him, as well as the NHAI and the state, for alleged negligence and tortious liability. In those proceedings, the court is bound to record evidence and render findings based on the facts. The NGT could not thus have unilaterally, based on a one-sided view of the materials, held that he was liable. 19. It was submitted that the allegation that Rathod was primarily responsible for degradation of the hill, which clogged the culverts and water channels, resulting in the tragedy, was contrary to the facts. Mr. Vijay Verma, counsel for Rathod, relied on some portions of the magisterial report to say that the NHAI had the report of an independent engineer, who had pointed to certain deficiencies on the part of the concessionaire. Therefore, to hold him responsible for the tragedy, and direct him to pay a huge sum of 15 lakh and further pay amounts towards environmental damage, was unwarranted. 20. It was argued that the NGT could not have issued directions with respect to payment of any sums, in the absence of any application by the legal representatives of the deceased. It is fu rther argued in Rathod’s appeal that apart from issuing notice for recovery of amounts towards alleged illegal mining, neither the state authorities nor the NHAI took any positive remedial action for strengthening the culvert and the catch water drains which were in disrepair, and constructed on the hill above the tunnel for drainage of rainwater. The masonry on the culvert for draining water was choked due to lack of mainten ance. Such maintenance was the sole responsibility of the concessiona ire and for that, the NHAI had to be held liable. It is also highlighted that Section 18 of the NGT Act mandates that the procedure established by the statute to exercise jurisdiction had to be followed. Since the legal heirs of the deceased had not applied to the NGT for any relief and had i nstead approached the civil court claiming compensation on account of wilful 1073 neglect and culpable inaction on the part of NHAI, the NGT ought to have left the matter for proper decision in accordance with the evidence led. Instead the NGT took upon itself the task of a judging the appellant as one of those responsible for the incident. It is emphasi sed that the mining activity carried on was in accordance with the licens e and if there was any irregularity that was cured on payment of fine. So far as the collection of debris which ultimately led to the overflow of water and the deaths of two individuals goes, it is argued that the proper functioning of the drainage system would have ensured that such collection of vast quantities of water would not have occurred. Therefore, the inaction of the NHAI in taking timely action and intervening with the state authorities, led to the tragic incident. The responsibility for this incident could not have been placed at the doorstep of Rathod. The actions of Rathod, it is stated were too remote and could not have been the subject of damages at all. 21. In the appeals (by special leave as well as the statutory appeals by third parties), where the grievance is on account of the dire ctions issued by the State of Maharashtra under Section 154 of the MRTP Act, the third party appellants challenge the order of the NGT ar guing that the provisions of the NGT Act, especially sections 14, and 19 do not authorise that tribunal to issue sweeping and unilateral directions requiring stoppage and cessation of all manner of building activity or developments within hundred feet of hill slopes. It is highlighted that such sweeping directions are illogical and are not based on any scientific study or analysis. It is argued that the NGT has issued general directions co uched in a vague manner in para 17 (e) of its order. 22. These appellants argue that the Bombay High Court also fell into error and did not appreciate that the entire basis of the Directions/ Resolution of 14.11.2017 by the State of Maharashtra were the directions issued by the NGT. Highlighting various provisions of the MRTP Act, learned counsel argued that wherever development co des were formulated, they were in accordance with established prin ciples, after following the prescribed procedure. Based upon these codes and the building regulations framed by various town planning departme nts, clearances and permissions/approval for development and construction were issued. It was argued that the mandatory and sweeping nat ure of the directions in para 17 (e) by the NGT has resulted in these directions DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] being embodied in the impugned resolution, which has a cat astrophic effect on those clearances. 23. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Shyam Divan, highlights that apart from the fact that the definition of ‘hill’ is vague, and even the regulations under the MRTP Act are silent in this regard, the NGT failed to consider that the impact of its directions and the impugned notification, in hilly terrains where the population is concentrated in particular areas, in small towns, semi urban and rural areas would be devastating inasmuch as all nature of buildings would be banned. It is pointed out that hill development is based upon consideration of individual local soil conditions, the stability of the surrounding terrain, etc. All these are taken in to account by individual local town planning authorities when they permit or r efuse permission to individual development or construction projects. The uniform adoption of the “no construction within the hundred feet area” rule, it is submitted, is completely contrary to well-established principles of town planning. 24. It is argued that the directions issued by the state government impugned in the writ petitions before the Bombay High Court, are contrary to the provisions of the MRTP Act inasmuch as they a mount to supplanting provisions of the existing master plan and other development codes, which have the force of law and were framed after w idespread consultations. It is pointed out that the provisions of the MRTP Act require that any change in such codes or master plans would have to be made after mandatory due consideration of objections, which are to be preceded by publication of the proposals. By directing the state gov ernment to follow the order in paragraph 17(e), the NGT in fact made dire ctions contrary to law. It is argued that the state also acted contr ary to the express provisions of the MRTP Act inasmuch as it did not follow the procedure required by the Act to change the master p lan and the development codes. 25. It is further submitted that the NGT’s directions wer e the basis of the state government’s notification. It was argued that the state government’s blind adherence to these directions amounted to abdication of its duties, was in contravention of express provisions of the MRTP Act and also amounted to acting on the dictates of another authority. It was submitted that for these reasons, the impugned notification cannot be sustained. Counsel relied on the decision of this court in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd. & Ors. 2 to 1075 highlight that the NGT has a narrow and circumscribed jurisdicti on in regard to issuing directions as well as ordering compensation. 26. The Lokmanch justified the order of the NGT and blamed the NHAI, the concessionaire, Rathod and the state government fo r not taking adequate and timely measures in public interest. It is alleged that proper channels were not created and maintained alongside the highway to avoid water clogging on the main carriageway. It is argued that existing water channels were extremely narrow and were incapable of handling significant volumes, and that even those channels were clogged due to construction debris which had fallen on the sides. It is pointed out that under Section 4 of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereafter “Highways Act”) “highways” include lands appurtenant thereto, all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways and other structures constructed on o r over the highway and all fences, trees, posts, etc. The duty of keeping them in good repair, clearly was that of the NHAI and the concessionaire. 27. So far as the Rathod’s role is concerned, learned counse l, Ms. Shilpa Chohan, submitted that the NGT acted well within its rights and acted within its jurisdiction in entertaining and proceeding with the application, under Sections 14 read with 16 and 18 of the NGT Act. The Lokmanch sought mandatory injunction to restore the natural contour at the foot base of the hills, particularly the hill that was destroyed by the private respondents. It was submitted that apart from the enquiry report of the magistrate /sub-divisional officer, a report was also commissioned by the NGT through the local tehsildar ; that report dated 15.09.2014 disclosed that unauthorised hill destruction under the pretext of minor mineral extraction was widespread during 2011-2013. This report showed that as many as 62 cases of hill destruction (mostly indulg ed in by developers), came to light. Many of these occurred without obtaining any permit or authorisation and were plainly illegal. 28. It is argued further that the private respondents were permitted to extract minor minerals only for a short period. However, they exceeded not only the permit, but also went further and destroyed the hill for the purpose of mining minerals. This over-mining as well as hill destruction was not within the permission or the terms of the license. It is highlighted that “hill cutting” or hill destruction causes shortening of hills, poses a potential danger of soil erosion and reduces vegetation, fo restry, flora and fauna, and deprives natural support to the earth, therefore ultimately 2 2019 SCC OnLine SC 221. DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] posing an environmental hazard to nearby areas, including resi dential areas. It is argued that the destruction of hills results in the distortion of the flow of streams and rivers, which change their courses resulting in heavy loss to human life and also to flora and fauna, besides at times, destruction of property. It is submitted that the NGT’s decision requiring payment of compensation was within its jurisdiction; to supp ort this, learned counsel relied upon the provisions of Schedule II to the NGT Act, particularly referring to the heads of compensation relief for damages that can be claimed and granted, i.e. death, permanent, temporar y, or total, or partial disability or other injury, damages to p rivate property, expenses incurred by the government for any administrative or le gal action, or to cope with any harm or damage, including compensation for environmental degradation and restoration of the qu ality of the environment. It was submitted that the statutory basis for calculating these damages under Schedule II to the NGT Act is provided by Section 15, which empowers the NGT to provide relief and compensa tion to victims of pollution in terms of Schedule I for restituti on of property, restitution of environment, and also importantly Section 17 , which empowers the NGT to direct the payment of compensation on account of death of or injury to any person or damage to property, under all any of the heads specified in Schedule II, which is the result of any accident or is an adverse impact of any activity or operational pr ocess. It is submitted that there is nothing in the enactment which con fines the jurisdiction of the NGT to adjudicate complaints, especially those relating to fatalities caused by environmental damage, to applications initiated by legal representatives or persons directly affected. It is submitted that if a particular accident or incident is so widespread as to affect a n entire area, it would be well within the jurisdiction of the NGT to entertain an application made by anyone. Learned counsel highlighted the difference in phraseology between Sections 15 and 17 on the one hand, and Section 18 on the other. It is submitted that Section 18(2) clearly is without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 16 and primary jurisdiction can be invoked by the Tribunal upon being moved by anyone in this regard. 29. Ms. Chohan cited the decision of this court in Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd. v Forward Foundation 3 to say that the NGT could legitimately issue directions which are binding on all other statutory authorities. She also relied on Section 33 of the NGT Act, emphasizing that the enactment 3 2019 (18) SCC 494 1077 overrides all other enactments. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India. 4 30. The State of Maharashtra supported the arguments made on behalf of the Lokmanch. It was pointed out that the jurisdiction to issue general directions to preserve and protect the environment, thr ough restitution orders is found in Section 15(1)(c) of the NGT Act. It is also submitted that the power and jurisdiction to order compensation in the case of death, is independent and can be invoked in case of fatal accidents, as is evident from the provisions of Schedule II. The state further argues that the judgment of the Bombay High Court too is unexceptionab le, inasmuch as it correctly appreciated and upheld the exercise of regulatory power under Section 154 of the MRTP Act. Counsel urged that the said provision was amended in 2015 and in the absence of any challenge to it, the exercise of power after due consideration of relevant factors, could not be countenanced. The Issues 31. Four issues arise for consideration. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the NGT to award compensation; secondly the merits and soundness of the NGT’s decision to award compensation and the legal princip les applicable; thirdly, the NGT’s wide directions with respect to the ban on construction in and around foothills and lastly, the vires of the directions/ notifications issued under Section 154, MRTP Act. I. Jurisdiction of the NGT 32. The relevant provisions of the NGT Act are extracted below: “2. Definitions . — (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX (m) “substantial question relating to environment” s hall include an instance where— (i) there is a direct violation of a specific statu tory environmental obligation by a person by which— 4 2019 (15) SCC 401 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] (A) the community at large other than an individual or group of individuals is affected or likely to be affecte d by the environmental consequences; or (B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or (C) the damage to public health is broadly measurable; (ii) the environmental consequences relate to a spe cific activity or a point source of pollution; XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 14. Tribunal to settle disputes .—(1) The Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a subst antial question relating to environment (including enforce ment of any legal right relating to environment), is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enac tments specified in Schedule I. (2) The Tribunal shall hear the disputes arising fr om the questions referred to in sub-section (1) and settle such disp utes and pass order thereon. (3) No application for adjudication of dispute unde r this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of six months from the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first arose: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from fi ling the application within the said period, allow it to be filed wit hin a further period not exceeding sixty days.” 15. Relief, compensation and restitution .—(1) The Tribunal may, by an order, provide,— (a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollu tion and other environmental damage arising under the enactm ents specified in the Schedule I (including accident occ urring while handling any hazardous substance); (b) for restitution of property damaged; (c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, 1079 as the Tribunal may think fit. (2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub- section (1) shall be in addition to the relief paid or payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991 ). (3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under this section shal l be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from fi ling the application within the said period, allow it to be filed wit hin a further period not exceeding sixty days. (4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compen sation or relief payable under separate heads specified in Sche dule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the c laimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environ ment, as it may think fit. (5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief unde r this Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application file d to, or, as the case may be, compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.” “16. Tribunal to have appellate jurisdiction .—Any person aggrieved by, (a) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under Section 28 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974); (b) an order passed, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the State Government under Section 29 of the Water (Preventio n and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974); (c) directions issued, on or after the commencement o f the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by a Board, unde r DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] Section 33-A of the Water (Prevention and Control o f Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974); (d) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the appellate authority under Section 13 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (36 of 1977); (e) an order or decision made, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the St ate Government or other authority under Section 2 of th e Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (69 of 1980); (f) an order or decision, made, on or after the commencem ent of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the Appellate Authority under Section 31 of the Air (Prevention a nd Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981); (g) any direction issued, on or after the commenceme nt of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, under Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986) ; (h) an order made, on or after the commencement of t he National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, granting environmental clearance in the area in which any industries, operations or processes or class of industri es, operations and processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986); (i) an order made, on or after the commencement of t he National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, refusing to gran t environmental clearance for carrying out any activity or operation or process under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986); (j) any determination of benefit sharing or order made , on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by the National Biodiversity Authority o r a State Biodiversity Board under the provisions of th e Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (18 of 2003), may, within a period of thirty days from the date on which t he order or decision or direction or determination is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: 1081 Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from fi ling the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed unde r this section within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 17. Liability to pay relief or compensation in certain ca ses . (1) Where death of, or injury to, any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property or environment h as resulted from an accident or the adverse impact of an activ ity or operation or process, under any enactment specif ied in Schedule I, the person responsible shall be liable to pay suc h relief or compensation for such death, injury or da mage, under all or any of the heads specified in Schedule II, as may be determined by the Tribunal. (2) If the death, injury or damage caused by an accide nt or the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process under any enactment specified in Schedule I cannot be attributed to any single activity or operation or process but is the combined or resultant effect of several such activities, operati ons and processes, the Tribunal may, apportion the liability for r elief or compensation amongst those responsible for such activities, operations and processes on an equitable basis. (3) The Tribunal shall, in case of an accident, app ly the principle of no fault 18. Application or appeal to Tribunal. (1) Each application under sections 14 and 15 or an appeal under section 16 shall, be made to the Tribunal in such form, contain such particulars, and, be accompanied by su ch documents and such fees as may be prescribed. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in s ection 16, an application for grant of relief or compensat ion or settlement of dispute may be made to the Tribunal by— (a) the person, who has sustained the injury; or (b) the owner of the property to which the damage h as been caused; or DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] (c) where death has resulted from the environmental damage, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such property or all or any of the legal representative s of the deceased, as the case may be; or (e) any person aggrieved, including any representat ive body or organisation; or (f) the Central Government or a State Government or a Union territory Administration or the Central Pollu tion Control Board or a State Pollution Control Board or a Pollution Control Committee or a local authority, or any environmental authority constituted or established u nder the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986) or any other law for the time being in force: Provided that where all the legal representatives o f the deceased have not joined in any such application fo r compensation or relief or settlement of dispute, th e application shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased an d the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application: Provided further that the person, the owner, the le gal representative, agent, representative body or organis ation shall not be entitled to make an application for grant of relief or compensation or settlement of dispute if such person, the owner, the legal representative, agent, representative body or organisation have preferred an appeal under section 16. (3) The application, or as the case may be, the appeal fi led before the Tribunal under this Act shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the application, or, as the case may be, the appeal, finally within six months from the date of filing of the application, or as the case may be, the appeal, aft er providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 1083 29. Bar of jurisdiction .—(1) With effect from the date of establishment of the Tribunal under this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any appeal in respect of any matter, which the Tribunal is empowered to determine under its appellate jurisdiction. (2) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle di spute or entertain any question relating to any claim for granting any relief or compensation or restitution of proper ty damaged or environment damaged which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Tribunal in respect of the settlement of such dispute or any such claim for granting any relief or compensation or restitution of property damaged or environment damag ed shall be granted by the civil court.” XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX “33. Act to have overriding effect .—The provisions of this Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law o ther than this Act.” 33. A plain reading of the above provisions of the NGT Act would reveal that the tribunal possesses two kinds of power and jurisdic tion: one, primary jurisdiction under Sections 14-15, and appellate jurisdiction under Section 16. Under Section 14, the NGT has the power to adjudicate upon disputes relating to “civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of a ny legal right relating to environment), is involved” relating to the implementation of “the enactments specified in Schedule I” [Section 14 (1)]. The other provisions [Sections 14(2) and (3)] are incidental to the pri mary jurisdiction under Section 14(1). Section 15, on the other hand, is couched in wide terms. Section 15(1) provides that compensation or da mages can be given by the NGT to “victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments s pecified in the Schedule I” [Section 15 (1)(a)]; for restitution of property damaged [Section 15(1)(b)] and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas [Section 15(1)(c)]. Section 15(2) is procedural; Section 15(3) DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] prescribes the period of limitation for applications. Section 15(4) enables the NGT to, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, “divide the compensation or relief payable under se parate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensati on or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the d amaged property or environment, as it may think fit.” 34. The enactments specified under Schedule I are the Wate r (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act , 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002. 35. Schedule II reads as follows: “SCHEDULE II [See sections 15(4) and 17(1)] HEADS UNDER WHICH COMPENSATION OR RELIEF FOR DAMAGE MAY BE CLAIMED (a) Death; (b) Permanent, temporary, total or partial disability or oth er injury or sickness; (c) Loss of wages due to total or partial disability or permanent or temporary disability; (d) Medical expenses incurred for treatment of inju ries or sickness; (e) Damages to private property; (f) Expenses incurred by the Government or any loca l authority in providing relief, aid and rehabilitati on to the affected persons; (g) Expenses incurred by the Government for any administrative or legal action or to cope with any h arm or damage, including compensation for environmental degradation and restoration of the quality of environment ; (h) Loss to the Government or local authority arising out of, or connected with, the activity causing any damage; 1085 (i) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to the fauna including milch and draught animals and aqua tic fauna; (j) Claims on account of any harm, damage or destruction to flora including aquatic flora, crops, vegetables, t rees and orchards; (k) Claims including cost of restoration on account of any harm or damage to environment including pollution of s oil, air, water, land and eco-systems; (l) Loss and destruction of any property other than private property; (m) Loss of business or employment or both; (n) Any other claim arising out of, or connected wi th, any activity of handling of hazardous substance.” 36. A conjoint reading of Sections 14, 15 and the Schedules would lead one to infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdicti on to deal with, adjudicate, and wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make restitutionary directions in cases where the violation (i.e. harm caused due to pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment listed in the first schedule. Yet, that, interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is not warranted. 37. The reference to Schedule II, in Section 15(4) is not merely by way of events which are actionable in relation to harm caused due to the acts resulting in violation of any enactment under Schedul e I. The wide language of that provision enables the tribunal (NGT) to direct, inter alia, payment of compensation, “having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment” . This interpretation is borne out by a reading of Section 17(2) regarding the apportionment of liability for payment of compensation. 38. In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi5, this court held that ponds constituted public utility and were meant for common use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment & Ors 6, the DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 5 2001 (6) SCC 496 6 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1510 Court quoted and applied the observations in Hinch Lal (supra), in the context of an appeal directed against an order of the NGT whi ch had summarily dismissed an application under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act seeking directions to cease the filling up of ponds in the Greater Noida Industrial Development Area. 39. Long ago, in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone & Ors 7, this court made following observations: “6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resour ces constitute a Nation’s natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one gener ation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding gene rations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankin d. It is in the interest of the nation. It is recognised by Par liament. Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its contr ol the Regulation of mines and the development of minerals. It has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 ...” 40. Likewise, in Lafarge Umiam Mining (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.8 these pertinent observations were made: “75. Universal human dependence on the use of environmental resources for the most basic needs rende rs it impossible to refrain from altering the environment. As a result, environmental conflicts are ineradicable and environme ntal protection is always a matter of degree, inescapably requir ing choices as to the appropriate level of environmental protec tion and the risks which are to be regulated. This aspec t is recognised by the concepts of “sustainable development” . It is equally well settled by the decision of this Court in N armada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India that environment has different facets and care of the environment is an ongoing process. These concepts Rule out the formulation of an across - the-board principle as it would depend on the facts of each case whether diversion in a given case should be per mitted 7 1981 (2) SCC 205 8 2011(7) SCC 338 1087 or not, barring “no go” areas (whose identification would again depend on undertaking of due diligence exerci se). In such cases, the margin of appreciation doctrine would apply.” 41. Recently, in State of Meghalaya and Ors. vs. All Dimasa Students Union, Dima-Hasao District Committee & Ors. 9 this court had affirmed a part of the decision of the NGT issuing direc tions in respect of large-scale mining in the state of Meghalaya, on the ground that it had an adverse impact on the environment. This was despite the fact that mining and the subject of mines is not specifie d in the list of enactments under the first schedule. The court also approved the NGT’s directions, appointing experts, to assess the impact of such mining on the environment. 42. The legal position and jurisdiction of NGT was considered by this court in Mantri Techzone ( supra ) where it was held that the NGT has “ special jurisdiction ” for “enforcement of environmental rights.” It was held that: “41. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 14 provi des the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial q uestion relating to environment (including enforcement of a ny legal right relating to environment) is involved. However , such question should arise out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. 42. The Tribunal has also jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act to provide relief and compensation to the victi ms of pollution and other environmental damage arising under t he enactments specified in Schedule I. Further, under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c) the Tribunal can provide for restitut ion of property damaged and for restitution of the envi ronment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fi t. It is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a glimpse into the wide range of powers that the Tribunal has been cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment. 9 2019 (8) SCC 177 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 43. Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of po wer and jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. The principle s of sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays, propounded by this Court by way of mu ltiple judicial pronouncements, have now been embedded as a bedrock of environmental jurisprudence under the NGT Act. Therefore, wherever the environment and ecology are be ing compromised and jeopardized, the Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the interest of the environment. 44. The NGT Act being a beneficial legislation, the pow er bestowed upon the Tribunal would not be read narrowly. A n interpretation which furthers the interests of environme nt must be given a broader reading. (See Kishsore Lal v. Chairm an, Employees’ State Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579, pa ra 17). The existence of the Tribunal without its broad restorat ive powers under Section 15(1)(c) read with Section 20 of the Act, would render it ineffective and toothless, and shall betray the legislative intent in setting up a specialized Tribunal specifically to address environmental concerns. The Tribunal, specially constituted with Judicial Members as well as with Experts in the field of environment, has a legal obligation to provide for preventive and restorative measures in the in terest of the environment. 45. Section 15 of the Act provides power & jurisdiction , independent of Section 14 thereof. Further, Section 14(3) juxtaposed with Section 15(3) of the Act, are separ ate provisions for filing distinct applications before the Tr ibunal with distinct periods of limitation, thereby amply demonstrating that jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from these Sections (i.e. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act) independently. The limit ation provided in Section 14 is a period of 6 months from the dat e on which the cause of action first arose and whereas in Section 15 it is 5 years. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear to keep Section 14 and 15 as self-contained jurisdiction s. 46. Further, Section 18 of the Act recognizes the right to f ile applications each under Sections 14 as well as 15. Therefor e, it cannot be argued that Section 14 provides jurisdic tion to 1089 the Tribunal while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. As stated supra the typical nature of the Tribunal, its breadth of powers as provided under the statutory provisions of the Act as well as the Scheduled enactments, cumulatively , leaves no manner of doubt that the only tenable interpretation to these provisions would be to read the provisions broadly in favour of cloaking the Tribunal with effective auth ority. An interpretation that is in favour of conferring juri sdiction should be preferred rather than one taking away jurisdiction. 47. Section 33 of the Act provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over anything inconsistent conta ined in any other law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of law other than this Act. This gives the Tribunal ov erriding powers over anything inconsistent contained in the KIAD Act , Planning Act, Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (“KMC Act”); and the Revised Master Plan of Bengalu ru, 2015 (“RMP”). A Central legislation enacted under Entry 13 of List I Schedule VII of the Constitution of India w ill have the overriding effect over State legislations. The coro llary is that the Tribunal while providing for restoration o f environment in an area, can specify buffer zones ar ound specific lakes & water bodies in contradiction with zoning regulations under these statutes or the RMP.” 43. It is noteworthy that this court clearly held that under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), the NGT has the power to make directio ns and provide for “restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal m ay think fit. It is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act.” Though a direction for compensation under Section 15(1)(a) is relatable to vio lation of enactments specified under the first schedule, the power under Section 17 appears to be cast in wider terms. 44. As noticed earlier, Section 17 (1) refers to first sc hedule enactments; it talks of death of, or injury to, any person”or da mage to any property or environment”which “has resulted from an accident or the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process, under any enactment” in Schedule I. One of the enactments is the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter “EPA”). DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 45. The definition of “environment” under the EPA is wide and is an inclusive one: ”environment” includes water, air and land and the inter- relationship which exists among and between wate r, air and land, and human beings, other living creatures, pla nts, micro- organism and property”. 10 Similarly, “environmental pollutant” and “environmental pollution” are defined as follows: “environmental pollutant” means any solid, liquid or gaseous substance present in such concentration as may be, or t end to be, injurious to environment; 11 “environmental pollution” means the presence in the environment of any environmental pollutant; 12 Section 3 (1) of the EPA confers upon the Central Government, wide power in relation to protection of the environment: “3. POWER OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO TAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT AND IMPROVE ENVIRONMENT.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Cent ral Government, shall have the power to take all such measure s as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing controlling and abating environmental pollution. ” 46. Long back, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 13 this court recognized the potential harm to the environment caused by m ining operations: “Legal parameters 45. The natural sources of air, water and soil cannot be utilised if the utilisation results in irreversible damage to environm ent. There has been accelerated degradation of environme nt primarily on account of lack of effective enforceme nt of environmental laws and non-compliance of the statut ory norms. This Court has repeatedly said that the right to live is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free wate r and 10 Section 2 (a) EPA 11 Section 2 (b) EPA 12 Section 2 (c) EPA 13 (2004) 12 SCC 118 1091 air for full enjoyment of life. (See Subhash Kumar v. Sta te of Bihar [(1991) 1 SCC 598.) XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 47. The mining operation is hazardous in nature. It im pairs ecology and people’s right to natural resources. The entire process of setting up and functioning of mining ope ration requires utmost good faith and honesty on the part of the intending entrepreneur. For carrying on any mining act ivity close to township which has tendency to degrade environment and is likely to affect air, water and soil and impair the qu ality of life of inhabitants of the area, there would be greater responsibility on the part of the entrepreneur. The fullest disclosures including the potential for increased burde ns on the environment consequent upon possible increase i n the quantum and degree of pollution, has to be made at the outset so that the public and all those concerned includin g authorities may decide whether the permission can at all be granted for carrying on mining activity. The regula tory authorities have to act with utmost care in ensuring compliance of safeguards, norms and standards to be observed by such entrepreneurs. When questioned, the regulatory auth orities have to show that the said authorities acted in the manner enjoined upon them. Where the regulatory authorities, ei ther connive or act negligently by not taking prompt act ion to prevent, avoid or control the damage to environment, nat ural resources and people’s life, health and property, the princ iples of accountability for restoration and compensation h ave to be applied.” 47. Acting under the provisions of the EPA, the Central Government had issued a notification on 14.09.2006, mandating Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in exercise of its power under Section 3( 2) of the EPA read with Rule 5 of the rules framed thereunder. In term s of this notification, environment impact assessment and cle arance was necessary for different processes and industries. Mining too, was included as part of the notification; the only exception was that min or mineral leases for an area below five hectares were exempted. Clearly, therefore, the Central Government included within the purview of the EPA, major and minor mineral extraction. DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 48. Several irregularities were noticed over a period of time, with regard to minor mineral extraction, including sand, and there was need for introducing stringent regulations for those activities. A report of the then Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF, now MoEF&CC) submitted in 2010 was critical of the prevailing norms. As a result, this court and the NGT issued orders and directives making ECs compulsory for projects less than five hectares. The Central Government too initiated measures. 49. The following observations of this court were made in Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana 14 : “18. Comments and inputs from various States and experts were also invited so as to prepare a report for considera tion of MoEF. Based on the discussion held and subsequent inputs received, a draft report was prepared and circulated to all members for their further inputs. The report was fu rther discussed on 29-1-2010 for its finalisation. The observations/ comments made during the meeting were incorporated in the report and it was again circulated to all members fo r their consideration. The report so circulated was ultimately finalised. The decision taken by MoEF affects generally the mining of minor minerals including the riverbed mining throughout the country. 19. For an easy reference, we may extract the issues an d recommendations made by MoEF, which are as follows: “4.0. Issues and recommendations XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX It may thus be observed that minerals have been cla ssified into major and minor minerals based on their end use rather than level of production, level of mechanisation, exp ort and import, etc. There do exist some minor mineral mines of si lica sand and limestone where the scale of mechanisation and level of production is much higher than those of industrial mineral mines. Further, in terms of the economic cost and revenue, it has been estimated that the total value of minor mi nerals constitutes about 10% of the total value of mineral production 14 (2012) 4 SCC 629 1093 whereas the value of non-metallic minerals comprise s only 3%. It is, therefore, evident that the operation of mines of minor minerals need to be subject to some regulator y parameters as that of mines of major minerals. Further, unlike India there does not exist any such system based on end usage in other countries for classif ying minerals into major and minor categories. Thus, the re is a need to relook at the definition of ‘minor minerals’ per se. It is, therefore, recommended that the Ministry of Mines along with Indian Bureau of Mines, in consultation with t he State Governments may re-examine the classification of minerals into major and minor categories so that the regulatory aspects and environment mitigation measures are appropriately integrated for ensuring sustainable a nd scientific mining with least impacts on environment. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 4.5. Requirement of mine plan for minor minerals At present, most of the State Governments have not made it mandatory for preparation of mining plan in respect of minor minerals. In some States like Rajasthan, eco-friendl y mining plans are prepared, which are approved by the State M ining Department. The eco-friendly mining plans so prepar ed, though conceptually welcome, are observed to be def icient and need to be made comprehensive in a manner as is being done for major minerals. Besides, the aspects of reclamat ion and rehabilitation of mined out areas, progressive mine closure plan, as in vogue for major minerals could be introduced for minor minerals as well. It is recommended that provision for preparation and approval of mine plan, as in the case of major minerals may appropriately be provided in the rules governing the mining of minor minerals by the respective State Governments. T hese should specifically include the provision for reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out area, progressive mine closure plan and post mine land use. 4.6. Creation of separate corpus for reclamation/rehabilitation of mines of minor minerals DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] Mining of minor minerals, in our country, is by and large an unorganised sector and is practised in haphazard an d unscientific manner. At times, the size of the leasehold i s also too small to address the issue of reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas. It may, therefore, be desirable that befor e the concept of mine closure plan for minor minerals is adopted, the existing abandoned mines may be reclaimed and rehabilitated with the involvement of the State Gove rnment. There is thus, a need to create a separate corpus, which may be utilised for reclamation and rehabilitation of m ined out areas. The respective State Governments may work ou t a suitable mechanism for creation of such corpus on the ‘polluter pays’ principle. An organisational structure may also need to be created for undertaking and monitoring these activit ies. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 4.8. Uniform minor mineral concession rules The economic value of the minor minerals excavated in the country is estimated to contribute to about 9% of t he total value of the minerals whereas the non-metallic mine rals contribute to about 2.8%. Keeping in view the large extent of mining of minor minerals and its significant potent ial to adversely affect the environment, it is recommended that model mineral concession rules may be framed for minor min erals as well and the minor minerals may be subjected to a simp ler regulatory regime, which is, however, similar to major minerals regime. 4.9. Riverbed mining 4.9.1. Environment damage being caused by unregulat ed riverbed mining of sand, bazari and boulders is att racting considerable attention including in the courts. The followi ng recommendations are therefore made for the riverbed mining: XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 5.0. Conclusion Mining of minor minerals, though individually, beca use of smaller size of mine leases is perceived to have lesser impact as compared to mining of major minerals. However, the activity 1095 as a whole is seen to have significant adverse impa cts on environment. It is, therefore, necessary that the mining of minor minerals is subjected to simpler but strict regulato ry regime and carried out only under an approved framework of mining plan, which should provide for reclamation and rehabilitation of the mined out areas. Further, while granting mining leases by the respective State Governments location of any eco- fragile zone(s) within the impact zone of the proposed minin g area, the linked rules/notifications governing such zones and the judicial pronouncements, if any, need be duly noted. The Union Ministry of Mines along with the Indian Burea u of Mines and respective State Governments should there fore make necessary provisions in this regard under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 , Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and adopt model guidelines to be followed by all States.” (emphasis supplied) 20. The Report clearly indicates that operation of mine s of minor minerals needs to be subjected to strict regu latory parameters as that of mines of major minerals. It was also felt necessary to have a relook to the definition o f “minor minerals” per se. The necessity of the preparation of “comprehensive mines plan” for contiguous stretches of mineral deposits by the respective State Governments may also be encouraged and the same be suitably incorporated in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 by the Ministry of Mine s. 21. Further, it was also recommended that the States, Union Territories would see that mining of minor minerals is subjected to simpler but strict regulatory regime and carri ed out only under an approved framework of mining plan, which should provide for reclamation and rehabilitation of mined out areas. Mining plan should take note of the leve l of production, level of mechanisation, type of machine ry used in the mining of minor minerals, quantity of diesel consumption, the number of trees uprooted, export and import of mining minerals, environmental impact, restoration of f lora and host of other matters referred to in the 2010 R ules. A proper framework has also to be evolved on cluster of mi ning DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] of minor minerals for which there must be a Regiona l Environmental Management Plan. Another important decision taken was that while granting of mining leases by t he respective State Governments, location of any eco-fr agile zone(s) within the impact zone of the proposed minin g area, the linked rules/notifications governing such zones a nd the judicial pronouncements, if any, need to be duly noted . XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 28. The Central Government also should take steps to bring into force the Minor Minerals Conservation and Development Rules, 2010 at the earliest. The State Governments and UTs also should take immediate steps to frame necessary rules under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Develop ment and Regulation) Act, 1957 taking into consideration the recommendations of MoEF in its Report of March 2010 an d model guidelines framed by the Ministry of Mines, Government of India. Communicate the copy of this order to MoE F, Secretary, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi; Ministry of Water Resources, Central Government Water Authority; the Chief Secretaries of the respective States and Union Territories , who would circulate this order to the Departments concerned. 29. We, in the meanwhile, order that leases of minor minerals including their renewal for an area of less than five hectare s be granted by the States/Union Territories only after getting environmental clearance from MoEF. Ordered accordingl y.” 50. By virtue of a notification, 15 environmental clearance is necessary even for minor mineral extraction where the area of operation is less than 5 hectares; the procedure has been outlined under Appendix XI of that notification. Clearly, therefore, mining of even minor minerals, when resorted to on a large scale (i.e. where more than a few leases or permits are granted), has a potential impact on the environment. In the facts of this case, the state had granted no less than 62 minor mineral permits in the vicinity; unauthorized activity (in the form inter alia, of over-mining and piling of debris) had resulted in the imposition of the penalty. Clearly, there was violation of the EPA in the pr esent case, 15 No. 3181 dated 14 August, 2018, published by the G overnment of India, in the Official Gazette 1097 because Rathod’s mining lease covered an area in excess of 5 hectares; it fell within the regulatory notification of 2006. There is nothing on record to show that the relevant clearance was obtained by Rathod . Plainly, therefore, the facts of the present case disclosed violation of t he EPA- an enactment listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. This meant that the NGT’s jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) and Section 17 could not have been disputed. 51. This court is of the considered opinion that the expressi on “environment” and “environmental pollution” have to be given a broader meaning, having regard to Parliamentary intent to ensure the objective of the EPA. It effectuates the principles underlying Article 48A of the Constitution of India. The EPA is in essence, an umbrella legis lation enacting a broad framework for the central government to coordina te the activities of various central and state authorities e stablished under other laws, such as the Water Act and Air Act. The EPA also effectively enunciates the critical legislative policy for environment protection. It changes the narrative and emphasis from a narrow concept of pollution control to a wider facet of environment protection. The ex pansive definition of environment that includes water, air and land “and the interrelation which exist among and between water, air and land, other human creatures, plants, micro-organisms and property” give an indication of the wide powers conferred on the Central Government. A wide net is cast over the environment related laws. The EP A also empowers the central government to comprehensively control environmental pollution by industrial and related activities. For these reasons, and in view of the above discussion, it is held that the NGT correctly assumed jurisdiction, having regard to the nature of the accident in the facts of this case. II. Was the direction to pay compensation towards death, and damages towards restitution justified? 52. In the present case, the deceased were concededly travelling on the highway. The incident of flooding occurred, and was caused due to clogging of the water channels. The report of the sub divis ional magistrate indicated that the Inspecting Engineer (Arvi A ssociates, a firm) had given a report after inspection. On behalf of the independent engineering firm appointed by the NHAI, an oral deposition was given before the sub-divisional officer. It was stated that the roadside channel and culvert from where water is disposed of, had been rendered screen DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] blinded and a pipeline of 1.2 m diameter existed there for disposal of water. The necessity of remedial action was communica ted to the concessionaire, before the occurrence of the accident. It was also stated that in terms of the instructions of the NHAI, the concessi onaire was informed about the deficiency on 15.05.2013 and by a further letter dated 04.06.2013. An action plan for completing pre-monsoon work was sought from the concessionaire. However, the concessionaire did not submit an action plan despite lapse of one month. 53. The SDO’s report noted that the culvert had been constructed from the new tunnel and was existing from 2004. Apparently a 1m diameter pipe was positioned in the culvert and had made a causeway. One hotel also had constructed an approach road and placed a 950 MM pipe. The existing drainage capacity of the octroi post and the hotel was insufficient due to heavy rains as a result of which rainwater was not totally drained. This water started accumulating on the road . Certain ramps were also constructed by Tata Motors for its convenienc e; they were removed by the concessionaire; nevertheless, the r amps were prepared again. The existing cross drainage provision was of a sub- culvert -type structure and the size at the time of the old highway was 1m x 1 m. The report further observed that the natural drainage an d sides of hills of the highway was adversely affected an d had been tampered with. The disposal of water on the right side overhead of the tunnel through the cross train on the old highway via the catch drain and subsequently the channels for the water flow were ch oked due to development work and adversely affected the clearance of r ain water. The report indicates that after the accident on 06.06.2013, the loca l administration cleared the debris which had created obstacles, to facilitate the free flow of water into the catch drain culvert and further flow of water. 54. The legal position regarding highways is outlined in two enactments, i.e. the National Highways Act, 1956 (“the Highways Act”) and the NHAI Act. The provisions of the Highways Act, to the e xtent they are relevant are as follows: “4. National highways to vest in the Union . — All national highways shall vest in the Union, and for the purposes of th is Act “highways” include— (i) all lands appurtenant thereto, whether demarcated or not; 1099 (ii) all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways, car riageways and other structures constructed on or across such highways; and (iii) all fences, trees, posts and boundary, furlon g and milestones of such highways or any land appurtenant to such highways. 5. Responsibility for development and maintenance o f national highways.—It shall be the responsibility of the Central Government to develop and maintain in proper repair all national highways; but the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that an y function in relation to the development or maintenance of any national highway shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, also be exercisable by the Government of the State within which the national highway is situated or by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to the State Government. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreemen ts for development and maintenance of national highways — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may enter into an agreement with any person i n relation to the development and maintenance of the whole or any part of a national highway. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7 , the person referred to in sub-section (1) is entitled to colle ct and retain fees at such rate, for services or benefits rend ered by him as the Central Government may, by notification i n the Official Gazette, specify having regard to the expe nditure involved in building, maintenance, management and operation of the whole or part of such national highway, interest on t he capital invested, reasonable return, the volume of tra ffic and the period of such agreement. (3) A person referred to in sub-section (1) shall have powers to regulate and control the traffic in accordance w ith the provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Motor V ehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) on the national highway form ing DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] subject-matter of such agreement, for proper manage ment thereof.” 55. Section 16 of the NHAI Act spells out the functions of t he NHAI; it reads as follows: “16. Functions of the Authority .— (1) Subject to the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to develop, maintain and manage the national highways and any other highways vested i n, or entrusted to, it by the Government. rules made by the C entral Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to develop, maintain and manage the natio nal highways and any other highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government.” 56. Acting in furtherance of its powers, the NHAI entered into an agreement with the concessionaire for the construction, operation and maintenance of the highway in question (i.e. the stretch of 140 kms on which the accident occurred). The question is whether the NHAI, which indisputably owns and controls the highway, and on whose behalf it was constructed, and for which the maintenance and operation agreem ent was entered into, led to a duty of care, to the users (of the highway). 57. This issue had arisen in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum 16 in the context of certain facts. The deceased used to travel on a railway season ticket to Rajkot to attend to his office work. One day whilst he was on the footpath on the way to his office, a roadside tree suddenly fell on him, resulting in serious injuries on the head and other parts of the body, and later died in the hospi tal. The High Court allowed the writ petition. This court noted the distinction between a common law duty of care owed to members of the publi c, and whether liability could be imposed upon a local authority for breach of its statutory duty. The court noticed previous English decisions 17 and stated that “18. The question emerges as to when would the breach of statutory duty under a particular enactment give rise to tortious liability? The statutory duty gives rise to civil a ction. The 16 (1997) 9 SCC 552 17 Gorris v. Scott [(1874) 9 Exch 125] and Kilgollan v. William Cooke & Co. Ltd. (1956) 2 All ER 294, CA] 1101 statutory negligence is sui generis and independent of any other form of tortious liability. It would, therefo re, be of necessity to find out from the construction of each statut ory duty whether the particular duty is general duty in public law or private law duty towards the plaintiff. The plainti ff must show that (a) the injury suffered is within the ambit of stat ute; (b) statutory duty imposes a liability for civil act ion; (c) the statutory duty was not fulfilled; and (d) the breach of duty has caused him injury. These essentials are require d to be considered in each case. The action for breach of statu tory duty may belong to the category of either strict or ab solute liability which is required, therefore, to be considered in the nature of statutory duty the defendant owes to the plai ntiff; whether or not the duty is absolute; and the public policy underlying the duty. In most cases, the statute may not give rise to cause of action unless it is breached and it has caused damage to the plaintiff, though occasionally the statute may make breach of duty actionable per se. The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to prove on balance of probabilit ies that the defendant owes that duty of care to the plaintiff or cl ass of persons to whom he belongs, that defendant was negligent in the performance or omission of that duty and bre ach of duty caused or materially contributed to his injury and that duty of care is owed on the defendant. If the statute require s certain protection on the principle of volenti non fi t injuria, the liability stands excluded. The breach of duty created by a statute, if it results in damage to an individual prima facie, is tort for which the action for damages will lie in the suit . One would often take the Act, as a whole, to find out the object of the law and to find out whether one has a right and remedy provided for breach of duty. It would, therefore, be of neces sity in every case to find the intention of legislature in creating duty and the resultant consequences suffered from the action or omission thereof, which are required to be considered. No action for damages lies if on proper construction of statute, the intention is that some other remedy is available. On e of the tests in determining the intention of the statu te is to ascertain whether the duty is owed primarily to the general public or community and only incidentally to an indi vidual DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] or primarily to the individual or class of individuals and onl y incidentally to the general public or the community . If the statute aims at duty to protect a particular citizen or partic ular class of citizens to which the plaintiff belongs, it pri ma facie creates at the same time corelative right vested in those citizens of which plaintiff is one; he has remedy for enforc ement, namely, the action for damages for any loss occasioned due to negligence or for failure of it. But this test is not always conclusive. 19. Duty may be of such paramount importance that it is owed to all the public. It would be wrong to think that on an action, the duty could be enforced by way of damages when duty is owed to a section of public and cannot be enforced if an individual sustains damages to whom the Corporation owes no duty and no private interest is infringed. Breac h of statutory duty, therefore, requires to be examined in the context in which the duty is created not towards the individua l, but has its effect on the right of individual vis-à-vis the society. Statutory duty generally is towards public at large and not towards an individual or individuals and the corelative right is vested in the public and not in private person, even though they may suffer damages. The duty in such a case is to be enforced by way of criminal prosecution or by way o f injunction at the suit under Section 192 of CPC or with leave of court under Order I, Rule 8 CPC by public-spirited per son or in any appropriate manner to enforce the right and not by way of private action for damages. In that situatio n, the legislature, while recognising the private right vest ed in an injured individual, may intend that it shall be maintained solely by some special remedy provided for a particular ca se and not by ordinary method of an action for damages as penalty or compensation. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 24. Generally, a public authority entrusted with no statutory obligation to exercise a power, does not come under common law duty of care to do so but by conduct the public authority may place itself in such a situation that it attracts the duty of care which calls for exercise of the power. Common illustration 1103 is provided by an action in which an authority in the exerci se of its functions, if it had created a danger, thereby sub jecting itself to a duty of care for the safety of others which mu st be discharged by an exercise of its statutory power or by giving necessary warnings. It is the conduct of the author ity in creating the danger that attracts the duty of care as envisag ed in Sheppard v. Borough of Glossop [(1921) 3 KB 132 : 1921 All ER Rep 61, CA]. The statute does not by itself give ri se to a civil action but it forms the formulation on which the common law can build a cause of action…. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 39. It can be seen that ordinarily the principle of the law of negligence applies to public authorities also. They are liabl e to damages because by a negligent act or failure to act when they are under a duty to act or for a failure to consider whether to exercise a power conferred on them with the intention t hat it would be exercised if and when public interest require s it. Where the public authority has decided to exercise a power and has done it negligently a person who has acted in reli ance on what the public authority has done, may have no difficulty in proving that the damages which he has suffered have been caused by the negligence. Where the damage has resu lted from a negligent failure to act there may be greater difficul ty in proving causation and requires examination in gr eater detail. …” 58. In the UK, the duty of a highway authority was described by Diplock L.J. in Griffiths v. Liverpool Corporation 18 as follows: “The duty at common law to maintain, which includes a duty to repair a highway, was not based in negligence bu t in nuisance. It was an absolute duty to maintain, not mere ly a duty to take reasonable care to maintain, and the sta tutory duty which replaced it was also absolute.” Again, Diplock, LJ stated in Burnside v. Emerson 19 described the duty as follows: 18 [1967] 1 Q.B. 374 19 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1490 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] “in such good repair as renders it reasonably passabl e for the ordinary traffic of the neighbourhood at all se asons of the year without danger caused by its physical conditi on.” 59. Later, in Haydon v. Kent County Council 20 Lord Denning M.R. explained that while the duty to maintain the highway m eant an absolute duty to ensure that it was in a condition to be used as a highway and to ensure safety, it did not include the duty to ensure at all times that the road surface was kept clean. It was clarified however, that the issue had to be considered in each case, and it was to be considered whether the authority had taken reasonable steps to keep it in good repair after being notified about obstruction: “If section 41 is to be construed as capable of imp osing a duty to take remedial measures to deal with ice and snow on a highway, or footway, which is in good physical rep air, so that whether in particular circumstances that duty has arisen is to be decided ‘as a question of fact and degree,’ it would seem that the facts relevant to determining whether the duty has arisen would be essentially similar to those rele vant to deciding whether a breach of the duty has been proved a nd whether the statutory defence under section 58 has been made out. Parliament did not define those facts for the purpose of section 41. The concept of the passing of sufficien t time to make it prima facie unreasonable for the highway author ity to have failed to take remedial measures must presu ppose some idea of the amount and nature of the resources for dealing with snow and ice which are or ought to be available to the authority, and of the order of priority among diff erent carriageways and footways which guides or which ough t to guide the authority; and of the necessary degree of u rgency in using those resources. No such guidance is given in the statute with reference to proof of the arising of the duty.” 60. In Stovin v Wise 21 , the defendant emerged from a side road and ran down the plaintiff, because she was not keeping a proper look- out. When she was sued for damages, the defendant joined the County Council as a third party because the visibility at the inte rsection was poor and they said that the Council, which had the duty to maintain the 20 [1978] Q.B. 343 21 1996 (3) All ER 801 1105 road should have done something to improve it. The council had statutory powers which would have enabled the necessary work to be don e and there was evidence that the relevant officers had decided in principle that it should be done, but they had not taken steps to do it. The House of Lords held that there was no duty of care in private law b ased on the statutory duty, and that “Drivers of vehicles must take the highway network as they find it” . It was held that statutory power could not be converted into a common law duty. The council had done nothing which, apart from statute, would have attracted a common law duty of care. It had done nothing at all. The only basis on which it was a candidate for liability was that Parliament had entrusted it with general responsibility for the highways and given it the power to improve them and take other measures for the safety of their users.Lord Hoffmann observed , “In summary, therefore, I think that the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of care upon the existence of a st atutory power, if it can be done at all, are, first, that it would in the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act, and secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires compensation to b e paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was no t exercised.” 61. Stovin (supra) and its enunciation that the existence of a public duty did not per se extend to a private duty of care to take special measures, unless exceptional features were proved, was follo wed in Gorringe v. Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council 22 . The entire law was re-examined and the correct position, resta ted in a recent judgment by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police 23 , which observed as follows: “32 At common law, public authorities are generally subject to the same liabilities in tort as private individuals and bodies: see, for example, Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275 and Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Gibbs (1866) LR 1 HL 93. Dicey famously stated that “every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes , is under the same responsibility for every act done without leg al 22 2004 (1) WLR 1057 23 2019 (2) All ER 1041 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] justification as any other citizen”: The Law of the Constitution, 3rd ed (1889), p 181. An important exception at common law was the Crown, but that exception was addressed by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, section 2. 33. Accordingly, if conduct would be tortious if committed by a private person or body, it is generally equally t ortious if committed by a public authority: see, for example, Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, as explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 39. That gene ral principle is subject to the possibility that the common law or statute may provide otherwise, for example by autho rising the conduct in question: Geddis v Proprietors of Ba nn Reservoir (1878) 3 App Cas 430. It follows that pub lic authorities are generally under a duty of care to avoid causi ng actionable harm in situations where a duty of care would arise under ordinary principles of the law of negligence, unless the law provides otherwise. 34. On the other hand, public authorities, like private individuals and bodies, are generally under no duty of care to prevent the occurrence of harm: as Lord Toulson JSC stated in Michael’s case [2015] AC 1732, para 97, “the com mon law does not generally impose liability for pure omiss ions”. This “omissions principle” has been helpfully summarised by Tofaris and Steel, “Negligence Liability for Omissi ons and the Police” [2016] CLJ 128: “In the tort of negligence, a person A is not under a duty to take care to prevent harm occurring to person B thro ugh a source of danger not created by A unless (i) A has assumed a responsibility to protect B from that danger, (ii) A has done something which prevents another from protecting B from th at danger, (iii) A has a special level of control over that source of danger, or (iv) A’s status creates an obligation to pr otect B from that danger.” 35 As that summary makes clear, there are certain circumstances in which public authorities, like pri vate individuals and bodies, can come under a duty of ca re to prevent the occurrence of harm: see, for example, 1107 Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 and Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619, as explained in Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, paras 39–40. In the absence of such circumstances, however, public authorities generally owe no duty of care to wards individuals to confer a benefit upon them by protecting them from harm, any more than would a private individual or body: see, for example, Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241, concerning a private body, applied in Mitch ell v Glasgow City Council [2009] AC 874, concerning a publ ic authority. 36 That is so, notwithstanding that a public authority may have statutory powers or duties enabling or requiri ng it to prevent the harm in question. A well known illustra tion of that principle is the decision of the House of Lords in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74. The position is different if, on its true construction, the statutory power or duty is intended to give rise to a duty to individual members of the public which is enforceable by means of a private right of action. If, however, the statute does not c reate a private right of action, then “it would be, to say the least, unusual if the mere existence of the statutory duty [or, a fortiori, a statutory power] could generate a commo n law duty of care”: Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 23. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 40 However, until the reasoning in the Anns case was repudiated, it was not possible to justify a rejection of l iability, where a prima facie duty of care arose at the first stag e of the analysis from the foreseeability of harm, on the ba sis that public bodies are not generally liable for failing to exercise their statutory powers or duties so as to confer the benefit of protection from harm. Instead, it was necessary to have recourse to public policy in order to justify the rej ection of liability at the second stage. That was accordingly the approach adopted by the House of Lords and the Cour t of Appeal in a series of judgments, including Hill’s case [1989 ] AC 53. The need to have recourse to public policy fo r that purpose has been superseded by the return to orthodo xy in DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] Gorringe’s case. Since that case, a public authorit y’s non- liability for the consequences of an omission can gen erally be justified on the basis that the omissions princi ple is a general principle of the law of negligence, and the law of negligence generally applies to public authorities in the sam e way that it applies to private individuals and bodies. 41 Equally, concerns about public policy cannot in themselves override a liability which would arise at common law fo r a positive act carried out in the course of performing a stat utory function: the true question is whether, properly co nstrued, the statute excludes the liability which would otherwise ar ise: see Gorringe’s case 2004 (1) WLR 1057, para 38, per Lord Hoffmann. 42 That is not to deny that what might be described as policy considerations sometimes have a role to play in the law of negligence. As explained earlier, where established pri nciples do not provide a clear answer to the question whether a duty of care should be recognised in a novel situation, the court will have to consider whether its recognition would be just and reasonable.” 62. In Yetkin v. Mahmood 24 , where injury was caused to a highway user by shrubs which had overgrown and impeded visibility, the court upheld the claim for damages. The court observed as follows: “…The planting of vegetation in the raised beds of the centr al reservation is obviously a reasonable exercise of t he authority’s powers but to plant shrubs which will g row so large as to obscure the view and then not to ensure that they are trimmed back is a negligent exercise of those power s. The judge held that that failure was a cause of this accident. It is not suggested that he was not right so to hold. I h ave no doubt that, in the circumstances of this case, the local authority had a common law duty of care towards the claimant, notwithstanding her own negligence, that that duty was breached and that the breach was a cause of the accid ent. There was no need for the judge to consider whether the danger created by the bushes amounted to a trap or 24 2011 QB 827 1109 enticement. It follows in my judgment that the judge erred i n dismissing the claim. He should have held that primary liability was established.” 63. A similar approach was indicated by this court in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Sushila Devi 25 (where a tree fell on a passer-by causing injury) the court upheld the findings that the municipal corporation was liable, stating that: “13. By a catena of decisions, the law is well settled that if there is a tree standing on the defendant’s land which is dried or dead and for that reason may fall and the defect i s one which is either known or should have been known to the defendant, then the defendant is liable for any injury caus ed by the fall of the tree (see Brown v. Harrison [1947 WN 191 : 63 TLR 484], Quinn v. Scott [(1965) 1 WLR 1004 : (1965) 2 All ER 588] and Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County Council [1927 WN 247] ). The duty of the owner/occupier of the premises by the side of the road whereon persons la wfully pass by, extends to guarding against what may happe n just by the side of the premises on account of anything dangerous on the premises. The premises must be maintained in a s afe state of repair. The owner/occupier cannot escape the liabil ity for injury caused by any dangerous thing existing o n the premises by pleading that he had employed a competent person to keep the premises in safe repairs. In Municipal Co rpn. of Delhi v. Subhagwanti [AIR 1966 SC 1750] a clock tower which was 80 years’ old collapsed in Chandni Chowk, Delhi causing the death of a number of persons. Their Lordships held that the owner could not be permitted to take a defence that he neither knew nor ought to have known the danger. “[ T]he owner is legally responsible irrespective of whethe r the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect,” — said their Lordships. In our opinion the same principle is applicable to the owner of a tree standing by the side of a road. If the tree is dangerous in the sense that on account of any disea se or being dead the tree or its branch is likely to fall and th ereby injure any passer-by then such a tree or branch mus t be removed so as to avert the danger to life. It is per tinent to 25 (1999) 4 SCC 317 at page 323 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] note that it is not the defence of the Municipal Corpo ration that vis major or an act of God such as a storm, te mpest, lightning or extraordinary heavy rain had occurred caus ing the fall of the branch of the tree and hence the Corp oration was not liable.” This approach that a statutory corporation or local authority can be held liable in tort for injury occasioned on account of omission to oversee, or defective supervision of its activities contracted out to another agency, was also followed in Vadodara Municipal Corporation v Purshottam V. Muranji 26 . 64. The terms of the agreement which the NHAI entered int o with the concessionaire clearly contemplated the safety of highway users (Clause 18.1.1) and an elaborate highway monitoring mechanism (Clause 19.1). The agreement also required any unusual occurr ences to be reported; an independent engineer was required to, and did inspect the highway. The reports of the inspecting engineer rev eal that the deficiencies by way of narrowing of water channels, and the unus ual collection of debris, were noted. Even before the incident, the NHAI was alive to this; it had separately written to Rathod, and lat er to the local administration about it through its letter dated 15.04.201 1. That letter is revealing; it inter alia, states that: “During pre-monsoon rains all the excavated muck has been carried to NH4 alongwith rain water and block Satara bound traffic lane for quite some time. The problem wi ll be severe during heavy rains of July and August. As such safety of highway and tunnel is completely at stake due to indiscriminate cutting of hills on upp er side of tunnel and both the end.” 65. Having regard to the duty imposed on the NHAI by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of the Highways Act, read with Section 16 of the NHAI Act, there can be no manner of doubt that the NHAI was responsible for the maintenance of the highway, including the stre tch upon which the accident occurred. The report of the sub-divisional officer clearly shows that inspection reports were furnished to the NHAI shortly before the incident, highlighting the deficiencies; also, the NHAI’s correspondence with Rathod, and the local administration, reveal that it 26 2014 (16) SCC 14 1111 was aware of the danger and likelihood of risk to human lif e, and the foreseeability of the event that actually occurred later. Further, letters addressed by the local administration and the NHAI to Rathod similarly show that it was incumbent upon him to take remedial action. The failure of the NHAI to ensure remedial action, and likewise the failure by Rathod to take measures to prevent the accident, prima facie, disclose their liability. 66. The absence of legal representatives or heirs of the deceased in the proceedings, or the fact that they had initiated independent civil action, in the opinion of this court, was not an impediment, nor could it have precluded the NGT from exercising its jurisdiction, given the gravity of the matter and the danger posed to the members of the pu blic. The initiation of civil action did not mean that the NGT had to either reject the application (as far as it claimed relief for the accident), or await the outcome of the civil suit. This position is clear from the proviso to Section 18(1) which reads as follows: “Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such applicatio n for compensation or relief or settlement of dispute, the appli cation shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the leg al representatives of the deceased and the legal represen tatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.” 67. The above provision clearly implies that an application without impleading the legal heirs cannot be rejected. At the most, the tribunal has to implead all legal heirs. In the present case, that p rocedure was not followed. However, the legal heirs have instituted a suit. The ends of justice would be served if that suit (Special Civil Suit No. 890 of 2014 before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune) is directed to revive and continue it; a direction is issued to the concerned court (Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune). The directions in this regard by the NGT, towards payment of compensation are to be regarde d as indicative of a prima facie determination. Consequently, the direction to the NHAI and Rathod, jointly making them liable to pay 15 lakh s is justified. It is clarified that the civil suit will now proceed, and based on evidence, the court would finally decide the issue of liability, and make such further consequential orders or decrees as may be found necessary in this regard, towards apportioning of liability of the NHAI, Rathod, the DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] state or any other party (including the concessionaire). This court’s order shall not be treated as conclusive; the trial court shall ind ependently proceed to evaluate the evidence and hear the parties on the merits of their submissions. The restitutionary order by the NGT, directing payment by Rathod and NHAI of 10 lakhs too, in this court’s opinion, cannot be found to be at fault. It is upheld. The NHAI and Rathod shal l comply with the directions of the NGT and deposit the sum of 15 lakhs with the said court within four weeks, in equal proportion. The sum 10 lakhs shall be deposited in the same proportion, in court, to be disbursed to the state government for restoring the environment and carrying out afforestation/ planting of trees etc. Point Nos III and IV: Correctness of NGT’s directio ns contained in Para 17 (e) of its impugned order, and the legality of the order/notification of the state of Mahar ashtra, issued under Section 154, MRTP Act 68. Asto the third point, two issues arise for consideration - firstly, the power of the NGT to issue directions banning development and building activities of the kind contained in Para 17(e) of its impugned order, and secondly, the correctness of the procedure adopted while iss uing such directions, in this case. 69. In the All Dimasa Student Union case 27 , this court considered the nature of powers and jurisdiction of NGT. The relevant discussion is as follows: “156. What are the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal given under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 has to be looked into to consider the above submission? Insof ar as jurisdiction of the Tribunal is concerned, we have already noticed Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act deals with procedure and powers of the Tribunal. Section 19 which is relevant for the present case is as follows 28 : XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 27 See f.n. 9 ( supra ) 28 “19. Procedure and powers of Tribunal.—(1) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Trib unal shall have power to regulate its own procedure. 1113 157. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Co de of Civil Procedure but shall be guided by the princ iples of natural justice. What sub-section (1) meant to convey is that the Tribunal is not shackled with the procedure laid down by CPC for conducting its proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 empowers the Tribunal with powers to regulate its own procedure. Section 19(2) confers vide powers on the Tribunal insofar as its procedure is concerned. Section 19( 4) vests some powers as are vested in the civil court, wh ile trying a suit, in respect of matters enumerated therein. The use of the expression “shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by CPC” is not akin to saying that procedure as laid down by CPC is in no manner relevant to the Tribunal. Further, Section 19(1) also does not mean that the Tribunal cannot follow any procedure given in CPC. One provision of CPC insert ed by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977 is Order 26, which is relevant for present inquiry. Order 26 Rule 10-A p rovides as follows: “10-A. Commission for scientific investigations .—(1) Where any question arising in a suit involves any sci entific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of the C ourt, be (3) The Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (4) The Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely— (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) subject to the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witn esses or documents; (f) reviewing its decision; (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; (h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (i) pass an interim order (including granting an in junction or stay) after providing the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard, on any application made or appeal filed under this Act; DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] conveniently conducted before the Court, the Court may, if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of j ustice so to do, issue a commission to such person as it thin ks fit, directing him to inquire into such question and report there on to the Court. (2) The provisions of Rule 10 of this Order shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to a Commissioner appo inted under this Rule as they apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under Rule 9.” 158. Rule 10-A provides that where any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be conveniently conducted bef ore the Court, the Court may, if it thinks necessary or expe dient in the interests of justice so to do, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit, directing him to inquire i nto such question and report thereon to the Court. Rule 10-A is enabling power to the courts to obtain report from such persons a s it thinks fit when any question involves with the scie ntific investigation. The powers under Rule 10-A which are t o be exercised by the Court can very well be used by NGT to obtain reports by experts. NGT as per the statutory scheme of NGT has to decide several complex questions pertaining to pollution and environment. The scientific investigation and r eport by experts are necessary requirements in appropriate c ases to come to correct conclusion to find out measures to remedy the pollution and environment. We do not, thus, find any dearth of jurisdiction in NGT to appoint a committee to su bmit a report. We may further say that while asking an exp ert to give a report, NGT is not confined to the four corners of R ule 10-A rather its jurisdiction is not shackled by strict terms of Order 26 Rule 10-A as per Section 19(1) as noticed above. ” (j) pass an order requiring any person to cease and desist from committing or causing any violation of any enactment specified in Schedule I; (k) any other matter which may be prescribed. (5) All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be de emed to be the judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.” 1115 70. The court also took note of Rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011 (framed under Sections 4(4) and 35 of the NGT Act). 29 This court then held as follows: “160. Rule 24 empowers the Tribunal to make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to gi ve effect to its order or to secure the ends of justic e. Rule 24 gives wide powers to the Tribunal to secure the ends of ju stice. Rule 24 vests special power to the Tribunal to pass orders and issue directions to secure the ends of justice. Use o f words “may”, “such orders”, “gives such directions”, “as m ay be necessary or expedient”, “to give effect to its orders”, “order to prevent abuse of process”, are words which enabl e the Tribunal to pass orders and the above words confer wide discretion. 163. The object for which the said power is given is not far to seek. To fulfil the objective of the NGT Act, 2010, NGT ha s to exercise a wide range of jurisdiction and has to possess wi de range of powers to do justice in a given case. The power is given to exercise for the benefit of those who have right for clean environment which right they have to establish be fore the Tribunal. The power given to the Tribunal is coupled wi th duty to exercise such powers for achieving the obje cts. In this regard reference is made to the judgment of this Cour t in L. Hirday Narain v. CIT [L. Hirday Narain v.CIT, (1 970) 2 SCC 3s55], wherein this Court was examining provisi on empowering authority to do something. This Court laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 359) XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 164. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that there is no lack of jurisdiction in NGT to direct for appointme nt of committee or to obtain a report from a committee in the give n facts of the case.” 29 The said rule reads as follows: “24. Order and directions in certain cases .— The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedie nt to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice.” DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 71. The power and jurisdiction of the NGT under Sections 15(1)(b) and (c) are not restitutionary, in the sense of restoring the environment to the position it was before the practise impugned, or before the incident occurred. The NGT’s jurisdiction in one sense is a remedial one, based on a reflexive exercise of its powers. In another sense, base d on the nature of the abusive practice , its powers can also be preventive. 72. As a quasi-judicial body exercising both appellate jurisdiction over regulatory bodies’ orders and directions (under Section 16) and its original jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the NGT Act, the tribunal, based on the cases and applications made before it, is an expert regulatory body. Its personnel include technically qualified and experienced members. The powers it exercises and directions it can potentially issue, impact not merely those before it, but also state agencies and state departments whose views are heard, after w hich general directions to prevent the future occurrence of incidents that impact the environment, are issued. 73. Courts in the US, notably the US Supreme Court, have been faced with problems arising from regulatory adjudication. The scope of such decision making which resembles an adjudicatory outcome by courts, was considered in Securities Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp .30 This case arose from an order of the Securities Exc hange Commission (SEC) refusing to approve a utility company’s bankruptcy reorganization plan, due to that plan’s favourable treatment of management’s stock purchases during the reorganization peri od. The SEC originally had based its disapproval on its understanding of general corporation law principles. The Supreme Court initially struck down that decision as a misreading of the principles.On remand, the SEC reaffirmed its rejection of the reorganization plan. But this time, the SEC relied on its interpretation of the standards of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.When the Supreme Court decided the appeal for the second time, it affirmed the SEC’s order. The court clarified that SEC would be allowed to establish such an interpretation by means of a particularized order rather than a general regulation and observed that: “Not every principle essential to the effective admi nistration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet pa rticular, 30 332 U.S. 194 (1947) 1117 unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functi ons in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency mu st be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. In other words, problems ma y arise in a case which the administrative agency cou ld not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved des pite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agen cy may not have had sufficient experience with a particular probl em to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and var ying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must r etain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if th e administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case by case evolution of st atutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding b y general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primary in the informed discretion of the adminis trative agency.” 74. Similar observations were made by this court in PTC India v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 31 . The court stated as follows, after analysing the provisions of the Electricity Act 2003: “49. On the above analysis of various sections of th e 2003 Act, we find that the decision-making and regulation-maki ng functions are both assigned to CERC. Law comes into existence not only through legislation but also by regulation and litigation . Laws from all three sources are binding. According to Professor Wade, “between legislative and adminis trative functions we have regulatory functions”. A statutor y instrument, such as a rule or regulation, emanates fro m the exercise of delegated legislative power which is a part of administrative process resembling enactment of law by the legislature whereas a quasi-judicial order comes fr om adjudication which is also a part of administrative process resembling a judicial decision by a court of law. 31 2010 (4) SCC 603 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 50. Applying the above test, price fixation exercise is really legislative in character, unless by the terms of a particular statute it is made quasi-judicial as in the case of tariff fixation underSection 62 made appealable under Section 111of the 2003 Act , though Section 61is an enabling provision for the framing of regulations by CERC. If one takes “tariff ” as a subject-matter, one finds that under Part VII of the 2003 Act actual determination/fixation of tariff is done by the appropriate Commission underSection 62 whereas Section 61 is the enabling provision for framing of regulations contai ning generic propositions in accordance with which the appropr iate Commission has to fix the tariff. This basic scheme equally applies to the subject-matter “trading margin” in a differ ent statutory context as will be demonstrated by discus sion hereinbelow.” 75. The NGT’s directions, though placed in the context of its adjudicatory role, have a wider ramification in the sense that its rulings constitute the appropriate norm which are to be followed by all those engaging in similar activities. Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication, also establish and direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. In these circumstances, given the panoply of the NGT’s powers under the NGT Act, which include considering regulatory directions issued by expert regulatory bodies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Biodiversity Act, 2002 it has to be held that general directions for future guidance, to avoid or prevent injury to the environment for appropriate assimilation in relevant rules, can be given by the NGT. 76. Turning next to the question of the correctness of the general directions contained in Para 17(e) of the NGT’s order, this court has no manner of doubt that such directions were improper and not justified in the facts of this case. What the NGT had before it, was the report of the SDM and a report commissioned about the nature of the incident. Based on these limited inputs, the tribunal concluded- without any rationale and based on no scientific or technical evidence, or experts’ opinion, that development and construction should not be carried out within 100 feet of a “lowest slope i.e. incline of any hill within its territor ial limits, as well as hill-tops”. The decisions of this court, including the All Dimasa 1119 Students Union case (f.n. 9); Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd case (f.n.3); the Hanuman Laxman Aroskar case (f.n. 4) and the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board case (f.n. 2) all show that the NGT resorted to the appointment of technical and scientific experts in the relevant field, who studied the issue, made site inspections and furnished reports. Such reports were subjected to discussion by the parties before the NGT, who were also given the opportunity of objecting to or making representations against such reports. Based on a final consideration of all these materials, and the submissions of parties b efore it, the NGT proceeded to issue directions. This procedure was wholly overlooked by the NGT in the present case. As a result, it is held that the said tribunal’s directions were improper and are procedurally indefensible. The directions contained in Para 17(e) are therefore set aside. 77. To consider the last issue, i.e. validity of the notification/direction issued by the state government, it is necessary to briefly outline provisions of the MRTP Act. The MRTP Act was framed and enacted for the purpose of use, planning and development in the regions (of Maharashtra). This was through the establishment of Regional Planning Boards, New Town Development Authorities and Special Planning Authorities, as the case may be, for specified “notified areas”. The Act provid es for the preparation of development plans, appointment of Special Planning Authorities for notified areas, and creation of new towns for designated areas by means of development authorities. The MRTP Act also enables compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes in respect of the plans and for purposes connected therewith. The Act provides for an elaborate procedure for preparation of the regional plan by a Regional Pla nning Board (“the board”) and development plan by any planning auth ority. The board has to follow the procedure contained in Chapter II(C). Section 16 provides the procedure – the regional boards have to (after necessary survey) prepare land-use maps for the region, and prepare a draft regional plan, after which they have to publish a notice about th e plan in the Official Gazette, inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the draft plan. The board has to refer the objections, suggestions and representations received by it to the Regional Planning Committee (“the committee” hereafter) appointed under Section 10 for consideration and report. The committee, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the affected persons has to submit its report to the board, after which the board has to prepare the regional plan after considering the suggestions, objections and representations and the report DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] of the committee. This is to be submitted to the State Gove rnment for approval. On approval of the plan by the State Government under Section 15, the final regional plan has to be published under Section 17. 78. Chapter III deals with the procedure for prepar ation of development plans by a planning authority. Section 23 provides that the planning authority should make a declaration of its intent to prepare such a plan and publish the same in the Official Gazette, inviting suggestions or objections from the public within a period of not less than sixty days from the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette . Thereafter under Section 26, the planning authority has to pre pare a draft development plan, not later than two years from the date of notice published under Section 23, and publish the notice in the Official Gazette stating that the development plan has been prepared, once again inviting objections or suggestions from any person with respect to the draft plan within a period of sixty days from the notice. Section 27 provides that the planning authority having regard to, and guided by the prop osals made in the regional plan, shall not carry out any modification therein without prior concurrence of the Regional Planning Board. Section 28 mandates the planning authority to consider suggestions or objections received by it under Section 26(1) and provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to any person including the representa tives of the Government who may have filed any objections or suggestions, and thereafter modify or change the plan in such manner, as provided under Section 28(4). Section 29 further provides for modification of the draft development plan, which is of substantial nature. By this, a planning authority or the Town Planning Officer is required to publish a notice in the Official Gazette inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification not later than sixty days from the date of such notice. The section then requires the authority concerned to consider all objections and suggestions received by it and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to any person including representatives of government departments who may have f iled any objections or made any suggestions in respect of the draft development plan before making such modifications or changes in the draft development plan. Section 30 requires the planning authority to submit the draft plan to the State Government for approval, within twelve months fr om the date of publication of the notice under Section 26 that the draft plan has been prepared. Section 31 provides that the State Government may, after consulting the Director of Town Planning by notification in the 1121 Official Gazette, sanction the draft development plan submitted to it for the whole area, or separately for any part thereof, either without modification, or subject to such modifications as it may consider proper, or return the draft development plan to the planning authority for modifying the plan as it may direct, or refuse to accord sanction. It further provides that where the modifications proposed to be made by the State Government are of a substantial nature, the State Governme nt has to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 28 to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the objectors before finalizing the modification. 79. Section 37 confers powers on a planning authority to carr y out such modification in a final development plan as will not change its character. This power could be exercised by a planning authority after publishing a notice in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be determined by it inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification, not later than one month from the date of such notice. This section also enjoins the planning authority to serve notice on all persons affected by the proposed modification and, after giving a hearing to any such persons, submit the proposed modification (with amendments, if any) to the State Government for sanction. Section 40 provides for appointment of a Special Planning Authority for developing certain notified areas, and Section 40(1)( c) provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) established under the Bombay Metropolitan R egion Development Authority Act, 1974 to be the Special Planning Authority for developing any undeveloped area specified in the notific ation as a notified area. Section 116 then lays down that a Special Planning Authority shall have all the powers of a planning authority as provided in Chapter VII of the MRTP Act for the special purpose of acquisition of such land in the notified area either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act. 80. So far as plans and developments that were approved before the impugned notification was issued, this court is of the opi nion that they cannot be disturbed and the right of the appli cants, be they developers, builders or owners of land or plots, cannot be prejudiced or adversely affected. This is evident from a ruling of this c ourt in T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member 32 . This court stated that town planning legislations (like the MRTP Act) are regulatory; and that DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] when a development plan is in force during the proposal for its amendment, courts should not interfere with them on the assumption that the approved plan for building or development, would not be eventually permitted. It was held that: “Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. I t is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan mu st conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed herei nbefore, the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecologi cal balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislatio n. If in the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into conside ration keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the Aut hority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendmen t in the legislation is not brought into force.” 81. This court has ruled, that even modification to an exist ing development plan, under the MRTP Act, under Section 37, is in the nature of a legislative function. This court had observed under Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Promoters and Builders Assn 33 speaking of Section 37 (1) that: “4. Reading of this provision reveals that under clause ( 1), the Planning Authority after inviting objections an d suggestions regarding the proposed amendment and af ter giving notice to all affected persons shall submit the pro posed modification for sanction to the Government. Delibe ration with the public before making the amendment is over at this stage. The Government, thereafter, under clause (2) i s given absolute liberty to make or not to make necessary i nquiry before granting sanction. Again, while according sa nction, 32 (2006) 8 SCC 502 33 (2004) 10 SCC 796 1123 the Government may do so with or without modifications. The Government could impose such conditions as it deems fit. It is also permissible for the Government to refuse the san ction. This is the true meaning of clause (2). It is difficult to uphold the contrary interpretation given by the High Court. The mai n limitation for the Government is made under clause (1) that no authority can propose an amendment so as to change the basic character of the development plan. The propos ed amendment could only be minor within the limits of the development plan. And for such minor changes it is only normal for the Government to exercise a wide discretion, b y keeping various relevant factors in mind. Again, if it is arbitrary or unreasonable the same could be challen ged. It is not the case of the respondents herein that the p roposed change is arbitrary or unreasonable. They challenge d the same citing the reason that the Government is not empowered under the Act to make such changes to the modification. 5. Making of DCR or amendments thereof are legislativ e functions. Therefore, Section 37 has to be viewed as reposi tory of legislative powers for effecting amendments to DC R. That legislative power of amending DCR is delegated to the Stat e Government. As we have already pointed out, the tru e interpretation of Section 37(2) permits the State Govern ment to make necessary modifications or put conditions w hile granting sanction. In Section 37(2), the legislature has not intended to provide for a public hearing before acc ording sanction. The procedure for making such amendment i s provided in Section 37. Delegated legislation canno t be questioned for violating the principles of natural ju stice in its making except when the statute itself provides for that requirement. Where the legislature has not chosen to prov ide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it is not permissible to read natural justice into such le gislative activity. Moreover, a provision for “such inquiry a s it may consider necessary” by a subordinate legislating bo dy is generally an enabling provision to facilitate the subord inate legislating body to obtain relevant information fro m any source and it is not intended to vest any right in anybody. (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [(1987) 2 SCC 720], DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] SCC paras 5 and 27. See generally H.S.S.K. Niyami v.Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 516] and Canara Bank v. Deba sis Das [(2003) 4 SCC 557: 2003 SCC (L&S) 507].) While exercising legislative functions, unless unreasonablen ess or arbitrariness is pointed out, it is not open for the Court to interfere. (See generally ONGC v. Assn. of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat [1990 Supp SCC 397] .) Therefore, the view adopted by the High Court does not appear to be correct. 82. This issue was again underscored by this court in Machavarapu Srinivasa Rao v. Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagir i Urban Development Authority ,34 where it was held as follows, in respect of provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Urban Areas) Development Act, 1975: “20 . An analysis of the above-noted provisions shows tha t once the master plan or the zonal development plan is approved by the State Government, no one including the State Government/Development Authority can use land for a ny purpose other than the one specified therein. There is no provision in the Act under which the Development Author ity can sanction construction of a building, etc. or use of land for a purpose other than the one specified in the master plan/ zonal development plan. The power vested in the Development Authority to make modification in the development p lan is also not unlimited. It cannot make important altera tions in the character of the plan. Such modification can be made only by the State Government and that too after following the procedure prescribed under Section 12(3).” 83. In a decision which concerned change in development plan under the MRTP Act, this court observed that any ch anges in a development or master plan involve consultations and a high degree of expertise, in MIG Cricket Club v. Abhinav Sahakar Education Society 35 : “28. It is well settled that the user of the land is to be decided by the authority empowered to take such a decision and thi s Court in exercise of its power of judicial review w ould not interfere with the same unless the change in the user is f ound 34 (2011) 12 SCC 154 35 (2011) 9 SCC 97 1125 to be arbitrary. The process involves consideration of competing claims and requirements of the inhabitant s in present and future so as to make their lives happy, healthy and comfortable. We are of the opinion that town pla nning requires high degree of expertise and that is best lef t to the decision of the State Government to which the advice of the expert body is available. In the facts of the present cas e, we find that the power has been exercised in accordanc e with law and there is no arbitrariness in the same.” 84. Now, under the provisions of the MRTP Act 36 , regional plans and development plans have to take into account features suc h as soil conservation, preservation of natural features, prevention of flooding etc, while factoring planning for each city or area concer ned. In turn, such regional and development plans would constitute the blueprint for local town planning authorities to grant or refuse permission to individual applicants. In these circumstances, the use of Section 154 of the MRTP Act, in the present case, in fact amounted to a modification of all plans - regional, development, etc. Such modification (by way of absolute prohibition in construction) was not preceded by any manner of public consultation, much less previous invitation of objections or consideration of the views of affected parties. It is in this background that one has to consider the argument of the state, which found favour with the High Court, that such notification was issued in public interest. 85. The unamended Section 154 of the MRTP Act read as follows: “154 Control by the State Government (1) Every Regional Board, Planning Authority and Development Authority shall carry out such directions or ins tructions as may be issued from time to time by the State Government f or the efficient administration of this Act. (2) If in, or his connection with, the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions by the Regional Boar d, Planning Authority or Development Authority under this Act, any dispute arises between the Regional Board, Planning Authori ty or Development Authority, and the State Government, the decision of the State Government on such dispute shall be final.” 36 Section 14 and 22 DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 86. Section 154 (1) was amendment by a substitution (with effect from 22.04.2015). The new provision [Section 154 (1)] reads as follows: “154. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ac t or the rules or regulations made thereunder, the State Government may, for implementing or bringing into effect the Ce ntral or the State Government programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient administration of this Act or in the larger publi c interest, issue, from time to time, such directions or instructions as may be necessary, to any Regional Board, Plannin g Authority or Development Authority and it shall be the d uty of such authorities to carry out such directions or instructi ons within the time-limit, if any, specified in such di rections or instructions.” 87. Directions can be issued “notwithstanding” any other provisions of the Act, “for implementing or bringing into effect the Central or the State Government programmes, policies or project s or for the efficient administration of this Act or in the larger pu blic interest, issue, from time to time.” No doubt, the non-obstante clause has an overriding effect on other provisions of the Act. However, if one keeps in mind that the preparations of regional and development plans are in terms of specific provisions which outline detailed procedures that have to be necessarily followed, in the absence of which, time and again courts have intervened and held that such modifications (without following prescribed procedure or without prescribed consultations) a re illegal, the power has to be resorted to for good and adequate reasons. T he direction, impugned in the present case, on the face of it, is not premised on any central or state government programmes, policies or pr ojects. The impugned notification reads as follows: GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT Madam Cama Road Hutatma Rajguru Chowk Mantralaya, Mumbai 4000032 Government Resolution No. TPS-1817/ANS-90/97/UD-13 dated 14 November 2017 1127 The Development schemes are prepared for area in jurisdiction of planning authorities under the Maharashtra Regio nal Development and Town Planning Act, 1966. In the context of unauthorised constructions undertaken by hill cutti ng, at Katraj Ghat District Pune, the Hon’ble National Gre en Tribunal, Pune has, by order dated 19 May 2015 in Application Number 4/2014, issued orders and instruct ed to inform all Mahanagar Palik/Nagarpalika in the state not to give any development permission for constructions o n the hilltop and 100 feet distance from the hill slopes. A provision already exists in development control regulations t hat no development is permissible on the hilltop and no hill slopes having a gradient of more than 1:5. Considering the order dated 19 May 2015 of the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal in exercise of powers under section 154 of the Mahar ashtra Regional Town Development and Town Planning Act 196 6 the following the directions were issued to all pla nning authorities in the state: DIRECTIONS 1. The planning authorities while preparing development p lan for area in their jurisdiction or amending them in respect of undeveloped portion abutting the hills upto 100 feet should be shown as No development/Open space Reservation. 2. In the event the 100 area abutting hills, has already been developed, in that area no permission be granted fo r additional FSI or TDR. 3. In the event the 100 feet area abutting hills is un der No Development Zone as per sanctioned Development plan, then while granting permission for Development for furthe r 100 feet area abutting/contiguous thereto should be permitted only for non-buildable purposes such as o pen space, road et cetera. In the name of and by order of the Hon’ble Governor State of Maharashtra” DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] 88. There are several authorities for the proposition that th ough an administrative order need not necessarily comply with principles of natural justice such as granting hearing, yet, administrative decisions or orders have to be based on some reasons. In Shri. Sitaram Sugar Mills Company v. Union of India ,37 (which concerned the zoning regulations for the purpose of levy sugar under the relevant statutory order, in terms of the Essential Commodities Act), the Supreme Court held as follows: “Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires the power granted, and on r elevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whether characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial , must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws o f the land. They must be “reasonably related to the pur poses of the enabling legislation”. If they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of t he objects of delegation, court might well say, “Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable ultra vires. A repository of power acts ultra vires either when he a cts in excess of his power in the narrow sense or when he ab uses his power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmiss ible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness.” 89. In Cellular Operators Association v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India ,38 this court held that subordinate regulatory legislation, can be set aside in judicial review, if they show no rationale or are arbitrary: “62. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Quality of Service Regulations and the Consumer Regulations mus t be read together as part of a single scheme in order to tes t the reasonableness thereof. The countervailing advantag e to service providers by way of the allowance of 2% ave rage call drops per month, which has been granted under the 2009 37 (1990) 3 SCC 223 38 (2016) 7 SCC 703 1129 Quality of Service Regulations, could not have been ignor ed by the impugned Regulation so as to affect the funda mental rights of the appellants, and having been so ignored, would render the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. 63. Secondly, no facts have been shown to us which would indicate that a particular area would be filled with call drops thanks to the fault on the part of the service prov iders in which consumers would be severely inconvenienced. The mere ipse dixit of the learned Attorney General, without any facts being pleaded to this effect, cannot possibly make an unconstitutional regulation constitutional. We, therefore, hold that a strict penal liability laid down on the erroneous basis that the fault is entirely with the service provider is m anifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. Also, the payment of such penalty to a consumer who may himself be at fault, and which gives an unjustifiable windfall to such consumer, is also manif estly arbitrary and unreasonable. In the circumstances, i t is not necessary to go into the appellants’ submissions that call drops take place because of four reasons, three of which are not attributable to the fault of the service provider, which i ncludes sealing and shutting down towers by municipal autho rities over which they have no control, or whether they ar e attributable to only two causes, as suggested by the Attor ney General, being network-related causes or user-related caus es. Equally, it is not necessary to determine finally as to whethe r the reason for a call drop can technologically be found o ut and whether it is a network-related reason or a user-rela ted reason. XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX 66. The reason given in the Explanatory Memorandum for compensating the consumer is that the compensation given is only notional. The very notion that only notional compensation is awarded, is also entirely without basis. A consume r may well suffer a call drop after 3 or 4 seconds in a voic e call. Whereas the consumer is charged only 4 or 5 paise for su ch dropped call, the service provider has to pay a sum of rup ee one to the said consumer. DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.] This cannot be called notional at all. It is also not clear as to why the Authority decided to limit compensation to three call drops per day or how it arrived at the figure of Re 1 to compensate inconvenience caused to the consumer. It is equally unclear as to why the calling party alone is provid ed compensation because, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, inconvenience is suffered due to the interruption of a call, and such inconvenience is s uffered both by the calling party and the person who receiv es the call. The receiving party can legitimately claim th at his inconvenience when a call drops, is as great as that of the calling party. And the receiving party may need to make the second call, in which case he receives nothing, and the calling party receives Re 1 for the additional expense made by the receiving party. All this betrays a complete lack of int elligent care and deliberation in framing such a regulation by the Authority, rendering the impugned Regulation manife stly arbitrary and unreasonable.” 90. In the present case, the State of Maharashtra has not shown any material or file containing the reasons behind th e directive of 14.11.2017. It is not in dispute that the direction was consequential to, and solely based on the directions of the NGT in Para 17(e). As noticed earlier, those directions were not based on any scientific evidence or report of any technical expert. Furthermore, even t he impugned notification does not specify what constitutes “hills”, and how they can be applied in towns and communities set in undulating areas and hilly terrain. This is not only vague, but makes the directions arbitrary as they can be applied at will by the concerned authorities. More import antly, they amount to a blanket change of all regional and development plans. While such directions can be issued, if situations so warrant, such as in extraordinary or emergent circumstances, the complete absence of any reasons why the state issued them, coupled with the lack of any supporting expert report or input, renders it an arbitrary exercise . That they are based only on the NGT’s orders, only underlines the lack of any application of mind on the part of the State, while issuing them. 91. For the above reasons, we hold that the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court cannot be sustained; it is set aside. Consequently, the directions in the notification under Section 154 (dated 14.11.2017) are hereby quashed. 1131 92. In view of the above discussions, CA 6932/2015 and CA 5971/ 2019 are hereby disposed of in terms of the directions in this judgment. The other appeals by special leave by third parties, against the NGT’s order, and the order of the NGT, are partly allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order on costs. Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of. DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWA YS AUTH. OF INDIA v. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH [S. RAVINDRA B HAT, J.]