Ravinder Nath Agarwal v. Yogender Nath Agarwal & Ors.
JUDGMENT
1. While Transfer Petition (C) No.970 of 2016 is for the transfer
of a suit for partition, pending on the file of the Additional District Judge,
Saket Court, New Delhi to a Court of competent jurisdiction in the District
of Nainital, Uttarakhand, Transfer Petition (C) No.2779 of 2019 is for
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the transfer of a testamentary case pending on the file of the High Court
of Uttarakhand, Nainital to the District Court at Saket, New Delhi.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parti es.
3. One Shri Badri Nath Agarwal, who was ordinarily a resident of
Village Bithoriya No.1, Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital, Uttarakhand,
died on 07.05.2011, at the ripe old age of 91 years, leaving behind him
surviving, five sons and a daughter. They were (1) Major Ravinder Nath
Agarwal, (2) Surender Nath, (3) Narender Nath, (4) Vir ender Nath
Agarwal, (5) Lily Nath (daughter) and (6) Yogender Nath Agarwal. Out
of these six children, Shri Narender Nath is now no more. He died on
06.09.2019 leaving behind his wife Smt. Ira Joshi and two sons by name
Nikhil Nath and Aditya Nath.
4. Claiming that his father Late Badri Nath executed his last Will
and Testament on 06.04.2011, cancelling and revoking his previous Will
dated 26.06.2005 and that under the last Will dated 06.04.2011, a vast
extent of agricultural land in Village Bithoriya No.1, Tehsil Haldwani,
District Nainital, was bequeathed to him, the eldest son Major Ravinder
Nath Agarwal got mutation effected in his favour in the revenue records,
but the same became the subject matter of a writ petit ion filed by Lily
Nath on the file of the High Court of Uttarakhand. Apart from fi ling a
writ petition challenging the mutation effected in favour of her eldest
brother, Lily Nath also filed a civil suit in Suit No.57 of 2011 on the file of
Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nainital seeking a decree of per manent
injunction. As a counter blast, Major Ravinder Nath, who claims to be
the legatee under the Will and who got mutation effected in his favour in
respect of one property, also filed civil suit in Suit No.72 of 2011 on the
file of the Civil Judge, Senior Division seeking a decree of permanent
injunction.
5. Thereafter the last son Shri Yogender Nath, filed a suit in C.S
No.2745 of 2012 on the file of High Court of Delhi, for a partition of all
the properties left behind by Shri Badri Nath. The suit wa s filed in
September-2012. But in the year 2016, presumably after the filing of the
written statements, the said suit was transferred to the file of the Additional
District Judge, Saket Court, New Delhi and re-numbered as C.S No.126
of 2016.
6. Immediately thereafter, Major Ravinder Nath Agarwal filed
the first of these transfer petitions namely T.P (C) No. 970 of 2016,
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
seeking the transfer of the partition suit pending on the file of the
Additional District Judge, Saket, New Delhi to the Court of District Judge
at Nainital, Uttarakhand. On 08.07.2016, this Court ordered notice in the
transfer petition and also granted stay of further proceedin gs in the
partition suit.
7. But a few days before this Court ordered notice and granted
stay, the plaintiff in the partition suit namely Sh. Yogender Na th (last
son) abandoned the suit and hence the only daughter Lily Nath got herself
transposed as the plaintiff, by moving an application under Order XXIII
Rule 1-A. The original plaintiff Yogender Nath was t ransposed as
defendant No.5.
8. On 09.10.2018, this Court passed an order in T.P (C) No. 970
of 2016, vacating the stay of further proceedings in the parti tion suit
earlier granted on 08.07.2016. Thereafter the eldest son Major Ravinder
Nath filed a petition in Testamentary Case No.01 of 2019 on the file of
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, seeking the grant of letters of
administration with the Will dated 06.04.2011 annexed thereto, under
Section 276 read with Sections 250 and 273(b) of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925. Upon receipt of summons in the said testamentary case, the
daughter Lily Nath came up with the second transfer petition namely
T.P (C) No.2779 of 2019, praying for the transfer of the testam entary
case from Uttarakhand High Court to the District Court, Sake t, New
Delhi where her partition suit is now pending, so that both could be tried
together.
9. Thus, I have on hand two transfer petitions, one of the ye ar
2016, filed by the eldest son seeking a transfer of the partition suit from
the District Court, Saket, New Delhi to the District Cour t, Nainital,
Uttarakhand and another of the year 2019 filed by the plaintiff in the
partition suit seeking the transfer of the testamentary c ase pending on
the file of the High Court of Uttarakhand to the District Court at Saket,
to be tried together with her partition suit. Since the e ldest son Major
Ravinder Nath, is the petitioner in the first transfer p etition, he shall
hereinafter be referred to as “the petitioner” and Ms. Lily Nath shall be
referred to as “the contesting respondent”.
10. Before I proceed further, it should be brought on record that
the earliest of the civil suits namely C.S No.57 of 2011 filed b y the
daughter Lily Nath for a decree of permanent injunction, on the file of
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the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nainital was dismisse d for non-
prosecution on 27.11.2015. However, the second suit in C.S No.72 of
2011 filed by Major Ravinder Nath, seeking a decree of per manent
injunction is still pending on the file of the Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Nainital. I am not concerned with this civil suit, as it is not the subject
matter of any transfer petition.
11. The short question that arises for consideration in these transfer
petitions, is as to whether the partition suit pending on t he file of the
District Court at Saket, New Delhi from the year 2016 (instit uted in
2012), should be transferred to the District Court, Nainital, Uttarakhand
or whether the testamentary case pending on the file of the High Court
of Uttarakhand from 2019, should be transferred to the District Court,
Saket, so that it could be tried along with the partition suit already pending
there.
12. Before I take up for consideration, the rival contentions, three
important aspects have to be borne in mind. They are:-
(i) The High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital does not ha ve
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, though it has jurisdiction to entertain a
testamentary case for the grant of probate or letters of administration.
Therefore, the partition suit pending in the District Court, Saket cannot
be transferred to the High Court of Uttarakhand, but can be transferred
only to a District Court in Nainital. The District court, Nainital will not
have jurisdiction to grant probate/letters of administration in respect of a
property located outside its territorial limits, if its value exceeds Rs.10,000/
-. Per contra, both the High Court of Delhi as well as the District Court,
Saket, have jurisdiction to entertain an application for the grant of probate/
letters of administration subject to certain conditions/restrictions;
(ii) The last Will and Testament dated 06.04.2011 set up by the
eldest son Major Ravinder Nath, covers two properties, one of which is
a MIG flat promoted by the Delhi Development Authority at Saket, New
Delhi. The other property is a bhumidhari land lying in Khat a No.741
measuring an extent of 6.8550 hectares in Village Bithoriya No.1, Tehsil
Haldwani, District Nainital, Uttarakhand, along with a residential house,
service quarters and sheds. Therefore by virtue of Section 264(1) of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925, the District Judge, Saket has jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for the grant letters of administration, at least in respect
of the property at Delhi; and
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
(iii) The partition suit was filed in the year 2012 on the file of the
High Court of Delhi and was transferred to the District Court, Saket in
the year 2016. At the time when the eldest son Major Ravinder Nath
came up with T.P (C) No.970 of 2016, no proceeding for the grant of
letters of administration was pending in the High Court of Uttarakhand.
Actually the petitioner in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 c hose to file a
testamentary case in the High Court of Uttarakhand only in Januar y
2019, after the stay of partition suit granted in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016
was vacated on 09.10.2018. Therefore it must be remembered that t he
petitioner in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 created a situation that could be
taken advantage of by him.
13. Keeping the above background in mind, let me now look at
the grounds on which the transfer of the partition suit from Delhi to
Nainital is sought. In the transfer petition T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 the
petitioner has contended :
(i) that he was 68 years of age (at that time), suffering from
many diseases and undergoing cardiac care treatment with
implanted pace maker;
(ii) that he had suffered a paralytic stroke on the right side of
the body and a blood clot in the brain;
(iii) that the respondents were already contesting the mut ation
case in Haldwani;
(iv) that three of the respondents are foreign nationals re siding
out of India;
(v) that the subject matter of the suit includes an immovab le
property situate within the jurisdiction of the competent Court
in Nainital; and
(vi) that there is a bar of jurisdiction of other Courts under Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
14. In addition to the grounds indicated in the transfer petition, it is
also contended by Sh. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior Counsel
and Sh. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner that in a petition
for transfer, the location and convenience of the parties, subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of the Courts, should also be taken into account;
that in the testamentary case, an application under Section 10 CPC was
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filed, but before the High Court of Uttarakhand could pass orders on the
application under Section 10, the second transfer petition came to be
filed; that testamentary proceedings, being proceedings in rem, will have
primacy over other proceedings and, hence, the partition suit is liable to
be transferred; and that by virtue of Proviso (b) of Section 27 3 of the
Indian Succession Act, any probate/letters of administration granted by
the District Court at Saket will not have effect in other States, unless the
value of the property and estate affected beyond the limits of the State
does not exceed Rs.10,000/-.
15. While Sh. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned Senior Counsel
cited the decisions of this Court in Ishwardeo Narain Singh vs. Smt.
Kamta Devi and Others .1 ; Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka vs. Jasjit
Singh and Others 2; T. Venkata Narayana and Others vs. Venkata
Subbamma (Smt.) (dead) & Others 3; Balbir Singh Wasu vs. Lakhbir
Singh & Others4,Sh. Manish Kumar learned Counsel relied upon Smt.
Rukmani Devi and Others vs. Narendra Lal Gupta 5.
16. In response, Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan and Sh. H.S. Sharma,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the
testamentary proceedings were initiated deliberately in Uttarakhand after
seven years of the institution of the partition suit in Delhi and that the
petitioner in the first transfer petition is guilty of abuse of the process of
Court.
17. As can be seen from the rival contentions, most of them a re
on factual foundation. However, one contention advanced on behalf of
the petitioner, is purely legal and deserves a deeper scrutiny. Therefore,
I shall take up that contention first.
18. According to the petitioner, who is eldest of the siblings and
who has set up a Will, the proceedings in a testament ary case are
proceedings in rem and that, therefore, they will have primacy and that,
irrespective of the fact that the testamentary proceedings were initiated
much after the institution of the partition suit, the partition suit and not
the testamentary case, is liable to be transferred. In s upport of these
1 AIR 1954 SC 280
2 (1993) 2 SCC 507
3 (1996) 4 SCC 457
4 (2005) 12 SCC 503
5 (1985) 1 SCC 144
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied
upon certain decisions. The first of these decisions is that of this Court in
Ishwardeo Narain Singh (supra).This Judgment is relied upon only for
the limited purpose of showing that a Court of probate is concerned only
with the question whether the document put forward as the last Will and
Testament was duly executed and attested in accordance with law a nd
whether at the time of execution, the testator was in a sound and disposing
state of mind. We are not concerned in this case with the question as to
the nature of the proceedings for probate or letters of a dministration.
Therefore, the said decision is of no assistance for deciding the question
on hand.
19. In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (supra), the primary question
that arose was as to whether an arbitrator appointed by this Court, by
consent of parties, would have jurisdiction to deal even with the
proceedings for probate. Answering the question in the negati ve, this
Court held that the probate Court alone has been conferred wit h the
exclusive jurisdiction to grant probate or letters of ad ministration and
that even by consent, the parties cannot confer jurisdicti on upon an
arbitrator to adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will. Obviously
this decision is only on the question of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal
relating to testamentary proceedings and not about the right of a party to
seek transfer of a proceeding, from one Court to another, whe n both
Courts are claimed to have jurisdiction.
20. In T. Venkata Narayana (supra), the question before this
Court was whether secondary evidence could be led, in a suit for
injunction, to prove an alleged Will. This Court held that a suit for injunction
cannot be converted into a suit for probation of a Will and that if the Will
is to be proved according to law, it has to be by way of a probate proceeding
in the Court having competency and jurisdiction acco rding to the
procedure prescribed in the Indian Succession Act. But this decisi on
does not lay down (and could not have laid down) any proposition that all
Wills executed by all classes of persons in all areas throughout the country
require probate/letters of administration, as we shall see later.
21. Balbir Singh Wasu (supra) is the only case where this Court
was concerned with the question whether the proceedings for proba te
initiated later in point of time than a suit for declaration and injunction
could proceed further or not. In this case, the party who had first filed a
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suit for declaration and injunction before the Court of a Ci vil Judge,
sought stay of the probate proceedings initiated by the opposite party in
the High Court, later in point of time, on the basis of Section 10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court rejected the prayer for stay on
the ground that the pendency of the suit for declaration will not bar the
High Court from entertaining probate proceedings. Without answering
the question revolving around section 10, CPC directly, this Court held in
Balbir Singh Wasu: (i) that a decision on the appellant’s civil suit would
not conclude the probate proceedings; (ii) that the question whether
probate should be granted or not would still be left to be determined by
the High Court, though the decision of the civil Court may be relevant
even in those proceedings; and (iii) that though the requirement of Section
213 of the Indian Succession Act, for an executor to obtain probate, may
not apply to all the areas outside the presidency towns (or the notified
areas), there is no prohibition for an executor to apply for probate as a
matter of prudence or convenience, even in cases where they are not
covered by Section 213.
22. There are two interesting aspects to the decision in Balbir
Singh (supra). They are: (i) Without deciding the question whether an
application under Section 10 CPC would lie or not, this Court transferred
the probate proceedings from the High Court to a District Court which
was competent to entertain probate proceedings and transferred the suit
for declaration also to the same Court so that both of them co uld be
clubbed and heard together. Unfortunately, this Court omitt ed to take
note of the fact that in cases where no probate is mandatorily re quired
by law, the Will could be relied upon in any civil action, even without
getting it probated. (ii)Balbir Singh followed another decision of this
court in Nirmala Devi vs. Arun Kumar Gupta6. It was a case where
probate proceedings were initiated in 1997 with respect to a Will of the
year 1984. A civil suit was already pending from 1987, but this C ourt
merely ordered the transfer of the civil suit pending on the fi le of the
sub-Judge to the Court of the District Judge where probate proceedings
were pending, so that both could be clubbed together and disposed of.
23. This Court did not consider or did not have an occasion to
consider in any of the above decisions, the difference bet ween cases
where a party is entitled to rely upon a Will in a judicial proceeding even
without getting probate/letters of administration and cases where there
6 (2005) 12 SCC 505
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
is a bar for the production of a Will in a judicial proceeding without first
getting probate/letters of administration. The primacy to be accorded to
probate proceedings would depend upon the category to which the case
belongs.
24. Having said that, let us now take a closer look at some of the
provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
25. The Indian Succession Act, 1925 is divided into 11 parts, with
some of the parts sub-divided into several chapters. Part VI of the Act
comprising of 23 Chapters, contains exhaustive provisions relating to
“Testamentary Succession”. Sections 57 to 191 of the Act are included
in this Part.
26. Part IX of the Act contains Sections 217 to 369, divided into
13 chapters. Chapter IV of Part IX contains provisions governing “the
practice in granting and revoking probates and lett ers of
administration.” Sections 264 to 302 are found in this Chapter. The
procedure for making an application for probate or for letters of
administration with the Will annexed, is provided in Section 276.
27. The District Judge is conferred with the jurisdiction to grant
and revoke probates and letters of administration in all cases within his
District, under Section 264 of the Act. Section 264 reads as follows:-
“264. Jurisdiction of District Judge in granting and rev oking
probates, etc.— (1) The District Judge shall have jurisdiction
in granting and revoking probates and letters of
administration in all cases within his district.
(2) Except in cases to which section 57 applies, no C ourt in
any local area beyond the limits of the towns of Ca lcutta,
Madras and Bombay, shall, where the deceased is a Hind u,
Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted
person, receive applications for probate or letters of
administration until the State Government has, by a
notification in the Official Gazette, authorised it so to do .”
28. It may be seen from Sub-section (2) of Section 264, that it
imposes a bar upon the Courts in any local area beyond the limits of the
towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, from receiving applications for
probate or letters of administration, until the State Government, by a
notification in the Official Gazette, authorized them so to do, wherever
895
the deceased is a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an
exempted person. But the bar under Sub-section (2) has no application
to cases, to which Section 57 applies.
29. Section 57 of the Act reads as follows:
“57. Application of certain provisions of Part to a cla ss of
Wills made by Hindus, etc.—The provisions of this Part which
are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the re strictions
and modifications specified therein, apply—
(a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Bu ddhist,
Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of Septembe r, 1870,
within the territories which at the said date were s ubject to
the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limit s
of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Cou rts
of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and
(b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside those territo ries
and limits so far as relates to immoveable property situate
within those territories or limits; [and
(c) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Bu ddhist,
Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1 927, to
which those provisions are not applied by clauses ( a) and
(b):]
Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such Wi ll or
codicil.”
30. Schedule III of the Act contains a list of provisions which are
applicable, subject to certain restrictions and modification s, to all the
Wills described in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 57.
31. The jurisdiction conferred upon the District Judge in Chapter
IV of Part IX, is also exercisable by the High Court, by virtue of the
concurrent jurisdiction conferred under Section 300. Section 300 reads
as follows:
“300. Concurrent jurisdiction of High Court.—
(1) The High Court shall have concurrent jurisdicti on with
the District Judge in the exercise of all the power s hereby
conferred upon the District Judge.
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
(2) Except in cases to which section 57 applies, no High Court,
in exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction hereby c onferred
over any local area beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutt a,
Madras and Bombay shall, where the deceased is a Hind u,
Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted
person, receive applications for probate or letters of
administration until the State Government has, by a
notification in the Official Gazette, authorised it so to do .”
The bar under sub-Section (2) of Section 264 is found also in sub-
Section (2) of Section 300.
32. Part VIII of the Act which is perhaps the smallest among the
several parts of the Act, contains two important provisions in Sections
212 and 213. They read as follows:
“212. Right to intestate’s property.— (1) No right to any part
of the property of a person who has died intestate can be
established in any Court of Justice, unless letters of
administration have first been granted by a Court of competent
jurisdiction.
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of the intestacy of
a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jaina, [Indian
Christian or Parsi].
213. Right as executor or legatee when established.— (1) No
right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court
of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in [I ndia]
has granted probate of the Will under which the rig ht is
claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the W ill
or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the Will annexe d.
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of Wills m ade by
Muhammadans [or Indian Christians], or and shall on ly
apply—
(i) in the case of Wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh
or Jaina where such Wills are of the classes specifie d
in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57; and
(ii) in the case of Wills made by any Parsi dying, afte r the
commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment)
897
Act, 1962 (16 of 1962), where such Wills are made within
the local limits of the [ordinary original civil jurisdiction]
of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay,
and where such Wills are made outside those limits, in
so far as they relate to immoveable property situat ed
within those limits.]”
33. While Section 212 deals with the right to intestate’s property,
Section 213 deals with the establishment of the right as ex ecutor or
legatee under a Will. In simple terms these two Rules ca n be stated as
follows:(i) without first obtaining letters of administration from a Court
of competent jurisdiction, no right to any property of a person other than
a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jaina, Indian Christian or Parsi,
who has died intestate, can be established in any court of justice; (ii) no
right as executor or legatee under a Will (other than a Will m ade by a
Muhammadan or Indian Christian) can be established in any Co urt of
justice unless probate of the Will or letters of administration with the Will
annexed, has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction.
34. But the second Rule stated above which is found in Section
213, is applicable only: (i) in the case of Wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist,
Sikh or Jaina, if those Wills are of the classes specifie d in Clauses (a)
and (b) of Section 57; and (ii) in the case of Wills made by any Parsi
dying after the commencement of the Amendment Act 16 of 1962, if
such Wills are made within the local limits of the ordinary original civil
jurisdiction of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and in
case such Wills have been made outside those limits, in so f ar as they
relate to immovable property situate within those limits.
35. A cumulative reading of Sections 57, 213 and 264 would show:
(i) that a person claiming to be an executor or legatee unde r a Will
cannot rely upon the Will, in any proceeding before a Court of justice,
unless he has obtained probate (if an executor has been appo inted) or
letters of administration with the Will annexed, if such a Will has been
executed by certain classes of persons; and (ii) that the jurisdiction to
grant probate or letters of administration vests only in c ourts located
within the towns of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay and the Courts in any
local area notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette.
36. Therefore, what follows is that: (i) unless the testator belongs
to any of the classes of persons specified in the Act; and (ii) unless the
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
Will is made or some of the properties covered by the Will are located,
within the local limits of a notified area, there is no nece ssity for an
executor or a legatee under a Will to seek probate or letters of
administration. In fact, the decision in Balbir Singh Wasu (supra) did
not take note of the bar under Section 264(2) when it opined in general
terms in Paragraph 5 of the judgment that “ We do not read Section
213 as prohibiting the executor for applying for probate as a matter
of prudence or convenience to the courts in other parts of the country
not covered by Section 213 ”.
37. By virtue of Section 213(2)(i) read with Clauses (a) and (b) of
Section 57, the mandatory requirement to seek probate or lett ers of
administration for establishing a right as executor or leg atee under a
Will, is applicable only to Wills made by a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina
within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jur isdiction of
certain High Courts and to Wills made outside those territories, to the
extent they cover immovable property situate within those t erritories.
Therefore, there is no prohibition for a person whose case falls outside
the purview of these provisions, from producing, relying upon and claiming
a right under a Will, in any proceeding instituted by others including the
other legal heirs for partition or other reliefs.
38. In the case on hand, the petitioner Ravinder Nath himse lf
proceeded (i) first to have mutation effected in the revenue records and
(ii) then to file a suit in O.S.No.72 of 2011 on the file of the Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Nainital, for a decree of permanent injunction, on the
basis of the very same last Will and Testament dated 06.04.2011 of his
father, without seeking letters of administration. He did not thi nk that
Section 213(1) was a bar for him to establish his right as a legatee under
the Will, without obtaining letters of administration.
39. After having done so, the petitioner in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016
chose to file Testamentary Case No.01 of 2019 after 8 year s of first
shooting a claim under the Will and that too after the vacation of the stay
of further proceedings in the partition suit by order dated 09.10 .2018.
Therefore, I cannot allow the petitioner in T.P (C) No. 970 of 2016 to
make this Court a fait accompli.
40. The partition suit, which is pending on the file of the District
Court, Saket is actually 8 years old, as it was instituted on the file of the
High Court of Delhi in September, 2012 and was transferred to the District
899
Court in 2016. The written statement in the said suit was filed by Major
Ravinder Nath way back in November, 2012, when the suit was pending
in the High Court of Delhi as C.S No.2745 of 2012. In Paragraph 8g of
the written statement, the petitioner has pleaded the exec ution of the
disputed Will. The true copy of the Will is stated to have been annexed
as D-1/5, to the written statement. Therefore, obviously Major Ravinder
Nath was convinced that there was no bar for him to establish his right
as a legatee under the will, even without first obta ining letters of
administration. Hence, his subsequent act of filing a testamentary case
before the High Court of Uttarakhand, is nothing but a ruse to take
advantage of the general proposition of law that probate p roceedings
are proceedings in rem and that they should have primacy. This argument
is available only to a person who is disabled by virtue of Section 213(1),
from relying upon a Will in any proceeding, without first obtaining probate/
letters of administration. Therefore, the legal contention raised on behalf
of the petitioner in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 that the partition suit should
follow the testamentary case, is liable to be rejected i n the facts and
circumstances of this case.
41. In fact, the petitioner in T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 is not eve n
helping himself by resorting to this. After having claimed way back in
November, 2012 that there was a Will, he chose to file the testamentary
proceedings only in January 2019, overlooking Article 137 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 and certain decisions of this Court. I am not going into those
details, as it may prejudice his case.
42. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Smt. Rukmani
Devi and Others vs. Narendra Lal Gupta 7, it was contended by Mr.
Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that by virtue of Proviso
(b) of Section 273 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, any lette rs of
administration granted by the District Court, Saket cannot have effect in
other States unless the value of the property affected by the grant and
located beyond the limits of the State, does not exceed Rs.10,000/-.
43. But this argument is one of convenience. Nothing prevented
the petitioner from filing the testamentary proceedings in the High Court
of Delhi by taking advantage of Proviso (a) of Section 273 and seeking
the withdrawal of the suit for partition from the District Court, Saket to
the High Court to be tried together. Section 273 reads as follows:
7 (1985) 1 SCC 144
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
“273. Conclusiveness of probate or letters of administration.—
Probate or letters of administration shall have effect over all
the property and estate, movable or immovable, of t he
deceased, throughout the State in which the same is or are
granted, and shall be conclusive as to the representative titl e
against all debtors of the deceased, and all persons h olding
property which belongs to him, and shall afford full indemnity
to all debtors, paying their debts and all persons deli vering
up such property to the person to whom such probate or letters
of administration have been granted:
Provided that probates and letters of administration granted—
(a) by a High Court, or
(b) by a District Judge, where the deceased at the time of his
death had a fixed place of abode situate within the jurisdiction
of such Judge, and such Judge certifies that the value of the
property and estate affected beyond the limits of t he State
does not exceed ten thousand rupees,
shall, unless otherwise directed by the grant, have like effe ct
throughout the other States
Therefore, the petitioner, taking advantage of the pendency of the
partition suit from 2012 to 2016, could have filed the testame ntary
proceeding in the High Court of Delhi itself and relied upon Proviso (a)
of section 273, instead of now relying upon Proviso (b) of Section 273.
44. Having dealt with the legal contention, let me now move on to
the factual basis on which transfer of the partition suit i s sought. It is
claimed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner
is a senior citizen suffering from a host of health issues. The attesters
are also not residents of Delhi. Therefore, he argued that a t least the
convenience of the parties may have to be taken into account.
45. But in these days of virtual hearings, the location of the parties
is hardly a matter of concern. In fact, an application in I.A.No.130939
of 2020 has been moved by the petitioner, seeking a direction to examine
one of the attesters either through video conferencing or through court
appointed commissioner, as he is 74 years of age, having a lot of medical
issues and has also tested positive for COVID-19.
901
46. The very fact that even according to the petitioner, the attester
can be examined through video conference or court a ppointed
commissioner would show that the place where the proceeding s are
pending, is immaterial.
47. The fact that 3 out of the surviving 5 children are citizens of
other countries residing out of India and that therefore they cannot have
any objection to the proceedings being tried in Uttarakhand, is not
acceptable. It would have been open to the petitioner to r aise such a
contention, had he chosen to make the first strike by filing the testamentary
proceedings in 2011 or 2012. He did not do so. Therefore, even on facts,
I find no ground to order the transfer of the partition suit to the District
Court, Nainital and hence, T.P (C) No. 970 of 2016 is liable to be dismissed.
48. In so far as the second transfer petition is concerned, t he
relief sought therein is to transfer the testamentary case pending in the
High Court of Uttarakhand to the District Court, Saket, Delhi. Since the
Will set up by the petitioner covers properties located both in Nainital
and Delhi, both these courts have concurrent jurisdiction. But in view of
Proviso (b) to Section 273, letters of administration granted by a District
Court cannot have validity in respect of a property located outs ide the
State, if its value exceeds Rs. 10,000/-. However, this prob lem can be
resolved by ordering the transfer of the testamentary case to t he High
Court of Delhi and ordering the transfer of the partition suit f rom the
District Court, Saket back to the High Court of Delhi.
49. Therefore, the Transfer Petitions are disposed of to the
following effect:-
(i) T.P (C) No.970 of 2016 is dismissed;
(ii) T.P (C) No.2779 of 2019 is allowed and the Testamentary
Case No.01 of 2019 pending on the file of the High Court
of Uttarakhand is ordered to be transferred to the file of
the High Court of Delhi;
(iii) The partition suit in C.S No. 126 of 2016 pending on the file
of the Additional District Court, Saket at Delhi shall stand
transferred to the High Court of Delhi and clubbed along
with the testamentary proceeding and taken up together
for disposal. Considering that the partition suit is about 8
years old, the High Court of Delhi may consider giving
RAVINDER NATH AGARWAL v. YOGENDER NATH AGARWAL
& ORS.
priority of listing. The parties are at liberty to m ove
applications for examination of the witnesses including the
attesters of the Will, either through Video Conference or
through Court appointed Commissioners and applications
for such reliefs may be considered by the High Court
favourably.
(iv) The parties shall bear their respective costs.
Divya Pandey Transfer petitions disposed of.