Surinder Singh v. State (union Territory of Chandigarh)
SURYA KANT, J.
1. Appellant–Surinder Singh has laid challenge to the judgement
dated 19th May 2010 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, whereby,
the order of his conviction and sentence dated 25th July 2006 passed by
Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh was confirmed. The
Appellant has been convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter ‘IPC’) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 19 59
1067
(hereinafter, ‘Arms Act’), and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 3
years for both the offences, with a direction that sentence s will run
concurrently.
FACTS:
2. The prosecution case in brief is that, on 10th July 1999, Mansur
Ali, Advocate (Complainant) was sitting at his residential office along
with his clerk Maler Singh (PW-3), giving dictation to his steno, R.K.
Sood (PW-4). At about 5:30 PM, the Appellant, who was then a Hea d
Constable in Chandigarh Police, entered the residential office of the
Complainant in an inebriated condition and stating that he was a beat
officer of the lane, asked for a glass of water. He thereaf ter sat across
the Complainant and after consuming the water served to him by Balbir
Singh (PW-5), pulled out his service pistol and threatened the Complainant
by pointing the pistol at him and stated that “there are 10 bullets in this
gun and I will kill 10 people today ”. Appellant also asked the
Complainant to stand and raise his hands. At the same time, he directed
Maler Singh and R.K. Sood to step outside the office, to which they
complied. In the meantime, the Appellant moved around the table, towards
the Complainant, pulled the lever and made himself ready to fire. Sensing
the seriousness of the situation, Complainant lunged at the Appellant and
pushed his hand towards the ceiling, which resulted in the bullet, fired
from the pistol, hitting the ceiling of the office.
3. The Appellant then attempted to fire a second time, however,
he was unable to and in the said exercise a bullet fell from his pistol. By
that time, the ladies of the house had entered the office and r aised a
holler. Panic-stricken, Appellant rushed out of the office, leaving behind
his wireless set on the table of the Complainant and his scooter outside
the house. No injury was caused to the Complainant. The incident was
then reported to the police. Upon receiving the information, about 10-15
minutes later, police officials arrived at the house of th e Complainant
and F.I.R. was lodged against the Appellant, whereafter, t he police
officials sprang into action and the Appellant was arrested by SI Ramesh
Chand (PW-6), who found the Appellant near the Masjid of Sector 20-
A, with the pistol still in his hand. Appellant was then taken for medical
examination where he refused to give his urine or blood samples.
4. The investigation ensued in light of the above-stated facts, and
upon collection of substantial evidence, the charge sheet was filed against
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
the Appellant. The case was committed to the Additional Sessions Judge,
Chandigarh, and charges under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the
Arms Act were framed. The Appellant abjured his culpability and claimed
trial.
5. In the eventual trial, a total of 14 witnesses were examined by
the Prosecution and 3 witnesses were led by the Defense. The c ase of
the Prosecution relied heavily on the testimonies of the eye- witnesses
present at the site of the incidence, including the Complainant (PW- 2)
who in his deposition stood by the version of events as stated by him in
the F.I.R. The Complainant deposed candidly and admitted that had the
Appellant not come near him and shot while being seated, he would not
have been able to stop the Appellant. Complainant also c ategorically
stated that while moving towards him the Appellant brought the pistol in
firing mode by pulling the lever and aiming at his face, which made him
realize the gravity of the situation. Likewise, R.K . Sood (PW-4)
corroborated the deposition of the Complainant and st ated that he
witnessed the shot being fired by the Appellant through the mesh wired
door, while standing in the veranda, right outside the office. Maler Singh
(PW-3), though denied having seen the shot being fired, attested to the
presence of the Appellant in a drunk state and to have hea rd the shot
having been fired while he was in the veranda along with PW-4.
6. Dr. Bidhi Chand (PW-7), examined the Appellant at 7:20 PM
on the day of the incident, after his arrest by S.I. Ramesh Chand ( PW-
6). This witness acknowledged the Medico-Legal Report dated 10th July
1999 (Ex J MLR), and deposed that upon medical examination, the
Appellant was found under the influence of Alcohol.
7. The Statement of Mr. B. Badaniya (PW-13) also bears some
importance. This witness in his examination before the Court, relying on
the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (in short ‘CFSL’) Report (Ex.
PW-13/A), deposed that the empty cartridge found at the resid ential
office of the Complainant, upon forensic examination, was proved to
have been fired from the pistol used by the Appellant. In his cross-
examination, PW-13 testified as to the manner in which semi-automatic
or semi-loader guns, such as the weapon used by the Appellant, function.
8. On the contrary, the Appellant raised a plea claiming an alternate
version of events under his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement. He claimed
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that he was on visiting terms with the Complainant and on the day of the
incidence, he was routinely visiting the house of the Complai nant. He
kept the gun along with his wireless set on the table and unbeknownst to
him, the Complainant picked up the weapon and accidentally fired. He
further asserted that the Complainant had lodged a false version of events
to save himself of any criminal liability. Mukesh Mittal ( DW-1) also
supported the case of the Appellant, claiming that the Complainant had
himself told DW-1 right after the occurrence that he had accidentally
fired from the weapon. The Trial Court found the version of ev ents
contended by the Appellant dubious. As far as DW-1 is concerned, during
his cross-examination, he was unable to substantiate how or w hy he
was present near the house of the Appellant at the time of the event, and
thereby failed to inspire confidence.
9. Since there is no dispute regarding the presence of the Appellant
at the residential office of the Complainant at the time of the incidence,
or that the bullet was fired from his service pistol, the pivotal question
before the Trial Court was, whether the Appellant fired the pistol, and, if
so, was the weapon used with the intent to kill the Complaina nt. The
Trial Court observed that the prosecution witnesses had, by a nd large,
supported the prosecution version and that no reason was adduced t o
depict why the Complainant would want to falsely implicate the Appellant.
Although the Trial Court noted that there were some inconsistencies in
the statements put forth by the prosecution witnesses, however, the same
were held to be minor contradictions brought about naturally due to the
passage of time. The Court found version of the Defense to be “a patch
of lies and figment of imagination ”, and rejected the same in its
entirety.
10. As far as the charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act was
concerned, the Trial Court observed that the Appellant had used his
service pistol without any prior permission and for an ill egal purpose.
The act of firing by the Appellant was thus held to be in contravention of
Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Trial Court therefore convi cted the
Appellant under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Ac t and
awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years.
11. Discontented with his conviction, the Appellant preferred an
appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court
upon reappraisal of the evidence, sustained convict ion and the
consequential sentence imposed by the Trial Court and dismissed the
appeal.
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
12. Aggrieved, the Appellant is now before this Court.
CONTENTIONS:
13. We have heard learned counsel(s) for the Appellant and the
Respondent-State at a considerable length and perused the record
in-depth. There are four principal contentions raised on behal f of the
Appellant. First, that there was an absence of ‘motive’ on behalf of the
Appellant to kill the Complainant. It is urged that, if either of the versions
are believed, at best, there were good relations between the parties and
at worst they were strangers, thus, the Appellant could have no motive
or desire to kill the Complainant. Second, there was an absence of intent,
which could not be imputed from the conduct of the Appellant.
14. Third, doubts were sought to be created through re-appreciation
of evidence once again, including, by depicting that the statements of the
eye-witnesses suffered from material contradictions, fatal to the case of
the prosecution and also that PW-3 to PW-5 were interested witnesses,
they being employees of the Complainant. And, that as agains t it, the
version of the Appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was
the correct chronicle of events and was more probable than the narrative
of the prosecution. Fourth and finally, it was argued that the conviction
under Section 27 of the Arms Act was not sustainable as t he weapon
used by the Appellant was licensed and misuse of a licensed weapon is
not a mischief under Section 5 of the Arms Act.
15. Learned State Counsel, on the other hand, reminded us of the
scope of interference by this Court in a case of concurrent fi nding of
fact and canvassed that no substantial question of law is involved in this
appeal.
ANALYSIS:
16. Having given our thoughtful consideration to th e rival
contentions, we find that the following two questio ns fall for our
consideration:
A. Whether the High Court erred in maintaining the conviction
of the Appellant under Section 307 IPC?
B. Whether conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of
the Arms Act is sustainable?
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17. It may be highlighted at the outset that although there ar e
spacious powers vested under Article 136 of the Con stitution,
nevertheless, while imploring such powers in a criminal appeal by special
leave, this Court would ordinarily abstain from entering into a fresh re-
appraisement of evidence and doubt the credibility of witnes ses when
there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for cer tain exceptional
circumstances. Notwithstanding thereto and in the interest of j ustice,
we have endeavoured to peruse and discuss the entire evidence on record
to ascertain whether or not the concurrent finding of conviction suffers
from any perversity and/or whether the conviction of the Appell ant is
legally and factually sustainable.
A. Whether the guilt of the Appellant under Section 307
IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt?
18. Before we advert to the factual matrix or gauge the
trustworthiness of the witnesses, it will be beneficial to brace ourselves
of the case-law qua the essential conditions, requisite for bringing home
a conviction under Section 307 IPC. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs.
Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr.1, this Court, while re-appreciating the true
import of Section 307 IPC held as follows:
“12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential
that bodily injury capable of causing death should have bee n
inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually cause d may
often give considerable assistance in coming to a fin ding as
to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be
deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some
cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual
wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of
the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be
attended by any result so far as the person assault ed is
concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit
would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the
injury actually caused to the victim of the assault sh ould be
sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause th e death
of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether
the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention
or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in t he
section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the
1 (2005) 5 SCC 554
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an
intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if
there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.It is not essential that bodily injury c apable
of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes
a distinction between the act of the accused and its re sult, if
any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespecti ve of its
result, was done with the intention or knowledge and und er
circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused
charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted mere ly
because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature
of a simple hurt.”
(Emphasis Applied)
19. These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the
later decisions, including in State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors.2, Jage
Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana 3 and State of M.P. vs. Kanha @
Om Prakash 4.
20. It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting
an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a Court
must consider, first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on
the part of accused to cause death of the victim, and, second, such
intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in execution
thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any
injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may deduce such intent
from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances of the
offence, including the nature of weapon used or the nature of injury, if
any. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more
than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not nece ssary that a
victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting
Section 307 IPC.
21. It would also be fruitful at this stage, to appraise whether the
requirement of ‘motive’ is indispensable for proving the charge of attempt
to murder under Section 307 IPC.
2 (2009) 4 SCC 26
3 (2015) 11 SCC 366
4 (2019) 3 SCC 605
1073
22. It is significant to note that ‘motive’ is distinct fr om ‘object
and means’ which innervates or provokes an action. Unlike ‘intention’,
‘motive’ is not the yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive
would not constitute an offence but it may not be true when an unlawful
act is committed with best of the motive. Unearthing ‘motive’ is akin to
an exercise of manual brain-mapping. At times, it becomes herculean
task to ascertain the traces of a ‘motive’.
23. This Court has time and again ruled:
“that in case the prosecution is not able to discov er an
impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibi lity of
a witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to
motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases whol ly
dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence wou ld
form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial e vidence
in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there
are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a
motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthe n the
prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion.
But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the
evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy.”
[See: Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra 5 and Bipin
Kumar Mondal vs. State of West Bengal 6]
24. We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is
infallibly a crucial factor, and is a substantial ai d for evincing the
commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not such
a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to the case
of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point towards the
guilt of the accused and testaments of eye-witnesses to the occu rrence
of a malfeasance are on record.
25. Applying these broad parameters to the facts an d
circumstances of the case in hand, we find the plea raised by the Appellant
devoid of any merit. The prosecution no doubt has failed to attribute any
motive to the Appellant for yearning to kill the Complainant, however, as
noted above, the absence of motive alone cannot abjure the guilt of the
Appellant. We are one with the concurrent findings of the two Cour ts
5 (1973) 3 SCC 219
6 (2010) 12 SCC 91
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
that the conduct of the Appellant is sufficient to surmise that his action
was intended to eliminate the Complainant, and that his conviction under
Section 307 IPC is fully justified.
26. We say so for the following reasons:
Firstly, neither the presence of the Appellant at the site of the
episode, nor the fact that the bullet was fired through his service pistol is
disputed by the Appellant. Even otherwise, the CFSL Report dated 15th
September 1999 (Ex-PW 13/A), prepared by Mr. B. Badaniya (PW-13)
proves that the cartridge recovered from the office of the Complainant
was fired from the service pistol recovered from the posses sion of the
Appellant;
Secondly , the Medico-Legal Report (Ex. J MLR) and the
testimony of Dr. Bidhi Chand (PW-7) corroborate with the ocular versions
of the Complainant (PW-2), Maler Singh (PW-3) and R.K. Sood (PW-
4), all of whom have sworn in their respective depositio ns that the
Appellant was in an inebriated condition when he entered the residential
office of the Complainant;
Thirdly, both the Complainant and R.K. Sood (PW-4) have
categorically testified to the effect that after cons uming water, the
Appellant pulled out his pistol and aimed the same at the Complainant,
whereafter, he directed Maler Singh and R.K. Sood to get out of the
room;
Fourthly, we also bear in mind that the offending weapon was a
semi-loader/semi-automatic pistol which was specifically pulled out of
the cover and aimed at the Complainant. Mr. B. Badaniya (PW-13) in
his cross-examination has categorically stated that a semi-automatic pistol
must be brought into firing mode by pulling back the frame of the weapon
manually for the first time, to enable a bullet to be fired. Further, both the
Complainant and R.K. Sood (PW-4) have unequivocally asserted tha t
the bullet was fired by the Appellant.
Fifthly, the version of the Complainant, that had he not interfered
and caught hold of the hand of the Appellant, the gun, which was aimed
onto his face would have unloaded the bullet, resulting in unfort unate
consequences carries weight; and
Sixthly and finally, the alternate version set up by the Appellant
looks to be incredulous that he took his loaded pistol out of the c over,
1075
placed it on the table of the Complainant, and let him toy around with it
as the Complainant pleased. There is also nothing on record to support
that the Appellant made any attempt at all to bring his ve rsion to the
notice of his Superiors, as claimed by him in his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C.
27. Consequently, and for the reasons afore-stated, we find that
the Trial Court and the High Court have unerringly convicted the Appellant
for the charge under Section 307 IPC.
B. Whether the Conviction of the Appellant under Section
27 of the Arms Act is sustainable?
28. Adverting to the conviction of the Appellant under Section 27
of the Arms Act, it appears to us that the Trial Court has erred in arriving
at his culpability. There is no gainsay that in order to prove a charge
under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the prosecution must necessa rily
demonstrate contravention of either Section 5 or Section 7 of the Act. In
the instant case, although not explicitly stated, it appear s that the Trial
Court has held it to be a case of breach of Section 5 of the Arms Act,
which stipulates that no person shall use, possess, manufacture, etc. any
firearms, unless such person holds a license in this behalf, and prescribes
a minimum punishment of 3 years of imprisonment. The relevant extracts
of unamended Sections 5 and 27 of the Arms Act which were in force at
the relevant time, read as follows:
“5.Licence for manufacture, sale, etc., of arms and
ammunition. — [(1)] No person shall—
(a) use, manufacture, sell, transfer, convert, repa ir, test or
prove, or
(b) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession
for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof ,
any firearm or any other arms of such class or descrip tion as
may be prescribed or any ammunition, unless he holds in this
behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provision s of
this Act and the rules made thereunder.
[(2)] xxxx
27. Punishment for using arms, etc. —(1) Whoever uses any
arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 sh all be
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall n ot be
less than three years but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited
ammunition in contravention of section 7 shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be les s than
seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life
and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited
ammunition or does any act in contravention of section 7 and
such use or act results in the death of any other person, shall
be punishable with death.”
29. True it is that prior to the amendment of Section 27 of the
Arms Act, vide Arms (Amendment) Act 1988, the said provision
penalized the use of any arms and ammunitions for any ‘unlawful purpose’.
However, post its amendment, Section 27 of the Arms Act is strictly
confined to violation of conditions mentioned either under Section 5 or 7
of the Arms Act and the ‘unlawful purpose’ of using arms and
ammunitions is no longer an inseparable component of the delinquency.
30. The Appellant was admittedly a police official at the time of
the incidence and the arms and ammunitions used for the commission of
the offence, were placed in his possession under the sanction accorded
by the Competent Authority. The Appellant being in authorised possession
of the weapon, cannot be said to have used an unlicensed weap on, as
prohibited under Section 5 of the Arms Act. It appears tha t the Trial
Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations such as illegal use of the
weapon, and lost track of the objective of the Statute, which ha s been
enacted to provide a licensing/regulatory regime, to enable law-abiding
citizens to carry arms, and also to prohibit the possession, acquisitio n,
manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms, unless authorized by
the Central Government. In other words, illegal use of a l icensed or
sanctioned weapon per se does not constitute an offence under Section
27, without proving the misdemeanour under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms
Act. At best, it could be a ‘misconduct’ under the service rules, the
determination of which was not the subject of the trial.
31. In light of the afore-stated discussion, we find that the order
of the Trial Court in convicting the Appellant or of the Hig h Court in
1077
maintaining such conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, is
unwarranted and unjust. Accordingly, the Appellant is acquitted of the
charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
Quantum of Sentence under Section 307 IPC
32. The equality of ratio between two sets of variables is now
well known as the doctrine of proportionality. The bedrock of sentencing
policy in our criminal justice system is also based on t he axiom of
proportionality. This principle of commensurate sent encing treats
offenders as agents capable of evaluating their own illegal conduct and
the social censure associated with it, which is communicated to them by
imposing a proportionate sentence. 7 The exercise for assessing
‘proportionality’ is thus dependent upon the gravity of the offence which
is determined according to - (a) mischief caused or risk involved in the
offense; (b) the overall conduct of the offender and; (c) motives ascribed
to the felon. Further, the equality of treatment so as to eliminate
discriminatory practices in the award of sentencing, is i ntegral to the
canons of proportionality. Needless to say, the guar antee of even-
handedness before the law(s), as enshrined in Artic le 14 of our
Constitution, encompasses the administration of criminal justice system
as well.
33. Having said that, we cannot be incognizant of the fact tha t
there are practical difficulties in achieving absolute consistency in regards
to sentencing. It must be candidly acknowledged that there is an element
of discretion present while adjudicating the issue of sentence, however,
the same cannot be exercised in an unprincipled manner. This Court has
explicitly ruled out the practice of awarding disproportionate sentences,
especially those that showcase undue leniency, for it would undermine
the public confidence in efficacy of law.
34. The sentencing policy, therefore, keeps pace with changi ng
time. Undoubtedly, the primary emphasis while deciding the quantum of
sentence should lie on the gravity or penal value of the offense. However,
other guiding elements of rehabilitative justice mo del, including,
appreciation of grounds for mitigation of sentence also deserv e to be
duly considered within the permissible limits of judicial discretion. The
awarding of just and proportionate sentence remains the solemn duty of
7Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edition, Cambridge University
Press 2010)
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]
the Courts and they should not be swayed by non-relevant factors while
deciding the quantum of sentence. Naturally, what factors should b e
considered as ‘relevant’ or ‘non-relevant’ will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and no straight jacket formula ca n be laid
down for the same.
35. Adverting to the facts of the case, in hand, we are of the
considered view that at this stage, the sentence awarded to the appellant
is no longer in degree to the crime which he has committed. Remitting
the Appellant to the rigors of imprisonment at this juncture of his life
would not serve the ends of justice due to following mitigating factors:
a. No motive or element of planning has been proved by the
Prosecution in the present case which indicates the
possibility that the offense could have been committed on
impulse by the Appellant. Hence, the culpability of the
offender in such situations is less than that which is ascribed
in premeditated offenses as the commission of planned
illegal acts denotes an attack on societal values with greater
commitment and continuity in comparison to spontaneous
illegal acts.
b. Even though the factum of injury may not have a direct
bearing on a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the same
may be considered by a Court at the time of sentencing.
No doubt, the offence committed by the Appellant squarely
falls within the four corners of Section 307 IPC, b ut
fortunately neither the complainant nor any other person
was hurt by the untoward act of the Appellant.
c. Appellant has already undergone a sentence of 3 months
and 19 days. Additionally, despite the occurrence taking
place in 1999, there is no indication that Appellant has been
involved in any untoward activity before or after the incident.
This highlights the Appellant’s good character and indicates
that the incident can be interpreted as an isolated lapse of
judgment. Further, the Appellant’s clean post-inciden t
behaviour suggests that he is rational individual who is
capable of responding to the social censure associated with
the offence. Hence, the passage of a long time period
coupled with a clean record, both before and after the
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incident is definitely a factor that calls for mitigation of
sentence.
d. Barring this particular incident wherein he was under the
influence of alcohol, the Appellant had an unblemished
service record with sixteen good citations in his favour. This
indicates that he was a valuable member of society than
the present criminal incident might lead one to assume. This
is not to say that courts should draw up a social balance
sheet when sentencing, but only to take these positive social
contributions as a factor for mitigation of sentence.
e. Lastly, it is to be noted that the Appellant was suspended in
the year 1999 and has also been subsequently dismissed
from service in the year 2007. Hence, this should also be
considered as a reasonable factor for mitigation because
the dismissal and the consequent loss of social security
benefits such as pension, also construes as a form of social
sanction.
CONCLUSION:
36. Consequently and for the afore-stated reasons, the crimi nal
appeal is partly allowed. While the conviction and sentence awarded to
the Appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act is set aside, his conviction
under Section 307 IPC is maintained. The sentence under Section 307
IPC is however reduced to the period already undergone. Since, Appellant
is on bail, his bail bonds are discharged.
Divya Pandey Appeal partly allowed.
SURINDER SINGH v. STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF
CHANDIGARH) [SURYA KANT, J.]