Padam Nabh & Sons v. Yash Pal

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. 1. This appeal arising out of an order of eviction pass ed by the Rent Controller, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar, Nawanshah r, under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and confirmed on revision by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, raises an interesting question as to whether a Non-Resident Indian who purchases a building to which the Act applies, subsequent to the induction 547 of the tenant, will be entitled to invoke the summary jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B or not. 2. We have heard Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Pardeep Gupta, learne d counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. Admittedly one Shri Padam Nabh, who was the father of the proprietor/partner of the appellant-concern, was inducted as a tenant in respect of a non residential building measuring about 12’ x 12’, situate at the Old Grain Market Nawanshahar. The induction of Shri Padam Nabh as a tenant, was by one Sat Prakash. 4. Claiming (i) that the original owner Sat Prakash sold the premises in question to his father Brij Lal under a sale deed dated 6.2.1989; (ii) that the property devolved upon him and his brother after the demise of his father in the year 1991 through testamentary succession; (iii) that he went to Australia in March-1996 and returned to India on 4.02.2004; and (iv) that he required the tenanted premises for establi shing a departmental store, the respondent filed a petition for evict ion under Section 13-B of the Act. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller by an Order dated 19.01.2010. 5. Challenging the order of the eviction passed by the le arned Rent Controller, the appellant filed a revision before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The revision having been dismissed by the High Court, the tenant is on appeal before us. 6. The main contention of Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the issue raised by the appellant is no longer res integra, but covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta 1. However, the High Court, in the impugned order, chose to follow the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Smt. Bachan Kaur vs. Kabal Singh 2, which distinguished the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi Devi (supra). Therefore, it is contended by Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel that the impugned order of the High Court requires to be interfered with, by this Court, in the light of the law dec lared by the Constitution Bench while interpreting an identical provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “ Delhi Act ”). 1 (2005) 2 SCC 271 2 2011(1) RCR (Rent) 368 PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] 7. Since Nathi Devi (supra) was concerned with the interpretation of Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and since we are concerned in this case with the interpretation of Section 13 -B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, we think it woul d be appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of both the enactments in a tabular column for better appreciation. 549 PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] 8. In Nathi Devi, eviction was sought under Section 14-D of the Delhi Act by a widow landlady. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction summarily and High Court confirmed the same. In the special lea ve petition filed by the tenant, the decision of this Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra vs Union of India & Anr. 3 was relied upon in support of the contention that a landlady who acquired the tenanted premises by way of transfer, could not avail the remedy under Section 14-D for the eviction of a pre-existing tenant. However, the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court before whom Nathi Devi (supra) first came up, doubted the correctness of the decision in S.Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) and, hence, directed the special leave petition to be placed before a three Member Bench. The three Member Bench noticed the conflict between the S. Surjit Singh Kalra and Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak 4. The conflict was with respect to the interpretation of the words “ let out ” appearing in the relevant provision. Due to this conflict, Nathi Devi was referred to the Constitution Bench by an order reported in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta 5. The short order of reference reads as follows: “Specifically the issue is in relation to the meani ng of the words” let out”. Do they mean the creation of a fresh tenan cy or do they refer to an existing tenancy? If the for mer, the section can be resorted to only by the creator of the tenancy (widow or her late husband). If it is the latter, even a transferee (widow) is entitled to invoke it. We find that ther e is some conflict in the views taken by two Benches of three learned Judges each. An observation in the judgment in Surjit Si ngh Kalra v. Union of India suggests that the words “le t out” refer only to the creation of a tenancy. On the other hand, the judgment in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak interprets the wo rds “let out” in the context of Section 14-D of the Act to mean that even a transferee landlord can invoke the provis ion. It is, in these circumstances, necessary that this appea l should be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges. It shal l be so placed after obtaining the directions of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India in this regard.” 9. The Constitution Bench, after referring to the provisions of Sections 14B to 14D as well as Section 14(6) of the Delhi Act held (i) 3 (1991) 2 SCC 87 4 (1977) 2 SCC 814 5 (2000) 9 SCC 249 551 that these provisions carve out an exception to the normal procedure for eviction; (ii) that being in the nature of exception, they must be construed strictly and (iii) that the words “let out by him” or “ let out by her” clearly signify that the premises let out by any other person will stand excluded from the operation of the summary procedure. Paragraphs 28 and 32 of the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi Devi (supra) are extracted as follows, as the entire argument of the petitioners, revolves around the same: “28. The observations in the aforesaid judgments no doubt support the case of the appellant. This Court did cle arly lay down that the expression, “the premises let out by h im” in Section 14-B of the Act did mean that it is he who has let out alone could evict, and in case the landlord had been killed in action his dependent could seek immediate eviction of the premises let out by such person. It is noticeable t hat the expression, “premises let out by him” is used inSection s 14-B and14-C, but the expression, in Section 14-D is “premises le t out by her, or by her husband.”Section 14-B contemp lates two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired person from any armed forces and secondly, where he was killed in action. In case the landlord was killed in action a right has been given to his dependant within one year of t he death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recoverin g the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confe rs a right on a retired employee of the Central Governme nt or of the Delhi Administration who requires the premises let out by him for his own residence. Section 14-D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possessio n of the premises let out “by her, or by her husband”. The scheme of these Sections appears to be that where the land lord is alive and the premises have been let out by him, only he can make an application for immediate possession of the premis es for his own use. Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, and his widow under Section 14-D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the expression, “let out by him” in Sections 14-B and 14 -C and the expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” in Section 14-D have significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises, PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] the legislature would not have used the term “let out by him ” or “let out by her, or by her husband”. In interpre ting a provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. Section 14-D gives a righ t to file an application under that provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises . Consequently, if the premises had been let out by s omeone else, Section 14-D will not apply. As pointed out in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression used in Section 14-B i s “the premises let out by him”, unlike the expression used in Se ction 14 (1)(e) where the legislature employed the expressi on “the premises let out for residential purposes”. Thus in the ca se of a landlord belonging to the general category it was immaterial whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else , as long as he was the landlord of the premises at the time of making an application seeking eviction of the tenant. But the expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” con veys a different meaning altogether. The widow’s right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her or by her husband, and not by a nyone else. It appears to us that the legislature has pur posely employed a different expression in Section 14-D as also in Section 14-B and 14-C. We are here concerned wit h an application filed under Section 14-D which specifies in c lear terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premis es. If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expressi on, “the premises let out by him” has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and t he lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself let out the premises, the legislature would not have then use d the expression “let out by her, or by her husband.” The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her husband im plies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. If the intention of the legislatu re was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the words “the premises let out by her, or by her husband” w ould have been unnecessary and the Section would have si mply read as follows:- 553 “Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are required by her for her own residence, she may apply t o the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.” By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has c learly excluded from the purview of the said provision “premise s let out by any other person” even if in course of time the wid ow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to rea d the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. T he expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, there fore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclus ion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow wh o let the premises or whose husband had let the premises befo re his death, and which premises the widow requires for her o wn use. “32. There is another aspect of the matter. Section 14-D uses the expression, “premises let out by her, or by her hu sband” which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immedia te possession of “such premises”. “Such premises” obviously i s relatable to the premises let out her or by her hus band. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefor e, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appel lant that Section 14-D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have pro vided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, “let out b y her or by her husband” and “such premises” in Section 1 4- D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14-D namel y, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, i n our PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] view, Section 14-D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a pre existing tenant.” 10. But it is difficult to accept the contention that Nathi Devi which interpreted Section 14-D of the Delhi Act, would apply with equal force to the interpretation of Section 13-B of the East Pun jab Urban Rent Restriction Act. There are several distinguishing features between the Delhi Act and the Punjab Act. Even before we take not e of the distinguishing features, we must keep in mind the fact that the shortage of housing and the exploitation of tenants by landlords in the urban areas, in the aftermath of the world wars, led to the enactment of rent control legislations in the country. The problems created by the post war conditions differed from State to State and hence, the solution sought to be offered in the form of legislation also differed from State to State. As a matter of fact the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is an offshoot of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 and the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, both of which are pre-indepe ndent and pre-partition legislation. On the contrary, the Delhi Act of 1958 is an offshoot of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The areas to which these acts applied had their own peculiar geographical features and socio-economic conditions. This is why the language employed in these rent control legislations differ, though they may have a common template. 11. Coming to the distinguishing features between the Delhi Act and the East Punjab Act, it may be seen immediately that the Delhi Act covers four categories of persons, namely, (i) a landlord in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and who is required to vacate such residential accommodation; (ii) a landlord, released or retired from armed forces or a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action, including a member of the armed forces who is due t o retire within one year; (iii) a landlord who is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration; and (iv) a widow. But under the Punjab Act, the right to seek immediate possession is conferred in favour of only two categories of persons, namel y, (i) a specified landlord, meaning thereby a person entitled to receive rent in respect of a building 555 on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in a connection with the affairs of the union or of a State; and (ii) an owner who is a non resident Indian and who returns to India. 12. While Section 13-A of the East Punjab Act was insert ed by amending Act 2 of 1985, Section 13-B was inserted by Punjab Act 9 of 2001. Delhi Act does not contain any special provision for the benefit of NRI landlords. It is common knowledge that the major chunk of the NRI diaspora is from three states, namely, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Therefore, the legislature thought fit to exempt buildings owned by NRIs from the rigors of the Rent Restriction Act. Hence, the normal rule of interpretation of a legislation for the welfare of the tenants, will give way while interpreting the provisions as applicable to the exempted categories. 13. It may be of interest to note that while carving out an exception in favour of four categories of persons, under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14- C and 14-D, the Delhi Act used only the word “landlord” . But the Punjab Act uses the word “specified landlord ” under Section 13-A and the word “owner” in Section 13-B. It is needless to mention that there is a world of difference between the expression “landlord” and the expression “owner”. While the owner of a premises may also be the landlord of the premises, a landlord, within the mea ning of the expression under the Rent Control legislations, need not necessarily be the owner of the said premises. Therefore, while interpretin g Section 13-B of the Punjab Act, the Court must keep in mind the di stinction between those two expressions. 14. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B which curtails the right of the owner to invoke this provision for a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner, makes it clear that the words “ let out by him” require a different interpretation . 15. If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta on the basis of the decision in Nathi Dev i (supra) is accepted, a NRI who is the owner of the building will be required to satisfy two c onditions, namely, (i) that the premises was let out by him; and (ii ) that a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner has elapsed. The proviso to Sub-section (1) cannot be construed as imposing a condition additional to the one prescribed in Sub-Section (1). The corre ct method of interpreting Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B and the proviso thereunder PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.] is to hold that irrespective of the person by whom the tenant was inducted, a NRI owner will have to wait for a period of five years from the date of becoming the owner, to be entitled to invoke Section 13-B. 16. We must also keep in mind the distinction between (i) inception of tenancy or induction of a person as a tenant; and (ii) letting out a premises on lease. Section 13-B(1) does not use the expression “inducted by him or her ”. If these words had been used, they would certainly refer to the inception of the tenancy. Section 13(B)(1) uses the expression “let out”. 17. Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 declares that a leasing of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year (in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary). It al so says that a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month. Therefore, if a NRI becomes the owner of the building to which the Act applies and the tenancy of a person in occupation is attorned in his favour, the premises would be come a premises let out by him, as otherwise the jural relationship of landlord and tenant will not come into existence. Once a NRI acquires a premises which is in the occupation of a tenant inducted by his predeces sor in title, he becomes the owner. The moment the tenancy is attorned in his favour, then the jural relationship of tenant landlord is created and the premises become one let out by him. It is perhaps with a view to highlight this aspect that the legislature has carefully used the expression “owner ” in Section 13-B, even while using the expression “landlord” in other places. 18. Therefore, the decision of the Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi (supra) as applicable to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Act cannot be pressed into service for interpreting Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Hence, we find that the order of the High Court impugned in the present appeal is perfectly valid and does not call for any interference. Therefore the appeal is dismissed. 19. However the tenant is granted six months’ time to vacate the premises, provided the usual undertaking is furnished within a period of two weeks. There will be no order as to costs. Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.