Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.

14. In our view, the present one is amongst those fittest c ases where the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have secured the ends of justice by closing the 1105 proceedings against the appellants. It is also surprising as to how and in what circumstances after moving an application under Sectio n 319 Cr.P.C., the prosecution continued to contest the c ase even after 26.09.2014 when the matter had already been comprom ised and compounded as against the main accused Gurmeet Singh. Appa rently, the parties were not able to correctly place the facts and material before the Trial Court or the High Court, which could have closed this matter then and there without proceeding any further. 15. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and also to secure the ends of justice. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis that inherent powers should be exercised in a given and deserving case where the Court is satisfied that exercise of such power would either prevent a buse of such power or such exercise would result in securing the ends of justice. In the case of S.W. Palanitkar and others. v. State of Bihar and another3. Shivraj V Patil, J. , in paragraph 27 of the report, has laid similar emphasis. The same is reproduced below: “Para 27: …….whereas while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to look at the object and purpos e for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Cour t to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the end s of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scop e and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementio ned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process fro m being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the ha nds of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inher ent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the jud icial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court und er Section 482 CrPC to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exerci se the powers with circumspection as stated above to really se rve the purpose and object for which they are conferred.” 3 (2002) 1 SCC 241 JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] 16. A seven-Judge Bench in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao vs State of Karnataka4, also laid down the same principles for use of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case where the Court was convinced that such exercise was necessary for whatever re ason in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Lahoti,J., speaking for himself and Bharucha, Quadri, Santosh Hegde, Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat,JJ., observed as follows in paragraph 21: “Para 21. “… In appropriate cases, inherent power o f the High Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order und er the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse o f the process of any court, or otherwise, to secure the e nds of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and conscio usly exercised, can take care of almost all the situatio ns where interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercise d their jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of first information report and investigation, and terminating criminal proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was c learly made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A .R. Antulay case referred to such power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was clear that even apart from Article 21, the courts c an take care of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matt ers or proceedings if they remain pending for too long and putting an end, by making appropriate orders, to further proceeding s when they are found to be oppressive and unwarranted.”” 17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab5 again summarized the legal position which emerged regarding powers of the High Court in quashing criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. R.M. Lodha, J. , (as he then 4 (2002) 4 SCC 578 5 (2012) 10 SCC 303 1107 was)speaking for the Bench, clearly observed in paragraph 61 of the report that criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing , particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties ha ve resolved their entire dispute. The relevant extract from paragraph 61 is reproduced below: “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise o f its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in acco rd with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (in) to prevent abuse of the proce ss of any court. In what cases power to quash the crimina l proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental deprav ity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittin gly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family a nd the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not pri vate in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in rel ation to the offences under special statutes like the Pre vention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public ser vants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide fo r any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving s uch offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingl y and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footi ng for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, part nership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matr imony JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wron g is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its Vi ew, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and b leak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accus ed to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustic e would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case des pite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it wou ld be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the cri minal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice , it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the Hig h Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the crim inal proceeding.” 18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others v. State Gujarat and others6 laid down the broad principles for exercising the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J., speaking for the bench, enumerated the principles in par agraph 16 and in sub paragraphs. The same are reproduced below: “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the H igh Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any cour t or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer n ew powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inher e in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the 6 (2017) 9 SCC 641 1109 offender and the victim is not the same as the invoc ation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Cri minal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proce eding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdict ion under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inher ent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (0) to secu re the ends of justice, or ) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or fir st information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revol ves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each cas e and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate d. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 48 2 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving me ntal depravity or offences such as murder, rape and daco ity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim o r the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a s erious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial i n such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. distinguished from serious offences, there ma y be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predomin ant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to qu ash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or s imilar JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parti es have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle s et out in propositions 16.8, and 16.9. above. Economic offenc es involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offend er is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act compla ined of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 19. From the above discussion on the settled legal principles, it is clear from the facts of the present case that there wa s a clear abuse of the process of the Court and further that the Court had a duty to secure the ends of justice. We say so for the following reasons: a) The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelmingly and predominatingly a civil flavour inasmuch as the complainant alleged that he had paid money to Gurmeet Singh, the main accused to get employment for his son abroad. If Gurmeet Singh failed the complainant could have filed a suit for recovery of the amount paid for not fulfilling the promise. b) Initially, the investigating officer and two superior offi cers of the economic wing has found that there is no substance in the complaint making out even a prima facie triable case and had therefore,recommended for closure. However, on the orders of the Senior Superintendent of Police, the FIR was registered and the matter was investigated. No criminal breach of trust was found and the charge sheet was 1111 submitted only against Gurmeet Singh under section 420 I.P.C. c) The complainant Nasib Singh had clearly deposed that he had paid Rs 4 lacs cash to Gurmeet Singh and had also given a cheque of Rs 2 lacs favouring Gurmeet Singh which he had encashed. d) During trial the present appellant as also the other co- accused Gurpreet Singh were summoned in April 2014invoking powers of Section 319 Cr.P.C., for being tried under Section 420 I.P.C. It may be noted that no specific allegations of cheating are made against these two accused as they were both settled abroad in Italy. e) The complainant Nasib Singh entered into a compromise with the main accused Gurmeet Singh which was filed before the learned Magistrate and the same was accepted vide order dated 26.09.2014 and the alleged offence being of financial transaction stood compounded. Proceedings against Gurmeet Singh were closed. f) Right from 2014, the present appellant and other c o-accused Gurpreet Singh who were in Italy were being summoned by the Court.The appellant was declared proclaimed offender. The appellant applied before the High Court challenging the order declaring him proclaimed offender and also filed a 482 Cr.P.C. petition for quashing of t he proceedings wherein, he also filed the compounding order of 26.09.2014. g) The High Court merely perused the FIR and noting the fact that the name of the appellant was mentioned in the FIR, declined to exercise the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 20. In our considered view, the High Court erred in firstly not considering the entire material on record and further in not appreciating the fact that the dispute, if any, was civil in nature and that the complainant had already settled his score with the main accused Gurmeet Singh against whom the proceedings have been closed as far back as 26.09.2014. In this scenario, there remains no justification to co ntinue with the proceedings against the appellant. JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] 21. For all the reasons recorded above on facts and on law b oth the present appeals deserve to be allowed. The impugned proce edings arising out of FIR No.179 dated 29.10.2009, PS Fatehgarh Sahib and all consequential proceedings stand quashed qua the appellant. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals allowed.