Commissioner of Police v. Raj Kumar

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. 1. Leave granted. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi (“the appellant”) is in appeal, aggrieved by a common judgment of the Delhi High Court by which the respondents (hereafter refe rred to as “candidates/applicants”) were directed to be considered for appointment to the post of Constable of Delhi Police. 2. An advertisement was issued in the year 2009, in viting applications from eligible candidates to fill up vacancies in the cadre of constable in the Delhi Police. It is not in dispute that th e respondent candidates, in their applications, disclosed that criminal cases had been instituted against them – as well as the outcome of those cases. Except in SLP(C) 18396/2014 where the applicant Deepa Tomar was faci ng trial, the criminal cases had ended in compromise. After due consideration of their candidature, and in terms of S.O. No.398/ 2010, the appellant referred their cases to a Standing Committee , to assess their suitability. In Deepa Tomar’s case, the consideration was deferred since she was facing trial in criminal proceedings wh ere she was charged with committing the offence of kidnapping under Section 364 IPC. By various orders, which were impugned in separate proceedings by the candidates, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) allowed the applications of the candidates, upholding their pleas, and quashing the orders of the Screening Committees. All the orders of the CAT were impugned by the appellant before the High Court. They were dealt with and considered by the common impugned order, which rejected the appellant’s petitions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. The main argument by the candidates was that having rega rd to the terms of the applicable Standing Order as well as t he decisions of this Court, the rejection of their candidature was u nsustainable because of non-application of mind and further the orders were made in a mechanical manner. By the impugned order, the Division B ench allowed the writ petitions and quashed the rejection of the candidatures of the respondents. 4. It is urged by the Additional Solicitor General (ASG), Ms. Madhavi Divan, appearing on behalf of the appellan t that the impugned judgment is erroneous inasmuch as the Division Bench lost sight of the fact that the Standing Orders could not be so read as 9 compelling the authorities to select applicants whose conduct was not satisfactory in the opinion of the Screening Committee. The appellant relies upon the rulings of this Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr v Mehar Singh 1as well as the observations of the three- Judge Bench in the Court’s judgment in Avtar Singh v. UOI &Ors 2. 5. The appellant urges that in all the four cases, the candi dates faced criminal proceedings – in most of them, even cha rges were framed after which the cases against them ended in a comp romise. In the case of Ms. Deepa Tomar, the candidate was not only accused but also charged for committing the offence of kidnapping. She stood trial but was acquitted on the ground of insufficient evid ence. It was submitted that having regard to the nature of the offenc es that the candidates were alleged to have committed and the outcome of the cases, the authorities were justified in concluding that they were unsuitable for employment in the concerned post, i.e. as Constables of Police. 6. It was argued by Mr. Singhal appearing on behalf of two candidates, Shiv Singh [SLP(C) 13282/2014] and Prem Singh Choudhary [SLP(C) 18396/2014] that the Screening Committee deal t with their cases in a perfunctory manner and did not appreci ate the entirety of facts. With respect to the respondent Shiv Singh, it was urged that though in the first information report (FIR), allegations could have led to grave offences, including charge under Section 353 IPC, a s a matter of fact the charges framed were not in relation to these offences. Ultimately, the alleged victims had no difficulty i n entering into compromise with the candidate, which led to compoun ding of the offences that he was said to have committed. It was submit ted that in the case of Prem Singh Choudhary/Respondent too, it could not be said that the criminal charges (i.e., of committing offences under Sections 143/343/341 IPC) were either grave or involved moral turpitude. In this case too, the accused/candidate was not convicted; and a compromi se was entered into with the informant. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent/candidates relied upon the observations of the High Court that in cases involving alle gations of commission of offences under Section 323 IPC, especially wher e the 1 (2013) 7 SCC 685 2 (2016) 8 SCC 471 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] offenders were youth from rural backgrounds, it cannot be said that the conduct involved moral turpitude and that the Courts should be alive to the realities that in such areas, brawls and fights are common place. It was also emphasized that there is a tendency of exaggeratin g on the part of the informants whenever such incidents occur, to falsify the facts and implicate the offenders. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Deepa Tomar drew the attention of the court to the findings recorded b y the trial court. It was submitted that an overall reading of the facts narrated by the trial court would show that the relationship between the candidate and her husband Joginder was strained and that therefore, she and her family members were accused of having abducted him; he was reported missing. Learned counsel submitted that having regard to the evidence led by the prosecution which was considered by the concerned cour t of competent jurisdiction, the candidate was exonerated of the offences. These had to be duly considered and appropriate weight given, t o the findings of such court by the Screening Committee. Learned couns el submitted that the Screening Committee did not apply its m ind and merely went by the label, i.e. the seriousness of the offence to hold the candidate Deepa Tomar unsuitable – an entirely arbitrary outcome. Analysis and Conclusions 9. For the sake of clarity, a tabular chart, indica ting the involvement of each of the respondent, in respect of various offenc es, the course of the trials, their outcome, etc, is set out bel ow: S. Name of Case No. FIR Offence Remarks No. writ petitioner candidate 1 Raj SLP(C.) No. FIR No. 283/07, Cognizance Acquitted Kumar 13285/2014 dated taken under by Order 14.10.2007. sec. 147, dated under Sections 451, 323, 22.05.2008 143, 451, 323, 336 IPC under 336, 382 IPC Sections 147 and 336 as charges were not proved. Compromised charges under Sections 451 and 323. 11 2. Shiv SLP(C.) No. FIR No. Cognizance Acquitted Singh 13282/2014 410/2009 taken under by order Dated sec. under dated 18.10.2009 Sections 01.12.2019; under Sections 323, 341, acquitted 323, 341, 325, 325, 34 IPC under Sections 34 IPC. 323, 341, 325, 34 IPC based on the compromise deed dated 01.12.2019. 3. Deepa SLP(C.) No. FIR dated Cognizance Acquitted by Tomar 18397/2014 26.05.2002 taken under order dated under Sections Sections 364, 04.05.2011 364, 506, 120 120 B IPC (pg.67- 106). IPC Acquitted under Sections 120B,364 IPC as the prosecution was not able to prove the charges beyond the doubt. Therefore, Court held that the accused as entitled to the benefit of doubt. 4 Prem SLP(C.) No. FIR No. Cognizance Acquitted by Singh 18396/2014 38/2007 Under order dated Choudhary dated Sections 04.12.2009 14.02.2007 323, 341, under Sections under Sections 325, 34 323, 341, 143, 341, 323 IPC 325, 34 IPC IPC on the basis of compromise with the informant. 10. Standing order No.398/2010, which is relevant f or an appropriate decision in this case, reads as follows: “STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010 POLICY FOR DECIDING CASES OF CANDIDATES PROVISIONALLY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] SELECTED IN DELHI POLICE INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR ACQUITTED). During the recruitments made in Delhi Police, several ca ses come to light where candidates conceal the fact of their involvement in criminal cases in the application Fo rm/ Attestation Form in the hope that it may not come t o light and disclosure by them at the beginning of the recr uitment process itself may debar them from participating in the various recruitment tests. Also the appointment if he/she has been acquitted but not honourably. In order to formulate a comprehensive policy, the fo llowing rules shall be applicable for all the recruitments co nducted by Delhi Police:- 1). xxx xxxxxx 2). xxx xxxxxx 3). If a candidate had disclosed his/her involvemen t and/or arrest in criminal cases, complaint case, preventiv e proceedings etc. and the case is pending investigat ion or pending trial, the candidature will be kept in abey ance till the final decision of the case. After the court’ ju dgment, if the candidate is acquitted or discharged, the case will be referred to the Screening Committee of the PHQ compr ising of Special Commissioner of Police/Administration, J oint Commissioner of Police/Headquarters and Joint Commissioner of Police/Vigilance to assess his/her suit ability for appointment in Delhi Police. 4) If a candidate had disclosed his/her involvement in criminal case, complaint case, preventive proceedin gs etc. both in the application form as well as in the attestation f orm but was acquitted or discharged by the court, his/h er case will be referred to the Screening Committee of PHQ to ass ess his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police. 5). xxx xxxxxx 6). Such candidates against whom charge-sheet in an y criminal case has been filed in the court and the c harges fall in the category of serious offences or moral tu rpitude, 13 though later acquitted or acquitted by extending be nefit of doubt or the witnesses have turned hostile due to f ear of reprisal by the accused person, he/she will generall y not be considered suitable for government service. However , all such cases will be judged by the Screening Committe e of PHQ to assess their suitability for the government job. The details of criminal cases which involve moral turpitud e may kindly be perused at Annexure ‘A’. 7) Such cases in which a candidate had faced trial in any criminal case which does not fall in the category o f moral turpitude and is subsequently acquitted by the court and he/ she discloses about the same in both application form as well as attestation form will be judged by the Screening Committee to decide about his/her suitability for t he government job. 8) xxx xxxxxx 9). If any candidate is discharged by extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 this will also not be viewed adversely by the department for his/her suitability for government service.” 11. Annexure A to the above policy which refers to offence s involving moral turpitude is extracted below: “1. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code) 2. Offences against the State (Sections 121 - 130, Indian Penal Code) 3. Offences relating to Army, Navy and Air Force (Sections 131-134, Indian Penal Code) 4. Offence against Public Tranquility (Section 153-A & 153-B, Indian Penal Code). 5. False evidence and offences against Public Justic e (Sections 193-216A, Indian Penal Code) 6. Offences relating to coin and government stamps (Section 231-263A, Indian Penal Code). COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 7. Offences relating to Religion (Section 295-297, Indian Penal Code) 8. Offences affecting Human Body (Sections 302-304, 304B, 305-308, 311-317, 325-333, 335, 347, 348, 354, 363-373, 376-376-A, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D, 377, Indian Penal Code) 9. Offences against Property (Section 379-462, Indian Penal Code) 10. Offences relating to Documents and Property Marks (Section 465-489, Indian Penal Code) 11. Offences relating to Marriage and Dowry Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code)” 12. Mehar Singh noted that Clause 3 of the Standing Order, which refers to the Screening Committee, comprises of seni or police officers. This committee assesses candidates’ (previously implicated for an offence, but against whom charges are terminated, for any reason), suitability for appointment. Clause 6 prescribes that ca ndidates who faced charges involving serious offences or offences involving m oral turpitude and who are later acquitted giving benefit of doubt or because the witnesses turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person shall not generally be considered suitable for government service. Each of such cases is to be considered by the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. 13. It is evident from a reading of the applicable Standing Order along with Annexure-A that in relation to certain offences, acquittal or exoneration of an accused candidate, per se would not entitle her or him to consideration. In this regard, in relation to offences listed in Annexure A inter alia, those who are accused of having committed offences under Sections 325-333; 363-373 and 379-462; would fall within the mischief of Clause 6. Upon an overall analysis of the Standing Order, this Court is of the opinion that an acquittal or discharge in a criminal proceeding would not per se enable the candidate to argue that the authorities can be compelled to select and appoint her or him. This Court, in this regard, held inter alia as follows: 15 “The Screening Committee will be within its rights to canc el the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the con- duct of t he prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses tu rning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Scr eening Committee who will be able to judge whether the acqu itted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar acti vities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed , to the post in a police force.” 14. This Court has, in the past, on several occasions, deal t with questions which are similar, if not entirely identical to what is involved in the present case, to wit, whether in the event of ex oneration or acquittal of an applicant/candidate arrayed as accus ed of various offences is a decisive factor for consideration of his or he r suitability. Several judgments in the past had appeared to draw a distinction between “clean” acquittal of accused individuals on the one h and and those acquitted or exonerated on account of benefit of doubt. Similarly, where candidates were charged with grave offences involving mor al turpitude as well as larger outcomes were examined. Another area which engaged this Court’s attention was the effect of non-dis closure of pending criminal cases. Matters came to a head when all these issues were referred to authoritative decision by a larger three j udge Bench. In Avtar Singh (supra), the three-judge bench, after detailed discussion of the various circumstances that arose when public aut horities are called upon to deal with such cases, recorded its conclusions in the following manner: “38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to e xplain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of a foresaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1 Information given to the employer by a candida te as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2 While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false informati on, the employer may take notice of special circumstances o f the case, if any, while giving such information.” COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 15. There are subsequent judgments too in this regard which have followed the ruling in Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors 3; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors v. Pradeep Kumar & Anr 4 and Anil Bhardwaj v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh 5. Before proceeding to analyze the facts in each appeal, it would also be useful to reproduce the relevant extract of this Court’s ruling in Mehr Singh (supra) where it was held as follows: “The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confi dence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidat e wish- ing to join the police force must be a person of ut most rectitude. He must have im- peccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit i n this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the cri minal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have t o be examined to see whether he has been completely exone rated in the case because even a possibility of his takin g to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Or- der, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screeni ng Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the i mage of the police force is tar- nished. Instances of po lice personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. T he reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the import ance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee c reated by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are lik ely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At t he same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importan ce of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with even hand.” 16. Turning now, to the individual facts of each cas e, the candidate in the Civil Appeal arising from SLP(C) 13285/2014 (Raj 3 (2015) 2 SCC 377 4 (2018) 1 SCC 797 5 (2020) SCC Online (SC) 832 17 Kumar), is alleged to have committed offences under Sections 143/323/ 336/451 IPC along with other individuals. The candidate is alle ged to have committed trespass along with others into the house of the complainant, armed with lathis and jailis, snatched the jewellery of the complainant’s brother’s daughter-in-law. According to the allegations, there was a scuffle resulting in injuries. Apparently, the existence of criminal charges had been disclosed by the candidate whi ch led to rejection of the case. The order of rejection of candidature 6 issued by the Screening Committee noted that the candidate’s explanati on was in regard to an antecedent family dispute between his fami ly and that of the informant. The order noted that a chargesheet was fil ed in the court and cognizance was taken. Later, during the pendency of tria l, both parties compromised the case so that it could be compounded under Section 451/323 IPC with the approval of the Court a nd that the candidate was later acquitted by order dated 22.05.2008 in the absence of adequate evidence for charges under Section 147/336. 17. The impugned order proceeds on the footing that the complainant was found to be suffering from a simple hurt. It also held that Raj Kumar was aged 20 years when the incident occurred. The Division Bench was of the opinion that having regard to thes e facts, the Screening Committee approached this task in a mechanical manner and rejected Raj Kumar’s candidature. 18. In the opinion of this Court, the conclusions recorded in regard to Raj Kumar are unsustainable. The Screening Commi ttee went through the case records and noted that a compromise was record ed with the approval of the Court with respect to two offences whereas in the graver offences, the candidate stood trial but was ac quitted on account as there was no sufficient evidence and tha t “material witnesses” did not support the prosecution story. In the opinion of this Court, that the compromise recorded in respect of the off ences, that were compounded (and the acquittal for lack of evidence) is apparently so on account of material witnesses not appearing or turning hostile, was a relevant factor that the Screening Committee co uld and did consider. In these circumstances, the conclusions of the High Court cannot be supported. 19. Shiv Singh, respondent, in another case was accuse d of committing offences punishable under Sections 323, 341, 325, 34 IPC. 6 dated 22.03.2011 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] A charge sheet was filed before the trail court on 12.11.2009. The court also recorded that the offences were prima facie made out against the accused persons- including the respondent Shiv S ingh. Later, however, a compromise was arrived at between the accuse d and the complainant, and an order of composition was issued on 01.12.2009, by the trial court. The Screening committee considered the charge sheet and the order of the trial court, and having regard to the nat ure of offences involved, was of the view that the candidate was not suitable, because of his propensity to indulge in such behavior without fea r of law. The High Court faulted the Screening Committee’s orde r, as a mechanical exercise of power, and reasoned that no charge of assaulting the modesty of a woman was made against the can didate and that the charge of theft was unsubstantiated. The court w as also of the opinion that the candidate was young. 20. This court is unable to agree with the impugned order. Here, there is no dispute that a charge sheet was filed in cour t, in respect of various offences, including Section 325. The respondent c andidate apparently thereafter approached the informants, and compromised the dispute. The approach of the High Court, in considering if evidenc e existed (in support of criminal charges), its credibility, especially after a charge sheet was filed, and on the basis of its apprec iation of those materials, without the benefit of all the relevant records and evidence in judicial review, cannot be sustained. 21. In the case of Prem Singh Choudhary, (the respondent in SLP (C) No 4304/2013) an FIR was registered in a police station at District Alwar, alleging that he committed offences punishable under Sections 143/323/341 IPC. He and four others were named by the complainant, Mukesh for forming an unlawful assembly; he also alleg ed that the accused were carrying lathis and jeli (a farm imple ment) and the accused, along with others assaulted him. The matter was compromised; consequently, the court recorded acquittal. The Screening Comm ittee took note of these facts; the appointment order previously issued, w as consequently withdrawn. The order was quashed by the CAT. The High Court, commented that the accused was not charged under Section 325 IPC; that he was young, and aged 22 years; that the informa nt had not suffered serious injuries. After noting that one of the off ences the candidate was charged with was Section 325, the High Court stated “that no material or evidence whatsoever was presented wherefrom 19 it could be gathered that the complainant suffered grievous injuries.” It was held that in the light of the materials before the police, the informant had given an exaggerated account, of the incident, which the Screening Committee rejected, mechanically. 22. Again, in Prem Singh Chaudhary’s case, this court is of the opinion that the scrutiny of the materials, by the High Court, was as if it was sitting in appeal over the decision of the Screening Committee. That body had the benefit of the overall record of the candidate, in the context of considering his or her suitability. Its conclusions should not have been brushed aside, on the ground that it showed mechanica l application of mind, or that the materials did not show involvement in a grave or serious offence. 23. Deepa Tomar is the last candidate in the present batc h of appeals. She was accused along with her father in CM No. 19 8/2003 for an offence punishable under Sections 120-B/364 IPC. Both w ere accused of having abducted her husband, Jitender Singh. After facing trial, both accused were acquitted, by judgment dated May 0 4, 2011. The screening committee was of the view that the acquittal was by granting benefit of doubt, and that the candidate w as unfit for appointment as a Constable (Female) in the Delhi Police b ecause she was accused of having committed a heinous crime i.e. of abduc tion and that the victim, her husband (Jitender) was still untra ceable. 24. While quashing the decision of the Screening Committee, the High Court reasoned that the incident was of 2001; Jitender’s fath er complained in 2002 and voiced his suspicion against the candidate and her father. The High Court also observed: “meaningfully read, the testimony of Jitender’s fam ily members was suggestive of the fact that Deepa and Jit ender were not having a strained relationship but because of problems in the house of her in-laws Deepa had to leave for her parental house and stealthily Jitender used to visit Deepa or so his parents suspected. If this be so it would no t stand to any logic or reason for Deepa and her parents to have contrived to abduct Jitender and make his disappear . Regretfully, the Screening Committee has gone by th e label of the offence and not the facts on which Deepa and her father were acquitted. The Screening Committee has also overlooked the fact that in her complaint lodged un der COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] Section 498-A/406 IPC Deepa has made no accusation against her husband.” 25. In the case of Deepa Tomar, the intensive factual s crutiny which led the impugned order to conclude that the decisi on of the screening committee is not sustainable, is impermissible under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is evident from the screening committee’s order, that it was aware of the judgment, as well as the materials before the trial court. Significantly, before the candidature was cancelled, the Deepa was issued with a show cause notice and she duly respon ded to it. The committee had the benefit of considering that, as well as her overall record, when it drew its conclusions. The fact apprec iation by the High Court, and the intensive scrutiny of the evidence, in the opinion of this court to conclude that Deepa could not have been implicated in the offence, based on inferences drawn under Articl e 226 of the Constitution, is an exercise of overreach of judicial review pr ocess. 26. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guess the suitability of a candidate for any public office or post. Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the materials), or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny on why a candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts’ decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive power of determining suitability of an ind ividual for appointment. This was emphasized by this court, in M.V. Thimmaiah v. Union Public Service Commission 7 held as follows: “21. Now, comes the question with regard to the sel ection of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the st atutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an Appellate Author ity to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a cour t of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates no r is the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion... xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 7 (2008) 2 SCC 119 21 30. We fail to understand how the Tribunal can sit as an Appellate Authority to call for the personal record s and constitute Selection Committee to undertake this exercise. This power is not given to the Tribunal and it should be clearly understood that the assessment of the Selection Com mittee is not subject to appeal either before the Tribunal o r by the courts. One has to give credit to the Selection Committee for making their assessment and it is not subject to ap peal. Taking the overall view of ACRs of the candidates, on e may be held to be very good and another may be held to be good. If this type of interference is permitted then it would vi rtually amount that the Tribunals and the High Courts have started sitting as Selection Committee or act as an Appella te Authority over the selection.” 27. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v Dr. B.S. Mahajan 8 this court held that “12. ... it is not the function of the court to hea r appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinise the relative merits of the candidates. W hether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decide d by the duly constituted Selection Committee which h as the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. ... in the present case the University had co nstituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant sta tutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant mat erial before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so ma de and in setting it aside on the ground of the so-called comparati ve merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.” 28. Again, in Union Public Service Commission v. M. Sathiya Priya9 it was iterated that “The question as to how the categories are assessed in lig ht of the relevant records and as to what norms apply in making the assessment, is exclusively to be determined by the 8 (1990) 1 SCC 305 9 (2018) 15 SCC 796 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] Selection Committee. Since the jurisdiction to make sel ection as per law is vested in the Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee members have got expertise in the matte r, it is not open for the courts generally to interfer e in such matters except in cases where the process of assess ment is vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides o r arbitrariness. It is not the function of the court to hear the matters before it treating them as appeals over the deci sions of the Selection Committee and to scrutinise the relative m erit of the candidates. The question as to whether a can didate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decid ed by the duly constituted expert body i.e. the Selection Comm ittee.” 29. Public service - like any other, pre-supposes that th e state employer has an element of latitude or choice on who should enter i ts service. Norms, based on principles, govern essential aspe cts such as qualification, experience, age, number of attempts p ermitted to a candidate, etc. These, broadly constitute eligibility conditions required of each candidate or applicant aspiring to enter public service. Judicial review, under the Constitution, is permissible to ensure that those norms are fair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in a non-dis criminatory manner. However, suitability is entirely different; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, is greatest, as long as the proces s of decision making is neither illegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides. 30. The High Court’s approach, evident from its observatio ns about the youth and age of the candidates, appears to hint at the general acceptability of behaviour which involves petty crime or misdemeanour. The impugned order indicates a broad view, that such misdem eanour should not be taken seriously, given the age of the youth and the rural setting. This court is of opinion that such generalizat ions, leading to condonation of the offender’s conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided. Certain types of off ences, like molestation of women, or trespass and beating up, assault, causing hurt or grievous hurt, (with or without use of weapons), of victims, in rural settings, can also be indicative of caste or hierarchy-base d behaviour. Each case is to be scrutinized by the concerned public employer, through its designated officials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. 23 31. For the foregoing reasons, this court hereby sets aside the common impugned judgment and the orders of the CAT, quashing the orders issued by the appellant, declining appointment to the respondent candidates. The appeals are accordingly allowed, without any order on costs. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals allowed. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. RAJ KUMAR [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]